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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

VOLUME XIV

Jain Philosophy (Part II)

Edited by
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MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS
PRIVATE LIMITED • DELHI

First Edition: Delhi, 2013

ISBN: 978-81-208-3615-0

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
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236, 9th Main III Block, Jayanagar, Bangaluru 560 011
Sanas Plaza, 1302 Baji Rao Road, Pune 411 002
8 Camac Street, Kolkata 700 017
Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004
Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

Printed in India

by RP Jain at NAB Printing Unit,
A-44, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi–110028
and published by JP Jain for Motilal Banarsidass Publishers (P) Ltd,
41 U.A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi-110007

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

Some Remarks on the *Naya* Method[1]

By Piotr Balcerowicz

The most significant and intriguing Jaina contribution to the Indian philosophical heritage is beyond doubt the theory of the multiple aspects of reality (*anekāṇtavāda*), which is developed into a method of four standpoints (*nikṣepa*, *nyāsa*), of sevenfold modal description (*saptabhaṅgī, syādvāda*), and the doctrine of viewpoints (*naya*), i.e., the sevenfold method of conditionally valid predications. At the same time no other Jaina concept has fanned so much controversy as the idea that one and the same sentence can be either true or false, which seems implied by the admission of the reality of these multiple aspects...

An ontological assumption underlying the theory of the multiple aspects of reality in general and the doctrine of viewpoints in particular consists in a belief which is supposed to defy all simplistic concepts of the real ranging from monism and eternalism (*advaita*) to pluralism and momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*). In other words, the world forms a multifaceted structure, every part of which enters into specific relations and interdependencies with other parts of the whole. Its make-up is complex enough to allow for a vast range of statements that can be asserted from various standpoints. The ontological framework is provided by the concept of substance (*dravya*), which is characterized simultaneously by origination, continued existence and annihilation, insofar as it is endowed with

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[1]The following Introduction consists of an edited version of Piotr Balcerowicz's article contained in *Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion* (ed. Piotr Balcerowicz) (Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi 2003, pp. 37-68. In editing the article some stylistic emendations have been exercised by the General Editor (Potter), and footnotes have been omitted to make the message of the text easier to understand..

qualities (*guṇa*) and transient modes (*paryāya*) as well as with directly experienced though verbally inexpressible momentary occurrences. Any truth-conducive analysis which is supposed to map the ontological structure onto an epistemological-conceptual framework should therefore take into account the individual ontological context and accompanying circumstances of any phenomenon or entity under examination.

This ontological assumption requires that truth should only be *complete* truth, whereas *incomplete* truth would be but a misnomer for utter falsehood. However, limitations of practical dealings and verbal communication by necessity abstract any given thing or facet of reality from *all* its temporal, spatial, causal and other relations, and emphasize but one aspect, relevant to a given moment.

Due to the infinite manifoldness of interdependencies of aspects of the world, including various temporal and spatial perspectives as well as either universal or particular reference, a vast range of properties, each of them being equally justified, can be predicated of a given entity with equal right. And that will lead eventually to seeming contradictions. The Jainas maintain that such contradictions that ensue from unconditional assertions standing in opposition to one another can be resolved when individual points of reference for each and every assertion are taken into consideration.

Given the Jains' ontological assumptions, description of the epistemological level becomes complex: each of such dichotomizing categories as big/small, good/bad, existent/nonexistent, true/false, etc. that are mutually related, when dissociated from its opposite, is false. In other words, each automatically entails its opposite, but the model is not dialectical, but rather assumes that there are multiple standpoints from which each category may be pertinent. To correlate such individual, partial standpoints is the task of the Jaina method of *syādvāda*, which systematizes possible arrangements of seemingly contradictory statements.

Interestingly enough, it is the model of perspectives (*naya*) which the Jainas use to interpret and incorporate various philosophical theories or world views into a consistent holistic framework, instead of the doctrine of seven-fold modal description (*saptabhaṅgī, syādvāda*). Numerous Jaina authors such as Akalaṅka, Siddhasena Divākara, Siddhasena Mahāmati, and Malliṣeṇa correlated particular theories and views represented by particular thinkers and philosophical schools *only* under the *naya* scheme.

On the other hand, the doctrine of seven-fold modal description (*saptabhaṅgī*) is primarily discussed in three contexts: that of the triple nature of reality, which is believed to consist of origination, continuation and decay, that of the relation between the universal and the particular, and that of the relationship between a substance and its properties/modes. Essentially, all the examples of the application of the doctrine of seven-fold modal description pertain to one and the same problem: how to relate the whole and its parts, the problem entailed by the question of the relation between permanence and change...

Due to multifaceted circumstances, any assertoric sentence can only be relatively true: "Therefore all viewpoints with no exceptions are false views [when strictly] related to their respective spheres (*pakṣa*); however, [when understood] as mutually dependent, they become [viewpoints] conducive to truth". (Siddhasena Divākara, *Sanmatiprakaraṇa* 1.21) This relativity, however, is not tantamount to professing skepticism, and the Jainas are quite explicit about that.

The possibility of *attaining* truth is ensured jointly by the concept of comprehensive and consistence-based cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) and partial, aspect-qualified viewpoints as instrument of detailed examination. However, the existence of truth *as such* and the possibility that it can become the content (*viṣaya*) of cognition is eventually warranted, according to Jaina belief, by omniscience (*kevalajñāna*). The latter

assumption led to such paradoxical contentions as that ultimately truth consists of all false statements taken together: "[Let there be] prosperity to Jina's words that are made of an amassment of false views, that are conducive to immortality, that are venerable and lead to the salvific happiness." (*Sanmatiprakaraṇa* 3.69)

This relativity of every predication and the impossibility of uttering an unconditionally valid statement about reality could theoretically lead to two more–beside skepticism–different approaches. On the one hand, it could be [taken as] a reason good enough to dispense with the soundness of discursive thinking altogether and, in this way, it would embrace the negative approach of Nāgārjuna and be reflected in the structure of the tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*). The dependent character of every notion and conceptual representation, the ineffable and complex structuring of reality (*prapāñca*), as it is reflected in the rational and dichotomizing mind, inescapably involves real contradictions (*virodha*) and antinomies (*prasaṅga*). On the other hand, the result could as well be an all-inclusive, positive approach. Two contradictory conclusions derived from one and the same thesis do not have to falsify the initial thesis, e.g., "things arise from a cause" and "things do not arise from a cause" do not have to unconditionally negate discourse about causality; "there is motion" and "there is no motion"; "there is time", "there is a part and a whole", etc. Such seemingly contradictory conclusions should make us only perceptive of the fact that they may--and indeed do--pertain to different contexts. This would be the Jaina approach.

Despite this, the Jaina theory of *anekāntavāda* has frequently, and undeservedly, been blamed with disregarding the law of excluded middle or the law of non-contradiction in a stronger or weaker sense. However, one and the same sentence (P), when negated conditionally (i.e. with the particle "*syāt*"–"from a certain point of view"), yields not a contradictory statement (~P) in the sense that when combined with the

initial statement P is an application of the law of excluded middle (*pv~p*), but refers to a different context, viz., its point of reference of the two conjuncts is different.

Jaina realism has it that even images in a dream are not purely figments of our conceptualization but have some kind of objective basis and rational justification. By the same token, our statements pertaining to reality are claimed by the Jainas to possess some truth; however, the infinity of ontological correlations can in no way be reflected in our language due to it inherent limitations (*avadhāraṇa*). That is why a range of utterances articulated about one and the same object, seemingly standing in contradiction to each other, may be consistent taking its various contexts and ramifications into consideration.

The way we deal with cognized objects is reflected in the Jaina scheme of *nayas*, and this takes place on the conceptual (*svādhigama, jñānātmaka*), verbal (*parādhigama*), *vacanātmaka*) and practical (*vyavahāra*) level, since all these three are interconnected. A set of conditionally valid viewpoints was not only considered an ancillary theoretical device, subordinate to the theory of multiplicity of reality, and was supposed to corroborate the latter, but from the very beginning of Jaina epistemology it coexisted with cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) as an alternative epistemic instrument..."All states of [all] substances that are comprehended by means of all cognitive criteria are [equally] capable of being predicated of by means of all [conditionally valid] viewpoints in a detailed manner." (*Uttarādhyāyanasūtra* 28.24)

Here we clearly find a conviction that any given utterance functions within its given individual context and it is only within the confines delineated by this context that the sentence retains its veracity. The viewpoints (*naya*) organize the world of things of our practical dealings, and within their sphere of practical application they help us determine the truth-value of a proposition by way of its contextualization within a given

universe of conceivable points of reference. They are not supposed to contribute anything new to our knowledge, as Akalaṅka declares (at *Tattvārthikavārttika* on I.6): "Application of viewpoints with regard to things cognized by means of cognitive criteria is the basis of every day practice." Accordingly, the *nayas* only *selectively* (*vikalādeśa*) arrange comprehensive data material already acquired.

Thus *pramāṇas* serve as criteria of validity and reliability of our cognitions and are expected to ensure the acquisition of truth, whereas the viewpoints are an attempt to contextualize any given utterance and determine in which sense it asserts truth.

The assumption of the manifold character of reality in which things relate to each other by an infinite number of relations finds its expression in the conviction that every situation can be viewed from infinite angles as well as reflected in our language: infinity of interrelations corresponds to a theoretically infinite number of predications, each retaining its validity only conditionally, viz. restricted to its particular perspective.

Usually, but not always, conditionally valid predications are divided into two major classes: substantial (*dravyāstikanaya*) or substance-expressive (*dravyārthikanaya*) and attributive (*paryāyāstikanaya*) or a-expressive (*paryāyārthikanaya*). Whereas the former emphasizes continuity and essential identity of evolving things, the latter predominantly deals with the mutable character of phenomena and their transient manifestations and accentuates the attributive side of reality. Most commonly these two classes of conditionally valid viewpoints are further subdivided into the seven following types:

substance-expressive (*dravyārthika*)
- 1. comprehensive (*naigama*)
- 2. collective (*saṃgraha*)
- 3. empirical (*vyavahāra*)

mode-expressive (*paryāyārthika*)
- 4. immediate (*ṛjusūtra*)
- 5. verbal (*śabda*)
- 6. etymological (*samabhirūḍha*)
- 7. factual (*evambhūta, itthambhāva*)

This scheme, found also in Akalaṅka's *Rājavārttika*, is not universally followed in Jaina literature. Further, we find the divisions of *dravyārthikanaya* and *paryāyārthikanaya* neither in the canonical works such as *Anuyoga* or *Sthānāṅga*, nor in such relatively later treatises as *Tattvārthasūtrasūtra* and *-Bhāṣya*, *Nyāyāvatāra* or its *Vivṛti*.

Nyāyāvatāravivṛti 29 classifies the seven viewpoints into two main divisions slightly differently:

object-bound, operating by means of object (*arthadvāreṇa [pravṛtta]*)
- 1. comprehensive (*naigama*)
- 2. collective (*saṃgraha*)
- 3. empirical (*vyavahāra*)
- 4. immediate (*ṛjusūtra*)

speech-bound, operating by means of speech (*śabdadvāreṇa [pravṛtta)*
- 5. verbal (*śabda*)
- 6. etymological (*samabhirūḍha*)
- 7. factual (*evaṃbhūta*)

Let us have a closer look at the character of each of the viewpoints in order to examine the exact relationship between them.

The comprehensive viewpoint (*naigamanaya*) grasps a given phenomenon in a most general way and takes recourse to a possibly most extensive, all-inclusive context, which is referred to by a particular utterance. From the perspective of the comprehensive viewpoint, what is taken into account is a complex of meanings and connotations evoked by an utterance,

irrespective of either distinctive features of individuals or of constitutive characteristics representative of a given class. "Speech elements that are expressed in inhabited localities (sc. colloquially) [have] their meaning; and the comprehension of [such a] meaning of speech elements [is what] the comprehensive viewpoint, which grasps collectively partial [denotations of a speech element, consists in]. (*Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* 1.35) Clearly, what is meant here is a colloquial, unreflected usage of an unspecified reference which comprises *indiscriminately* both the particular and the universal: "When one says 'pot' what [is meant] is this particular substance (sc. thing) produced by the effort [of a pot-maker], with a rounded, elongated neck [and] a rounded edge at the top [as well as] with a spherical container below, [which is] suited for fetching and carrying water etc., [and has been] finished off by secondary operations [like baking]. [Accordingly,] the comprehensive viewpoint [consists in] comprehension without [making] any distinction between such an individual [thing] furnished with particular features or [things] belonging to its class". (ibid.)

The collective viewpoint (*saṃgrahanaya*) pertains cumulatively to a whole class of individuals, which constitutes the denotation of a given utterance, and thereby it forms a basis for any taxonomy. In fact, Umāsvāti defines it briefly as "the synthesizing of one facet out of all [possible facets] of things" (ibid.) and further explicates: "The collective viewpoint [consists in] the comprehension of [,say,] present, past and future pots, distinguished by the name and other [standpoints, whether with regard to one [individual] or to many [things belonging to its class]."(ibid.)... In other words, the scope of the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigamanaya*) is narrowed down by excluding the particular and laying stress on the universal alone.

When only a particular specimen of the whole class of objects–that has previously been defined from the perspective of the collective viewpoint–is selected for practical purposes and directly referred to by an utterance, or becomes an object of one's own action, we have an instance of the empirical viewpoint (*vyavahāranaya*). It is especially in early analyses that the commonplace aspect (*laukika*) and the conventional practice prevalent among people (*lokopacāra*) is said to be emphasized in this case. Clearly, the point of reference is further limited to such individual things, or elements of a class, that can become directly subject to practical activity. This clearly nominalist perspective reflects an aspect of speech commonly encountered in linguistic usage: most frequently we refer to particular things, viz. to individuals, by means of linguistic units of general denotation that correspond to respective classes.

The last in the quadruple classification of the "object-bound" viewpoints that "operate by means of an object " is the immediate viewpoint (*ṛjusūtra*). It is defined [in *Tattvārthasūtra* I.35) as "the comprehension by way of the denotative acts concerning existent and present objects" and its province is the present point of time, viz. particular things that have already bee pointed out by the empirical viewpoints and which are being perceived here and now. Accordingly, the immediate viewpoint narrows the point of reference down to the present manifestation of an individual and puts aside its past and future facets. At the same time, the immediate viewpoint opens up–according to the other tradition–the fourfold catalogue of mode-expressive viewpoints, or conditionally valid attributive predications, which view things according to their transitory properties and modes and neglect their incontrovertible substantial nature and existence as substrata of those properties and modes. From such an angle, in this viewpoint,...the substantial and non-momentary character of an entity is entirely ignored and merely its transient aspects (generally the present moment) are taken into account...Here, it is irrelevant which linguistic expressions we choose to refer to one and the

same individual.

The three remaining viewpoints operate on the speech level and, in addition, analyze the verbal structure of an utterance, the domain for them being external objects that are nameable within a strictly limited range of verbal expression...The proper point of reference for the speech-bound viewpoints is therefore the thing as it enters linguistic practice. Accordingly, all they are about is rather the Austinian *how to do things with words*, not *how to do things with things*.

What the majority of Jaina epistemologists named simply the verbal viewpoint (*śabdanaya*) Umāsvāti calls the accurate (or present) verbal viewpoint (*sāmprataśabdanaya*) and defined it as "the cognition of an object through a speech element already well-known on [account of] such [categories as] name etc." (*Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* I.35) and as "the comprehenion of precisely those [objects, grasped by means of the immediate viewpoint, like] pots, that are present, that comprise one of [such categories as] name etc., [and] that are already well-known." (ibid.) Two things in these passages are conspicuous: the further diminishing of the scope to present (*sāmprata*) phenomena, and the verbal reference. The verbal viewpoint (*śabdanaya*) was interpreted variously by the subsequent Jaina tradition, but one thing remained common: the verbal point of reference and the role of verbal (or grammatical) means of expression relevant for the interpretation. Applying the verbal viewpoint is tantamount to the recognition of the prevalent linguistic convention and to the overlooking of fine differentiation between meanings of synonymous expressions, etc., that may go back to different derivation, grammatical construction, etc.: "the verbal [viewpoint] intends, as they say, by the force of understanding, one object (denotatum) for all such linguistic units like 'Indra", "Śakra", "Purandara", etc., that are used--in accordance withe the usage--to denote [one and the same] specific object (denotatum)." (Siddharṣigaṇi, *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti* 29.19)...In other words, the users of the

language agree upon a conventionally determined selection of verbal expressions that denote a particular individual.

If one further limits the context of an utterance and draws a distinction among synonyms which is based on their divergent derivation, viz. if one sticks to a viewpoint which denies any equivalence among existing meanings, we have the case of the etymological viewpoint. Thus, two expressions, for instance, "contemplation, speculation" (*vitarka*) and "meditation, reflection" (*dhyāna*), that are [generally] considered synonymous, may refer to different phenomena in some particular contexts...Although three epithets in an undiscriminating commonplace usage pertain to one and the same god, nonetheless the name "Indra" refers in fact to a divine sovereign", the appellation "Śakra" describes a being possessed of might, and the epithet "Purandara" denotes a destroyer of strongholds etc., in the same manner as words like "Indra", "pot" or "man" have different denotata...

The factual viewpoint (*evaṃbhūta, itthambhāva*) functions with reference to the narrowest possible context in the case of any expression. It lays down the rule according to which, out of a series of synonyms, we select such a term in a given context which describes its denotatum in the *present* state in the closest possible way, for instance, the appellations "Indra", "Śakra" and "Purandara" can be applied to the god only when he either is actually displaying his sovereign authority (*indana*), or is exhibiting his might (*śakana*) or is destroying a stronghold respectively. In other words, according to this viewpoint we may apply to a phenomenon only such a term which describes this phenomenon in its present condition most adequately or the etymology or grammatical derivation of which corresponds most closely to the present state of an object it refers to...

It is emphasized by the Jainas that contradictions involved in its theory are only apparent, insofar as each of the utterances has a different point of reference. What is significant is that not some abstract, eternal sentences are dealt with in the method

of conditionally valid predications, but [the theory concerns] particular concrete utterances pronounced in particular situations.

Even though only the seven-staged method of description is as a rule mentioned, the Jainas admitted a theoretical possibility of an infinite number of thinkable viewpoints. Some instances, which are usually not mentioned in the secondary literature, are to be found, e.g. in the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* itself. While discussing the nature of liberated beings (*siddha*) Umāsvāti avails himself of two viewpoints which he contrasts with each other, viz. the one revealing the previous existence (*pūrvabhāvaprajñāpanīyanaya*), during which the particular liberated being destroyed the bondage of transmigration, and the other one revealing the previous existence (*pūrvabhāvaprajñāpnīyanaya*), viz., the condition of being emancipated. (Cf. *Tattvārthasūtra* I. 35, verse 5) Here two different perspectives are assumed with respect to time, and one could easily add another viewpoint predicating a property or a condition of a being in one's next existence...

What is conspicuous in this method of description by way of applying seven conditionally valid predications is the gradual limitation of the context: from the most general one, viz. the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama*), down to the most specialized, context-restricted factual and qualified viewpoint (*evaṃbhūta*) of narrowest extension. At the same time the informative content gradually and cumulatively increases from the most undistinguished and "contextless" *naigama* viewpoint to the most circumstantial and semantics-laden *evambhūta* viewpoint with the most complex point of reference. Thus every subsequent viewpoint is directly related to the one preceding it and it represents a further restriction of the point of reference. This hierarchical arrangement is apparent from the expressions used by various authors that explicitly indicate that the extension of successive viewpoints is included in that of their antecedents...

These findings are crucial for any further analysis of the logical structure of the doctrine of viewpoints (*nayavāda*). They also help us to evaluate such misconstrued conjectures that rest on the alleged presence of contradiction embedded in the *naya*-structure or claims...that all *nayas* can be assigned the third truth-value I (indeterminate) of Lukasiewicz's three-valued system S3.

In view of the multiple character of all phenomena and due to limitations of verb al means of expression at our disposal, it is a practical impossibility to express the "whole truth" about an object. Even though we may be aware of many other features and circumstances thanks to cognitive criteria, we refer to any object or situation by way of an arbitrarily selected set of features which distinguish it from all other objects or phenomena in a particular situation in compliance with our practical demands. How such various modes of reference operate is precisely what the *naya*-theory attempts to formalize. The general, *pramāṇa*-based knowledge of an object is thus a prerequisite for any *naya*-based reference to the same object.

Since every statement is uttered in a particular situation, it does communicate truth as long as we keep in mind its particular context. In other words the relation between a statement and its referent is not a one-to-one relation of the sort "utterance to truth-value"...As a matter of fact, we are forced to use incomplete statements that are correctly understood by others, provided we are able to apply them to their particular context. Since the process of interpretation is not a simple binary function (utterance to truth-value), a simple statement "Devadatta is" can trivially be either true or false depending on the context. Siddharṣigaṇi explicitly states that to determine the truth-value of an utterance we have to take into account at least the intention of the speaker and the linguistic convention, besides the denoter-denoted relation. Thus the simple relation utterance to truth-value is intermediated by a range of additional parameters. Altogether the Jainas

distinguish seven major parameters, or interpretive factors, comprised within the consistent scheme of the *nayas*. For the sake of simplicity we can subsume all such parameters, or context-indicators, under an index as follows.

No utterance is simply either true or false. In order to ascertain its truth-value one has to ascribe it to its specific viewpoint type, which supplies the contextual information which is lacking. In what follows all meaningful context-indicators (intermediary parameters) are comprised under the index *i*. The utterance yields truth or falsehood depending on the adequate interpretation of its context which is determined by means of indexing.

Accordingly, we have the following model of the context-based interpretation J of the utterances α,β,γ...that belong to a class F* of formulas:

$$J = < D, I, A >$$

In the model, D is the domain of admissible interpretations, i.e. a class of conceivable individuals denotable by the utterances α,β,γ...; I is a class of indices *i*, or context-indicators; A comprises *i*-indexed classes of actual denotata.

The truth-value of any *i*-interpreted utterance α depends on the *actual* context represented by indices, or *nayas*, of the class I in the interpretation J, and the paradigm index comprises the following co-ordinates:

$$i = < c, a, t, l, e, s >$$

In this formula, the variable *c* designates the subsets of meanings belonging to the general class C (included in D) of all possible denotata of utterances α,β,γ ...The variable *a* is an element of the class C (viz. a particular individual of the class C). The variable *t* is the point of time of reference (usually the present moment of 'now', which is steadily changing along the time axis). The variable *l* is the prevalent linguistic convention in accordance with which utterances α,β,γ ...are pronounced and understood. The variable *e* indicates etymology and other verbal means of expression, such as prevalent convention,

relevant for the proper understanding both of apparent synonyms α,β,γ...and of the difference between them based on etymology etc. The variable *s* stands for the present status of the individual that is the denotatum of α,β,γ...; in other words, *s* refers to a present condition in which the referent *actually* manifests the quality by which it is being referred to by α,β,γ...

In this hierarchical model every subsequent viewpoint introduces a new indexical co-ordinate; the only exception being the first *naya*, the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama*), in the case of which the context-defining parameters remain indeterminate and the interpretation is open. (This 'contextlessness' (the empty contents of $i = < \ >$) of the *naigamanaya* may be the reason why Siddhasena Divākara in his *Sanmatiprakaraṇa* does not include the comprehensive viewpoint in his classification of the *nayas* at all.)

1. the comprehensive (*naigama*): $i = < \ >$
2. the collective (*saṃgraha*): $i = < c >$
3. the empirical (*vyavahāra*): $i = < c, a >$
4. the immediate (*ṛjusūtra*): $i = < c, a, t >$
5. the verbal (*śabda*): $i - < c, a, t, l >$
6. the etymological (*samabhirūḍha*): $i = < c, a, t, l, e >$
7. the factual (*evaṃbhūta*): $i = < c, a, t, l, e, s >$

Thus, the truth-value of the utterance α is not simply true ($\alpha = 1$) or false ($\alpha = 0$), but rather $\alpha^J_i = 1$ or $\alpha^J_i = 0$, insofar as the utterance α is by necessity always understood according to the interpretation *J* at a particular point of reference *i*. Accordingly, the domain D of possible interpretations of the utterances α,β,γ (members of J) is mapped onto the class A of actual denotata *via* the context delimited by *i* being a member of I.

That is why one may consistently express both "hedgehog is" and "hedgehog is not" in one breath without involving any contradiction. What one actually expresses is not

α *and* $\sim\alpha$ but rather, for instance, α^{J}_{i1} *and* $\sim\alpha^{J}_{i4}$ ("There are hedgehogs in this world, but there is no hedgehog here and now") or α^{J}_{i3} *and* $\sim\alpha^{J}_{i7}$ ("I have a pet hedgehog but it is *not* a hog that is presently in the hedge"), etc.

Thus, at least as far as the theory of the *nayas* is concerned, the claim of multi-faceted reality (*anekānta*) not only does not involve any contradiction but it also does not necessitate any admission of multi-valued logic and can be understood with the classical interpretation of the law of non-contradiction or the law of the excluded middle.

PART TWO

SUMMARIES OF WORKS
(ARRANGED CHRONOLOGICALLY)

1 KAKUDA SŪRI (970)

In Prakrit. Kakuya Sūri "of Upakeśa or Ūkeśa Gaccha; preceptor of Jinacandra or Devagupta" [our #6 below] (author of) "*Navapadaprakaraṇa*..", great-grand-preceptor of Siddhasūri II (*Kṣetrasamāsavṛtti*)."[1] Peterson[2] calls him "Kakkasūri", and gives two different accounts of the lineage of the Ūkeśa Gaccha, which would of course bring into further question our estimation of the date of this author.

1.1 KAKUDA SŪRI (980?), *Pañcapramāṇīpañcāśikā*

Peterson 5. p. 105 (no. 62) provides the beginning and end of the text. It is in "about 43 Prākṛta Gāthās"[3].

2.2 PĀRŚVANĀGA (986), *Ātmānuśāsana*

NCC 2, p. 63 says the work was composed in 986 A.D.[4] It is printed in Sri Satyavijaya Jaina Granthamala No. 12, Ahmedabad 1928. It contains 77 *kārikās* and the manuscript exists in the Jaisalmer Grantha Bhandar. It provides "advice given to the soul in 77 verses in Sanskrit".[5]

3.3 VARDHAMĀNA SŪRI (999), *Ṭīkā* on Haribhadra's *Upadeśapada*

The work was composed in *saṃvat* 1055 (=999 CE),[6] so this appears not to be the same person as the author of the *Dharmaratnakaraṇḍaka*, who lived into the 12th century. Kapadia adds: "The *praśasti* of this *ṭīkā* was written by Pārśvilagaṇi and its first copy written by Āmradeva." We are not sure whether this writer is the same as the purported founder of the Kharatara Gaccha, "a mysterious monk named Vardhamāna who died in 1031 and about whose origin the Kharatara chronicles differ. One version says he was given the *mantra*, sacred bond, to be the leader of the *gaccha* by Dharanendra, the tutelary deity of the Jina Parshva. Vardhamana's own teacher was a temple-dwelling monk who was rejected by him because of his disrespect for the doctrine."[7]

4.4 ŚIVAŚARMAN (1000)[8], *Bandhaśataka*[9]

The Introduction to B162.5.S58 provides a Table of Contents in Hindi, which has been kindly summarized for us by Ratna Lahiri.

4.5 ŚIVAŚARMAN, *Karmaprakṛti*[10]

Velankar 1930[11] says "It contains 415 *gāthās*. Naginbhai Ghelabhai Javera's Preface to his edition of this work[12] (pp. 1-3) says: "The present *Kammapayuḍi* was composed by Śivaśarma Sūri in about 475 stanzas (*gāthās*). It is an excerpt from the *Karmapravādapūrva*. Jainas believe in the fourteen *pūrvas*, voluminous expositions of miscellaneous Jaina literature which are now extinct. [The] *Karmapravāda* is said to be the tenth of those fourteen *pūrvas*."

4.6. ŚIVAŚARMAN, *Gāthāśatakaprakaraṇa*[13]

5.7 MĀDHAVACANDRA TRAIVIDYA (1010?), *Karaṇānuyoga* on Nemicandra's *Trilokasāra*

This author was a pupil of Nemicandra Saiddhāntika, the author of the *Gommaṭasāra* as well as the *Trilokasāra* and other works (cf. Vol. 10 of this Encyclopedia). Mādhavacandra has added some verses to his teacher's work.[14] L. C. Jain[15], however, dates this author at 1203.

5.8 MĀDHAVACANDRA TRAIVIDYA, Vṛtti on Nemicandra's *Kṣapaṇasāra*

JRK p. 97 gives this '1010' date of composition, and identifies the author as a pupil of Nemicandra Saiddhānta.[16]

"This is a valuable work on the Jaina ethical system illustrated by scales showing the relative positions of the human feelings and emotions and how to regulate them for the annihilation of *karman* and the final emancipation. It necessarily ends with the philosophy of the soul and controverts the *mokṣa* theories of Yoga, Sāṃkhya and Saugata."[17]

6. DEVAGUPTA SŪRI or JINACANDRA GAṆI (1017)

"(He was a) pupil of Kokkasūri (Katkadācārya): belonged to the Upakeśagacchā; became known after *dīkṣā* as Devagupta; Kulacandra seems to be another name of Jinacandra", or perhaps was the name of a Gurudandhu of him.[18]

6.9 DEVAGUPTA SŪRI, *Navapadaprakaraṇa* with *Śrāvakānandakāriṇī*

NCC 7, quoting Peterson IV, p. xxxiv, says that the author composed the commentary on a *Navapadaprakaraṇa* titled *Śrāvakanandī* in 1017 A.D.[19]

We can gather the nature of the contents of this work by

examining the Table of Contents given in Vijayajinendrasūri's edition. Translations are the Editor's.

Falsity (*mithyātva*), pp. 3-11
Right Inclination (*samyaktva*), pp. 12-20
Breaths (*prāṇa*), etc., pp. 21-29
Wrong Views (*mṛṣāvāda*), pp. 30-38
Acceptance and Rejection (*ādānādāna*), pp. 39-47
Sexuality (*maithunā*), 48-65
Directional Vows (*digvrata*), pp. 66-74
Punishments for Offenses (*anarthadaṇḍi*), pp. 75-92
Equanimity (*sāmāyika*), pp. 93-101
Spatial Intervals (*deśāvakāśika*), pp. 102-110
Days of Fasting (*pauṣadha*), pp . 111-119
Distributing to Guests (*atithisaṃvibhāga*), pp. 120-128
Suicide (*saṃlekhana*), pp. 129-139

6.10 DEVAGUPTA SŪRI, *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*

The author wrote this work in fourteen *gāthās* in 1017 A.D.[20] It is not to be confused with another--anonymous--work of the same title, which was published--for example--by Bhimsingh Manek from Bombay in 1889 in *Laghuprakaraṇasaṃgraha*.

6.11 DEVAGUPTA SŪRI, Commentary on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*

6.12 DEVAGUPTA SŪRI (?), *Jīvavibhaktiprakaraṇa*

This is a work in twenty-five *gāthās*. Velankar lists manuscripts dated at 1129 A.D. and ascribed to a Jinacandragaṇi who may have been our author, although that is by no means certain.

7.13 PADMASIṂHA (1029), *Jñānasāra*

Edited in Prakrit with Hindi translation by Kailash Chandra Jain. Varanasi 1984 (BL1356. P3315) This is our "E".

Summary by Ratna Lahiri

2 (E1) Worldly living results in roaming in the four states and suffering thereby.

3 (E1) Omniscience will be described here, that attributeless knowledge which is bereft of the four obstructing *karmans* and thus perceives directly the essence of substances, as experienced by Jinadeva. This should be known without any doubt, by the grace of the *guru*.

4 -5 (E1) Since it has to be known through the *guru*, the attributes of such a *guru* are described.

6 (E2) Even after gaining advice (from such a *guru*), if the *yogin* does not have control over the mind his meditations will waver. Therefore it is essential to win the mind.

7 (E2) Without meditations, the aspirant to yoga will not succeed in burning his *karman*.

8 (E2) On controlling the mind (or consciousness, *citta*) the meditation of the self (*ātman*) becomes as calm as still water.

9 (E2) Places conducive for practicing meditations (solitude, quiet, mosquito-free, etc.).

10-12 (E3) Four categories of meditations have been described. Worrying about chewing betel, flowers, unguents, or favorite sons, etc., as well as thinking about harming others, are categorized as the cruel (*raudra*) meditation.

The frustrating (*ārta*) types of meditation are about losing desired objects or objects already possessed, worrying about health or about future enjoyments in this or the other world.

Contemplating on the fourteen stages and vows, the meaning of *sūtras*, etc. is *dharma* meditation, while the white (*śukla*) type of meditation needs to be explained.

13 (E3) The frustration-producing type leads to animal-births, the cruel type leads to hell, *dharma*-meditation leads to rebirths as gods, and the white type leads to liberation (*śiva*).

14 (E4) So, forsaking the first two, engage in the latter two types of meditation.

15-18 (E4-5) The *dharma* type of meditation is to be encouraged daily.

19-20 (E5) The method of meditation within the human body. In the area of the lotus within the navel (*nābhicakra*), meditate on the effulgent form of the *arhat*, who shines like the sun. Also, meditation on the form of the Jina, as effulgent as the sun, within the body–in the palm of the hand, on the forehead, in the heart, in the throat.

21-27 (E5-7) Concentration on holy chants, on an object (*padastha*), on syllables conjoined with particles to make the *mantra*, and on the syllable as if in a white form, etc.–such *padastha*-type meditations are now described. A *yantra* (ritual drawing) called *gaṇadharavalaya* is also advocated.

The one-syllable *mantra* is *oṃ*. The words denoting the highest states should be meditated upon in white color. The five-syllable *mantra* is *a*, *si*, *ā*, *u*, *sā*; and the thirty-five syllable *mantra* is the *namokāra*, all of which are known as *padastha* types of concentration. Establishing the five lotuses in the five places (head, mouth, throat, heart, and navel), meditate on the five sounds (above) in the center of them.

Vasunandī Śravakācāra has stated that in the four petals related to the directions the five sounds should be placed while on the other four cross-directional petals the first letters of vision (*darśana*), knowledge (*jñāna*), proper conduct (*cāritra*) and penance (*tapas*) should be placed and meditated upon. Establishing these seven syllables in white in the seven places, meditate on the perfected (*siddha*) form on the top of the head; this is also a *padastha* meditation.

In the *Tattvānuśāsana* (?) seven syllables have been prescribed and seven orifices in the face (two eyes, ears, nose

and the mouth) are prescribed as centers of meditation.

The *gaṇadharavalaya* is a device (like a *maṇḍala*), a drawing used at the time of consecrating images of Jinas. On an eight-petaled lotus write '*arhan*' in the center, and surround it with the ultimate root syllables. On eight petals put a, k, c, ṭ, t, p, y and ś. In the spaces between establish the seven syllables of *namo arthantāṇām*. Surround these with the *gaṇadharavalaya* and the *mantra hrīṃ*, and thus meditate, and whatever you shall desire will be fulfilled immediately.

Meditation on forms (*rūpasthadhyāna*). One should meditate on the white-colored form of the *arhant*, which is the abode of eight miraculous happenings and thirty-four extraordinary occurrences (*atiśaya*), and which destroys even the densest of obstructing and obfuscating *karman*.

29 (E8) There are three types of self, the inner self, the outer self, and the supreme self. Know the nature of all of them through the preceptor.

30 (E8) The self which is full of pride and attachment and undergoes jealousy and indulges in the five senses is called the outer self.

31 (E8) The one that is immersed in the *dharma* type of meditation and is always in faith and knowledge is the inner self. Those who are knowledgeable recognize this self.

32 (E8) Two facets of the supreme self are the self complete with attributes (*sakala*) and the attribute-less self (*niṣkala*). The *arhant* is a self with attributes, and the perfected self is an attribute-less self.

33 (E9) Without old age, death or birth, bereft of eight types of actions, without all types of activity, free of passing into the four states, without any inner faults, and without compare, is the perfected or supreme self.

34 (E9) Know the supreme self as rightness or the abode of all eight right qualities, but also as a reservoir of infinite qualities.

35 (E9) One should concentrate on the self without anxiety or doubt, as residing in the central lotus of the navel, effulgent as the sun and as the very abode of knowledge.

36 (E9) Just as gold lies within stone, and fire within word, but are not revealed without proper experiment, so also the self is not revealed without this type of concentration.

37 (E9) What is the use of saying too much? First concentrate on the meditations with some object as the support, then go for unsupported, object-less meditation (for example, the forms, object and chants, etc. are meditations with support of objects).

38 (E9-10) Just as one climbs a ladder to reach the top, the *yogin* climbs the steps of supported meditations and ultimately reaches the object-less state of emptiness (*śūnya*). Attribute-free meditation is known as *śūnya*, which the writer now explains.

39 (E10) The *yogin* who engages in emptiness meditation is gradually released from the activities of the senses. The fickleness of his mind is removed and he reaches the elevated state of freedom. This means that only after all sense-activities have stopped and the mind is still is the emptiness type of meditation possible.

40-41 (E10) Scholars have described many types of emptiness meditation. The Jina's teachings (or the work *Jinaśāsana*?) describe emptiness meditation as the realized knowledge of realities which is free of any attachments or delusions. "Empty" (*śūnya*) or "without any object" does not mean without any thought, but it does mean "without any attachment".

The commentary further explains that pure meditation is the unwavering state of knowledge itself. As long as it is wavering, it is "knowledge of", but as soon as it is stable it becomes meditation. This why at the end of [Nemicandra's] *Dravyasaṃgraha* knowledge has been categorized as both construction-filled (*savikalpa*) and construction-free (*nirvikalpa*). Since it is of the pure nature of the experience of the sense of self, it is construction-filled, but due to being bereft

of any outer objects and attributes it is construction-free.

42 (E10-11) Without the objects of the senses, bereft of devices like *mantra* or *tantra*, being neither meditation nor the content thereof, that which is like the sky but is not the sky, is known as empty omniscience.

The commentary further explains that the content of meditation herein can be nothing other than the pure self. There remains no difference between the meditation, the content of meditation and the one meditating. The term "retention" ('*dhāraṇā*')' is used to denote the outer devices used for the purpose of this kind of meditation, like the five *mantras* of genuflection and outer aids like images. In emptiness- or object-less-meditation, there being no outer aids, there is no such retention. Thus it is of the very nature of omniscience. Although as empty as the sky, it is not really "empty", as it is of the nature of knowledge. The *Niyamasāra* (of Kundakunda) avers that the very nature of the self is that of knowledge. Therefore the self knows the self. If knowledge did not know the self, it would be proven as something other than the self. This is why it is referred to as '*śūnya*' as its object is itself, the self of the very nature of knowledge, and no others.

43 (E11) I am neither the son of anyone, nor does anyone belong to me. I am alone. Realizing this object-less knowledge in meditation, the *yogin* reaches the highest state. A note further explains that even this feeling, that no one is mine, etc., is the stage just before realization as in realization there remains no such thought.

44 (E11) Neither do I have a mind, nor speech, nor body. I am bereft of jealousy, anger, ownership, body or any accumulations (property, money, etc.). Thus the *yogin* immersed in construction-free meditation does not accrue merit or demerit.

45 (E11-12) The pure self is the size of the body, is knowledge itself, and the repository of consciousness. "Thus alone I am"--meditating thus, he realizes the highest state of

supreme selfhood.

46 (E12) Due to indulging in mental activity and the objects of the senses, living beings are deluded. Attachments or aversions to likes and dislikes occur. Once these are stopped, the self takes rest within its true nature, and thus reaches liberation.

47 (E12) Internalizing outer pleasures and knowledge, etc. within, become full of the knowledge and pleasures that are beyond the senses, and be mindless of the body (of its comforts, etc.). Thus, becoming free of anxieties, the elevated person becomes a *kevalajñānin*).

48 (E12) The state of supreme selfhood is herein described as the desire-free essence. By the grace of the *guru*, that (essence) should be known in certain particular contemplations.

49 (E12) If those who are immersed in desire, full of pride or devoted to sense pleasures, and fickle by habit, object to this, they sink in the ocean of rebirth (*saṃsāra*).

50 (E12-13) All other sciences, like that of the inner light, the lotuses within the navel (*kuṇḍalinī*, etc.), or the *bindu* and *nāda* theories and other such sciences, are the cause of rebirth. In Hāṭhayoga there is the practice of envisioning the supreme self as the light of all lights, and meditating upon it. In Tantra they envisage the three precious gems of Śiva, *śakti* and *bindu*. Another name for *bindu* is *mahāmāyā*. The word is of three kinds in order of subtle sound, the syllabic point (*akṣara-bindu*), and consonantal sound (*varṇa*). The five facets of *bindu* are named fame, skills, etc., but these too are then said to lead to rebirth.

51 (E13) By practicing the ultimate meditation, very rare austerities are achieved (the ten gems like fasting, adherence to prescribed rules, perfect behavior, self-control, etc.) are referred to, which are required preliminaries to such pure meditation.

After this, the commentator admits that the next few ascriptions of breath-control, etc. have not been substantiated

by other texts, and therefore he is unable to make right sense out of them, but they are given as follows:

52-58 (E12-14) describes the various methods of yoga, breath-control, etc. in addition to the stipulation that alternating by the hour, the basic substances of fire, water, air and earth each regulate bodily behavior. Breath control is to be practiced in view of this knowledge. The left nostril breath is favorable for *yogins* and the right one unfavorable. By knowing the left (*idā*), right (*piṅgalā*) and central (*suṣumnā*) paths in the body, perhaps the *yogin* may discern the auspicious-inauspicious moments, and life and death. This is perhaps the import of the couplet (says the commentator).

60 (E14) Therefore, by the rationality of the supreme self, know the momentary nature of life, youth, or assets like cereals, etc. They are as momentary as flash of lightning or a bubble of water.

61 (E15) Padmasena Muni has composed this work for enlightening the mind and to explain the nature of the supreme self.

8 PRABHĀCANDRA (1040)

was a "resident of Dhārā; pupil of Māṇikyanandin... contemporary of Bhojadeva...But he and his work *Nyayākumudacandrodaya* are mentioned by Jinasena in *Ādipurāṇa* (9th Cent.)", adding "hence he is placed prior to the ninth Century". This is supposedly confirmed by the reference to Māṇikyanandin as his teacher. Nevertheless, there are other Māṇikyanandins, e.g., one cited[22] as a pupil of Udayacandra Gaṇi and the author of an *Avacūri* on the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*.

Asim Kumar Chatterjee writes: "Prabhācandra, according to the colophon of the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, wrote that work during the reign of Bhoja of Dhārā", "who began ruling about A.D. 1000. This Prabhācandra outlived Bhoja and wrote his works also during the rule of Bhoja's successor

Jayasiṃha." [23]

8.14 PRABHĀCANDRA, Commentary on Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*[24]

8.15 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Nyāyakumudacandra* on Akalaṅka's *Laghīyastraya*[25]

The chapter of this work on the possibility of liberation of women (*Strīmuktivāda*) is translated in Padmanabha S. Jaini, *Gender and Salvation: Jaina Debates on the Spiritual Liberation of Women* (Delhi 1991). The same section has been quoted and summarized by Nirmala Kulkarni in V. N. Jha 1997, pp. 145-154). Jaini's translation is our "T".[26] We provide here the translation of the entire section, substituting as usual our preferred translations of technical terms for his.

Jaini argues (T, pp. 111-112) that Prabhācandra had very much in mind an earlier work, the *Strīnirvāṇaprakaraṇa* by the Yāpanīya Ācārya Śākaṭīyana, whose dates Jaini gives as 814-867. Two verses are quoted from that work, and a number of half-lines make up elements of the prose portions of Prabhācandra's work. Jaini suggests that by Prabhācandra's time "the Śvetāmbaras had so appropriated the Yāpanīya position that the latter had lost its individual identity."

"Prabhācandra in the course of his refutation (of the possibility of liberation for women) introduces some new examples and several novel arguments that had either escaped the notice of Śākaṭāyana or had not yet been presented by anyone else. He is probably the first to provide the example (*udāharaṇa*) of the hermaphrodite (*napuṃsaka*), à necessary component without which the logical statement concerning a woman's inability to attain *mokṣa* would not have been complete. It proved to be a valid example--congenital hermaphrodites are forbidden mendicant initiation among the Digambaras and the Śvetāṃbaras--and thus an acceptable example to both sides."

"One can detect a similar originality in his answer to the persistent objection of the Yāpanīya author that there was no pervasion (*vyāpti*) between a woman's inability to go to the seventh hell, or to acquire yogic powers (*labdhi*) and so forth, and her attaining *mokṣa*. Prabhācandra clearly saw the fallacy in the argument of concomitance based on the relationship of causality (*kārya-kāraṇa*) or that of pervasion (*vyāpya-vyāpaka*) and came up with the novel idea of the *gamya-gamaka sambandha*...by which it could be argued that a woman's inability to attain *mokṣa* can be logically implied by her inability to be reborn in the seventh hell. His responses to the opponent's claim that the nun's clothes are similar to the whisk broom (*rajoharaṇa*) of a naked monk (and hence not a possession), or to the comparison of the nun's clothes to the clothes thrown on the head of a naked monk (a proof of her non-attachment), are equally ingenious. Moreover, he should be credited for examining in detail the nature of shame (*lajjā*), which was admitted even by Yāpanīya and the Śvetāmbara and the real reason for denying the vow of nudity to women. For the Digambaras, *lajjā* is invariably associated with sexual desire and...is essentially connected with a woman's biological condition including the menstrual flow. Prabhācandra strongly articulates this peculiar Digambara perception of the female sex and argues that clothes are a sure proof of a woman's congenital inability to eradicate sexual passion, that is, to become *vītarāga*, a prerequisite for attaining *mokṣa*." (T, pp. 112-113)

Translation by Padmanabh S. Jaini

1 (Digambara:) Liberation having the characteristics (of the Four Infinities, knowledge, perception, bliss, and energy[1] is

[1]...(T)he Four Perfections--namely, infinite knowledge (*anantajñāna*), infinite vision (*anantapratyakṣa*), infinite happiness

possible only for men and not for women. This is because, like the hermaphrodite, she is unfit for it and because of the impossibility of establishing any proof for the existence of that liberation.

2 (Yāpanīya:) Objection. The following argument establishes it:

> There is liberation for women;
> Because all the necessary conditions (for liberation) are found there;
> As in the case of men.

The conditions for attaining liberation are the Three Jewels...right view, right knowledge, and right conduct, and those are found in women... (That) proves that they are capable of (attaining) liberation, which is characterized as a total emancipation from all *karmans*...

3 (Digambara:) We maintain that women are (inherently) in opposition to (the perfection of) the Three Jewels, because they are different from men, as are the gods, animals, and the denizens of hell, who also are incapable of attaining liberation. It is well known that gods, hell beings, animals, and men born in the realms of experiencing (*bhogabhūmi*) are inherently opposed to the Three Jewels...In the same manner, being a

(*anantasukha*) and infinite energy (*anantavīrya*). He now makes the further claim that the state of liberation characterized by these four infinite qualities, is possible only to men and not to women. Technically speaking, liberation is achieved only at the end of the Arhat's life at the time of attaining Siddhahood, but the term can be applied to the earlier stage of the Kevalin also when these four qualities are perfected.

woman is itself in opposition to (the perfection of) the Three Jewels.

4 (Yāpanīya:) Your claim is not well considered, since the insufficiency of those conditions that are required to attain liberation in one (being, i.e. gods, etc.) does not automatically apply to another (i.e., women)...

5 Moreover, how would you ascertain the absence of the Three Jewels in a woman: by perception, inference, or scriptural testimony? Surely it cannot be ascertained by perception, since the Three Jewels are not accessible to the senses. It cannot be ascertained by inference either, since there is no sign invariably associated with the absence (of the Three Jewels in a woman) that would lead to such an inference. It also cannot be ascertained by scriptural testimony, since there is no scripture that would declare that the Three Jewels are not found in a woman comparable to the scriptures that establish this in the case of gods and the denizens of hell.

6 (Digambara:) We of course do not reject the mere presence of the Three Jewels in a woman; rather, (we claim that the mere presence of those Three Jewels) is not itself enough to bring about liberation, since we maintain that only when the Three Jewels have been completely perfected will they produce liberation. Such perfection is not found in women and, consequently, liberation is impossible for them.

7 (Yāpanīya:) This is not proper, because of the impropriety of denying (the existence of) something that is inaccessible to the senses. The complete perfection of the Three Jewels (i.e., an Omniscient Being, in whom they are perfected) is of course not visible to us, and it is not possible to determine the absence of something that is not accessible to the senses, because of the resulting absurdity. By the same token, it is not possible to ascertain the absence of (the complete perfection of the Three Jewels in a woman)--and to deny something that has not first been ascertained (to exist or not exist) is improper, because of the same logical fallacy.

8 Here (the Digambara) might contend: It is not proper to assert the presence of liberation in women, since it is possible to ascertain via inference the absence of liberation in women. For example:

> There is liberation for women;
> because they cannot be reborn in the seventh hell;
> like moisture-born beings and so forth (who also cannot be reborn in the seventh hell or attain liberation).

9 (Yāpanīya:) Such a statement is inconsistent, since the negative concomitance (*vyatirekavyāpti*) between the two is not proved. Here (in this world), when one thing is invariably related to something else, the latter's absence implies the absence of the former. For example, when (the domain of) fire pervades (the domain of) smoke, (the domain of) the absence of smoke pervades (the domain of) the absence of fire. Similarly, when (the domain of) tree-ness pervades (the domain of) *śiṃśapā*-ness, (the domain of) the absence of *śiṃśapā*-ness pervades (the domain of) the absence of tree-ness. Such negative concomitance between the two absences is not found in this case. The absence of liberation (in women) is not proved, because the ability to be reborn in the seventh hell, and so forth, is not the cause of liberation and does not pervade (the domain of the absence of liberation)...as do the eight qualities (of omniscience, etc.) which are invariably associated with liberation...(I)t is wrong to deny the absence of that which is not pervaded, for otherwise there is an over-extension of logical convention. Therefore, the reason given by you is subject to doubt (as to) whether it is excluded from (the) *vipakṣa* (i.e., the class of those who are capable of attaining liberation).

10 Moreover, (the relationship that you seek to establish between the two) is absolutely violated with respect to those who are in their last life (and destined to attain liberation). They attain liberation in that very life without being reborn in the seventh hell (i.e., they are nevertheless liberated).

11 Moreover, (as has been said) "Although (the classes of beings listed previously) have unequal destinations when going downward (to hell), when going upward (those same beings) can go without distinction as far as the Sahasrāra heaven. Therefore, what you have said about (a woman's) incapacity to go downward is not a reason (for her not going upward to liberation." (*Strīnirvāṇaprakaraṇa*, verse 6).

This proves that (your reasoning)...is invalid; for merely because the potential of males and females to be reborn in hellish abodes is dissimilar, that is not itself enough to conclude that they are not equal in their capacities to attain the good destinies as well.

This is because an impure attitude of the self is not the cause of a pure state. (The scriptures) state, for example, that creatures such as crawlers (e.g. lizards), birds, quadrupeds, snakes, and fish are dissimilar in their downward destinies. Beings crawling on their chests that have five sense-faculties and mind, for example, may fall as far as the first hell; birds as far as the third; quadrupeds as far as the fifth; snakes as far as the sixth; and fish as far as the seventh. But all these beings are equal with respect to their births in auspicious heavens, since they all may be reborn (in heavens as high as) the Saharāra heaven.

12 One also cannot assert women's incapacity for liberation merely because of their lack of skill in debate and so forth, for there is no rule that only (through the presence of such skills) is liberation possible. There is a text that states: "It is well-known that infinite numbers of selves have attained to liberation merely by assuming the *sāmāyika* vows." (*Tattvārthabhāṣya-Sambandha-kārikā*, verse 27)

13 If women are indeed said to lack excellence in debate--which is considered to be a result of extraordinary austerities--and because of that are rendered incapable of attaining liberation, then the scriptures would have explicitly declared as such, as indeed they declare their lack of excellence in debate.

14 (Digambara:) Women cannot attain liberation because of the presence of possessions--that is, clothes.

15 (Yāpanīya:) (If, as you allege, their clothes were a possession,) then why would they who are desirous of liberation have not abandoned that possession? Surely clothes are not life, and people desirous of liberation would abandon even their own lives, let alone clothes!

16 (Digambara:) Scripture, of course, is opposed to a woman's relinquishment (of clothes): "It is not permitted for a nun to be without clothes" (*Kalpasūtra*, section 2).

17 (Yāpanīya:) Well, in that case, their clothes must be considered an aid to liberation, like such requisites as the whisk broom and so forth. Omniscient Beings, the preachers of the path to liberation, have prescribed (use of) the whisk broom, and it is therefore not a possession but an aid to liberation; in the same way should clothes be considered, since there is no difference (between the two). If things that are conducive to the holy path and prescribed by the scriptures were to become 'possessions', then you must admit that, like clothes, the alms, medicines, and a sleeping place (obtained from a layperson) would all become possessions too. This would then result (in the acceptance of the wrong theory, and that would imply the impossibility of liberation for all those who receive such things (including men).

18 (Digambara:) If you admit liberation even while wearing clothes, then what would restrict a householder as well from attaining liberation?

19 (Yāpanīya:) (A householder may not attain liberation) because of (the presence of an) attachment (to his clothes). A householder is not free from attachment to clothes, and attachment itself is his possession. Even a naked person comes to have possessions if he has attachment. In the case of a nun, however, her clothes are not possessions because of her lack of attachment, like a naked monk upon whom clothes have been thrown (but who remains yet unattached and thus without

possessions).

20 Moreover, even in the case of a (naked) monk, when he enters a village or a house, his freedom from possessions cannot be asserted without recourse to the argument that he remains detached from those places. This is analogous to his (continued) freedom from possession of the karmic matter that flows into his self on account of his actions and the variety of subtle karmic matter that sustains the body and the senses (*nokarman*).

21 (Digambara:) But surely insects are born in clothes and violence toward them is inevitable (on the part of the nun who wears those clothes). Because of this violence, there is no possibility of (a woman developing perfect) conduct; so how can she attain liberation?

22 (Yāpanīya:) This is not correct, since (such incidental violence) does not result from carelessness. Carelessness itself is violence; as the scripture says: "Violence is taking the life of a being on account of careless actions" (*Tattvārthasūtra* vii, 13). If this were not the case, then even a (naked) monk would be committing violence in (receiving) alms, medicines, and a dwelling place.

23 If it is maintained that the monk is not guilty of violence because he is abiding by the rules prescribed by the Arhat, and is therefore free from carelessness, then nuns too must be considered to be engaging in nonviolence, for their case is not different (from that of the monks). As it is said:"Whether a being lives or dies, violence is inevitable for one who is of unrestrained conduct. For a restrained person there is no bondage, since he has restrained himself from all forms of injury." (*Pravacanasāra* iii, 17).

24 Women (i.e., nuns) also cannot be said to be incapable of liberation merely because they are not greeted by men (i.e., monks); for if this were to be the case, then the *gaṇadharas* would also not be able to attain liberation, as they too are not greeted by the Tīrthaṅkaras. Since they do attain liberation, it

is clear that being greeted or not greeted is not a condition of liberation. Rather, only the possession of the Three Jewels is (a condition for liberation).

25 It also cannot be said that women will not attain liberation because of excessive deceitfulness, because such excessiveness is also to be found in men. Deceitfulness is caused by the arising of deluding, *mohanīyakarman*, and such *karman* is found in both (sexes) without distinction.

26 It also should not be claimed that women are of little strength (*sattva*) and therefore do not attain liberation. This is because, in (a religious) context, strength should be understood as the ability to undertake austerities and keep the precepts (of mendicancy). No other type of strength is implied, since that would not be conducive to liberation. As it has been said: "Even in the household life, there were ladies like Sītā and others who were the best of those having good conduct and were known for their great strength. How could such women be deficient in strength for performing austerities and lacking in holy conduct (after they have become nuns)?" (*Strīnirvāṇaprakaraṇa*, verse 30).

27 Moreover, it is said: "In one moment, (a maximum of) eight hundred men and twenty women and ten of the remaining (gender, i.e., the hermaphrodites) also attain liberation." (Cf. *Strinirvanaprakarāṇa*, verse 34). These and other scriptures are the authority for the (presumption that) liberation (is possible) for women.

28 (Digambara:) But the word "women" (*strī*) in this passage refers to (a male experiencing) female sexuality.

29 (Yāpanīya:) How can that be construed to deny liberation to women? It cannot be, because, just as a man may attain *siddha*-hood having (at the start of the ascent of the *guṇasthāna* ladder) experienced female sexuality, so too can women attain (liberation having similarly experienced male sexuality), for the cause of attaining *siddha*-hood is the inner state of the self (and not the external state of the body).

30 Moreover, just as a person who is of male gender but is internally female and hence comes to be considered a "woman" may attain liberation, so too may a person who is of female gender but internally male (be able to attain liberation). Why should she not attain liberation, since (the two situations) are indistinguishable?

31 In fact, sexuality is irrelevant to the state of the Perfected Being (*siddha*), since sexuality in any form (whether as male, female or hermaphrodite) is totally eliminated at the (ninth spiritual stage called the) *anivṛttibādarasamparāya*.

32 (Digambara:) The verse quoted above, which cites the numbers of each sex that attain liberation at a given time, describes the liberation of males with reference to the initial state of sexuality with which they began to climb the (*guṇasthāna*) ladder to the extinction of the *karmans*. But this is a conventional description of a liberated self by referring to a condition that is long past.

33 (Yāpanīya:) But why resort to such interpretation applying a secondary meaning when this verse can be construed literally as referring to a woman who is physically endowed with breasts and the birth canal? Hence, liberation is possible for women.

Now begins the author's rebuttal of the opponent's position.

34 (Digambara:) First, concerning the statement "(women are able to attain liberation) because they do not lack any of the (conditions making up a) sufficient condition (for attaining liberation) and so forth", we respond that this particular reasoning concerning the sufficiency of conditions is not proved.

The (immediate) condition of liberation is undoubtedly the Three Jewels, but (the crucial point is) whether this means merely a (degree of development) of the Three Jewels or only (Three Jewels) when they have achieved absolute perfection. If it is maintained that mere possession (i.e., the lowest grade of the Three Jewels) is sufficient, then you must admit that even

householders (who possess only the rudiments of good conduct) could also (immediately) attain liberation. But if it is maintained that the Three Jewels become a sufficient condition only when they have attained absolute perfection, then a woman cannot (be said to attain liberation), because womanhood is incompatible with the state of attaining to absolute perfection...

35 Similarly, it is equally wrong to claim that "a refutation is not admissible with reference to something that cannot be seen" and so forth. As far as a thing that is invisible is concerned, we also admit that a refutation by means of perception about such things cannot be proved. But this does not legitimately deny the applicability of inference (in the cases where perception is not possible). Otherwise, how else would you admit the possibility of refuting a woman's rebirth in the seventh hell, which is the result of the ultimate extreme of demerit?

36 Concerning the statement, "The absence of falling into the seventh hell does not imply the absence of liberation," and so forth, this also is not correct, because in two things that are not in the relationship of cause and effect, an awareness (linking) these two things is possible. This is (due to the invariable relationship pertaining between them)--as, for example, (the awareness relating) the rise of (the asterism) Kṛttikā (the Pleiades) with the rise of Śakaṭa (the five stars forming the asterism Rohiṇī). An invariable relationship is a condition in which two things not causally related are related as indicator (e.g., Kṛttikā) and indicated (e.g., Śakaṭa). Such a relationship does exist in the example (of not falling into the seventh hell and not reaching the abode of the *siddhas*; therefore, we can accept the fact that women do not fall into the seventh hell as being a valid condition for inferring that they do not attain liberation.

It also cannot be said that such an invariable relationship is ascertainable only between things that are either identical (as

were tree and *śiṃśapā*) or causally related (as were smoke and fire)--for, if this were so, there would be the undesirable consequence of (denying) the indicator/indicated relationship between the rise of Kṛttikā and the rise of Śakaṭa. We have discussed this matter at great length in our examination of the Buddhist theory of pervasion (on pp. 446-448 of E). Thus is answered your contention that "falling into the seventh hell is unrelated to the attainment of liberation, because it is neither causally related nor related by means of pervasion".

37 How does the opponent, who refuses to accept the indicator/indicated relationship based on invariable concomitance, explain the absence of the latter part when there is an absence of the former part? Especially (in this case), the (temporal) relationship pertaining between the former and latter parts is based neither upon identity (as were tree and *śiṃśapā*) nor upon cause and effect (as were smoke and fire).

38 (Opponent:) In this example (of the temporal relationship between Kṛttikā and Śakaṭa), there obtains a relationship called inherence (*samavāya*) with reference to a single whole. Therefore, on this account, that (inherence) alone serves to explain their relationship of the indicator and indicated.

39 (Digambara:) But this (doctrine of inherence) is surely the view of the (heretic) Naiyāyika, not that of the Sitāmbara ("White-Clothed", i.e., the Jaina of the Śvetāmbara sect)? Without establishing the (validity) of inherence (as an independent category of existence), it is improper for (the Śvetāmbaras who profess to be Jainas) to advocate the argument of the inherence of parts in the whole; for this argument (of inherence in a single whole) is workable only when the argument via inherence has first been established.

40 Let us grant (for the sake of argument) validity (to the view that there is inherence of both parts in a single whole); even then, (the Śvetāmbara) must admit the validity of the indicator/indicated relationship that pertains between the two

(parts). If that is admitted, then you must also admit that the same relationship of indicator and indicated exists between the two parts under discussion (namely, the capacity to fall into the seven hell and the ability to attain liberation). This is because, in the case of these two (capacities), there is inherence in a single whole (which is the self of the individual aspirant). Surely, in the same self where the capacity to fall into the seventh hell is inherent the capacity to attain liberation would also be inherent.

41 We (the Digambaras) do not wish to establish the incapacity of women to attain liberation merely on the grounds of their incapacity to fall into the seventh hell. So you cannot fault us on that (for all we are claiming is that there is an indicator/indicated relationship pertaining between the two, not a causal one).

42 (Śvetāmbara:) What are you trying to prove, then?

43 (Digambara:) We wish to establish that there is an absence of the causes leading to liberation (in women)--namely, their inability to attain the absolute perfection (of the Three Jewels). This (lack of achieving the ultimate extreme in anything) is equally applicable in the example (of falling into the seventh hell) and in the goal (of attaining liberation). In the absence of that (cause leading to liberation, which is the absolute perfection of the Three Jewels), the impossibility (of women attaining) liberation will perforce be proved, for if the result were to appear without an initial cause, there would be the over-extension of logical applicability. Therefore, your claim that "'falling into the seventh hell is not the cause of liberation, unlike the Three Jewels" is incorrect.

44 Concerning the earlier statement, "The concomitance between going to the seventh hell and attaining liberation is absolutely violated with respect to those who are in their last life" (see #10), the expression "the absence of falling into the seventh hell" actually refers to the absence of the capacity to accumulate those kinds of *karmans* that are capable of

producing such (a rebirth). That absence surely exists only in women and not in those who are in their last state of embodiment. It is well known that such *cakravartins* as Bharata, and so forth, who were in their last state of embodiment (i.e., who attained liberation in that body), still had the capacity to accumulate *karmans* that could have led them to the seventh hell at the time of their marching out on military campaign. It is equally well known that (when they engaged in wholesome actions like) worshiping the Jina (they had the capacity to accumulate *karmans* that could have resulted in a rebirth) in the highest heaven, called *sarvārthasiddhi*. This is because the extreme form of both the meritorious and demeritorious state of the self is that with which (a person) undertakes an action and this results, respectively, in extremely meritorious or demeritorious rebirths. The capacity to initiate (such extreme) states of the self is found only in men, not in women. Just as a woman lacks that capacity for extremely demeritorious states of the self, so too is she incapable of extremely auspicious states; and since liberation is possible only by means of the most auspicious (*śubha*, i.e. pure) state of the self, (a woman) is inherently incapable of attaining liberation."

45 By this (response) is also answered the (Yāpanīya) statement: "Although there is inequality in the downward destinies of animals, such inequality does not affect their potential upward destinies, which are identical". This is because the capacity to attain liberation is possible only for a person who is able to accumulate those actions that will be conducive to bringing about the most extreme forms of destinies, and not for one who is incapable thereof. What we maintain is that only the person who has the capacity to attain to the most auspicious form of upper destiny (of a perfected being, i.e. liberation) has the concomitant capacity to fall to the most inauspicious lower destiny (i.e., the seventh hell), as is possible for a man. You who wish to admit the capacity of women to attain to the most auspicious state (of liberation) must also acknowledge their

capacity to attain to the most inauspicious state of existence as well. But if you admit this, you will be in conflict with your own scripture, which says, "Women are not reborn lower than the sixth hell."

46 Moreover, you also said: "Liberation cannot be denied to (women) merely because they lack the powers of skill in debate and so forth." This too is frivolous talk. Where there is not even the special kind of purity gained through restraint that serves as the direct cause of such worldly powers as skill in debate, transformation of the body, and moving (through the air), what intelligent person would believe that they would be capable of that (restraint) which is conducive to liberation? Ability in debate is the talent to expound one's doctrine even in a court presided over by Indra and in the presence of opponents as learned as Bṛhaspati. By exposing the deceitful practices perpetrated by one's opponent--such as quibble and futile rejoinders--one demonstrates the ability to expound one's doctrine. The power of transformation refers to the ability to assume a form like that of Indra, the king of the gods. The ability to move (through the air) is the talent to walk through the sky. The words "and so forth" include such yogic powers as the ability to create a kitchen where there is an unlimited quantity of food. The Jaina scriptures do not refer to that kind of extraordinary conduct on the part of women which could serve as the cause of such powers; (therefore, if women cannot even attain these mundane powers, how can they ever hope to attain liberation?).

47 It also was said: "The scriptures would have explicitly referred to the impossibility of liberation for women if such were the case, as indeed they refer to the absence of skill in debate and so forth." This too is sheer verbosity, since by denying a specific type of restraint, the scripture can be proved to have refuted in kind the attainment of liberation. It is well known that the scriptures ordain that specific kinds of restraints which lead to liberation, such as nudity, can be prescribed only

for men and not for women. Surely, there can be no effect (liberation) without a cause (the restraints), for otherwise there would be an over-extension of logical possibility. Admittedly, women may be capable of some degree of restraint, but this is not enough to bring about liberation (in that very life), as is also the case for the restraints assumed by animals and householders. Thus, it can be concluded that women are incapable of attaining liberation because they have possessions, like the householders.

48 It was also said: "Clothes are conducive to liberation, as is the case with the whisk broom and so forth." This statement is also incorrect, since the whisk broom is enjoined by the Lord for the sake of protecting one's mendicant restraints (that is, the view of nonviolence by guarding against the inadvertent killing of small insects). For what purpose are clothes enjoined?

49 (Yāpanīya:) We maintain that clothes are also stipulated in order to protect one's mendicant conduct. For example, generally speaking, women who are unclothed are overcome by men whose minds are aroused by passions incited at the sight of the nude parts of a woman's body, as a mare is overcome by stallions.

50 (Digambara:) Pray tell us, then, how only nude women are overcome by men and not nude men overcome by women.

51 (Yāpanīya:) Women are overcome because they possess only a little strength. It is well known that there is such a division between male and female. It is seen even among animals like cattle and horses, for example, that it is the nature of the female to be overcome and that of the male to overcome.

52 (Digambara:) If so, it is surely great delusion to assume that females who can be overcome even among animals because of their deficiency in strength should be able to attain liberation--a state that is characterized by the total destruction of the heap of *karmans* that have overcome the whole three worlds and is achievable only by (those endowed with) great strength.

53 As for what was said, "If those things that serve as aids in keeping the *dharma* (righteousness, precepts) are to be considered possessions and so forth, then what is this *dharma* that is attained by wearing clothes?", is that (*dharma*) a type of merit or a type of restraint? If it is the first (i.e., a type of merit), then how can merit be the cause of liberation? Clothes that are accepted according to the rule set down by the scriptures can only be the cause for merit, as is the case for householders. If the cause of merit were also to be the cause of liberation, then one could attain liberation even by such acts as charity (which are undertaken only by householders).

54 It is hard to demonstrate that (clothes) serve as an instrument in supporting specific kinds of (mendicant) restraints. The (mendicant) restraints refer actually to the renunciation of internal possessions (such as attachments) and external possessions (such as clothes). How is such (restraint) possible if one accepts clothes, which invariably cause agitation of mind because of the need to beg for them; to stitch, wash, and dry them; to lift them up and put them down; and be anxious about them being stolen? On the contrary, clothes are destroyers of the (mendicant) restraint, since they are the adversaries of that state of mendicancy (*nairgranthya*) that is free from both internal and external possessions.

55 (Yāpanīya:) Surely then, (by your argument,) even accepting food and medicines and so forth would have to be considered as (accepting) possessions. If so, how could there be liberation for those who receive such things?

56 (Digambara:) This (argument) too has no substance, since food and medicines, when they are accepted without incurring any of the blemishes attached to their origins, become means for the increase of the Three Jewels. Being received according to the rules prescribed by the scriptures, those (food and medicines) do not bring about the destruction of the cause of liberation. On the contrary, if food and medicines are not accepted, then death may result before its time, which would

amount to suicide. But no such blemish accrues in the nonacceptance of clothes. Indeed, even the intake of food is reduced by devout aspirants to liberation in a gradual manner, by restricting themselves to eating only once every third or fourth day. And some mendicants who have attained to the highest form of detachment even give up carrying their whisk broom also. But is it never permitted for a woman to relinquish her clothes.

57 Nor should it be said that nuns are practicing non-possession when they receive clothes because they do not entertain such thoughts as "this is mine". This is inconsistent. A woman who intentionally picks up a fallen piece of cloth and wears it could not be without attachment (*mūrcchā*) toward it. This is because whenever a person intentionally picks up anything that has fallen, that picking up cannot be devoid of attachment toward that object; as with (the picking up of) a piece of gold and so on; such is the case with women (i.e. nuns) who accept clothes (and, hence, are not free from attachment toward them).

58 By this (argument) has been refuted the (Yāpanīya) statement, "Clothes are not possessions (for women), because they are like the clothes that have been forced upon (a naked mendicant in meditation)". This is because, in the latter case, where the clothes have been thrust it is impossible that (those clothes) when fallen will be picked up intentionally by that monk.

59 (The Yāpanīya) might say: "If you insist that women must also abandon clothes (in order to receive the mendicant restraints), then women from good families who are full of shame and modesty would never want to be initiated (into the mendicant order). If they are allowed to keep their clothes, however, such women could be held culpable of only the small defilement (i.e., blemish) of keeping clothes, but (at the same time) the virtue of keeping the complete precepts would result. Thus, by observing the relative advantage and little

disadvantage in accepting clothes rather than discarding them, the Lord has prescribed clothes for women.

60 (Digambara:) This very thing is advocated by us also; we do not disagree with (the Yāpanīyas) in this matter. Our dispute is only over whether women are actually capable of attaining liberation. All we maintain is that:

> Their moral restraint (*śīla*) is not sufficient to achieve liberation;
> Since it is based on possession;
> As is the moral restraint of a householder.

The Lord indeed has prescribed a (partial renunciatory) conduct suitable for the householders, having considered the relative advantages to them in (allowing certain) possessions over the disadvantages of not giving up any possessions at all. But (the householder's partial renunciation) is not considered to be able to accomplish liberation, as is also the case for the matter under discussions.

61 (Yāpanīya:) The moral restraint of the householder is tainted by violence; it is, therefore, unable to bring about liberation.

62 (Digambara:) But this applies equally well to the conduct of the nun. Is it not the fact that the restraint associated with the nuns is stained by violence since, like the restraint of the householder, it is founded upon the acceptance of clothes, which are the abode of lice and their eggs? If you contend that, despite the fact that clothes harbor insects born of moisture, they are not conducive to injury, then you must admit that (the obligatory practice of) removing the hair from the scalp (of a monk to prevent the breeding of insects there) is also not necessary.

63 It was also claimed (by the Yāpanīya), "As there is no carelessness (in nuns) there is no (cause for the) rise of violence and so forth." This also is not felicitous, because diligence (i.e., freedom from carelessness) is not possible for (women) because (there is the inevitable) transformation of the

self by the passion of covetousness (associated with the wearing of clothes); indeed, carelessness is nothing other than this coming under the influence of those (passions). As is said, "Idle talk as well as passions, sense(-activities), sleep, and sexual activity are respectively four, five, one and one. These are fifteen forms of carelessness." (*Pañcasaṃgraha* I, 15) From the fact that (the nuns) intentionally accept clothes, it can be determined that they come under the influence of the passion of covetousness.

64 Now, (the Yāpanīya might claim) that, while remaining free from such (alleged) desires, it is still possible for them to accept clothes solely in order to dispel shame; it is not therefore proper to conclude that they come under the influence of covetousness.

65 (Digambara:) Surely, then, why not also allow them to take a lover in order to combat the torment of concupiscence, for there is no distinction (between dispelling shame and dispelling sexual desire)?

66 (Yāpanīya:) But when such torment is present, they would not be free from attachment, for (such concupiscence) is contrary to their freedom from desire.

67 (Digambara:) The same can be said about the presence of shame. It is not proper to say that shame is compatible with freedom from desire, for it is the nature of shame to wish to cover the loathsome parts of the body when one is aroused by desire. A person who is free from desire will not feel shame, like a child; you consider nuns to be free from desire. (However, since you maintain that nuns wear clothes in order to dispel shame, they therefore cannot be free from desire.)

68 If (in spite of this) you will insist that for a male his (mendicant) restraint consisting of nudity is a means of attaining liberation, but in the case of women that restraint must be with clothes, then you must admit that this would result in the undesirable consequence of (there being a qualitative) difference between the types of liberation that each

achieves, because the causes (necessary for the achievement of liberation) would be different (for the two sexes). That mendicant restraint (of nuns) which differs from another types of mendicant restraint (i.e., that of monks) must yield an effect that is also of a distinctly different nature. For example, the restraint assumed by a householder leads to heaven and so forth (i.e., rebirth in good abodes) while the restraint of a renunciant leads to liberation; thus their respective goals are totally distinct from one another. The mendicant restraint that is intended by you to serve as the cause of liberation for monks differs from that of nuns: the latter demands the wearing of clothes; the former does not.

69 Nevertheless, you refuse to accept that there is any qualitative difference between the liberation of the two, since you acknowledge that both the monk and the nun attain the same liberation--that is, that which is characterized by the total destruction of all the *karmans*. (Surely, this is inconsistent.)

70 Moreover, if it is admitted that the mendicant restraint which involves the wearing of clothes also serves as a cause of liberation (as you claim to be the case for women), then there would surely be no point in enjoining the compulsory renunciation of clothes (to those men who) are desirous of liberation. But since it is so enjoined, clothes must be assumed to be not conducive to liberation. This can be shown *via* a syllogism:

> Clothes are not conducive to liberation;
> because renunciation of clothes is compulsory for those who desire liberation;
> likewise wrong views (are to be abandoned and) cannot therefore be a condition for liberation.

You do not admit that abandoning clothes is laid down as compulsory for those (who wish to attain liberation). Conversely, that which is conducive to liberation is not to be abandoned and is compulsory to those who desire liberation, as, for example, right views.

71 It was also said: "The argument of (women's incapacity for attaining liberation because of the fact that she) is not reverentially greeted by men is inapplicable, as in the case of the *gaṇadharas* (who similarly are not greeted by the Tīrthaṅkaras)...This statement too is irrelevant, since the Arhats (i.e., the Tīrthaṅkaras) have attained to that extremely exalted state known as "attaining the body of a Tīrthaṅkara" (which is characterized by various auspicious marks and attended by assorted miracles); hence, it is only fitting that they should be reverentially greeted by all other people (such as the *gaṇadharas*) while not returning those greetings. There is no one in this world whose status is worthier than theirs and therefore no one whom the Tīrthaṅkaras may greet. On the other hand, the *gaṇadharas* do not attain that high status because of the absence of that sort of (supreme) merit; therefore, they do not have that status which is worthy of being reverentially greeted by the entire world, as do the Tīrthaṅkaras. As far as the conditions leading to liberation are concerned, however, there is no distinction whatsoever in the type of liberation achieved, whether that person is a Tīrthaṅkara or otherwise. But in the case of nuns, there is such a distinction, since they do not possess any of the causes leading to liberation--namely, the (perfection) of the Three Jewels.

72 Therefore (we propose the following argument);

Women do not attain the state of liberation;
Because they are unworthy of that status which is deserving of the reverential greetings of mendicants, householders, and gods;
As in the case of hermaphrodites.

There are, for example, two statuses that are worthy of the reverential greetings of mendicants: the primary and the secondary. In the case (of mendicants), the primary status is that of the Tīrthaṅkaras, while the secondary status is that of the *ācāryas* (leaders of the mendicant order) and so forth (i.e., the preceptors (*upādhyāyas*) and other monks (*sādhus*). Both these statuses are said to be assigned to men alone, not women. Similarly, there are also two statuses--primary and secondary--that are worthy of the greetings of householders and gods: respectively, the primary status is that of *cakravartins* (earthly rulers) and *indras* (kings of the gods); the secondary is that of provincial governors and (gods) of equal rank. But even these are known to be only for men, not women.

73 Furthermore, the authority in each and every household resides in men and not women: as is well known, whether the father is alive or not, in all matters the authority of a son alone prevails, even if he is younger and ugly, and never of a daughter, even if she is older and beautiful. Therefore, it is truly astonishing to assume that those (women) who do not even have authority over mundane fortunes would have any mastery over (the supra-mundane) fortunes of liberation.

74 (Yāpanīya:) If women do not attain liberation merely because they are unworthy of great mundane fortunes, then, as there would be no difference in the logic, you must also admit that the *gaṇadharas* and other mendicants could not attain liberation because they too are unworthy of attaining to the great glory of Tīrthaṅkarahood.

75 (Digambara:) That assertion too is not felicitous. This is because what is permitted or prohibited in one case does not necessarily apply to another. (Or, in this case, specific individuals within a group cannot be used to form a universal rule.) It is the prerogative of the male sex (to enjoy) the great glory (of Tīrthaṅkarahood), not of the female sex. Hence, liberation should be admitted only for the male sex, and females should be excluded.

(The opponent rejects this claim and says:) This claim of variability (i.e., that a specific individual of the male sex may attain liberation and yet remain incapable of attaining to the glory of a Tīrthaṅkara) does not hold, since even without enjoying the glory exclusive to the Tīrthaṅkara, a *gaṇadhara*

may attain liberation.

(Digambara:) It is not proper (for you) to bring up this fault of variability and claim that women are the equal of the *gaṇadharas*. (For example,) surely when the eldest prince inherits the kingdom and the other princes do not, one may admit that the latter are inferior to the former; even so, it would be wrong to then claim that those other sons are the equals of Tīrthaṅkaras. (Similarly, the *gaṇadharas* may not enjoy the glory of the Tīrthaṅkaras, but that does not make their position equal to that of the nuns.) It is well known that, in all activities in the world, sons are totally different from daughters. Therefore:

Women do not attain liberation;
For they are inferior to men;
Like hermaphrodites.

Nor is it that this inferiority of women has not been proved, for this (inferiority) was just now established.

76 Moreover, this (inferiority) is also proved by the fact that it is the men who remind (them of their duties), prevent (them from committing wrongs), and exhort (them to abide by their responsibilities); women do not do these things for men. Moreover, it is a male who becomes endowed with the body of a Tīrthaṅkara, not a female. As it has been said: Men remind, prevent, and exhort, not women." (*Oghaniryuktiṭīkā,* verse 448)

77 (Yāpanīya:) Such superiority and inferiority are not a means of attaining liberation; it is instead the endowment with the Three Jewels, as in the case of a disciple and a teacher. For example, disciples are inferior to teachers and teachers are superior to disciples, but both may attain liberation. Similarly, both monks and nuns may attain (liberation irrespective of the inferiority of the nuns).

78 (Digambara:) This is nothing but wishful thinking, for if it could be proved that the Three Jewels, which are undoubtedly the cause of liberation, can be attained by women to the same extent as they are attained by men, then both men and women could attain liberation, just as disciples and teacher (can both attain liberation) in spite of their respective inferiority and superiority. However, such (attainment of the Three Jewels to the same extent as men) is not found in women, because that which is the cause of attaining the Three Jewels (i.e., total restraints of a monk) has been rejected in detail with respect to women. Of course, the mere existence of the Three Jewels (in their rudimentary form) in women (which is not disputed) is not a sufficient cause for liberation. Otherwise, you would have to admit that householders (who also possess the rudiments of the Three Jewels) also could attain liberation. It is impossible even in a dream to imagine that a lamp can have the capacity to accomplish something that is possible only for the blazing sun.

79 Moreover, concerning the foregoing statement, "Even in their household life (Sītā and other women) were endowed with great strength (*sattva*)", even that suggestion is felicitous only so long as it is not critically examined. This is because only in a man does that great strength exist which, by virtue of his capacity to bear manifold and severe afflictions, he is capable of uprooting the totality of *karmans*. Even in a dream, women cannot have such great strength. As for (the description of) Sītā and the other ladies as being "possessed of great strength (*sattva*)", this was spoken only with reference to their ability to attain the highest degree of strength possible to women; in no activity whatsoever do they have the excellence in strength as is found among men. Being thus deficient in that kind of excellence of strength, how can women have that cause of liberation--that is, the total perfection of the three Jewels--that is possible only to one who has the supreme strength? Therefore

A female body is not the support of a self that can be considered to be endowed with the totality of the Three Jewels, which is the cause of liberation;

Because it has been produced by great evil (i.e., by the aid of wrong views);
Like the bodies of hell denizens and so forth.

80 Moreover, only that body by the support of which one can begin the total destruction of the totality of *karmans* can be considered a means for attaining liberation; and it is not the case that a female body can be a means for beginning such a destruction of *karmans*. This can be argued thus:

A female body is not a fitting means of even beginning the destruction of the totality of *karmans*;
Because that body is earned by the assistance of great evil (i.e., wrong views);
Like the bodies of hell demons and so forth.

The *karman* that produces a female body is extremely evil, since (a female body) is not earned by anyone except a person on the (first rung of the *guṇasthāna* ladder called) *mithyādṛṣṭi*, wrong view. Although (technically speaking, even a person dying) in the (second *guṇasthāna* called) *sāsvādana-saṃyagdṛṣṭi* may also attain a female body, in actuality he must be considered a person endowed with wrong views, since he is in the process of forsaking the right view. He is, therefore, designated as "one who is endowed with wrong views," since he is tending toward the first *guṇasthāna*, called *mithyādṛṣṭi*. A female body is not attained even by a person who is in the transitory stage--namely, the third *guṇasthāna* called *saṃyagmithyādṛṣṭi*--let alone by one who is well established in the fourth *guṇasthāna* called *saṃyagdṛṣṭi*. A self that has been born as a female must be necessarily be born possessed of wrong views. As has been said: "One endowed with right views is not reborn in the six lower hells nor in the (lower) heavenly existences, namely, Jyotiṣka, Vyantara, and Bhavanavāsi; nor in any female bodies; nor in the twelve kinds of lower animal births that are (invariably) associated with wrong views." (*Pañcasaṃgraha* I, 193) What great skillfulness in reasoning is required to maintain that women who cannot even attain the highest heavenly states of extremely long duration can, nevertheless, attain liberation!

81 Moreover, so far as the statement "eight hundred in one moment..." being a proof for the liberation of women is concerned, that too is a manifestation of considerable ignorance. This is because the text that you cite is not authoritative for us. Indeed, its lack of authority is well known, because it advocates materials that are contradicted by all means of verification. (Specifically,) we have already demonstrated in detail how the liberation of women is opposed to any means of verification.

82 (Yāpanya-Śvetāmbara:) But surely there is the following verse: "Those men who have climbed the ladder of the destruction of the *karmans* while experiencing male sexuality, as well as those in whom other sexualities arise, also will attain to *siddha*-hood if they engage in (the requisite) meditation." (*Prakṛti-Siddhabhakti*, verse 6). This is an authoritative text that advocates the liberation of women. How can you therefore state that the former text ("eight hundred at a time") advocates something that is invalidated by the means of verification? How can you make a flat claim that the liberation of women is impossible according to all scriptures?

83 (Digambara:) This too is wishful thinking, because it is impossible that the text you referred to ("Those men who...while experiencing male sexuality", in 82) would declare that women may attain liberation. That text indeed mentions liberation only with reference to males, since it not only speaks of the rise of male sexuality in those who are males by gender but also states that the remaining two types of sexuality (of females and hermaphrodites) also arise only in one who is of male gender. As should be apparent, the word "males" (*puruṣāḥ*) in the foregoing verse is connected with both (of the other two types of sexuality). This is because "sexuality" (*veda*) refers to a specific type of desire and a passion of the mind, either of which are born due to the rise of the deluding

karman. As is well known, the expression "rise" ('*udaya*' in the foregoing verse) can be applied only to mental states, not to the gender (of the aspirant).

84 (Digambara:) It also was said: "Just as a person who is male by gender (but internally female) comes to be considered a 'woman' and may attain liberation, so also may a person who is female by gender but psychologically 'male' attain liberation": this too is unsubstantial talk. As we have already expounded upon the inability of a person who is of female gender to attain liberation, how could it be admissible that such a female could attain liberation through experiencing "male" sexual feelings?

A being that is unable to attain liberation because it is physically unfit to do so must necessarily be unable to attain it mentally also; as, for example, animals and (other nonhuman beings), and a woman is unable to attain liberation because of her female body. Therefore, she cannot attain it mentally either.

Consequently, regardless of the type of sexuality a person may experience psychologically, only a person who is male by gender at the time of ascending the ladder of the path (from the seventh *guṇasthāna* onward) may be admitted to have the ability to vanquish the totality of the hosts of *karman*. This is in conformity with worldly usage also. As is well known even to children, a man who is endowed with great strength, having mounted whatever mount is available to him, whether elephant, horse, and so forth, and having taken hold of some superhuman weapon in the battlefield, defeats the entire host of enemies; this is not done by a woman, who is appropriately called "powerless" (*abalā*, a synonym for "woman"). Similarly, only a person who is of the male gender, having experienced one of the three internal sexual feelings and having taken hold of the incomparable weapon called "white (i.e., purest) meditation", eradicates the host of *karmans* and experiences the highest glory.

85 (Digambara:) It was also said: "Sexuality is irrelevant to the attainment of Siddhahood and so forth." We too do not admit that one attains liberation while still in possession of sexuality; we advocate that the former and latter liberations (i.e., *arhat*ship and *siddha*-hood respectively) are both made possible only through the intense fire of the purest form of meditation, which alone is able to burn completely the totality of *karmans*.

Pages 403-411 of the *Nyāyakumudacandra* are analyzed in S. C. Dash, "Prabhācandra's concept of *smṛti*", in V. N. Jha 1997, pp. 164-172. We reproduce here the conclusion of this article, with grammatical and stylistic alterations to suit the style of our present Volume.

"1. Memory is not a cognizer (*jñātṛ*) since a cognizer is he who wants to know something or about something, whereas memory is a process, viz. remembering.

'2. Prabhācandra proves that memory is different from awarenesses like perception, inference, etc. on three grounds. They are causal factor, characteristic feature, and the content of the awareness.

"3. Memory refer to the experience of past events, whereas perception, etc. refer to present experience.

"4. The knower remembers the earlier experience and for that having been experienced (*anubhūtatā*) is the helping factor, whereas in perception, etc. the knower is required to be experiencing (*anubhūyamānatā*). This is the basic reason why *smṛti* is included in indirect (*parokṣa*) *pramāṇa*.

"5. Prabhācandra refutes all the earlier definitions and gives his own definition, viz., "*jñānaviśeṣa eva hi saṃskāraviśeṣa-prabhavaḥ tadity ākāro'nubhūtārtha-viṣayaḥ smṛtirity ucyate.*" [Dash does not translate this: we may offer a try: "What is called 'memory' is a specific kind of awareness which is produced from a specific trace (*saṃskāra*), which has the form 'that (thing)' and the content of which is a content experienced (previously)."

"6. Memory is an operating instrument for the production

of knowledge, as it is proved in the case of the remembrance of pervasion in the case of inference also, and hence (is) different from inference and called a *pramāṇa*.

"7. Memory is non-erroneous with reference to the content of the earlier experience and helps in bring out the revival of the past impressions which is required for focused concentration (*dhāraṇā*) in the Jaina tradition.

Jonardon Ganeri has translated an important section of this work in J. Ganeri, *Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 145-146. The Sanskrit text of the passage occurs in the 1991 edition of the work by Mahendra Kumar, cited above, pp. 421-425. In this passage, Prabhācandra is commenting on Siddhasena's definition of a "reason", found in *Nyāyāvatāra* 22, which Ganeri translates as "The mark of a reason is 'being impossible otherwise' (*anyathānupannatva*)". To explain the context of Prabhācandra's passage, as well as to clarify Ganeri's translation of certain relevant technical terms, it is best to give here (in parentheses) his introduction and conclusion to the paragraph in which he translates the passage we will then quote:

("Vādideva Sūri gives the developed Jaina formulation:

> "A reason has a single mark, 'determined as impossible otherwise'. It does not have three marks, for fallacies are then still possible" (*Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 3.11-12)

"The idea is that the reason" (-property) "*cannot* be present if the target" (i.e., the *sādhya*-property) is not. It is impossible for the reason to be present otherwise than if the target is present. The presence of the reason necessitates the presence of the target. The necessity introduced by the new definition (i.e., Siddhasena's definition above) "is in fact a universal quantification over parameter-values. What the new definition states is that there is no set of parameter-values for which the

reason is present, but not the target. That rules out the worrisome case--the case where the target is non-present, but the reason is both absent and present. For a property is absent if it not present at some set of values, and it is non-present if it is not present at *any* set of values. And if we read 'no presence without' as 'non-presence without' then what the definition states is that there is no set of parameter values at which the reason is present, but not the target".

"The problem is discussed in detail by Prabhācandra..."--[and now follows the quote from our text]:

"(Opponent:) And again, is it that smoke is impossible when some one fire is absent or when all fire is absent? Not some one (fire), because even when one fire is absent the presence of smoke is possible if another fire (is present). Not all (fires), for it is impossible to comprehend (every absence of fire) without comprehending a condition (qualifying the absences generally). A condition (*upādhi*) for the absence of smoke is the absence of fire in general, and that cannot be comprehended when every fire is not comprehended, since to comprehend an absence it is necessary to comprehend the locus of the absentee."

"And also, even when the absence of a certain fire is absent, a contradiction is seen between the presence of smoke and the absence of smoke. So the condition for opposition to the presence of smoke is not the absence of fire but the absence of smoke..."

"(Reply:) Whatever was said on the lines of 'is it that smoke is impossible when some one fire is absent or when all fire is absent,' that is not right at all. For the extrapolation relation (i.e., pervasion, *vyāpti*) is understood in dependence on all, as in 'any particular smoke is impossible when all fire is absent', and not by mentioning each and every locus, as in 'smoke is impossible when fire is absent on the mountain or in the house or in the forest.' For if that were required no extrapolation relation could be proved even with an infinite amount of time,

since there are infinitely many loci. And because an extrapolation would be useless, since the time of comprehending the extrapolation relation would be the same as that of comprehending the loci of fire and smoke together."

"Now one should not say that, if the qualifying condition for the impossibility of smoke concerns all fire, and this is not comprehended, then neither can one comprehend its absence. For the absence of the (fire) is its presence at other places, etc. (i.e. other parameter values), and because the absence is being present at other presences, which (in turn) is because presence expels absence. That is how a place, etc. is cognized perceptually as disjoined from all fire..."

"And whatever was said on the lines of 'even when the absence of a certain fire is absent, an opposition is seen between the presence of smoke and the absence of smoke,' that too is mere words. For when fire is absent, the presence of smoke is necessarily ruled out. This is because both the absence of fire and the absence of smoke can be the bases of an opposition to (smoke). That which is necessarily ruled out when something is present is a basis of an opposition to it. For example, cold touch in the presence of hot touch. The presence of smoke is necessarily ruled out when fire is absent; so it is the basis of an opposition to smoke."

Ganeri explains: "The distinction between some fire being absent and all fire being absent is just the one between fire being absent (not present with respect to some parameter) and (its being) non-present (not present with respect to any parameter). Prabhācandra is emphatic that it is the latter that we need. One property contradicts another if its presence 'necessarily rules out' the presence of the other. The absence of fire does not contradict it presence, but its non-presence does. And the logical form of the extrapolation relation is: if there is no set of parameter values for which fire is present, then there is no set of parameter values for which smoke is present. Non-presence of target implies non-presence of reason.")

8.16 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* on Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha*[27]

Summary by Piotr Balcerowicz

The work ('The Lotus-like Sun [revealing] Cognizable Objects'), being a commentary on 'An Introduction to Analysis', has been edited by Mahendra Kumar Sastri in 1941 (Nirnayasagarā Press, Mumbai) and reprinted in 1990 (Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi). "E" refers to the pages of that edition. "PM" refers to the *Parīksāmukha.*

Chapter One: On the Definition of a Cognitive Criterion

(E1-7) Eulogy in praise of Mahāvīra, etc. The existence of an object is established by cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*), whereas misconception arises due to the use of fallacious (*ābhāsa*) cognitive criteria. That is one of the possible ways to ward off the hypothetical criticisms, voiced at the outset of the work, that the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* is incoherent, illogical and self-contradictory, its subject -matter has no real referent, and it serves no purpose, like a madman's statement, that it does not have meaningful contents as its subject-matter, like an investigation of a crow's teeth, that it has no reasonable or realistic purpose, like the discussion of one's mother's remarriage, and that it is not possible to accomplish its goal, like the (supposedly) miraculous gem that cures all afflictions. Since the definition of 'cognitive criterion' is a matter dispute, Prabhācandra explains, it is necessary to define it adequately, because as long as we do not rely on proper cognitive procedures our cognition of the world and all things cognizable is not only liable to doubt but even fallacious.

(E7-13) (On PM 1.1) The definition of "*pramāṇa*" follows. It is a cognition whose nature is the determination of both itself and a previously uncognized object, because the nature of a cognitive criterion is otherwise not explicable

(*anyathānupapatti*). Prabhācandra denies that a *pramāṇa* is just anything that accompanies the rise of cognition or that it is the complete causal complex (*sāmagri*) that occasions the comprehension of an object in a non-deviant, reliable manner. A *pramāṇa* is an awareness which excludes all accompanying factors such as light, sense-organs, contact of the organs with an object, etc. from being included in the definition. Every cognitive act is necessarily accompanied by some kind of self-awareness, for entities can be causes of their effects by virtue of their own nature only and not due to accompanying factors such as place, time etc. A detailed discussions, and subsequent rejection from the definiens, of a number of such factors follows.

(E14-19) The Nyāya definition of a *pramāṇa,* and its corollaries (e.g., the connection of the sense-organ with the object as an integral element), is refuted. If one wants to characterize the most efficient means (*sādhakaraṇa*) contributing to true cognition, it is not really the case, as the Naiyayika holds, that being a *pramāṇa* requires being the most efficient means contributing to true cognition (i.e., that every most efficient means contributing to true cognition is necessarily a *pramāṇa*), just as being a *pramāṇa* does not require either cognition *per se* (*jñāna*), such as doubt or false cognition (*ajñāna*), even when its object is real. The Naiyāyika's following argument to prove that also such factors as the contact of a sense-organ with the object etc. is faulty: whenever it is the case that when x occurs the resulting cognition occurs, and when x does not occur the resulting cognition does not occur either, such x is the most efficient means contributing to true cognition.

Is the fitness (or cognitive capability, *yogyatā*) of the most efficient means contributing to true cognition some kind of special capacity, either extrasensory or characterized by the presence of auxiliary factors? Or is it an auxiliary factor as such, be it a substance, quality or motion, or merely the removal of impediments to the cognizer's cognition? None of these can be a *pramāṇa*. Since the self is the cognizer (*pramātṛ*) and a macroscopic object is what is cognized (*prameya*), none of these can be the *pramaṇa*; something else must be, other than these two, that is the *pramāṇa*. In reality, the self as the ultimate cognizer is the *pramāṇa*. That is why it is not the case that the truth is arrived at when all of four elements are there separately–the cognizer, the *pramāṇa*, the content and the resulting cognition; truth arises just when the cognizing self is there, because that self incorporates the other three components.

Rejection of the Naiyāyika's theory that the characteristic of the use of the internal organ (*manas*) is that two (or more) cognitive acts cannot occur at the same time (*Nyāyasūtra* I.1.16). The implication would render the omniscience, e.g. of Maheśvara, impossible.

(E19-20) Refutation of the Sāṃkhya definition. The operation of the sense-organs cannot be a *pramāṇa*. According to the Sāṃkhyas, perceptions, being *pramāṇa*, are restricted spatially (and temporally) to a place where the operation of the sense-organs takes place. That is why we have perceptions limited spatially. If the sense-organs did not count as *pramāṇa*s we could have perceptions anywhere, because they would not be restricted to the place of the sense organ.

(E20-25) Criticism of Mīmāṃsā definitions. First comes the refutation of Prabhākara's definition of "*pramāṇa*" as "the activity of the cognizer, which can also be of a non-cognitive nature, that illuminates the true nature (*tathātva*) of an object", because this cannot be proved either by perception or by inference or in any other way. Further, this definition is not compatible with inference defined as "the judgment with respect to a remote object on account of seeing one aspect of something whose invariable relation (to that remote object) is already known" (*Śabarabhāṣya* on I.1.5). This relation can be known neither by positive concomitance, nor negative

concomitance, nor by perception, nor non-perception, etc.

Acceptance of a sixth type of *pramāṇa*, namely non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) or absence (*abhāva*), leads to contradiction and other problems such as: how could non-apprehension be an "activity of the cognizer"? Further, on the Mīmāṃsā definition neither a *pramāṇa* nor a cognition as such could be the locus of a quality or a quality itself. Another undesired consequence would be that the cognizer would be unconscious. Also the definition of "*pramāṇa*" as an activity of the cognizer the nature of which is cognition, formulated by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, is flawed.

(E25-27) (On PM 1.2) A *pramāṇa* helps one attain happiness and the means to achieve it, and helps avoid unhappiness and what leads to unhappiness. A human being in principle strives to undertake causally efficient action (*arthakriyārthin*), and a *pramāṇa* can be instrumental in undertaking causally efficient actions, inasmuch as it indicates a content [of awareness]. However, it is not the case that there is no attainment of the goal if the goal is not indicated by any *pramāṇa*: one can accidentally be successful even without resorting to a *pramāṇa*.

The attainment of an object which one would like to achieve (*upādeyārtha*) rests on activity, not on *pramāṇas* as such, because it has its source in such an activity which is triggered by a person's will. However, it is not the case that there is operation (*vyāpāra*) of *pramāṇas* indicating an object only when an activity (*pravṛtti*) towards that object occurs. Experience contradicts this: e.g., "I see the moon" indicates the moon even though it does not make one undertake any activity. This fact, easily perceptible by everyone, is incompatible with the Buddhist understanding of what a *pramāṇa* is–i.e., something that triggers activity–for clearly something which should be avoided does not activate the person to avoid it [since there is no such thing]. This additionally invalidates the Buddhist definition of "*pramāṇa*".

Question: Is the object of an activity future or present? It cannot be a future object, because it, being something that exists in the future, could not activate perception that prompts one to undertake activity in order to attain the object. But it cannot be a present object either, because there cannot be any activity with respect to an object one desires to achieve by one who has not yet experienced (e.g. perceived) that object. And it is well-known that only a concrete thing prompts causally efficient action towards it as an intended result, for only animals act immediately without first considering their action. Therefore the concept of undertaking activity is irrelevant to the definition of "*pramāṇa*"; it is rightly said that the distinctive feature of a *pramāṇa* is cognition (i.e., it is a cognitive state), in order to exclude any non-cognitive element from it such as activity.

(E27-36) (On PM 1.3) A *pramāṇa* constitutes a true, determining (*niścaya*), construction-filled) belief and is contrary to any kind of false superimposition, of which there are three main types: doubt, error and non-apprehension. "The quality of being contrary to these" means that a *pramāṇa* grasps or indicates the true nature (*tathā-bhāva*) of an actual entity (*vastu*) and is pervaded by the quality of being construction-filled and true; this includes inference. And it is not construction-free.

There is no awareness of the clarity (characteristic of perception and self-perception or introspection of cognition) of a construction-filled state, for one apprehends the identity of the construction-free and construction-filled moments of awareness, which apprehension is in its turn due to the simultaneous grasp or indiscernible consecutive recurrence of the two states. They usually occur together. It is not the case that construction-filled awareness is indistinct (*aspaṣṭa*) and construction-free awareness distinct (*spaṣṭa*) and known through perception. How can one attempt to analyze this state if one dismisses clarity as something directly experienced

perceptually and views it instead as something which cannot be directly experienced? As long as one does not understand both theses states there could not be awareness of a difference between them, since such difference is never experienced between awareness (*buddhi*) and consciousness (*caitanya*) as there is said to be (for example) in the Sāṃkhya system? Further, the construction-filled character of awareness invalidates what Dharmakīrti (in the *Nyāyabindu*) says about there being a kind of perception which is "introspective" (*ātmasaṃvedana*) of all kinds of consciousness (*citta*) and all mental concomitants (*caitta*)

However, what does the seeming apprehension of the identity of construction-filled and construction-free states of awareness involve? Does it mean that these two have one and the same content, or that the one's content becomes the content of the other, or that the apprehension of one is mirrored in the other? An analysis follows. Further, would this seemingly apprehended identity be apprehended in a construction-free way, or a construction-filled way, or some other way?

Dharmakīrti's answer is that a construction-free cognitive state such as the perception of some color is experienced perceptually in its pure form when all construction-filled states have been pacified (*saṃhṛtya*) (*Pramāṇavārttika* II.3.123-124: "After one has withdrawn one's own thought from everything, even though one abides tranquil inside oneself, the mind incited by the senses sees non-conceptually some form with the eye. Perception is proved to be free from construction by that very perception itself. The conceptual awarenesses of all beings is cognized by itself individually and is correlated with the words." Dharmakīrti is reported to have said that in such a construction-free state of pacified conceptualizations it is not possible for conceptualizations experienced as associated with language etc. to occur. That is obviously wrong because, as Prabhācandra explains, such perception which is construction-free is simply impossible in the case of someone who, directly

perceiving an horse, the nature of which is stationary, gross etc, and who now finds himself in a construction-free state of awareness of a cow. What has happened is that one image (of horse) has been replaced by another (of cow), but both are of a construction-filled character. Something which is not definitely cognized cannot aspire to possess cognitive validity (*prāmāṇya*).

There are other problems with the Buddhist idea of purely construction-free cognitions, one of them being the impossibility of purely construction-free perception giving rise to any conceptual cognitive state. After a lengthy discussion Prabhācandra concludes that construction-filled awareness–being both reliable and an efficient means to a construction-filled cognition of an object, and also because it makes certain things which were so far uncertain–can be a genuine *pramāṇa*. And the cognizing subject desiring to know the world has to take recourse to it. Inference is a good example of such a construction-filled cognition. In contradistinction to such kinds of cognitions, a purely construction-free awareness cannot be reckoned as a *pramāṇa*, because it differs in all these aspects, including that it does not bring in any certainty and the cognizing subject cannot really have a chance to take recourse to it.

(E30-38) One could argue as follows: On the other hand, a construction-filled awareness fails to possess cognitively valid status (*prāmāṇya*), i.e. be a *pramāṇa*, for a number of reasons: it lacks lucid, clear form; it can grasp what is normally never grasped (e.g. objects in the realm of fantasy); it prompts one to undertake action with respect to something which does not exist; it is not capable of making one achieve something that is to be achieved or making one avoid something that is to be avoided; it is not useful in everyday practice; its domain is not the pure particular, i.e. something which ultimately exists; it is sometimes fallible; it does not preclude false superimposition; it is triggered by verbal symbols, not by real existents; it brings

in an image of something even though that something does not exist; etc. Prabhācandra subsequently rejects all these criticisms by analyzing them one by one, and explaining that even though some of these points may be relevant (e.g., indeed conceptualization lacks lucid, clear form), they do not rule out the cognitive validity of construction-filled cognitions for various reasons.

(E40-44) Discussion of the view, ascribed to Śabdādvaitins, i.e., followers of Bhartṛhari, that all ideas and cognitive states are imbued with or intrinsically related to speech and the verbal domain, without which they cannot exist, and that is why they have to be conceptual by nature; without speech no cognition would possess the capacity to manifest an object. A few verses from the *Vākyapadīya* are cited. Their ultimate underlying, verbal reality, called *śabdabrahman*, has no beginning and no end, because it does not undergo any origination or destruction; it is indestructible (*akṣara*) because it is occasioned by phonemes (*akṣara*) such as "a", etc.

Prabhācandra rejects this view for a number of reasons. First of all, the fact of all entities and ideas being imbued with speech is in no way reflected or represented in our actual cognitions. For how could we prove this? It would have to be either by perception, whether sensory or introspective, or by inference of some sort: but none of these can corroborate such a claim of verbal reality and the purely verbal nature of our cognitions. One cannot even prove, on the basis of a recollection of an object as closely connected with a verbal expression, that we had a perception of the object as having such a nature–that would be a circular argument.

Further, what does it mean to say that an object is closely connected with a verbal expression? Is it that when there is perception of an object one immediately cognizes its verbal designation? Or is it that when the object itself occurs, there also occurs its verbal designation? None of these possibilities hold. How could then one explain perception in the case of a

very young child, who has not yet learnt a language, or of a mute person who knows no verbal designations? The doctrine of Śabdādvaita would imply that anyone who doesn't possess any linguistic skills and doesn't know any verbal expressions cannot have or experience perceptions, i.e. would virtually be blind, etc.

Can one prove that the world is made of speech on the basis of it consisting in the transformation of speech or because it originates from speech? But how can speech evolve, as the world does, if it is indestructible, hence unchanging? And how can speech produce anything, being eternal and unchanging? One is faced with the dilemma of how an eternal, unchanging entity can produce effects. Does it produce its effects continuously (if its eternal nature is to produce)? or all at once?, or simultaneously? (but then the cause cannot be eternal).

(E44-46) Next Prabhācandra discusses the monistic position: the ultimate verbal underlying reality, called *śabdabrahman*, is homogeneous and unified, undivided and complete in its nature, without beginning and end, unchanging; nevertheless, ordinary people who are impaired in their thought and vision due to ignorance comprehend it as manifold and intrinsically differentiated, the way they grasp the manifested world. In support some verses of Sureśvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* are quoted. Prabhācandra retorts that there is no valid way to prove such a theory; the monistic "verbal absolute" cannot be demonstrated or proved by means of perception, inference, or even by such statements as "all this is indeed Brahman" (*Maitryupaniṣad*).

(E47-59) Another problem indicated by an opponent is this: If one cognition of a definite (*vyavasāya*) nature possessed cognitive validity, then all cognitions of such a nature would automatically become *pramāṇas*, including cognitive errors, since they are likewise of determinate nature.

A problem raised by a skeptic is this: Since such cognitions

as doubt, error etc. are not established as valid by nature, what exactly is rejected or criticized by the reference to "cognitions of determinate nature"? The analysis of the nature of a doubt in terms of its locus and qualities leads to the conclusion that doubt as such is not possible, nor is false cognition or error.

Prabhācandra responds that what doubt is every living being can experience directly and introspectively; it has the nature of uncertain, faltering comprehension. His reply is also applicable to similar difficulties regarding cognitive error.

Prabhācandra further analyzes, step by step, the nature of various types of invalid cognitive acts such as doubt, illusion, cognitive error, etc., and attempts to show that their nature is not of a determinate character, for being conceptual does not entail being determinate. Doubt is first subjected to analysis. It is clearly distinguished from cognitive error. The various types of error are distinguished: a pseudo-presentation (*akhyāti*), a presentation of something non-existent (*asatkhyāti*), a presentation of an already well-known object (*prasiddhārthakhyāti*), the self-presentation of consciousness (*ātmakhyāti*), the (monistic) presentation of the inexpressible object as existence, non-existence etc. (*sadasattvādy-anirvacanīyārthakhyāti*), the presentation of something in a distorted form (*viparītakhyāti*) or the obscuration of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*). In the sequel, all these are discussed in detail. The recurring theme is the correspondence theory of truth (as something that provides, with external reality, an objective criterion of truth) to refute all these theories of error.

There is no problem with the overlapping of *pramāṇas*. The fact that two or more *pramāṇas* grasp one and the same object does not make its cognition invalid, because each *pramāṇa* may contribute some new piece of information to the knowledge which we already have of the object. No ordinary cognition is capable of providing exhaustive information about an actual entity, and that is why a subsequent cognition may indeed bring in new data about other aspects of a thing.

(E59-64) (On PM 1.4-5) The "previously uncognized object" (referred to in E7-13 above) is something which has not been ascertained either directly in its own form or with one of its distinctive features. Further also, an object which has been previously seen and apprehended but due to a mistake or false superimposition (*samāropa*) is sometimes accompanied by doubt can also be reckoned as an object previously uncognized. That is why comprehension of a not-yet-comprehended object is not really a defining characteristic of a *pramāṇa*. And it is not always the case that the first cognition which apprehends an object becomes a *pramāṇa*.

A problem is addressed: Can a second cognition establish the truth of a previous cognition? A discussion of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) follows. It cannot be proved, on the basis that recognition apprehends an object already cognized either by perception or memory, that recognition grasps an object which has already been experienced, because the truth is that it does not act with respect to exactly the same object which is being perceived or remembered. Prabhācandra points out that otherwise one would have to accept that, since any cognition which grasps a previously uncognized object is a *pramāṇa*, the cognition of a double moon would turn out to be a *pramāṇa* if one has not grasped a double moon before. And one could not argue, for a number of reasons, that such a cognition of a double moon is not a *pramāṇa* because it can be sublated (*bādhita*), inasmuch as only such a cognition that is free from sublation can be accepted as a *pramāṇa*.

A discussion follows concerning what exactly the state of being free from sublation is and under what conditions can we know its occurrence. Is the state of being free from sublation something that takes place at the same time as the cognition, or something that takes place at some later point of time, or is the cause which produces a cognition itself a *pramāṇa*? And is it a quality which is known as such, or unknown? A number of possibilities are discussed. The conclusion is that the state of

being free from sublation with respect to all cases and always is not something that can be known to a person who is not omniscient. A related problem is how to know whether our cognition has been caused by factors which are not defective, and is this quality something that is known, and if so, at what time and by what means, or does it remain unknown?

(E64-67) Prabhācandra considers the idealist's criticism (Bhāskara's?) leveled against the cognition of a definite nature which grasps a previously uncognized content being defined in the above manner, the criticism being that a definite cognition which comprehends an empirically available content of our ordinary experience does not correspond to truth, whereas only the cognition which makes one grasp the ultimate reality is true. A few lines from the *Ṛgveda, Maitryupaniṣad* and *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* etc. are quoted in support of such a criticism and elaborate arguments are provided to prove that the diversified world is an illusion. E.g., how can one prove the differences between objects–through the difference of place, time or form? None of these hold, however, for how could the awareness of diversified form be logically possible? The one, uniform Absolute (Brahman) is by nature pure consciousness and all systems that speak of manifold things are false, for they contradict the statement of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* "Brahman is truth and consciousness and is infinite". Only that *pramāṇa* of something that is both differentiated and undifferentiated (*bhedābheda*) has as its content an actual entity, whereas ignorance (*avidyā*), the content of which is unreal only, is illusion (*māyā*), since it represents itself falsely. The conclusion of this lengthy passage is that Brahman as undifferentiated (*advaita*) and as the ultimate reality is proved by virtue of the fact that the unity of the world can be known through perception, inference and scriptures.

(E67-77) A refutation of the monistic standpoint, presented above, follows. It begins with a dilemma. Is non-difference (*abheda*) proved because the phenomenal differentiation is

disproved through a *pramāṇa*, or because there is a *pramāṇa* to prove the monistic unity? Well, neither of these options works. As Prabhācandra demonstrates, it is certainly not the case that the monistic unity can be ascertained through construction-free perception (and the monists argument rests on the assumption that the illusion of a differentiated phenomenal world occurs through the process of construction). Would its contents be one individual, or man individuals, or the individual essence? These and other possibilities will inevitably lead to the conclusion that the unity cannot be perceived or conceived without admitting manifold-ness. Hence there is a contradiction.

Prabhācandra sarcastically points out that the Advaitin's explanation that the differentiated phenomenal world becomes the contents of construction-filled awareness due to some external factor begs a counter-argument, viz., the monistic unity becomes the content of construction-filled awareness due to some external factor, i.e the objectively existent diversity. More elaborate arguments follow.

What actually is this constructive or conceptual state of mind? A number of possible explanations are examined: Is it the condition of a cognition which immediately follows recollection? the fact a of cognition's being imbued with speech? the manifestation of the class (or universal) etc. in cognition? a cognition's having a non-existent thing as its content? a cognition's determination of the essential nature of a thing by way of dependence on some other factor or metaphorical transference? He rejects the claim that the unity of consciousness or the self must be proved through inference or scripture if one wants to retain their purposefulness.

It is not true that the self is the cause of the creation, continuity and dissolution of the whole world in any sense, because the cause-effect relation would contradict the notion of monistic unity. In such a way also, the ability of a permanent entity to produce any effects is refuted.

What purpose would the creator, Brahmā, have in creating

the diversity of the world (which apparently contradicts the Vedāntins monistic unity)? It couldn't be a purposeless act of rapture. It couldn't be an act of compassion to help other beings either, because one shouldn't have created the world with living beings afflicted with pain and tormented in hells etc., and because prior to the act of creation there wouldn't have been any entity or living being with respect to which the creator Brahmā could experience compassion, hence compassion itself would be groundless and purposeless. Another possibility is that Brahmā creates the world with happiness and suffering in dependence on the invisible principle (*adṛṣṭa*) of the merits (righteousness) and demerits (unrighteousness) of living beings, but then he is impeded in his independence and freedom of choice and his actions are determined by factors external to him. If one assumes that the diverse complexity of the world is due to merits and demerits of living beings, what's the use of additional useless factors which cause suffering? In no way is it possible to argue that the creator acts prompted by compassion.

The creator Brahmā cannot create out of his free will. The comparison of the creation of the world to a spider which makes its net out of its free will does not work because the spider is driven by its desire to consume its victims. An explanation that the world is just a perceptual vision of the creator is extremely paradoxical.

It is not possible to explain the apparent difference of objects in the ultimately monistic world due to difference of place, time or form, because these differences would involve real distinctions and the monistic world then turns out to be a fiction. One has to accept the intrinsic oneness of the universal or the intrinsic difference of the particulars as ultimate. One cannot claim that ignorance does not really exist as something different from Brahman and that it is Brahman which is ultimately active. Prabhācandra rejects the Advaitin's definition of ignorance as the prior absence of a cognition of truth.

The argument based on the assumption--that a *pramāṇa* which is both differentiated and undifferentiated has as its content an actual entity--is faulty because the implication is that there is ultimately no content of construction-filled awareness if we accept the idea of ignorance.

The Advaitin argues: If the representation of a differentiated world occurs in the state of dreams, it does not have to mean that the differentiated world or its representation is the ultimate reality. Prabhācandra criticizes this.

Another problem raised by an opponent is this: What is actually negated by a sublating factor (e.g., a cognition)? Is it a cognition? or its content? or its result? A related problem is how we can know that our cognition is true and whether we can know it by means of a sublating cognition? Is it really the case that the cognition which can be taken as sublating is the subsequent one which presents a content contrary to the original one, and that what becomes sublated is the presentation by a previous cognition of a content which turns out to be non-existent? What is the sublating factor? Is it cognition *per se* or is it an object? Further, for someone who maintains that the sublating factor may invalidate either a previous cognition or a previously cognized content the following problem arises: What actually is the relation between what sublates and what is sublated?

(E77-83) The next butt of criticism is the Yogācārin and his theory of the sole existence of consciousness (*vijñānamātratā*), which is claimed to be established as the ultimate reality because an external object supposedly does not exist independently inasmuch as it is not cognized as different from the essence of a part-less, unified consciousness (*buddhi*); further, the theory that the cognition which grasps this consciousness is a *pramāṇa*. Is one supposed to accept the sole existence of consciousness as the ultimate reality simply because of the existence of a *pramāṇa* which apprehends the essence of a part-less, unified consciousness or on account of a

pramāṇa which sublates the existence of an external object? Whichever path we take it is not possible to prove that what ultimately exists is undivided consciousness. The non-existence of an external object cannot be proved by perception or inference, and subsequently one has to reject the Vijñānavādin's theory.

Another attempt to prove the sole existence of consciousness is not by rejecting any content of cognition but by demonstrating that both the content and its awareness are one and the same because their apprehension is invariably concurrent. In passing, the problem of the cognition of the omniscient in Buddhism is discussed. The fact that invariable concurrence of the omniscient's cognition and the objects of his cognition does not prove that there are one and the same thing. If the Buddha weren't accepted as ultimately omniscient, why should one say he "is someone who is the *pramāṇa*" (*Pramāṇasamuccaya*)?

But what actually does this concurrent apprehension mean? Does it mean that two things are apprehended simultaneously, or that there is no consecutive apprehension, or that two things are comprehended as one? Further, what sort of unity can be proved in this way: is it the oneness of the content and its awareness or the absence of difference? Prabhācandra demonstrates how both these alternatives lead to one and the same conclusion: their undesired consequence is the relation between something-to-be-grasped and something-which-grasps (*grāhyagrāhakabhāva*) and a proof of the existence of an external object.

(E83-86) (Buddhist:) First, cognition is said to be whatever is manifested. What would be a correct logical reason for that: the fact that it manifests itself by itself? or by something else? or just the very fact of it manifesting itself? All three are rejected. Further, is the "I" notion grasped or not grasped? does consciousness involve any cognitive operation or not? does it have definite content or is it content-less? does it occur at the

same time as a cognition grasping e.g. something blue or at a different time? All these possibilities are analyzed, and in support some verses of the *Pramāṇavārttika* are quoted. The conclusion drawn is that consciousness is illusory. That also leads the opponent to establish a link with an insentient, material object: its notion in consciousness cannot come from outside of it. Also the contention "I know this with my eye" brings the Buddhist to the conclusion that the cognition which has this material object as its content occurs due to traces and beginningless ignorance in the very same way as an image of a double moon can appear in awareness without the existence of an external object that could correspond to the image.

(E86-94) Prabhācandra responds to Buddhist arguments. The nature of consciousness (and he deliberately chooses the Buddhist term "*vijñāna*") is such that it correctly manifests both the cognizing subject (reflected in the "I" notion which the Buddhist contests) and the cognized object, external to itself. Similarly, the dilemma whether consciousness involves cognitive operations or not, has definite contents, or is content-less etc., are not really applicable for a number of reasons.

The possibilities listed by the Buddhist–whether cognitions occurs at the same time as a cognition grasping e.g. something blue, or at a different time, etc., would hold provided one accepted the theory of absolute momentariness.

Prabhācandra refers to the Buddhist argument that at the time when an object is actually perceived it does not really exist, due to its momentary existence, and the undesired implication of that is that all beings would be omniscient, because they could grasp what does not stand in front of their eyes. He also indicates that absolute momentariness is not compatible with, and actually would undermine, inference. Inference is defined as cognition of an inferential sign-possessor (*liṅgin*) on the basis of an inferential sign (*liṅga*) which fulfils three conditions of validity (*trirūpa*). These conditions cannot be fulfilled if reality is absolutely momentary, because of the

dilemma whether the cognition of the inferential sign concurs with the inferential sign or not.

Prabhācandra demonstrates why, under Sautrāntika-Yogācāra ontological assumptions, it would not be possible to grasp the content of consciousness through itself or through something else. He further refutes the Buddhist claim that an insentient, material object could not be manifested in cognition. He begins with a dilemma whether what could not be manifested is the insentient material object as something comprehended or not comprehended? Whichever way the Buddhist tries to disprove that an external material object could be manifested in consciousness, his argument will always involve mutual dependence (*anyonāśraya*).

There ensues a discussion, with reference to an example earlier used by the Buddhist, whether happiness and suffering essentially consist in consciousness or are external to or different from it, e.g. being qualities etc. If pleasure and pain were not essentially consciousness, there would be no use of pain because it would never be sensed. More options are examined.

(Buddhist:) Just as for a person suffering from an ophthalmological disorder there occurs an image of a double moon even though no double moon exists, in a similar way the agent, external object and all the ontological correlates of the subject-object relation may manifest themselves even though they are non-existent.

(Answer:) One may entertain such a belief but it is not possible to find a reliable argument of epistemic procedure to disprove the existence of the agent, etc., whereas one can easily find such an argument to disprove the existence of a double moon.

To conclude: If there were a proof to establish reality as undifferentiated and non-dual, that would entail the duality of that proof (i.e., that cognition) and the cognized, undifferentiated, non-dual world, and one could not then

escape the subject-object division however one tries to establish a monistic ontology. Further, if there be no such proof, the thesis of an undifferentiated reality cannot be proved, because the proof of the existence of a cognized object and its nature depends on the existence of a proof of undifferentiated reality.

This conclusion is followed by a discussion on whether the negation in "non-dual" ("*advaita*") is a weak (*prasajya*) or a strong (*paryudāsa*) negation (*pratiṣedha*)?

(E95-98) The Buddhists (viz., Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who are quoted) could try to defend non-dual reality as follows: Even though it appears as having a representation of a complex, differentiated form, cognition is numerically and essentially one and homogenous, inasmuch as it is ultimately devoid of any external, heterogeneous object. It is so because the external objects, being heterogeneous, might appear as distinguishable, whereas the images which occur in consciousness are indistinguishable from consciousness. Hence reality (consciousness) has to be one and ultimate.

Prabhācandra rejects this line of argument by showing a range of undesired implications. He also points out that the unity of the world would imply that the Buddha would still be engrossed in the mundane world (of *saṃsāra*) and ordinary folk, being engrossed in the mundane world, would be liberated Buddhas. If the Buddhist tries to defend himself by saying "well, suppose that at the time when the Buddha attains liberation all others also do, what would be the problem?", Prabhācandra ironically retorts: suppose that is the case, but then who would praise the Buddha as "someone who is the *pramāṇa*" etc. (*Pramāṇasamuccaya*)? Or who would be the one who is completely benevolent and dedicated (*parādhīna*), by virtue of whom Dharmakīrti says in the *Pramāṇavārttika* "There exist, i.e. remain in the mundane world, those who are completely benevolent and dedicated (the Buddhas) whose compassion for other beings is enormous"? Further, one would consequently "bid farewell to the dead cognizer", i.e. there would be no room

to admit anyone that could cognize.

Another problem is this: How could one prove absolute emptiness (*śūnyatā*): through a *pramāṇa?* or without one? In the first case, how could absolute emptiness be possible, if the *pramāṇa* which demonstrates the existence of absolute emptiness were genuinely real, i.e. not empty? In the second case, how could absolute emptiness be proved, if the proof of the existence of the cognized object depends on the existence of a *pramāṇa*?

(E98-103) (On PM1.6-7) In the definition of "*pramāṇa*" (*Parīkṣāmukha* I.1), "the determination of itself" means the representation in cognition as referring to or illuminating the nature of cognition itself. And similarly the determination of the object means the representation in cognition as referring to or illuminating the nature of an object external to cognition.

Prabhācandra launches an attack against the Sāṃkhya. First, he examines the Sāṃkhya argument:

> Cognition cannot consist in the determination of itself,
> Because it is unconscious, like a pot; and cognition is unconscious, because it is an evolute of *prakṛti* which is unconscious by nature;
> Whatever is conscious is not an evolute of *prakṛti*.
> Like the self.

Prabhācandra examines various possibilities within the Sāṃkhya system from which consciousness might be derived, but none of them is cogent: an example of a counter-argument is "whatever is conscious cannot be an evolute of *prakṛti*, like the self". He also demonstrates that the permanence and immutability of the self is not compatible with the idea that it is a cognizer and that therefore its nature is cognition. In fact, the idea of a conscious and cognizing entity is not compatible with Sāṃkhya ontology because there is no principle in the system from which the idea of cognition could be derived.

It is not possible to maintain that due to a special relation

(contact?) between the self and *prakṛti* a person in a state of mundane deception does not perceive the difference which does exist between the intellect (*buddhi*) and consciousness (*caitanya*), which is the essence of the self. If the intellect is not conscious by itself it would not be capable of comprehending any object. Similarly, the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is not capable of illuminating or perceiving anything. Therefore, there is nothing to support the thesis that the self cannot cognize without the internal organ, whereas there is much that speaks against it. Further, it is not possible that the intellect could contain an image or form of any object.

(E106-110) The arguments used against Sāṃkhya are now applied to refute the (Yogācāra-Sautrāntika?) Buddhist who maintains that cognitively valid status (*prāmāṇya*) applies to cognition by virtue of its possessing or acquiring the form of an object. This can be refuted also through perception and introspection. One of the arguments is that just as a cognition produced by an object imitates, say, its color, e.g. blue, in the same way if it were to imitate the object's insentience it would also be insentient. But if it is claimed that cognition does not imitate the object's insentience, what comprehends the object's insentience, i.e. how is that insentience reflected in cognition? If the insentience is not grasped by cognition, which cannot imitate the insentience, then also the object's being blue cannot be comprehended. Or else, how could one explain why the object's blueness is reflected in cognition but not its insentience? Should then the cognition grasping an object require another special cognition to grasp the object's insentience? But then the cognition would also require another cognition to grasp the object's blueness. The conclusion is that the idea that the cognition reflects, or imitates, the form of its object entails that it would have to imitate its insentience, ergo it would be insentient. Suppose then that the cognition does not imitate its object and occurs as having no specific form? But then the Buddhist concedes victory to the opponent.

Prabhācandra also provides positive proofs why cognition is not capable of imitating or appropriating an object's form. He proposes the following: if cognition possessed the form of an object, it would assume the form of cognizable things and thereby it would forego its state of a *pramāṇa*. But that is not the case because a *pramāṇa* and what is known by it (*prameya*) are represented in cognition due to the difference between them as occasioned externally and internally.

A further examination of the Buddhist position follows. Except for the fact that cognitive awareness has the form of its object it is not possible to relate the cognition to its object, e.g. "this is a cognitive awareness of something blue". That is why one should accept that an awareness has the form of its object, as Dharmakīrti explains in the *Pramāṇavārttika,* "for nothing relates a cognition to an object except for the fact that the cognition has the form of an object. This is why the *pramāṇa* for the comprehension of a cognizable thing is the fact of the cognition having the form of that cognizable thing." To see to what extent the Buddhist enjoys his immense ignorance,, Prabhacandra gibes, let us first see whether the cognition in question relates or connects itself to its object, or whether its being related to or having the form of an object is validated by something else? Obviously, the relation of the cognition to its object cannot be made in virtue of the cognition's assuming the form of its object, because the cognition of an object is produced as being related to the object in virtue of its causes, such as sense-organs, light etc. Further, is the fact of a cognition's having the form of its object made known by a cognition which has the form of its object or by a cognition that is without such a form? This dilemma demonstrates that the initial (Buddhist) thesis is wrong.

Another problem which is examined is this: For the Buddhist a *pramāṇa* is the relation of awareness to the object inasmuch as it is otherwise not explicable, and similarly the arising comprehension is the result, because the comprehension

is possible only as related to a well-determined object. Now is the object's form of momentariness different from its form of blueness etc., which forms both become the contents of cognition, or is it not different? Both alternatives yield undesired results.

(E110-121) Prabhācandra turns his criticism against the materialists now. Let's suppose, as the materialists do, that cognition (consciousness) has no form; for cognition cannot be known by itself, inasmuch as it is a transformation of material elements, like a mirror. Prabhācandra points out that the reason used in the argument, viz. that cognition (consciousness) is a transformation of material elements, cannot be proved in any way. Consciousness could be either that kind of transformation or not. If cognition (consciousness) were a result of a particular transformation of material elements, that would imply that it should be visible to external sense-organs, just like a mirror, and the theory cannot be saved even if the materialist holds that consciousness is made up of subtle matter, for subtle matter is still a kind of material element, being both essentially disconnected from conscious stuff and void of its materially observable form, and would permanently remain invisible to the external sense-organs and imperceptible to introspective perception, and it would turn out to be of the same class of inferable subtle entities as the afterlife, karmic merit, karmic demerit, etc. If consciousness, being a product of material elements, were of a different type than matter, it could not acquire its status of some conscious stuff, because if that were possible fire could easily acquire the status of water etc., and one would have to give up one's belief in the four material elements.

Suppose now, as the materialist suggests, that there would still be something else, e.g. the self, different from particular cognitive applications (faculties, *upayoga*) of cognition and perception, and different from matter; but this could not be proved either. It would consequently remain unknown even

introspectively, and could not be established through perception or inference etc. So this could not be claimed to be a site of consciousness, anyway.

Prabhācandra rejects this argument by claiming that the self is cognized through perception, and that is evident from such statements as "I am happy", "I am unhappy, "I want this". No one can claim that such feelings and statements that report such feelings are false, because there is nothing to sublate them. And they do not have their locus or origin in the body. These statements belong to a different category than the following, which do refer to the body: "I am fat", " "I am slim". Further, one cannot claim that the true nature of the self as conscious cannot be established because it is like material form, etc. When one says "I" one's nature is represented as consciousness.

In addition, the self can be proved to be consciousness also through inference. This is how Prabhācandra believes it can be done.

> The ear and other sense-organs, being instruments, fulfil their purpose by serving the agent,
> Because they are instruments,
> Like an axe.

The mind does not possess consciousness as its quality, because it is an instrument, like an axe. Similarly, consciousness is not a quality of perceived objects. Some passages from Lokāyata lost works are quoted.

Some materialist arguments are rejected, such as this one: Consciousness is manifested by material elements such as earth etc. which are called the body, sense-organs, perceived objects, just as the power of alcohol is produced by flour, water, sugar, flowers etc. One of the problems with the materialist's argument is: would consciousness manifest itself being something existent, or nonexistent, or something which has a double form as something both existent and non-existent? Or, would living beings possess consciousness right from birth as something which has been caused by the process of appropriation from

some earlier consciousness, because of some alteration of the previous consciousness, like an intermediary consciousness being between one moment and another moment? This is, of course, rejected as being like an argument based on the observation of the birth of conscious worms etc. from unconscious cow-dung.

Expressions in which the idea of the self is embedded, such as "I know a pot etc. with my mind (lit. cognition)", are taken to prove the reality of the self. Prabhācandra reveals his favorite proof of the self:

> The self is both beginningless and endless,
> Because it is a substance,
> Like earth and other substances.

And the reason here does not suffer from having an unproved locus (*āśrayāsiddha*), because the self is well-known from the notion of "I". Neither is its form as beginningless and endless unestablished, because it is characterized by its nature of being a substance. To demonstrate:

> The self is a substance,
> Because it is endowed with qualities and modes,
> Like earth etc.

The reason in this inference is not unestablished.

Prabhācandra considers and rejects several other arguments for the same conclusion. One is: Since the self is manifested as devoid of a body, it is different from the body; hence it must be both without beginning and end, just as fire is always manifested as devoid of water. Another: It is not the case that the self is different from the body, because the self is its nature, or because the self is its quality, or because the self is its effect. A third: Since cognition (consciousness, *vijñāna*) is directly perceptible, it turns out to be a patient of an action, like a material thing; therefore another cognition acting as an instrument perceiving it has to be postulated.

(E121-126) (On PM 1.8-9) Suppose that cognition cannot be known by itself, it can only be known as an object. But

consider the proposition: "I know the pot by myself", in which case one cognizes the action (*kriyā*), the instrument (*karaṇa*) and the agent (*kartṛ*), which can all be cognized like the patient of the action. In other words, here the self is the agent, the *pramāṇa* is the instrument, the cognition is the action, all with respect to the patient, and all can be cognized. But the fact of them being known as the patient does not mean that they can be known as directly perceivable; otherwise it would absurdly imply that the self would be perceptible, like the cognition of the instrument, inasmuch as it would not be cognized as the patient of the action (which would be cognition). Cognition which is cognized as an instrument is an instrument, but not perception.

Question: Are the self and the cognition (as the instrument) not established as the patient in all cases, or only sometimes? Both lead to contradiction. Therefore it is established that the self and the cognition can be patients of an action (which is cognition itself).

Question: Is perceptibility a property of an object or a property of a cognition? That may eventually lead to the conclusion that no direct cognition is possible, but only indirect cognition. But how could someone who maintains that cognition is indirect establish the presence of cognition: through perception or through inference? Certainly not through perception because he accepts perception as that kind of cognition which cannot have itself as its object, viz. he claims that it is not self-referential. He cannot avail himself of inference either, because there is no inferential sign (*liṅga*) which could be demonstrated as inseparably connected with this cognition. What could be the basis for the inference: the resulting cognition of an object, or a sense-organ and its object taken jointly, or the mind (*manas*) which accompanies them? None of these options work.

(E126-128) But how can one prove the nature of the mind which assists a sense-organ and its object and is capable of

relaying one sensory datum at a time? The Naiyāyika offers this explanation: The existence of the mind can be proved through the fact that cognitions do not arise simultaneously; for it is as follows: when there is a contact of the self with the mind and of the object with the senses cognition arises. Prabhācandra rejects this on the ground that one does experience that all five types of data can be received simultaneously and that while entertaining an image of a horse in one's mind one can see a cow and ascertain it with his mind. So the existence of such a mind cannot be proved by perception. Besides, to prove it by inference is a circular fallacious argument (*cakrakaprasaṅga*): the proof of the existence of the mind is based on the proof of the impossibility of simultaneous occurrence of cognitions, and the proof of the impossibility of simultaneous occurrence of cognitions is based on the proof of the existence of the mind. Further, the proof of the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of cognitions is based on the proof of consciousness, and that in turn is based on the mind. Therefore, as Prabhācandra stipulates, one has to reject the mind which assists a sense-organ and its object and is capable of relaying one sensory datum at a time as an inferential sign which could be demonstrated as inseparably connected with this cognition. But let us suppose that there is some kind of inferential sign: even then the problem is that such a relation which inseparably relates to the inferential sign cannot be established as long as one holds to the claim that cognition cannot be perceived or known directly.

Consequently, one has to reject the argument, ascribed to Prabhākara, that the self is not directly perceivable because it is not cognized as a patient of the action of cognizing, like the cognition of the instrument.

(128-149) (On PM1.10) The truth is that cognition (consciousness) can be an object of itself, i.e. it is aware of itself even without the use of language, just as it can be aware of an external object. Just as the nature of a pot is represented in

cognition even without a verbal statement of "a pot" and this representation is not of verbal character because it is illuminated in awareness in a non-verbal manner, similarly the nature of the cognizer and of the cognizing instrument, etc., is also represented and illuminated in awareness even though no words are spoken. Otherwise we would require external verbal symbols to know that "I am happy". An opponent claims that indeed happiness and other feelings are not cognized directly, so also one cannot become aware of the cognition of an external object directly. If one grants that another problem arises. Suppose that a cognition needs another cognition to be cognized, because it is a cognizable object itself: but then is the other, second cognition perception or indirect cognition? This leads to infinite regress. Ultimately one would have to take recourse to God to account for the difference between the two cognitions. Even the reason used in the argument "because cognition is a cognizable object itself" is faulty and entails circularity in reasoning, or it turns out to be baseless (since the locus, here the self, is unproved.

The opponent should also satisfactorily explain whether the contradiction, which should ultimately be demonstrated or represented in cognition, in which the action of cognizing supposedly stands with respect to its being a patient of the action, depends on still another cognition or on its own essence?

Further, Prabhācandra criticizes a view which he ascribes to the Mīmāṃsaka. The cognition of an object is made known by another cognition which follows it immediately and is inherently connected with it; this entails a distinction of two kinds, the cognition of qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇajñāna*) as the instrument (*pramāṇa*) and the cognition of the qualified object (*viśeṣyajñāna*) as the result. Now, the Mīmāṃsaka maintains that there is a difference between these two, because the cognition of qualifiers is the instrument or *pramāṇa* while the cognition of the qualified object is the action, the result. But this

is merely a matter of belief, not proof. Prabhācandra responds: "But no one cognizes as follows: 'Being the cognition of qualifiers myself, I know through the cognition of the qualified object'!" Further, is the object of these two cognitions different or not different? Would they occur simultaneously or not? The mind is material like the point of a needle, whereas the senses "subsist by excluding one another" (viz. when one is active, the others are not), being like lotus-petals which are perceived one by one by the mind, but only one at a time, and are not able to be cognized simultaneously.

Another undesired problem for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would be that if one does not accept that cognition can become aware of itself also in the case of God (*īśvara*), then the full range of existents (such as substances, qualities, motions, universals, individuators and inherence) and absences could not be reflected in any cognition.

Further, would the second cognition know that the contents of the first one arise while the first one still exists or not? Would it be perceptual (direct) or indirect? That's how a vicious circle progresses.

Besides, how could one know that "I want to know something"–by the same mental act or by some subsequent cognition? The opponent's reply leads to a paradox: "My cognition, even though it is not known, knows an object"–how could one know even this piece of knowledge? Or consider the following: "Even though I am not aware of it, it gives me pleasure". Such mental states cannot be known through perception, if one does not accept that cognitions are self-revealing, for there is no way to know of such mental, cognitive or emotional states through inference. The idea is elaborated.

(E149) (On PM1.11-12) Who possibly, be it an ordinary person or an expert, desiring such directly perceptible contents as present themselves to awareness, would not desire a *pramāṇa* that reveals them? It is not possible that an object revealing itself to cognition can be visible without a lamp which

reveals itself or is itself visible. Similarly, without the self-revealing character of a cognition it is not possible for an object manifesting itself to awareness to become visible.

(E149-151) (On PM1.13) Cognition derives its validity both intrinsically and extrinsically. In this way both intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) and extrinsic validity (*parataḥprāmāṇya*) apply to cognition, since a *pramāṇa* defined through such characteristics as its determining both itself and a previously uncognized object displays extrinsic validity, whereas in the case of cognitive activity itself and its resulting cognition the validity is intrinsic or extrinsic depending on the rehearsed exertion (*abhyāsa*) of cognitive activity or its lack (*anabhyāsa*).

Since they maintain that all true judgments possess intrinsic validity, the follows of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa should explain, with reference to what "truth" applies to, by reference to its origin, to the judgment itself, or to its result. Further, what does it mean to say that truth arises? Does it mean that it arises without a cause, that it arises due to its own peculiar causal complex, or due to the causal complex of pure consciousness?

Just to accept the idea of intrinsic validity alone is problematic, because for all practical purposes these two (extrinsic and intrinsic validity) may be indistinguishable, just as a particular cognitive result characterized by cognitive invalidity is produced by sense-organs suffering from particular defects, e.g. from an ocular disease (*kācakāmala*); similarly truth can be produced by sense-organs qualified by particular qualities.

(E151-159) An exposition of the Mīmāṃsaka position on truth is presented. Suppose a judgment acquires its truth from some other source. But can such factors responsible for truth be established by perception or by inference, and if by the latter, would it be by inference based on a reason (cause) (*hetu*) as essential nature (*svabhāva*), effect (*kārya*), or non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*)? None of these possibilities work. Further, it is not even possible to indicate a proper inferential

sign on any of these assumptions.

What is truth? It consists in the illumination of an object, and its conscious nature is revealed when awareness arises due to a causal complex incorporating sense-organs, etc. To put it differently, truth is the power consisting in the (accurate) determination of the object. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's views express in the *Ślokavārttika* are expounded and a number of his verses are quoted in support: "It should be accepted that the validity of all *pramāṇas* is intrinsic. For a power which does not come from itself (i.e. is not intrinsic) cannot accomplish anything by taking recourse to something else (i.e. what is extrinsic)"; When entities (here, cognitions) come into existence, they depend on their own causes, whereas the operation with respect to their tasks of the entities which have already established their existence is intrinsic, "Just as a pot, with respect to its prod uction, depends on a lump of clay, a stick, a potter's wheel etc., but .when it comes to fetching water there is no more dependence on these causal factors".

The cognition of one's cognition being true is intrinsic because it is not infected by doubt or misconception about its validity the moment it arises. For when a cognition arises there is certainty with regard to it: "this is indeed a real thing", not a doubt or any feeling of it being a misconception.

Another problem is discussed: How can we verify the veracity of our cognitions if they are not valid intrinsically? Through a subsequent practical verification? But, for instance, does the cognition resulting from causally efficient action, which establishes the validity of the previous cognition, take place at the same time or at a different time as the cognition of that action. Suppose it arises at the same time: then would these two cognitions have the same content or different? Etc. And how can we practically distinguish between valid and invalid cognitions? Would they not turn out to be non-different, accepting Mīmāṃsaka assumptions? The Mīmāṃsā rejects the theory of extrinsic validity in a lengthy passage.

(E159-176) Rejection of the Mīmāṃsaka views. The Mīmāṃsaka is wrong to claim that truth cannot be derived from perception and that it is not possible to assess the reliability of a perceptual apparatus, i.e. the sense-organs, etc., through perception itself. Perception is capable of cognizing relevant particular qualities of the sense-organs which attest to the veracity of cognitions derived from them. The Mīmāṃsaka should answer whether this alleged incapacity of the senses, their defects and the lack of particular qualities which attest to the veracity of cognition, can be proved if we consider the sense-organs as consisting in sensory power or as consisting in the actual physical apparatus.

The Mīmāṃsaka is wrong to maintain that it is not possible to indicate a proper inferential sign which could be related to the qualities of sense-organs that would attest to their being non-defective. Indeed, this cannot be done with the help of perception or inference, but there is one more cognitive criterion which can accomplish the task, namely imagination or presumptive knowledge (*ūha*). One can also find a method to determine that a particular cognition does not fulfil the standards of cognitive validity and make sure that the sense-organs are not defective. Since the situation is that defects and the qualities of truth are mutually exclusive, if there are no defects it means that there are sufficient qualities of truth, as in the case when in the absence of fire there is the presence of cold, viz. when there is absence of negation there is the presence of confirmation. Otherwise, how could there be a defect in the form of the absence of a fixed relation in the presence of a logical reason, because absence in the form of defects would not be possible either.

If the Mīmāṃsaka maintains that the absence of defects is established through qualities of truth, he actually expresses the idea that particular qualities (of truth) are established through particular qualities. When its presence is established through particular qualities, why couldn't truth be established extrinsically? Further, a true cognition which arises does not depend for its truth exclusively on stainlessness, i.e. on qualities of veracity.

There follows a longer discussion on how truth can be established through perception and inference. There is a rejection of Mīmāṃsaka arguments that validity cannot be proved externally through perception or inference, e.g. that the inferential reason for that claim cannot be established, etc. There is also the rejection of the argument that the senses do not provide unequivocal data, because in some cases, even though they are intact, they can be a cause of false cognition, whereas in other cases they cause true cognition, and that therefore they cannot provide validity to our cognition.

It is wrong to maintain that "when entities (here, cognitions) come into existence they depend on their own causes, whereas the operation, with respect to their tasks, of the entities which ave already established their existence is intrinsic", because that is not compatible with the understanding of truth as a mental state in the form of the determination of the object as it is. For the problem is the following: when cognition comes into existence and in this depends on particular causes, what would be the particular operation with respect to its tasks which could be intrinsic? Further, what would be the task of truth with respect to which its operation could proceed intrinsically? Would it be a determination of a thing as it is or an ascertainment of the form "this is a *pramāṇa*"?

Scriptural testimony, if it is to provide any reliable cognition, has to be imparted by a human agent who is endowed with proper qualities ("qualities of veracity"), but scriptural testimony, if it were of divine, non-human origin could not generate any kind of cognition of an object by itself.

Cognition resulting from causally efficient action, inasmuch as it depends on causally efficient action which is infallible, does not bring the certainty expected of a *pramāṇa* in virtue of

its dependence on its own infallibility. It requires additional factors. It is not the case that any doubt with respect to cognition resulting from some causally efficient action can be exercised in the waking state simply because it can be seen that cognition resulting from some action can be exercised in a state of dreaming even when there is no real object of this action, because these states two differ.

It is because cognition resulting from some action exercised in a state of dreaming is subsequently sublated by another cognition of the same agent at another point of time, after one wakes up, whereas it is not the case with cognition resulting from causally efficient action exercised in the waking state. It can be proved that no living being entertains doubt or mistrusts the validity of his cognition the moment it arises; hence validity (the conviction of one's cognition being true) is intrinsic. A person who acts with deliberation first reflects whether a particular awareness of an object is a true or false cognition, and does not act hastily.

The Mīmāṃsāka is wrong to hold that the ascertainment of cognitive validity arises in the absence of a cognition of defects, which are sublating factors. Their absence would be ascertained when one doesn't grasp sublating factors or when one determines the absence of sublating factors. A number of other alternatives follow to demonstrate the failure of the Mīmāṃsaka theory.

A refutation is given of the idea that the power of scriptural injunctions can bring truth by itself. Prabhācandra concludes that it has been established beyond doubt that cognitive awareness produced by scriptural injunction cannot be accepted as a *pramāṇa* because it lacks truth, inasmuch as it is produced by causes the defects of which cannot be successfully eliminated, and in this such awareness produced by scriptural injunction resembles a vision of a double moon.

A kind of succinct catechism (*āśis*) follows to wind up the first Chapter, which begins with a question: Who is the revered

Vardhamāna. The reply is: a Tīrthaṅkara, the highest divine being (*deva*), and it ends with a conclusion that he is (a) *pramāṇa*.

Second Chapter on Perception

(E177-180)(On PM 2.1) Having demonstrated the general common defining characteristics of *pramanas* in the previous Chapter, the author proceeds to their specific characteristics. There are two kinds of *pramāṇa*. Some maintain that there is only one *pramāṇa*. These are the Cārvākas who say that all the above discussion has no purpose.

Exposition of the Cārvāka theory. Perception is the only *pramāṇa*, because it is "non-secondary", i.e. primary or the main source of data. A *pramāṇa* is defined by them as cognition which determines its object. This cannot be accomplished through inference, which cannot provide us with certainty about cognized objects because inference relies on universals and these do not exist (according to the Cārvāka). As a quoted Cārvāka source says: "There is no way to prove particulars through inference, and to prove universals through inference involves the fallacy of proving what is taken by the opponent to be already proved (*siddhasādhana*). Further, inference succeeds when pervasion is grasped and when the presence of the *hetu*-property in the *pakṣa* (*pakṣadharmatā*) is known. But neither of these conditions can be fulfilled, because they cannot be established through perception. And they cannot be established through inference; as long as inference itself is not established as a *pramāṇa* we cannot use it to prove them, but inference relies on them. And there is no other *pramāṇa* to help us out."

Prabhācandra rejects these arguments. First, he claims, inference and other *pramāṇas* can be proved to be as valid as perception, for in all of them truth can be demonstrated by taking recourse to the logical reason that they all, including perception, are non-deviating (*avisaṃvādaka*).

It is wrong to maintain that since (a) *pramāṇa* is "non-secondary". i.e. primary, inference cannot be considered a *pramāṇa*, because what does "being non-secondary" mean? Does it mean that the contents of inference is secondary or that it is preceded by perception? The first alternative is false, because inference, like perception, cognizes an object which is characterized by a universal property as well as a particular quality, both being real. The second alternative is equally false, because it is sometimes observed that perception is preceded by inference (a reference to *Nyāyāvatāra* 10-11). The Cārvāka is also mistaken in maintaining that it is not possible to grasp the relation of pervasion through perception, because it is well-known that there is still another *pramāṇa* called presumption (*ūha*) which arises by force of perception and non-apprehension and which grasps pervasion.

The Cārvāka should explain what he means by rejecting inference as a *pramāṇa*. Does he reject inference in its totality or inference with regard to extra-sensory objects? If the first alternative is the case, his position results in the total destruction of all practical activities, because it is appealed to by everyone. In the case of the second alternative, the problem is how to decide about truth or its opposite in the case of non-sensory perception and other *pramāṇas* (such as inference etc.) with regard to their being primary or not? And without it one could not even argue against heaven, *apūrva*, divine beings etc. A verse from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* is quoted in support: "Since the general form (idea) of a *pramāṇa* and its opposite is established, since one knows the ideas of another person, and since one can negate some things (heaven, etc.), the presence of another *pramāṇa* [besides perception] is established." Hence it is not the case that inference is not a *pramāṇa*.

(E180-197) (On PM 2.2) The twofold division of *pramaṇas* is based on the dichotomy of perception and the rest, including inference.

Exposition and criticism of Buddhist position. The Buddhist maintains: Since there are two kinds of cognizable objects there must be two kinds of *pramāṇas*, perception and inference. But that position is wrong because there is just one kind of object of any *pramāṇa*, and it is both universal and particular. If inference were operative only with respect to universals no inference would be possible with respect to particular things, for it is not possible that a cognition has x for its content but is operative with respect to y. Furthermore, how can one prove that there are two kinds of cognizables? Does this dyad come as something known, unknown or making itself know to the two kinds of *pramāṇa*? Can it be known by perception or by inference? The Buddhist theory cannot escape a number of *aporias* that it generates, including the overlap of perception and inference.

Exposition and criticism of the Mīmāṃsā position. Consider the following: even though there is no strict division of cognizables, *pramāṇas* other than perception are not necessarily included in inference. For instance, verbal testimony cannot be classified as a subtype of inference, and it cannot be subsumed under the category of indirect cognition. Likewise, each *pramāṇa* has its specific causes, e.g., verbal testimony is produced by language. A verse (also partly cited in the *Tarkarahasya*) is quoted to support this: "The proponents of [there being] more *pramāṇas* [than two] regard the cognition which arises from language (lit. words) also with respect to imperceptible things, such as verbal cognition"; this kind of cognition produced by language cannot be classified as perception or inference, therefore it has to be granted a separate category. A number of verses from the *Ślokavārttika* (of Kumārila) are quoted. Further, what renders a *pramāṇa* the status of validity is that it cognizes an object previously not cognized.

Also this defining characteristic justifies the acceptance of more *pramāṇas* than just two. The Mīmāṣaka (with numerous

of Kumārila's verses provided) adduces arguments why reasonings based on comparison, presumption and absence as negative proof have to be accepted as separate *pramāṇas*. The Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to attack the Buddhist dichotomy of *pramāṇas* directly, and also considers a number of counter-arguments against certain *pramāṇas* admitted almost exclusively by his system; e.g. presumption does not meet the condition of the *hetu* being present in the *pakṣa* (*pakṣadharmatā*) or it rests on no inferential sign.

(E197-216) Criticism of the Mīmāṃsā position begins with the Mīmāṃsakas criticism of extra-sensory special power (*śakti*). Should the absence of the special power be accepted because there is no *pramāṇa* to accept it or because the power is extra-sensory? Prabhācandra's analysis of the Mīmāṃsaka's arguments shows that numerous points cannot be explained without admitting the existence of some extra-sensory special power. Prabhācandra emphasizes that the Jainas do not deny that a causal complex has the causal power of producing its effect, but they maintain that in particular cases causal power to produce effects is not possible without accepting the existence of some extra-sensory power. Why should fire not cause an effect, e.g. burning an opening etc., even in the presence of preventers (*pratibandhaka*)--such as a (fire-proof) gem or a (fire-preventing) charm (*mantra*)–of an (otherwise) sufficient condition)? Such preventers can nullify the causing of the (otherwise) sufficient condition and hence one has to admit the special power. Eventually, one has to accept that the hindrance to the origination of the effect caused by preventers is in fact due to their special power. What kind of absence of preventers could be the auxiliary cause accompanying the production of the effect? Could it be mutual absence, prior absence, posterior absence of absolute absence?

But it is wrong to maintain that the special power inherent in earth and other elements is nothing but the universal property earth-ness, e.g., because that would lead to an undesired consequence that a piece of cloth (made of the element earth) would originate also thanks to a lump of clay (likewise made of the element earth).

Anyone justifying the existence of a special power by attacking the idea with the alternative "Is this power permanent or not?" should first reflect whether the question refers to the special power in a substance or in a mode, because the true nature of all existents is endowed with special substantial and modal power. Then the paradoxes disappear. Another related problem is this: How is it possible that God could produce any effect at all? To attack the idea of special power with a dilemma whether the special power is different from its possessor or not is off the mark, because in point of fact it is both different and not different.

It is wrong to hold that special power is one in all things, for the contrary is easy to prove: there are numerous such special powers which inhere in causal factors, because there are numerous effects. Also there are numerous effects which are occasioned by numerous special powers residing in causes, because things are effects which are diversified through their natures.

Criticisms are offered of examples of presumption (*arthāpatti*) adduced by the Mīmāṃsaka: (1) one knows of the permanence of language due to the efficacy of denoting terms, (2) living Caitra must be somewhere else, because he is not at home.

There follows an extensive critical discussion of absence as negative proof, particularly of its relation to an entity (e.g. the surface of the ground) which is the locus of a to-be-negated object (e.g. a pot) or to the counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) which is not there. Further, the Mīmāṃsaka is mistaken in maintaining that it is not possible to apprehend the absence of something through perception (thus requiring a sixth *pramāṇa*, viz. absence) allegedly due to the supposed fact that absence cannot be comprehended through perception.

It is problematic to cite the dilemma "Does the absence of five *pramāṇas* being the cause of the knowledge of the absence of a cognizable thing (e.g. a pot on the ground) come as something already known or not known?" to prove that one requires still another, sixth *pramāṇa* to comprehend the absence.

There is complete disagreement with the Mīmāṃsaka's claim that there is a special cognizable object, i.e. absence of the counter-positive, for the *pramanā* called 'absence'; and his thesis: "perception, which can only grasp what exists, cannot apprehend the absence of something" has to be rejected for the simple reason that perception can at the same time grasp other, diverse objects in a place where something is missing.

The division of absences into four categories which serve as objects for the *pramāṇa* called "absence"-viz. mutual absence, prior absence, posterior absence and absolute absence–is artificial and not required. There follows a lengthy refutation of that typology and a demonstration of the paradoxes it yields. The section ends with a direct rejection of Kumārila's verses quoted from the *Abhāvapariccheda* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*. "Prior absence is when there is no curd in milk yet; the defining characteristic of a posterior absence is the non-existence of milk in the curds; the absence of horse in cow is called 'mutual absence'; the lower sections of the hare's head devoid of stiff outgrowth in relation to the hare's horns is called 'absolute absence'." The conclusion is that there is no reason to uphold absence as a separate *pramāṇa* and that it doesn't have a distinct object. An absence can be known through perception, which is one of the two (correctly so-classed) *pramāṇas*.

(E216-219) (On PM2.3) The first kind of *pramāṇa* is perception, which is clear, i.e. lucid or distinct; whatever is not a clear cognition is not perception, such as inference. There is a problem to consider: when cognition arises that there is fire here on account of seeing smoke incidentally (without recalling an example): does one see fire-ness (fire in general) or does

one see a particular fire? If the former it couldn't be perception. If the latter, there would be no place for a doubt whether this fire is produced by burning grass or burning leaves, because when under ordinary circumstances one sees fire in the proximity one immediately knows its source. The conclusion is that this kind of cognition is inference triggered by apprehension of an inferential sign, because inference is possible even if one doesn't know any previous example, as long as one knows the relation of pervasion between smoke and fire. Knowledge of pervasion is not directly perceptible and is not lucid or distinct, so this knowledge cannot be perceptual.

But is this non-lucidity a property of an awareness or of its content? Or is it a property of the contents of a cognition or of pyschic sense-organs? Or, perhaps, it is a property of light etc. The conclusion is that it is the intrinsic nature of the particular type of cognition known as perception.

(E219-220) (On PM2.4) (But what actually is this clarity of perception? It is the representing (of an object) without mediation by any intermediate cognition or the representing (of an object) as something possessed of its distinctive character..

(Objection:) This would indicate that subsequent states of perception, e.g. direct awareness (*īhā*), determinative awareness (*avāya*) and focused concentration, which follow the first moment of indistinct awareness, should not be reckoned as clear or lucid.

(Answer:) Actually these are all stages in one process, so the objection does not hold.

(Another objection:) Also, in the case of indirect cognition such as memory, recognition, etc., this defining characteristic (of clarity) is possible, because the rise of memory or recognition is possible without any intervening cognition.

(Answer:) Memory, recognition etc. are not immediate awarenesses.

(E220-229) Criticism of the Naiyāyika. Prabhācandra proceeds to demonstrate that, since it has been established that

clarity is a genuine defining characteristic and the definition of it contains no defects, the aspect of the Naiyāyika's definition of perception as a cognition "arisen from sense-object contact" (*Nyāyasūtra* I.1.4) cannot be correct for a number of reasons: pervasion between sense-object contact and perception is not established; perception does not pervade sense-object-contact; sense-object contact is not possible in the case of extrasensory perception and in the case of an omniscient being; it is also not possible in introspection (e.g. in the perception of one's own pleasure) inasmuch as a contact between a sense-organ, e.g. the eye, and pleasure is not possible.

(Naiyāyika:) The contact between the eye and its object is possible just as the contact between the sense of touch etc. and the object touched, for the eye possesses the capacity to reveal an apprehended external object because it is an external sense-organ, just like the skin (as opposed to the internal organ, which is internal).

(Answer:) What is meant by "an external sense-organ" here: directed outside towards an external object or located outside in an external place? The internal organ would satisfy the first alternative (of contact with its object) whereas the second alternative (location outside the body) is based on an unproved reason, because the existence of external rays being the extension of the eye is not established.

What is the eye, which comes into direct contact with its object? Is it the eyeball or the rays which satisfy the Nyāya definition? Prabhācandra demonstrates that neither does.

(Objection:) The real sense of vision is the rays emitted through the eyeball.

(Answer:) (But those rays sometimes come into contact with glass or a crystal, not with the object behind. The Naiyāyika would first have to prove that the rays could go through little holes in the crystal or other translucent substance. Further, if the rays were to exit from the eyeball and illuminate the object by coming into direct contact with it, they would apprehend the heat of the object, heat being the corollary of light.

(Objection:) We can see the light of a cat's eye which is emitted through the cat's eyeball at night, and we don't see it the daylight; so a cat doesn't need external light to see at night. This is a proof that the rays of an eye do exist.

(Answer:) Well, cats must need external light to see just as we do. Otherwise why can't we see human rays at night too?

Consider the following argument: The eye reveals an object connected to its rays, because it is luminous. But then are the rays proved by this or do they make contact with the object as something already proved? The result is that there is no proof for visual rays. Prabhācandra shows why eyeballs could not emit visual rays. And there is nothing else in ocular sense-organs which could emit these rays.

Further, the property of revealing color is tantamount to the property of generating cognition. This equation cannot be explained by direct sense-object contact. For that would imply that a substance would have to reveal its color to be seen, and this in turn would mean that the revealing color is either luminous or not luminous.

(Naiyāyika:) If the eye could enter into direct contact with its object, how could one explain the product of cognition?

(Answer:) Such sense-object contact is irrelevant, inasmuch as the cognition is produced independently in the knowing self.

Further, the Naiyāyika should explain why the apprehension of an object which has fallen into dirty water is not possible if it is possible to see the same object in clean water.

(E229-231) (On PM2.5) In fact, there are two kinds of perception: primary (*mukhya*) or genuine, and practical (*saṃvyavahārika*). Practical perception is occasioned by the sense-organs and quasi-sense-organs and its clarity is partial. Sense-organs are twofold: physical (*dravya*) and psychic (*bhāva*). The former are made of matter endowed with the

qualities of color, taste, smell and touch (but not sound) which has been transformed into physical forms such as the eyeball etc. The latter consist in predispositions (*labdhi*) and cognitive applications or actual faculties.

The following theories are rejected. (1) The essence of the senses of smell, taste, vision and touch is made of earth, water, fire and air jointly. (2) The sense of smell is made of earth only because even though other sensory data are present only the smell is revealed; similarly other senses are made of one element only. (3) Earth, water, fire etc. manifest their respective sensory data. Sound belongs to space, because even when other sensory data such as color are present, only the sound is manifested. This Vaiśeṣika theory is rejected on the ground that Prabhācandra has already demonstrated that sound cannot be a property of space.

It cannot be proved that sense-organs are the results of particular elements, because there is no evidence for that. However, it is indeed the case that the physical senses are produced by matter which is amenable to respective senses, and they are not explicable without admitting that they are the instruments for the respective psychic senses.

(E231-232) (On PM2.6)The sixth *sūtra* says that neither the object nor light can be genuine causes of cognition, just as darkness is not the genuine cause. It is well known also that darkness, even though it is not the genuine cause of any cognition, being rather an impediment to cognition, can be discerned, but certainly it is not a cause of cognition.

(E233-239) (On PM2.7) It can be proved that anything which can be discerned [in the dark] is not a cause of cognition on account of a lack of conformity by way of positive and negative concomitance, as in the case of a cognition of a hair-net and as in the case of the cognitions of nocturnal animals. On the contrary, the rule is that if x follows and has both positive and negative concomitance with y, x is the effect of y, as smoke is the effect of fire. And it is not the case that both kinds of concomitance relate either the object or the light to cognition.

The examples cited are explained in detail. An object which becomes the content of the cognition of a hair-net is acted upon by an eye afflicted by an eye-disease such as *kāmala* etc. Is the cause of such a cognition the operation of the hair-net, of the pupils, eyelids etc., of eyelashes, or of eye-disease? None of these options is satisfactory. Further, will the object of such a cognition of a hair-net manifest itself only in one place or in some other places too? Clearly it is not the case that the cognition occurs only when there is present the object known as the hair-net–that would lead to the undesired consequence that such cognition would turn out to be non-erroneous. Or one would entertain doubt, for it is said in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* that "doubt arises due to perception of the common features (*sāmānya*), due to non-perception of the specific features (*viśeṣa*), and due to remembrance of the unique features, of several things."

Further, if one accepts that what is to be discerned is nothing but the cause, the extrasensory cognition of a *yogin* could cognize only past objects, because only past objects could be the cause of such a cognition, not present or future ones. But this is not acceptable. Clearly the cause of such a cognition of a *yogin*, the object, could only precede the cognition, because being a cause of something is tantamount to making that something come into existence, hence preceding it temporarily, not otherwise. Suppose it were otherwise: if the *yogin*'s cognition could discern a co-existent of a future object, that discernment of such an object as a cause of a cognition x would be accomplished by another cognition y–a contradiction. If one cognition could discern objects which cause other cognitions, it would result in everyone being omniscient.

Further, suppose the object were momentary: what would the cognition of a *yogin* actually grasp, because the object as a cause preceding the cognition would not exist any more at the

time of the cognition. And it has already been explained in the first Chapter that a momentary object cannot be the cause of anything. Moreover, on the level of the ultimate truth nothing could be cognized, because a momentary object could never co-exist with its cognition, it could never cause it, and it could never be discerned by it, so nobody could be omniscient either. If one sees a person called Maitra who looks like Caitra, ultimately one in no way sees Caitra except in a metaphorical sense. The same is the case with momentary objects. Thus it is indeed correct to say that the idea of the omniscience of the Buddha is only acceptable metaphorically. Alternatively, granted that by seeing one thing one also cognizes other things similar to it (e.g. momentary entities belonging to the same series), in the case of a sensation of something one would cognize all other things similar to it, and everyone would turn out to be omniscient.

And how would it be possible to cognize such a momentary thing if it were supposed to be the cause of the cognition? The Buddhist or anyone who maintains that the actual cause of cognition is an object has no way to explain it satisfactorily. Would the fact of the object occurring be cognized by a cognition coexistent with this fact, by an earlier cognition, or by a subsequent cognition? None of these options work.

(Objection) If cognition could arise in the absence of any object, why could it not arise in places devoid of a particular object, e.g. something blue etc.? Suppose that such a cognition arises due to the contact of the eye with the mind. Why should such an object (e.g. the blue thing) then not be grasped in other places too, because whether the object is actually there or not is irrelevant?

(Answer:)That shows that the very presumption that an actual object is the ultimate cause of the cognition is wrong.

(Objection:) If the object were absent and the cognition of it were present, then there could be cognition of past, future and distant objects as much as cognition of present and

proximate things.

(Answer:) What does the phrase "there would be cognition" actually mean? that the cognition of the thing would arise, or that there would be a cognition which grasps the object? Neither of these holds.

The only logically possible conclusion is that the rise of cognition of an object does not conform to positive and negative concomitance of the object. So how could the Naiyāyika (Vātsyāyana) maintain in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* that "a *pramāṇa* has an object"? Consequently, cognition is not the effect of an object.

Neither is the cognition the effect of the light, because one does not see that cognition arises in the case of beings with eyes embellished with collyrium etc. (which do not see clearly) and in the case of nocturnal animals even though there is no light entering their eyes.

(Objection:) If light were not a cause of cognition, we could see even in darkness, and the rule would be: if the light is there the cognition occurs; if not, not; so light must be a condition for cognition, otherwise smoke could not be regarded as produced by fire.

(Answer:) How could darkness then be cognized, if we assume that light is the cause of cognition? If the cognition of darkness were possible even without light, then also in other cases, e.g. in the case of pots, etc. such cognition would also be possible. So light cannot be a causal condition for cognition.

(Objection:) An object known as darkness, and which is discerned in cognition, actually does not exist, and the verbal practice among people to speak of "darkness" refers to the fact that no cognition is occurring.

(Answer:) There is a difference between those objects which have clarity (*vaiśādya*) and those that don't.

The verbal practice of saying that in this place there is more light and in that place less light does not prove that light is a cause of cognition. An opponent who takes recourse to such a

way of speaking forgets that there is also another practice of saying the following: "in this cave etc. there is more darkness, and in that cave there is less darkness." Prabhācandra demonstrates that even in the absence of light a cognition arises, so the former can in no way be a condition for the latter.

(E239) (On PM2.8-9) The case is, however, that a cognition, although not produced by its content or the light, manifests them as its contents. In this sense the situation is like the case of the lamp: a pot etc. to be manifested does not produce the lamp which manifests it, because the lamp comes into existence due to its own specific causes.

(Objection:) Even if it is not appropriate to speak of the illuminating power of a cognition if there is no thing to be illuminated, one has to accept that thing to be illuminated is the ultimate producer of the illuminating cognition.

(Answer:) But then the following argument also holds equally well: If it is not possible to speak of the 'illuminated-ness' of the thing to be illuminated if there is no illuminating cognition, so let it be admitted that an illuminating cognition is the ultimate producer of the thing to be illuminated.

(E240-241) (On PM2.10-11) In each and every case cognition, like a lamp, establishes (illuminates) its content within itself being incapacitated in its nature characterized by destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*, one of five karmic states) or by veils (*āvaraṇa*) that obstruct cognition). This incapacitated nature of cognition is, in fact, its cognitive power (*śakti*). And it is this cognitive power which is the actual expedient for establishing the object in awareness as something determined in each and every case, not the occurrence of the object etc. Obviously it is not the lamp which is produced by illuminated objects, although it does illuminate them.

If the cause of cognition were something to be discerned through cognition, that would yield deviance (*vyabhicāra*) with respect to the sense-organs etc. (which would also have to be considered causes, but which are not discerned). Sense-organs

or imperceptible things are also causes of cognition and should be discerned by it.

(Buddhist:) What we actually say is not that 'the cause is always discerned' but that 'nothing but the cause is discerned'.

(Answer:) That is clearly wrong, because the undesired consequence would be that the extrasensory cognition of a *yogin* or the cognition of pervasion which grasps objects in their entirety would not be possible, because it has already been explained that objects--either destroyed or not yet produced or which coexist at the same time as the cognition--are not the causes of a cognition.

(E241-247) (On PM2.12) Now is the time to explain the subdivisions of perception. Perception is primary when it is absolutely clear, extrasensory and when all its obstructing veils are dissolved by a specific set of conditions sufficient to do so. The destruction of the obstructing veils may be due to destruction-cum-subsidence or mere destruction, and depending on the type or extent of the destruction of the obstructing veils, the result can be extrasensory awareness (*avadhi*), telepathy (*manaḥparyāya*) or omniscience. The proof (*prayoga*) is as follows: A cognition x of an object y which is true when it occurs in a lucid form is such that its obstructing veils have been removed with respect to y, like a cognition with respect to a tree etc. enveloped in a cloud of dust etc., which when the veiling dust is removed can perceive the tree; and such a cognition defined as above, when it is indeed lucid, is true with respect to anything which becomes illuminated by it. It cannot be dependent on the senses or the mind, and being such it becomes free from any impurity, and so being clear it can grasp its object completely.

(Buddhist:) If the obstructing veils of cognition were known to exist it would be correct to maintain that cognition arises due to their elimination; but the problem is that no one knows of such obstructing veils. What could they be? or where could they be located? Would they consist in the body or in

passions (*rāga*) etc., or in a particular place or time, etc.? It can easily be demonstrated that none of these options can function as obstructing veils, hence the Jainas are wrong to claim that some kind of perception may arise when all its obstructing veils are dissolved by a set of conditions that is sufficient to do so.

(Answer:) Of course, an obstructing veil can neither be the body nor anything else which the Buddhist has mentioned, but rather it is *karman*, different from the body, etc.. And this can also be demonstrated through two kinds of proof based on inference.

(Objection:) How can one prove that cognition has as its contents *karman* in its entirety? If one argues that when the obstructing veils are removed, cognition can still illuminate its object, one commits the fallacy of vicious circle or mutual dependence.

(Answer:) The obstructing veils are material (*paudgalika*), i.e. karmic matter as such.

(Advaitin:) It is well known that the only kind of obstruction is ignorance, not material *karman*, because it is not possible that *karman* having physical form (*mūrta*) could obstruct cognition which does not have any physical form; otherwise also the body etc. would easily obstruct cognition.

(Yoga philosopher:) Since *karman* is a quality of the self, how could it be material?

(Answer to both the above objections:) It is evident that that on which a self is dependent (stimulated in its inner states) is *karman*. And *karman* is material because the self is conditioned by its dependence on it. This does not involve any deviance with respect to anger and other passions, considered to be qualities of the self, because they–being transformations of the self–are by nature dependent on the self.

(Saṃkhya): It is true, but something imperceptible cannot be a quality of the self, because the fact is that *karman* is an evolute (*pariṇāma*) of *prakṛti*, in accordance with a passage from a Sāṃkhya source: "*karman* is an evolute of *prakṛti*, and is white and black".

(Answer:) Well, that objection is just a fancy of your creative imagination, for if *prakṛti* does not exist, as is evident, it is not possible that there could really exist any evolute of it.

(Objection:) It is well known that material *karman*, the way it was explained, which operates in a causal way, itself being caused by deeds and effecting in turn further causes, exists from beginningless time, so a specific causal complex which could theoretically effect its destruction simply does not exist; so how is it possible that all obstructing veils could be dissolved by a particular causal complex. This is simply not possible.

(Answer:) It is very well known that this particular causal complex consists in the triad of right vision, right awareness and right conduct and it can accomplish the dissolution of the karmic matter enveloping the self. Amassed karmic matter is dissolved through the process of cleansing of traces, which is twofold. How can it then be proved that a complete eradication (cleansing) of karmic matter can be accomplished? Through this inference: In a particular self karmic matter undergoes the process of its complete eradication, because there is the end of its functioning: such entities what are not eradicated do not have an end to their functioning, like time etc., and we can see that karmic matter does have an end of its fruition, therefore can be completely eradicated in a particular self.

Further, the existing karmic matter can be successfully obstructed through the cessation of inflow (*saṃvara*), as has been said in the *Tattvārthasūtra* IX.1-2: "Cessation of inflow is the obstruction of the inflow of new karmic matter (into the self). This inflow is fivefold, and can be obstructed through restraint (*gupti*), care (*samiti*), reflection on righteousness (*dharmānuprekṣā*), control of discomfort (*parīṣahajaya*) and proper conduct (*caritra*)".

It can also be proved that a complete eradication of the karmic matter enveloping a self is possible, not just partial eradication. Whatever exhibits gradual progress through higher

and higher stages reaches the apex of the gradation at some point, like heat or cold; and such gradual progression is possible in the case of the right vision, right awareness, etc. of those who are at the first stage of inner development, i.e. the correct thinkers (*saṃyagdṛśin*). Gradual progression of suffering, etc. does not pose any problem of deviance from the rule, because it is well-known to everybody that suffering reaches its empirical limit (although it is not absolute suffering) in the seventh hell. It happens in some people that removal of obstructing veils entails the highest gradation of cognitive faculties, because they gradually undergo the progression up to the apex.

But it is wrong to maintain that cognition has as its domain all objects thanks to scripture. Such cognition is never clear, so it does not fulfil the criteria of direct perception.

(Buddhist:) But we can see that the perfect extrasensory cognition of a *yogin* is produced by attaining the culmination of the gradual progression of the depth of meditation, which is twofold: based on scripture and based on thought.

(Answer:) This is wrong, because both meditation based on scripture and meditation based on thought, both of which concern the momentary and insubstantial character of the world, have to be false. So it is proved that genuine perception is clear, extrasensory, its contents cover all objects, and it occurs when its obstructing veils are dissolved entirely.

(E247-254) Now it is the turn of the Mīmāṃsaka, who says: It is known that in the case of some people it is not possible for cognition to know all objects, so how can you claim that such cognition of all things is possible, viz. how can you maintain the thesis of omniscience. Moreover there exists nobody who is omniscient, because it cannot even become the domain of any of the five *pramāṇas* which cognize existent things, i.e. which can verify the existence of something, hence there can be no proof of such a person, any more than in the case of the baby of a barren woman. The Mīmāṃsaka claims

that it cannot be known through perception that there can be an individual person who can see or know all categories and entities.

Neither can it be accomplished through inference. He tentatively attempts to falsify the poor and tests whether the reason used in the argument indeed is faulty: can it be abolished through perception or inference or other *pramāṇas*? The result of the text is that the proof denying the existence of an omniscient person is correct.

If it could be proved that a Jaina perfected being (*arahant*) is omniscient, the same proof could be used to demonstrate that the Buddha too is omniscient, because there is no difference.

The following proof is also faulty according to the Mīmāṃsaka: Objects which are subtle, separated from sight and far away are perceptible for some, because they are cognizable things; therefore an omniscient must exist. What does "cognizable" mean? Does it mean that being cognizable is accepted as for the Jainas as something that is characterized by an individual property which is cognizable by *pramāṇas* that comprehend all knowable things? or that it consists in a particular property of being cognizable by *pramāṇas* accepted by us and others? or is it a property which combines both? None of these is tenable.

An omniscient person cannot be known through scriptural testimony either. Would the scriptural way to prove the existence of such an individual be permanent or impermanent? It cannot be permanent, because no permanent scripture establishing an omniscient being exists. It cannot be impermanent either, because the problem is: who expressed such a scripture, that very omniscient being or some other human being? The first case yields a fallacy of mutual dependence. The second case allows for words of a madman to be taken as authoritative.

Neither can it be demonstrated through a reasoning based on comparison or presumption. Several verses from an

unidentified Mīmāṃsā source are quoted against the idea of omniscience. And there is no other *pramāṇa* available which could demonstrate that an omniscient being is possible, so the idea has to be rejected. It can also be observed that perception produced by the senses and in accordance with actual entities cannot demonstrate that things become objects for an omniscient person etc. The Mīmāṃsā considers a defense by proponents of omniscience, which is rejected because it leads to a number of undesired consequences. A number of verses quoted from an unidentified Mīmāṃsā source is provided to illustrate this defense.

Is the cognition of an omniscient person produced by the eye and other sense-organs, or does it grasp moral law and that's how it is acquired, or is it produced by rehearsed exertion, or is it born through (authoritative) speech, or is it manifested through inference? All these should be rejected, so there would be no other way for the alleged omniscient to acquire cognition.

Does the fact that the omniscient grasps all things imply that everything is known to him, or that it comprehends a particular number of the most important things? In the first case, would he comprehend everything gradually or all at once? Gradual comprehension is not possible because the set of all past, present and future things cannot be completed at any point of time so it can never cause such cognition of all things. To comprehend all at once is also not possible because that would lead to a lot of contradictions such as simultaneous sensation of heat and cold etc., which exclude each other. Further, every next moment brings new things to cognize, so it is not possible to know everything. Or, if one knew everything in one moment, he wouldn't know anything in the next moment in a valid way (i.e. as something new) and there would be nothing left to be determined by cognition.

How could an omniscient person be known to exist by non-omniscient beings even at the time when his cognition actually comprehends all things graspable by omniscient cognition? Clearly, someone who is not omniscient cannot know that someone is omniscient. A few verses from the *Ślokavārttika* are quoted in support.

(E255-266) Rejection of the Mimāṃsaka criticism of the idea of omniscience step by step. The starting point is the following argument: There is such a self who directly perceives all categories, because since the self has such a nature that it can grasp these categories, the causes for cognitive impediments having been destroyed in that self. When, if someone has a nature which can grasp x or y, the causal factors of cognitive impediments having been destroyed in it, he directly perceives x or y, just as in ocular cognition, the cognitive impediments of which in the form of jaundice or some other disease having been removed, one directly perceives color etc. Therefore there is indeed some self in which the causal factors of cognitive impediments have been destroyed, since it has such a nature that it can grasp color etc. In fact, this argument is believed to be impossible to refute: it does not suffer from any fallacy.

It is wrong to argue against omniscience in the following way: What is accepted as the inferable property is either that objects which are subtle, distant etc. are directly perceptible by one person or that objects which are subtle etc. are directly perceptible by many persons. The fact is, on the other hand, the following: The extrasensory perception of a *yogin* is independent of the sense-organs, because its content is objects which are subtle etc.; what is, however, dependent on senses and the mind is not a cognition the contents of which are object which are subtle, etc. like the perceptions of ordinary people such as us; therefore, extrasensory perception of a *yogin* must exist.

Likewise, it is wrong to argue against omniscience as follows: The property of being validly cognizable can either mean the particular valid cognizability of all objects or some

valid cognizability by *pramāṇas*. The Mīmāṃsaka must not understand the idea of valid cognizability if he posits such a dilemma.

Arguments of the *reductio ad absurdum* type, or the imputation of erroneousness, cannot apply to or disprove the idea of an omniscient being, the existence of which can easily be proved by resorting to arguments based on comparison. It is well known from the *Rāmāyaṇa* etc. that perception of Garuḍa (Vainateya) can grasp things a hundred miles away, the perception of vultures, boars etc. can grasp things which are very far away: perception produced by recognition triggered by sense-organs combined with memory can grasp things as distant in time such as things known from past perceptions. Since we can perceive such things we can safely assume that also perfect perception of these kinds is possible.

But the Mimāṃsaka should explain the following: Why can't moral law (*dharma*) be comprehended directly with the help of the eye etc.: is it because it is extrasensory, or because it is not present, or because it has no distinctive features? Since these and similar options are not possible, how can *dharma* be known without taking recourse to the existence of an omniscient being who can see it directly? Without assuming such a person one cannot explain how *dharma* can be known, and this is an argument based on presumption. General cognition, the content of which is all objects and which is infallible, is possible, and it also comprehends what was expressed in the *Tattvārthasūtra:* "The existent is furnished with origination, cessation and permanence."

The existence of an omniscient being can be known also through language and testimony which can also lead to omniscient perception. And it is irrelevant that inference and verbal testimony are not lucid cognitions, because it is not always the case that the result is similar in nature to its cause, since it is commonly seen that the sprout, etc. which is very different from its cause (a seed) is produced from that seed.

That is why it is possible that cognitions which are not lucid lead to lucid cognition (i.e., perception).

The omniscient can grasp different things, e.g. heat and cold, simultaneously without any contradiction, because such things can coexist in reality. Even ordinary people can project in their mind darkness and illumination by strong light simultaneously, which does not involve any contradiction though these two exclude each other in reality.

It is wrong to argue that if an omniscient person grasped all things in one moment he would not know anything in the next moment. The argument would be correct if the things cognized in the first moment did not exist in the second moment, but that is not the case, and that would lead to the complete absence of any valid cognition. Such things should always be held in mind, etc.: we do not assert that the cognition by an omniscient cannot be produced by sense-organs, so the omniscient person can know tastes and colors too; the cognition of an omniscient person does not comprehend everything one after another; since that would involve an infinite time needed to determine all the infinite things, it follows instead that he comprehends all things simultaneously.

Consider another argument against omniscience: How could people who are not omniscient know that someone is omniscient? The reply is: How cold Jaimini and others maintain that people who do not know all the things mentioned by the Vedas know that all things are comprised in the Vedas, viz. that the knowledge contained in the Vedas concerns everything? They cannot prove that everything is comprised in the Vedas by any of the *pramāṇas*; what they require is the existence of an omniscient being to tell them that the Veda speaks of all entities.

Similarly, it is not possible to prove that there is no omniscient being by taking recourse to any of the *pramāṇas*. Ultimately the opponent would himself have to be omniscient in order to know that there is no omniscient being, or he would

have to know it from an omniscient being--a clear contradiction. Hence it is well established that cognition of everything is a *pramāṇa* against which no counter-argument is possible and which cannot be sublated by anything.

(E266-270) Vindication of the idea of God, done especially from the position of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school. The section begins with the rejection of the Jaina position and the assertion of a being who is eternally omniscient. It is wrong to claim that the cognition of an all-comprehending being occurs due to the dissolution of obstructing veils, because it is not possible for such a being, permanently liberated, to be impeded by any obstructing veils at all.

(Jaina:) This is not possible, because there is no evidence. God cannot be permanently liberated, because He is a liberated being, like any other liberated being who attained liberation at a certain point of time. Everyone knows that liberation is possible only with reference to the idea of bondage: without bondage there can be no liberation; the idea of liberation would lose any meaning, like "there is no space".

(Naiyāyika answer:) This argument should be rejected because the opposite can be proved, as follows: God is permanently liberated because He is the agent creating a permanent series of effects such as (the) earth etc. (The earth etc. are seen to be composite wholes created by a conscious agent, because they are effects; whatever is an effect is known to be created by a conscious agent, like a pot etc.; and (the) earth etc. are known to be effects: therefore they must have been created by a conscious agent.

It is not sound for the Jaina to maintain that it is not proved that the property of being an effect is inseparably connected with the property of being preceded by a cause in the form of a conscious agent. Reasons given.

God is invisible not because He does not exist, but because He does not have a body. But even having no body He can act and create, because having no body does not logically entail the

incapability of being an agent.

Further, His omniscience is proved by the fact that He is an agent actuating all effects, because anyone who accomplishes everything must necessarily know the aim and purpose which is the totality made up of material and other causes etc.; otherwise none of His actions would be possible. This is also mentioned in the *Bhagavadgītā*: "There are two kinds of selves in the world: the perishable and the imperishable. The perishable is all living beings; the highest is known as the imperishable. Still another highest self is called the paramount self, who is the one who presides over the three worlds, pervading them, and is God".

It is not the case that He does not possesses cognitive ability because He does not propagate the truth in His own form, for it is attested that He does have the property of producing knowledge in His hearers, for the truth of a *pramāṇa* depends on its ability to produce knowledge in one's hearers, not on the ability to initiate activity. God who is known to be a *pramāṇa* performs His tasks with respect to living beings at the time of the creation of bodies etc. out of compassion, but that does not mean that He becomes an instrument of their happiness, because He, as the agent, is accompanied by an auxiliary cause in the form of the invisible principle (*adṛṣṭa*, i.e. *karman*) of the *dharma* and *adharma* of living beings, where the invisible principle is superintended by consciousness when effects are produced, because it itself is not conscious. This has been explained in the *Nyāyavārttika* by Uddyotakara Bhāradvāja: "Manifest elements, superintended by consciousness, are causal factors of living beings' happiness and suffering, etc." Also Aviddhakarṇa said in the same spirit: "Material causes of the world, because they have a material form, like threads of a cloth etc...." Inanimate entities cannot initiate anything, unless they are superintended by a conscious agent, and--at the time of creation of the world--that must be God. More quotations from Aviddhakarṇa, Praśastamati

(though nothing derivable from the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*) and Uddyotakara follow in support.

(E270-285) Prabhācandra replies in detail to the arguments of the Naiyāyika in the previous section. If one tries to prove that earth etc. must be effects because they are composite wholes, he should first explain what he means by "composite whole" (*sāvayava*, lit. "having parts"): the fact of being present along with its parts, the fact of being produced by parts, or just the whole as such? Then he should also prove that composite wholes have to be effects of the activity of a conscious agent. But that cannot be done in a consistent manner. How does it follow that being the content of consciousness of an agent means that it has to be a composite whole? There is no coherent and regular relation between these two.

Further, how could the opponent explain the idea of creation, which involves the idea that something previously nonexistent is called into being as a composite whole by being connected with existence (the highest universal): How could existence be related to something nonexistent before it comes into being? A relation can only relate two existent entities. And is this existence, prior to being connected to the composite whole, itself existent or nonexistent?

Would, in the process or creation, earth and other elements become effects in a limited way or in every respect? The latter is not possible, because not all things which exist substantially are effects. The former involves contradiction. All this leads to the rejection of the idea that composite being are effects and require a conscious agent.

Also, the idea of a cause in the form of a conscious agent stands in need of clarification and there is no evidence for the qualifier of the specification of the agent as possessing consciousness. The concept involves a number of undesired consequences and has to be rejected.

The idea of consciousness that the conscious agent is endowed with also stands in need of explanation: does it have

a momentary or a permanent nature? In any case, there could either be no creation or no liberation.

One needs a body to create; otherwise no creation of action in the physical world is possible. A demon (*piśāca*) cannot break a branch of a tree, despite a common belief, because he has no body. Also the argument that an agent is not grasped as conscious not because he does not exist but because he does not fulfil the criteria of perceptibility is not conclusive.

It is not possible that inanimate matter, even when superintended by a conscious agent, could effectuate anything, but if it could it would contribute mostly purposeless actions and effects.

It is wrong to claim that a conscious agent acting from compassion could cause happiness in living beings, because God creating the world would also create suffering, so there would be no place for compassion.

The concept of God is incompatible with the idea of liberation. Likewise the idea of karmic retribution and its dependence on the invisible principle of merits and demerits of living beings cannot be explained by the idea of a conscious agent controlling it.

An interesting argument from the ladder of perfection is cited in support for the existence of God. Every being from Brahmā to demons is superintended by one conscious agent, i.e. God, because there is a progression of the pre-eminence of one above the other, which leads to a being which is pre-eminent with respect to all other beings, they being subordinate to Him. The argument is rejected on the basis of the fallacy of inconclusive reason and other flaws.

Since the reasoning proving that God is the creator of the whole world turns out to be objectionable, also the proof that there is a self eternally liberated cannot be defended.

(E285-289) Vindication of the idea of a primordial active factor (*prakṛti*) as the cause of the world, done from the position of the Sāṃkhya school, whose proponent says: It is

correct to say that omniscience obtains when all obstructing veils are dissolved; however, these veils are the result of *prakṛti.* It is not true that the veils are absent in the self, because actually the self is veiled by "*karman* (which) is an evolute of *prakṛti*, and is white and black", as a Sāṃkhya source testifies. But how is the world created? Is it through the mere power of *prakṛti*? This is explained in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*: from *prakṛti* issues the "great one" (*mahat*), i.e. objective consciousness; from it the subjective consciousness (lit. ego-maker, *ahaṃkāra);* from this a group of sixteen elements; and from these sixteen elements issue five elements". This evolutionary sequence (*pariṇāma*) is elaborated in detail. Thus, the whole creation preserves the nature of *prakṛti*. For in the world whatever nature is the cause precisely the same nature possesses the effect, e.g., a piece of cloth woven from black threads cannot have any other color but black.

Further, in the world if there is a creator of x we see precisely the transformation of x in the process of creation, as when the potter who is making a pot, which evolves from a lump of clay, produces an upward form and then hollowed and rounded form, etc. This explains how from *prakṛti* proceeds all differentiated individual things.

There can be no doubt that *prakṛti* exists, because we can see its operation by virtue of its creative power. In this world, if x operates with respect to an object y, x is empowered with respect (to capable of effecting) y, as a weaver is empowered with respect to (capable of manufacturing) a piece of cloth.

(E289-297) This position of the Sāṃkhya school is rejected. If all evolutes comprising entities from the *mahat* down to differentiated individual things that issue from *prakṛti* have the same nature as *prakṛti*, than there is a contradiction. As everyone knows, if x is not completely different from y, then x is neither the effect nor the cause of y because the cause and effect have different characteristics; otherwise the distinction between cause and effect would be blurred.

Besides, a permanent entity, such as *prakṛti*, cannot be a cause of anything. Would it produce all its effects all at once or gradually? Would it produce through the transformation of its cause renouncing its nature or without renouncing it? How could the effect differ from its cause? And if the cause were everlasting, would all its effects, inheriting the nature of their cause, also be everlasting? Would they be the effects that always exist or that exist occasionally? Also, the creative power allegedly inherent in *prakṛti* cannot be explained.

(E297-299) Exposition of the position of the theistic (*śeṣvara*) Sāṃkhyas, who argue that all these differentiated entities are not impelled by *prakṛti* alone, because it is not conscious. Clearly, something inanimate, unconscious cannot impel anything or produce an effect without an overseer. It could not produce anything at the time of creation either, for the same reason. Therefore, God alone, but dependent on *prakṛti*, is the genuine agent and creator of differentiated entities.

This position is refuted by Prabhācandra. If neither God nor *prakṛti* can effectuate anything, how can they produce something together, since neither of them possesses the creative potency? The question of their permanent nature also raises serious problems. Liberation cannot be conceived in such a system either.

(E299-307) Criticism of the Śvetāmbara Jainas, who accept that a liberated person consumes food. For them, apparently, a liberated person does not possess the four perfections, because he must be devoid of infinite happiness, and it is so because he suffers from hunger and thirst, otherwise he would have no need to partake of food.

If he partakes of morsels of food, he must then be afflicted by passions etc. Clearly, anyone who eats food is not someone who has gotten rid of all his passions, any more than the man in the street, and indeed in the opinion of the Śvetāmbaras the perfected being (*kevalin)* partakes of food.

They (the Śvetāmbaras) defend their position that he eats food not because of hunger and passions but in order to preserve and maintain his body, for otherwise he would die, and because this is what we know as the means of preservation of anyone's body. But then the Śvetāmbaras should explain what they mean by "consumption" and what is proved by their argument: consumption as such or consumption of food? Their argument that the omniscient person must preserve his own body through eating, because that is what preservation of one's body means, like the preservation of the body of an ordinary person, is wrong, because then the following should equally be accepted: The perception of the omniscient person is produced by the senses (it is not extrasensory) because that is what perception means, like the perception of ordinary people like us. But the fact is that the omniscient being requires no food to preserve his body. It is wrong to argue, as the Mīmāṃsakas do, that there is no one whose physical body could be structurally different from other peoples'. There are unique bodies and unique people.

There follows a discussion of the various types of *karman* and their influence on the omniscient person's body and its structure.

Prabhācandra demonstrates that hunger is not independent of *karman*, e.g. of the *karman* causing confusion (*mohanīyakarman*). He also points out the undesired consequences which follow when one accepts that the omniscient being consumes food: Would he eat alone or accompanied by his disciples? Would he perform the ritual of repentance (*pratikramaṇa*) after he has eaten? Why would he actually eat: to preserve the growth of his body, or to sustain meditation and ascetic practices for which the body is necessary, or to quell the sensation of hunger, or to uphold the circulation of the three breaths or vital forces? Let us consider what Śvetāmbaras say: the omniscient person consumes food but he is not seen by people directly. But why should the

omniscient do it? Out of false conceit or shame?

(E307-328) A section on liberation (*mokṣa*). It is wrong to define liberation as the attainment of the four perfections of infinite cognition, infinite conation, infinite happiness and infinite energy, because in fact it is the destruction of nine specific properties of the self (viz., understanding, happiness, suffering, will, hatred, effort, righteousness, unrighteousness, and traces). Even other systems (e.g., Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika) recognize that cognition of truth, tantamount to the destruction of false cognition, is the cause of liberation (*niḥśreyasa*).

There is also no proof for the claim that "the *karman* which has not been consumed (i.e. is without retribution) does not disappear even after millions of millions of eons". But there are proofs that such *karman* can be destroyed through various ascetic practices.

Similarly, there is no proof for the theory that the annihilation of all accumulated *karman* can only be accomplished through the cognition of truth and what the *Bhagavadgītā* says is wrong: "As a blazing fire turns fuel to ashes, O Arjuna, in the same way the fire of cognition turns to ashes all *karmans*".

Other theories of liberation are also discussed, including that of the Mīmāṃsakas. It is wrong to maintain: When a trace which is born out of false cognition and which is the accompanying cause disappear, *karman*, even though it still exists, does not produce any more body and does not lead to a new birth.

The concept of one desirous of heaven is not compatible with the idea of liberation.

The Vedāntin follower of Bhāskara maintains: Since in the liberated state consciousness also disappears, reasonable people do not strive after any kind of perfected knowledge, and liberation is accepted as a state of eternal bliss. The proof is the following: the self consists in happiness, because the contents of the self's consciousness in the liberated states is unlimited

joy, in accordance with a hemistitch "Bliss is the real nature of Brahman, and it is manifested in the liberated state". This position raises a number of problems, including the relation of the attribute (i.e. liberation) and its locus and the question whether these are permanent or not.

A Buddhist thesis: "Liberation arises due to clear cognition" is referred to and is likewise rejected, because it is not possible that liberation, which is free from passions, etc., can be attained through the cognition of a person under the influence of the passions, etc. Such an idea also involves a contradiction between the idea of one momentary personal continuum (*santāna*) and the idea of last moment of personal consciousness. A recourse to the idea of the waking state and the state of deep sleep to prove the Buddhist thesis is also in vain.

A number of other opinions are described and subsequently criticized at length.

(Dharmakīrti's school of Buddhism:) The destruction of passions etc. comes about by force of rehearsed exertion of a particular type of meditation (*bhāvanā*).

(Another Buddhist position:) Liberation, i.e. the ultimate good, is the cessation of a moment in one's personal continuum.

(The Advaitin and Śabdādvaitin positions:) The dissolution of the mundane world and liberation occurs when the Highest Self is attained due to the cognition of the oneness of that Self. (Advaitin). The ultimate good, i.e. liberation, is achieved due to the cognition of the oneness of the world (Śabdādvaita).

(The Sāṃkhya position.) The realization of the discriminative knowledge of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* gives rise to liberation which is the state of being absorbed in pure consciousness.

(E328-334) A separate section is devoted to the rebuttal of the Śvetāmbara's belief in the idea of the liberation of women (*strīmukti*). Liberation, which is defined as the acquisition of infinite cognition, etc., is possible only in the case of men, not

women. The following Śvetāmbara proof is baseless: "Liberation of women is possible because all causes of it are available to them, just as for men", because these causes which normally do lead to liberation cannot be fully operative in the case of women. For the same reason, hermaphrodites cannot attain liberation either. There are many additional reasons why women cannot attain liberation: they live in the highest state of illusion and deceit (*māyā*); they are not capable of genuine restraint; they must wear clothes, which prevents them from real restraint, asceticism and avoidance of material and other possessions; they cannot prevent the destruction of many living beings; they cannot practice outer and inner restraint which is defined as the rejection of external and internal possessions, including the abandonment of negative feelings such as shame etc.; they pay more attention to clothes, which limit them, than to the protection of living beings; they are not capable of realizing all the three gems (*ratnatraya*), i.e., right view, right cognition and right conduct, completely. Liberation of women is not possible also because otherwise hermaphrodites would attain it too, but that is not possible.

Chapter Three: Indirect Cognition

(E335-338) (On PM 3.1-4) The other kind of *pramāṇa*, besides perception, is indirect, because it is not qualified by a clear nature, and the proof is: Indirect cognition is cognition the nature of which is not clear, because it is indirect. It is occasioned by perception, etc. It is divided into memory, recognition, *tarka*, inference and verbal testimony.

The first of these is memory, which is that kind of cognition which is based on the awakening of traces and has the form "it is that". A trace (or subliminal impression) is nothing but the fourth stage of practical perception known as retention or focused concentration (*dhāraṇā*). An example of memory is the experience which brings on the reflection associated with a speech element such as "He is Devadatta".

A Buddhist, who accepts only perception and inference as *pramāṇas*, questions the cognitive validity of memory. Is it pure cognition, or is it a cognitive act the content of which is a previously experienced object? The first alternative leads to the conclusion that memory should be regarded as perception, whereas the second reveals that the memory of Devadatta has the same structure and nature as the memory of Yajñadatta, and cannot be valid because it is fallible (*visaṃvādaka*). This and other reservations are rejected. Further, Prabhācandra adds that since memory dispels false superimposition it has to be reckoned as *pramāṇa* in the same way as inference.

(E338-348) (On PM 3.5-10) Recognition is the correlation of perception and recollection and it has the form "this is that" or "this is like that".

Objections of the Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist schools are discussed.

One may object that recognition should be classified as perception because it consists in perception. As the Mīmāṃsaka says: recognition follows both the presence and absence of the eye, i.e. it occurs only when perceptual data are there and when perceptual data are not there it does not occur, and in this way it functions like ordinary perception. A number of verses from the *Ślokavārttika* are quoted in support.

These arguments are rejected. It is not the case that recognition consistently follows presence and absence of perceptual data. Recognition does not stick to the time and place of the content of the original perception (when that content was perceived for the first time).

Examples of recognition are the following: "He is like Devadatta", "A wild ox (*gavaya*) is like a cow", "A buffalo is different from a cow", "That thing in the distance looks like a tree".

Recognition is essential in proving some basic tenets of Buddhism: for instance, "Whatever exists is momentary", because only recognition allows us to compare similar entities in a temporal series, or "Rehearsed exertion of meditation on the insubstantiality of everything makes sense".

Recognition is an important device to compare previous and subsequent similar occurrences or phenomena. One cannot even ascertain cut and re-grown nails or hairs without it, especially when one accepts the momentary nature of being. How could one infer anything without recognition. One infers the presence of fire on a mountain, which resembles past fires, one the basis of smoke, which resembles past smokes, by recollecting the relation between them, which also requires recognition.

The criticism--that recognition is not a *pramaṇa*--is not justified. All reasons to justify the criticism are rejected: because it grasps a previously grasped object, because it immediately follows memory, because it assumes verbal form, because it is subject to sublation.

The Mīmāṃsaka identifies recognition with reasoning based on comparison as follows: "When one remembers the trace left by a perception of a cow when one sees a *gavaya*, and knows that 'this is like that', is nothing but comparison". Some verses from the *Ślokavārttika* are quoted. This interpretation is rejected as an unsatisfactory account of the nature of recognition.

(E348-355) (On PM 3.21-25) Presumptive knowledge (*ūha*), also known as *tarka*, is the cognition of pervasion between a *sādhya* and a *sādhana* (i.e., *hetu*) on the basis of their apprehension and non-apprehension. It is not based merely on frequent observation or infrequent observation, and it brings certainty; it is also contingent upon destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*, one of the five karmic states) of one's *karman*. It is also capable of determining the relation of pervasion between imperceptible, extrasensory inferable properties and the proving properties. Its nature is based on the following observation: "x occurs only when y is there" and "when y is not there, x does not occur", e.g., "only when there

is fire is there smoke; when fire is not there, there is no smoke".

One may object: presumptive knowledge is not known to be a *pramāṇa*, so how can anything be determined by it? But why should it not be a *pramāṇa*? Because it grasps something already grasped? Because it is fallible (*visaṃvāda*)? Because it merely confirms the content of an inference? None of these objections holds.

Presumptive knowledge guarantees certainty even though it follows perception.

(Buddhist objection:) How can presumptive knowledge determine that smoke is universally the effect? One can determine the causal relation only at a particular place and time, but not with respect to all times and places. Dharmakīrti says in the *Pramāṇavārttika*: smoke is the effect of fire in compliance with the property of an effect. Some thing x which is present when y is absent violates its status of effect having y as its cause (i.e., it cannot be regarded as the effect of y). If inseparable connection concerns the presence of something that is just related to mere presence, if it were absence, the absence of it would follow because there is no difference". Accordingly, pervasion can be determined without recourse to presumptive knowledge. Or, presumptive knowledge is nothing but inference.

(Answer:) Presumptive knowledge retains its *prāmāṇya* because it removes false superimposition. In addition, it is a *pramāṇa* because it supports other *pramāṇas*.

(E356-368) Inference is the cognition of the *sādhya* from the *sādhana* which consists in certainty based on the rule that x is not possible in the absence of y. In inference, a reason is ascertained as being inseparably connected with a property being proved. Its nature is specific, whereas the threefold condition of validity (*trairūpya*) is specific and inference cannot be based on it, because even if a reason is fallacious the threefold condition of validity can still be satisfied. An extended criticism of the Buddhist idea of the threefold condition of

validity follows.

Is the defining characteristic of a valid reason the threefold condition of validity in general, or is it a particular set of criteria of validity of that reason alone? Besides, there are many cases where the condition is met but the inference based on it seems wrong to the Buddhist. E.g., "The Buddha is not omniscient, because he is a speaker, like an ordinary person on the street", and vice versa, a reasoning may be valid although the triple condition is not met, e.g., "When the constellation Kṛttikā rises, the Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) constellation rises".

Discussion of the role of the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa* in inference with respect to the *trairūpya*. The following fallacious inferences reveal problems with the *trairūpya*: "These melons are ripe because they grow on the same branch as the ripe fruit which I have just eaten: and "This Devadatta is stupid, because he is the son of that man, like his other son (who is stupid)".

Discussion of the fallacy of question-begging (*prakaraṇasama*), i.e. a reason which raises the very problem it is meant to solves, and other fallacies which supposedly undermine the very process of inference. It is not that all reasons are formally fallacious. For instance, it is not true that all reasons are inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). In fact, it has been demonstrated that a valid reason is invariably concomitant with the property-possessor (*dharmin*) of the *sādhya*.

A number of other critical questions are posed: e.g., does the reason (of an inference) have a universal form, or a particular form, or both, or neither?

The Nyāya definition of inference as "that which is preceded by perception and commonly seen *(sāmānyatodṛṣṭa)*" is rejected.

Discussion of the problem of only-positive (*kevalānvayin)* properties and their role in inferences, and of the problem of only-negative (*kevalavyatirekin*) properties, which are not instantiated except in the *pakṣa* itself.

Positive pervasion (*vyāpti*) is said to be threefold: external

(*bahir*), universal (*sākalya*) and internal (*antar*).

Thus, various definitions of the reason (in an inference) have been rejected.

(E369-371) (On PM 3.18-29) The proper definition of a reason is as follows: The main characteristic of a reason is its inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*), which is defined as constant regularity (*niyama*) of (a) simultaneous concurrence (*sahabhāva*) and (b) consecutive occurrence (*kramabhāva*). (a) comprises two sub-varieties: (a1) co-occurring phenomena, e.g. color and taste of a fruit, and (a2) pervaded and pervader, e.g. a *śiṃśapa* tree and the particular (species of that?) tree. (b) comprises two sub-varieties as well: (b1) successive phenomena, such as e.g. the Kṛttikā and Śakata (Rohiṇī) constellations, and (b2) the effect and its cause, e.g. smoke and fire.

This relation of inseparable connection can only be known through suppositional knowledge (*tarka*), not through perception or other *pramāṇas*.

A *sādhya* or property to be proved in an inference is defined as something which is accepted, unsublated, and yet unproved. This excludes properties which are doubtful, contrary and unrecognized. A doubtful *sādhya* is, for instance: "Is this a pillar or a man?". A contrary *sādhya* is the apprehension of silver instead of a piece of shell. An unrecognized *sādhya* is something about which one is uncertain whether it has been grasped or not grasped. A *sādhya* cannot be something sublated by what is not accepted (by the Jainas, e.g., the permanence of language) or something sublated by perception (e.g. the non-audibility of speech). A *sādhya* cannot be sublated by scriptural testimony either.

Something which is accepted as proved by the proponent is not such for the opponent. What the proponent accepts as a *sādhya* does not have to be a legitimate qualifier for the opponent, because nothing is accepted as proved by everybody. The desire of the proponent is to demonstrate the property

accepted by him. The *sādhya* may either be a particular property located somewhere or a possessor (*dharmin*) of that particular property, also called the *pakṣa*. A *dharmin* is something already known.

Two examples of *sādhyas* proved through conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) are (1) the existence of an omniscient person and (2) a donkey's horn.

(E372-373) (On PM 3.30-35) Whether a *dharmin* is established by either a *pramāṇa* or *vikalpa*, it is qualified by the *sādhya*. E.g., "This place is fire-possessing" and "Speech possesses evolution".

(Objection:) If the thing to be proved is the fire-possession of a particular place, how could this be established by perception or any other *pramāṇa*? Such things can only be known through extrasensory perception.

(Answer:) In the case of pervasion the *sādhya* is just the property of the possessor, not the property-possessor qualified by the property, because in such a case the pervasion could also be possible otherwise, and the positive concomitance of the reason cannot be proved in this way.

(E373-377) (On PM 3.36-51) The specification of the subject term (*pakṣa*) in an argument serves to remove any doubt as regards the actual locus of the *sādhya*. E.g., "Does the *sādhya*, viz. existence, pertain to an omniscient being or to the feeling of pleasure?" It is the identification of the subject term which serves to bring to awareness that the *sādhya* and the *hetu* are related. Who on earth, having first mentioned the three kinds of reason (proposed by the Buddhist), viz., reasoning from effect, reasoning from essential nature, and reasoning from non-apprehension, and wanting to successfully prove anything, would not specify the subject term? That is why the subject term has always to be specified, and that statement is necessary. Thus the two mandatory members of an inference are the *pakṣa* (here, the thesis, *pratijñā*) and the reason, but not the example. The form of inference accepted by the Nyāya

school has five members. Prabhācandra accepts the following functions (but not the necessity) of the five traditional members of an inference. The thesis is the tenet (*āgama*); the reason is the inference *per se*, because the *sādhya*'s being a property of that subject term can be inferred only through it; the example is based on perception or empirical observation and attestation; the application is reasoning based on comparison, and the conclusion is the result of the demonstration that all these four are applicable to one and the same thing. The example is not a member of the argument-form which make the *sādhya* known, because it is only the reason, already defined as constant regularity in the form of inseparable connection with the property of the thing to be proved, which is operative with respect to the *sādhya*, since actually the *sādhya* property can be proved through reasoning based on the negative example (*vipakṣa*) alone.

Pervasion cannot be proved merely by indicating the presence of the *sādhya*-property in the *sapakṣa*. Further, the example has the form of pervasion in a general manner applied with reference to an individual case, e.g. "like in the kitchen"–said with reference to fire as the *sādhya*–because pervasion is normally formulated in a general manner, i.e. with reference to an unspecified place, time, form and locus. But a situation can occur when there is no certainty as regards a particular example and one has to look for still another example to settle the difference of opinion between the proponent and the opponent. The example cannot serve to remind one of the relation of pervasion, because it is immediately remembered upon the formulation of the reason in formulating an inference.

The example, mentioned after the statement of the reason, raises doubt as regards whether the property-possessor of the *sādhya* is indeed the proving property (*sādhana*) of that *sādhya*. What would otherwise be the need for the application and the conclusion? These two are not members of the inference, because the doubt is with regard to whether the *dharmin* (i.e., the possessor of the *sādhya*-property) can be proved exclusively through the specification of the reason and the *sādhya*-property. However, the best and most effective member of an inference is in the form of the reason alone and it is that which is the genuine shape of the proof, because it is really pertinent to the *sādhya*. These three, i.e. the example, the application and the conclusion, can be included in an inference in order to bring about the proper understanding of the matter by those ignorant of it, but only in the context of instruction and for didactic purposes. However, in the context of debate, they are not to be used, because they serve no purpose and do no effectuate anything.

Furthermore, there are two kinds of example, depending on whether they instantiate positive or negative concomitance.

What is used in an inference where the proving property is pervaded by the property to be proved is known as the example of positive concomitance, e.g., "as in a kitchen", said with reference to fire as the property being proved.

What instantiates an inference which demonstrates the absence of the *sādhana* where the *sādhya* is absent is known as the example of negative concomitance, e.g.., "as in a pool of water" said with reference to fire as the *sādhya*.

The application is the formal use of reason, whereas the conclusion is the formal use of the thesis.

(E378-383) (On PM 3.52-64) Inference is twofold: inference for oneself and inference for others. Inference for oneself has already been described. It is the cognitive process of comprehension of the *sādhya* on the basis of the *sādhana*. Inference for others is a cognitive process of comprehension of the *sādhya* produced by a formal statement that refers to and makes known an object, which is the content of inference for oneself. Its purpose is precisely the same as that of inference for onself, because the reason employed in it is also the same as in inference for oneself.

However, a reason can be of two types: positive, based on

apprehension (*upalabdhi*), and negative, based on non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*). In either case it is characterized by inseparable connection, i.e. the relation between the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* as well as the relation between something-to-be-comprehended (*gamya*) and something that leads to the comprehension (*gamaka*). Apprehension concerns affirmation (*vidhi*) and negation (*pratiṣedha*); similarly, non-apprehension concerns both. Thus apprehension has two varieties: apprehension of the non-contrary and apprehension of the contrary. An apprehension of the non-contrary with respect to affirmation has six sub-varieties: the pervaded property, the effect, the cause, the antecedent, the consequent and the temporal correlate.

Discussion of various problems and inconsistencies which other accounts, especially Buddhist accounts, of the reason involve.

When one accepts the inference of color from taste on the basis of the inference of one causal complex, one also accepts a particular cause as a reason (of an inference) in cases when there is no deficiency of other causes (e.g. soil, water) which could prevent the efficacy of that particular cause. In other words, from the particular taste (of a particular fruit) which one relishes one infers a particular kind of causal complex (which comprises a number of cognate qualities). In the next step, from that particular kind of causal complex one infers a particular color (associated with the taste).

The relation of causality (*tadutpatti*) or the relation of essential identity (*tādātmya*) do not apply to (the relation between) two things, i.e. the antecedent (past) and the subsequent (future), related in time as *sādhya* and *sādhana*, because these two relations are not apprehended when things are far apart in time: e.g., the absence of the demon Rāvaṇa at the time of the future Cakravartin Saṅkha or the rise of the Kṛttikā constellation and the rise of the Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) constellation are related by neither relation, whereas one can infer fire from smoke only when there is no lapse of time (i.e. when one immediately follows the other).

(Prajñākaragupta's objection:) Since one knows from the rise of the Kārttika constellation that its effect is the subsequent rise of the Rohiṇī constellation, why should the reason not be an effect (of the *sādhya*, i.e. why should this inference not be based on the relation of causality)?

(Answer:) Two things, the future and the past, e.g. death and the awareness of being awake, cannot serve as reasons for things which have originated long before or for omens, such as lines in the palm of the hand, because when these themselves occur, they do not require such correlates (i.e. death in the future occurs independently of any omens on the palm of the hand, and awareness of the waking state in the past does not require that one will wake up again some time later). This is so because when x requires the action of y it means that x exists when y exists. But omens and death are not causally related, nor is the waking state and waking up.

(Objection:) If there were no cause-effect relation how could one possibly infer anything one the basis of one observation (without repeated, prolonged observation)?

The answer is easy: Through inseparable connection, because it is often seen that, even when the relation of causality and the relation of essential identity are not operative, one does know through the inseparable connection (of two things). But when this connection is absent, one cannot correctly infer that a particular person is not omniscient, or that a particular person is dark-complexioned, on the basis of the property of being a speaker or on the basis of the property of being that man's son, even though neither of the two relations, i.e. neither the relation of causality nor the relation of essential identity, obtains.

Two temporal correlates (i.e. two co-existent things) cannot serve as reasons in inferences based on either the relation of causality or of essential identity, when either the two

things are mutually exclusive or when they occur simultaneously.

(E383-390) (On PM 3.65-98) There follows a detailed description, with examples, of the six sub-varieties of the reason (see PM 3.65-70) related to non-contradictory affirmation (comprehension of the non-contradictory with respect to affirmation).

1.(*Vyāpya*) *Hetu* pervaded by the *sādhya*. A positive and a negative example are provided: (1) Speech evolves (*pariṇāmin*) because it is produced, like a pot; (1) whatever is of such a type (i.e. is produced) is an evolver, like a pot; and indeed it is produced, therefore it evolves; (2) whatever does not evolve is not produced, like a barren woman's child; and indeed it is not produced, therefore it does not evolve.

2.(*Kārya*) *Sādhya* a result of the *hetu*. E.g., in the body there is sentience, because there is verbal activity and practical actions.

3. (*Kāraṇa*) *Hetu* a result of the *sādhya*. E.g., Here there is shadow, because there is an umbrella.

4.(*Pūrvācāra*) Where the *sādhya* precedes the *hetu*. E.g., Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) will rise because Kṛttikā has risen.

5. (*Uttarācāra*) Where the *hetu* precedes the *sādhya*. E.g., Bharaṇi (another constellation) has risen because Kṛttikā has risen.

6. (*Sahācāra*) Where *sādhya* and *hetu* co-exist. E.g., In this fruit there is color because there is taste.

Just as there is apprehension of the non-contrary, there is also apprehension of the contrary. Examples are given.

Apprehension of the contrary with respect to negation, and similarly with respect to non-apprehension, are now discussed.

There follows a parallel account of the varieties of the contradictory and non-contradictory varieties with respect to non-apprehension.

(E390-391) Identification in the formal argument (*prayoga*) of the reason, along with the remaining members

(example, etc.) with respect to something which has already been understood by oneself, is made in order to give rise to the opponent's understanding, and it can be justified either as explicable in such a way or by appeal to its inexplicability otherwise. Examples of each: "This place is possessed of fire because it is explicable only as involving the presence of smoke", and "This place is possessed of fire because it is inexplicable without the presence of smoke" respectively.

The formal pronouncement of the reason is validated through a proper grasp of pervasion, and this pervasion can be determined accurately by the competent only thanks fo the pronouncement of the reason. Moreover, the eventual proof of the *sādhya* can be accomplished only through this, too. That is why it is important to mention the subject term (*pakṣa*) too in order to indicate the substratum (*ādhāra*), i.e. the actual thing referred to by the inference.

(E391-399) (On PM 3.99.) Scriptural testimony is the cognition of a thing based on utterances of an authoritative person or his gestures or other signs given by him.

(Mīmāṃsaka:) Since there is no authoritative person who can see imperceptible things, one has to admit that scriptural testimony with respect to such things must be of non-human origin, and since only such testimony is a *pramāṇa*; how could scriptural testimony ever be based on utterances of an authoritative person?

(Answer:) This objection is misguided, because it has already been demonstrated, first, that the Tīrthaṅkaras are those who see extrasensory objects and second, that scriptural testimony of non-human origin is not possible. What would this non-human origin of the Veda concern? Would it be about words or sentences or phonemes? How could the Veda be of non-human origin if there is no *pramāṇa* that proves its non-human origin? And what could serve as a proof of it? Could it be perception, or presumption, or some other *pramāṇa*? Perception cannot prove it because it merely grasps the sonic

layer of speech and nothing more. It cannot be inference for a number of reasons, including formal ones, e.g. there is no example which could be formally adduced ir in support of either positive or negative concomitance (between the Veda and not being humanly caused). It is wrong to claim that since the power to remember the author of a work is generally there but the author of the Veda cannot be remembered, the Veda is of non-human origin. Further, would the author not be remembered by the proponent or by the opponent or by everybody? Etc. The thesis of non-human origin leads to a number of undesired consequences.

(E399-427) The non-human origin of the Veda cannot be proved through scriptural testimony. It is proved that scriptural testimony does not possess cognitive validity (it is not a *pramāṇa*) to prove the thesis of the non-human origin of scriptural testimony.

Nor can presumption prove it.

But let us assume that the Veda is of non-human origin. Would that make the cognition of itself being as already explained and known or itself being otherwise? There follows a longer discussion of what the non-human origin of scripture could be and why it is not possible.

Another problem is the following: Jaimini says that speech is permanent because the object of its grasp is the ultimate reality, which is permanent, and what corresponds to the permanent must also itself be such. Such an argument is faulty for a number of reasons, including the fact that one does not observe an object as corresponding to any kind of similarity to speech. And if one could observe any similarity between language and its object, then verbal cognition would have to be fallacious. The Mīmāṃsaka may argue that speech is permanent because it is inexplicable without the fact that speech's denoting power demonstrates the object and such power must always be there. A number of verses from the *Ślokavārttika* are quoted in support, along with more arguments to prove the thesis of the non-human origin of the Veda. All these arguments of the Mīmāṃsaka are subsequently rejected.

(E427-431) (On PM 3.100-101) Words etc. are the causes of the cognition of things due to linguistic convention (*saṃketa*) in the presence of inherent semantic power which concerns the relation of the signified thing and the signifying instrument (the word) that obtains between objects and speech. An example is: "Like the sentence, Mount Meru etc. exist".

(Objection:) Is this inherent semantic power, which is in fact the relation of the signified things and the signifying instrument (the word), permanent or impermanent? It is neither (a verse from the *Vākyapadīya* is quoted in support), therefore the concept should be rejected.

(Answer:) Prabhācandra explains that the inherent semantic power is neither absolutely permanent (e.g. the relation between momentary symbols and gestures and their referents cannot be permanent) nor absolutely impermanent. The relation which obtains is actually between a speech element with a content as such mediated through a beginningless succession, and it is the basis to establish linguist convention that rules the use of words. This linguistic convention rests on human agents; it does not involve any kind of extrasensory perception.

But is this relation between the signified thing and the signifying instrument of sensory nature itself extrasensory knowledge, or can it be known inferentially? It is not true what the Buddhist says (a quote from the *Pramāṇavārttika*) that the relation signifies its object by referring to its intrinsic nature. Therefore words, whish are either common (pertaining to the empirical world) or cultivated (pertaining to the extra-empirical world) signify their referents due to linguistic convention in the presence of inherent semantic power.

(E431-444) An exposition of the Buddhist theory of semantic exclusion (*apoha*) comes next. The Buddhist may object that a word's capacity to signify its content is not possible

because the existing objects with respect to which words are used are either past or future and they do not co-exist with the words when the words are used. Therefore, words do not signify what their users intend them to signify; instead, one should adopt the theory of semantic exclusion. Words do not signify directly; they signify through what they deny.

This theory is shown to be a matter of mere belief (but not truth) for a number of reasons. First, we would not be able to communicate any meaning, whereas practice shows that we do. Further, it is contradicted not only by practice but also by cognition: a cognition of, say, a cow does arise due to direct reference to the signified object on hearing the word "cow".

If through the word "cow" one primarily obtains the exclusion of the word "non-cow", then on hearing the word "cow" one would understand "non-cow". But the Buddhist defends his position, and quotes from the Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* and from Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra* follow.

Furthermore, would the universal characterized by semantic exclusion, described as that which is to be denoted, refer to things through weak negation or strong negation? Neither of these is satisfactory.

What kind of entity is meant by the Buddhist which consists in the suspension (exclusion) of, say, "horse"? It can neither be something singular, e.g. a pure particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) cow, nor a physical individual, say the dappled cow named Śābaleya.

More criticism follows, this time formulated by the Mīmāṃsaka along with quotes from the *Ślokavārttika*. For instance, such a cow which is consistently signified through a word "non-cow" is in fact something which is consistently signified by the word through affirmation, i.e. directly, because it serves to exclude the preclusion of "non-cow".

Dignāga's idea, that the statement that "speech elements such as 'blue' and 'water-lily' refer to things qualified by the exclusion of other things than themselves" serves to corroborate the relation between the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and the qualifier

(*viśeṣaṇa*) is also wrong.

But let us suppose that the theory of *apoha* is correct. Then with respect to a unique individual there is no qualifier to qualify it because there cannot be any discernment the content of which is such an object; for we can see that all qualifiers produce discernment of a qualificand which mirrors the object's form. More verses from the *Ślokavārttika* are quoted against the Buddhist position. The conclusion is that all the words which exclude the other would be void of their distinct character and they would all merge as far as their reference is concerned; they could not denote anything either. Last but not least, is semantic exclusion itself denotable or not denotable? Moreover, it would not be possible to establish any linguistic convention concerning the usage of words.

(E444-453 Exposition of the theory of *sphoṭa*, The theory of *sphoṭa* serves to repudiate the Buddhist theory of semantic exclusion. According to the *sphoṭa* theory, linguistic convention is humanly produced only with respect to the usage of actual, empirical linguistic units; in other words, such units (sounds, *dhvani*) refer directly to objects and are based on a convention which is artificial. The convention concerns objects consisting in general and particular features but does not concern the universal property (*jāti*).

A detailed description of the theory of *sphoṭa* follows, also supported by references to the *Vākyapadīya*. The rule is: if x leads to a particular linguistic practice with respect to y, then y is the content of x, and that is how the convention is established. There is a discussion of what the inte(*vivakṣā*) of the speaker is and what role it plays in the communication process. Is it merely the desire to pronounce words, or is it an intention of the sort "I will communicate this object by using this word"? Does the sentence communicate its intent independent of linguistic convention or depending on it.

(E453-458) Criticism of the *sphoṭa* theory. The following explanation of the process of verbal decoding of meaning is

correct: One grasps the meaning by force of the last syllable characterized by the disappearance of the previous syllables which are being cognized one by one. In other words, traces (*saṃskāra*) produced by a cognition of previous syllables reaches the final syllable in a continuous succession as follows: First, the apprehension of the first syllable of a word or sentence occurs and a corresponding trace is generated by it; then, by dint of that, the apprehension of the second syllable occurs, then another corresponding trace is produced which is characterized by the trace impressed by the previous apprehension. In the same way, also, the third syllable and subsequent ones are absorbed in this continuous way until the last trace, assisted by the last syllable, leads to the understanding of the meaning of the word or sentence.

But there is also an alternative and equally correct way to explain the process of understanding the meaning: Individual instances of the awareness of previous syllables in the series, not yet destroyed due to a fixed principle of destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*, one of five karmic states) occasioned by the comprehension of the meaning of the speech element (a word or a sentence) as well as by the traces produced by them establish the trace of the final syllable; the final syllable, dependent on the memory produced by such traces become the cause of the understanding of the meaning of the word.

It is not possible for an unanalyzable meaning-unit (*sphoṭa*) to be manifested through syllables, because neither can all syllables taken jointly manifest it nor syllables individually.

Moreover, is the final trace which is implanted by the final syllable of the nature of being an unanalyzable meaning-unit or its property? Neither is possible, so the idea of *sphoṭa* should be rejected.

What would be the locus of a *sphoṭa*, or what would be the factor or element which would manifest it? Would it be the element of air, which is the locus of sound?

Further, let us admit the reality of the *sphoṭa*, but then precisely in the way that it is manifested through an audible locus and data, other similarly unanalyzable unit of smell, taste, etc. would have to be admitted. And similarly, one would have to admit unanalyzable meaning-units corresponding to motions of the hand (i.e. gestures) and feet, etc. or to gesticulations indicating symbols at a matrix, etc.

(E458-460) A discussion of the relation of words and sentences follows along the lines of the previous discussion of the relation of words and *sphoṭas*.

What would be the ultimate meaning conveyer: words or sentences? A word is a combination of syllables but is independent of mutually dependent syllables. A sentence is a combination of words but is independent of mutually dependent words. It is not possible to claim that a sentence is a speech-unit which is one and unanalyzable, either. What kind of unit would it be: spatial, temporal or verbal/acoustic?

A sentence as a conveyer of meaning cannot be of a generic nature existing as an unanalyzable unit, nor can it be eternal.

(E461-465) Exposition of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā theory of the expression of sentence-meaning only through connected words (*anvitābhidhānavāda*). According to this Mīmāṃsaka only words, which lead to the understanding of the meaning of a sentence, preceded by the understanding of respective meanings of the words, can convey the intent of the sentence; thus the primary meaning-conveyers are interconnected words. Quotes from the *Ślokavārttika* which favor this theory.

A critique of it follows. If the understanding of sentence meaning depends on the understanding of the meanings of words which depends on the expression through words of the meanings which are interconnected with the meanings of other words in the sentence, then–in the sentence "Devadatta, bring a white cow"–the expression of only the word "Devadatta" connected with the meaning of the sentence and with other words such as "bring", "white" and "cow" could convey the meaning and the use of all the remaining words in the sentence

would purposeless.

A word exercises two functions: the function of conveying its own meaning and the function of interpreting (making understood) the meanings of other words. But that is not compatible with this Mīmāṃsā position.

If a cognition of the referent of a word which has arisen on account of hearing the word could lead to apprehension of the meaning of a sentence, then why should the cognition of a color etc. produced on account of the eye etc. not lead to apprehension of smell etc.

Critique of another Mīmāṃsā (Bhāṭṭa) theory of sentence meaning as the connection of separately expressed meanings (*abhihitānvaya*), according to which words do have isolated meanings independent of their sentences' meanings. One of the problems is: How are the isolated meanings meaningfully combined? Are the meanings expressed through words connected into a semantic whole through still other words or through consciousness? It is not the case that words are the ultimate meaning-conveyers.

CHAPTER FOUR: ON THE OBJECT KNOWN

(E466-473A) (On 4.1-5) The contents of *pramāṇas*, including language, as they have been described so far, are particular things with universal properties. It is so, because those kinds of objects makes up the domain of the cognitions of repeatable (recurrent) and unrepeatable things. Such a thing is the object of *pramāṇas* which involve universals and particulars, because it is the object known as possessing external and internal form, but also because of its transformation characterized by continued existence as well as by acquisition and by the exclusion of preceding and succeeding aspects, and because it is capable of causally efficient action.

That is why the universal (*saṃānya*) is twofold, divided into synchronic homogeneity (*tiryak*) ands diachronic (*ūrdhvatā*) homogeneity. Synchronic homogeneity is the

permutation of the same property, such as cow-ness in calves with half-grown horns, in young hornless cows, etc.

(Objection:) The universal is as non-existent as a lotus growing in the sky.

(Answer:) Such an objection is baseless, because the universal is comprehended by valid (unsublated) cognitions of the sort "a cow", "a(nother) cow", etc., i.e. cognitions of a series of similar individuals. If the universal defined in this way did not exist, there would be no particular things either.

Cognitive awareness (*buddhi*) manifests within itself something which is of imitable, repetitive form, which has not entered one's experience as unrepeatable form; such a cognition is true, i.e. not sublated, and it is this cognition which establishes the universal as something really existent.

(Objection:) There is no universal property other than a particular, because there is no such division in cognitive awareness, and without such a division in cognitive awareness it is not possible to establish any difference between them in the world of existing entities.

(Answer:) What is represented from a distance is only the universal, not particulars such as something that is either a pillar or a human being, because there is serious doubt as to what that content really is (i.e., no such doubt is possible concerning its being a particular something). A universal is represented in cognition as a repeatable (recurrent) form, whereas the representation of a particular in cognition is experience as an unrepeatable form. There follows a detailed criticism of the Buddhist (Dharmakīrti's) account of the universal and the particular.

The universal is neither permanent nor omnipresent. Were it permanent no change would be possible. If it were omnipresent, would it be present in absolutely everything or present only where particulars are present, etc.?

(E473-481) It is wrong to maintain that the universal is of the nature of the individual (*vyakti*), a view which is expressed

in the *Ślokavārttika*: "Why should there be any essential identity (between the universal property and the particular)? Because the particular's nature is of the universal". Detailed criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka's view of the universal and the particular; copious citations from Kumārila's works, and the Mīmāṃsā thesis of the actual identity of the universal and the particular, which should be rejected.

In fact, the property of an actual entity is twofold: dependent on another (*parāpekṣa*) and independent of another (*parānāpekṣa*). The particular, being dependent on another, executes its own causally efficient action which is characterized by cognition of its object's being exhibits a causally efficient action different from everything else. A universal executes action which is characterized by the cogntion of all repeatable (recurrent) entities groupable under one kind. Thus one is different from the other, but they are complementary and separable.

In fact, a universal resembles similarity (*sādṛśya*).

(Objection:) If the universal were tantamount to similarity, then how could the cognition "just this thing is a cow (exemplifying the universal cow-ness)" be applicable--after one has seen a dappled cow (and understood that it is cow)–to a white cow too? (Answer:) This is possible because of the notion of oneness, which is of two kinds: primary and metaphorical.

(E482-487) The idea, upheld by the Nyāya school, that a universal is a class of all its members, e.g. that the universal Brahminhood pervades all individual Brahmins, is mistaken. It is not possible to assemble all such particulars into one class by perception, e.g. by repeated observation "This is a Brahmin; that is a Brahmin; that other is a Brahmin". This cannot be accomplished by inference or by any other *pramāṇa*.

(E488-504) (On PM 4.6) Diachronic homogeneity, which is the second type of universal, is exemplified in a substance's pervading all its previous and subsequent manifestations, like clay in different stages, say, a lump of potter's clay etc.

The exposition of this idea offers an opportunity to attack Buddhist nominalism and momentariness. (Buddhist:) Since one in no way perceives any substance which pervades all its previous and subsequent manifestations as something different separately from those manifestations, one has to conclude that it does not exist; what really exist are momentary particulars. (Answer:) One does cognize through perception itself the progressive cohesion of form (*anvayirūpa*) of things which stand in clear opposition to their alleged momentariness and uniqueness.

(Buddhist:) Let's grant that the progressive cohesion of forms is what the Jainas call continued existence (*sthiti*); when this continued existence is cognized not in succession, i.e. all its stages at once, then one simultaneously grasps it along with its end or termination; alternatively, when continued existence is cognized in succession (along its temporal span), then cognitive awareness cannot cognize such continuity, because both are momentary.

(Answer:) This is mistaken as well. What role do memory and recognition play in establishing the continuity of one substance of the moments of time? If omniscience is possible it is purposeless to try to establish the continuity of a thing through memory etc.

(Buddhist:) Since previous and subsequent moments of a thing are not grasped in the present, how else could this permanence of things be known?

(Answer:) You can see it yourself! If you didn't see it yourself, how could you claim to cognize the impermanence of its middle (i.e. present) moment: in other words, how would it be possible for you to relate this present moment of the thing to its previous and subsequent instants if you didn't cognize the substance over time in its continuity?

(Objection:) Impermanence means the absence of previous and subsequent instants in the present moment and the absence of the present moment in these instants; and this present

moment is grasped through perceiving the absence of the previous and subsequent moments.

(Answer:) If these previous and subsequent moments were not cognized as related to the present moment, and if this present moment were not cognized as related to the previous and subsequent instants, it would not be possible to differentiate the previous and successive moments from the present one.

(Buddhist:) The continuity of things is called by you "permanence" (*nityatā*), and this depends on the three times–past, present and future; but how is it possible to perceive this continuity which depends on the three times if neither past nor future instants are perceived? Further, the permanence of things actually means that they have past and future instants, because they are related to past and future time, but the past and the future of time cannot be proved. The thing's property of permanency is supposed to be proved through direct perception of repeatable (recurrent) form, but such perception is known to be false because it can be sublated.

(Answer:) None of these objections withstand scrutiny. That *pramāṇa* which establishes a thing to be contrary to one's previous awareness of it is known as the sublater of that previous awareness. But perception cannot play any role in establishing an entity as something which disappears within a moment, neither can it be done through inference. The Buddhists accept no other *pramāṇa,* so with what *pramāṇa* can he sublate the permanence of things? Inference cannot sublate the permanence of things because it depends on perception; moreover, what kind of reason can be employed to disprove it? That reason can be neither permanence's essential nature nor its effect; it cannot be inference based on non-apprehension either, and impermanence cannot be claimed to be true without any reason.

Another problem which impermanence involves is this: Let us grant the impermanence of things and the thesis that things

originate, continue and disintegrate in the same moment: then if only an existent entity is the cause of the destruction of something existent (a non-existent entity cannot effectuate anything), does it produce that destruction before the origination of the existent thing, or at a subsequent point of time, or at the same time? This yields a number of contradictions. If one does not accept non-existent entities as some other kind of thing, then what is it that is called the locus of momentary destruction--the thing itself, e.g., the pot, the shards, or still something else? It is impossible to explain why things would disintegrate moment after moment, but the claim that they do so without a cause is not reasonable either. Does a momentary actual entity produce its case while already being destroyed itself, or not yet destroyed, or being both destroyed and not destroyed, or neither?[1] All these options lead to undesired consequences.

(E504-520) Let us analyze the idea of a causally efficient action in the context of momentariness. The Buddhist maintains that whatever exists has the defining feature of executing causally efficient action. In this definition of what exists thing, does the word 'defining feature' refer to a the thing's cause, or to its intrinsic nature, or to the element which makes it known (*jñāpaka*)?

Another problem with momentariness is that it is not possible to establish, not just any causal relation but any relation of any kind.

As Dharmakīrti himself points out in his *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, the relation between things has to be characterized by one of two possible relations, either some kind of dependence on other factors (i.e., interdependence (*parātantrya*) of things), or an amalgamation of their forms (*rūpaśleṣa*). Neither of these kinds of dependence is possible in the case of momentary entities. A number of verses from the *Sambandhaparīkṣā* are quoted.

[1]This is clearly a reference to *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 1.1 etc.

This leads to the conclusion that no causal theory, or no appeal to the relation of effect to cause, can explain the origination and destruction of things from the Buddhist perspective.

(E520-524) (On PM 4.7-9) Just as the universal property is of two kinds, also particulars are of two kinds: modes and differential particulars (*vyatireka*). Modes are transformations which take place in succession in what is numerically one substance, e.g. joy or despair in the self.

(Buddhist:) The examples do not make sense because the self is not different from particular modes such as joy, despair, etc., since a self simply does not exist.

(Answer:) The self can be directly perceived through self-illuminating cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) as an agent which pervades manifold mental states, like the cognition of something of mixed color. The rule here is: if something manifests itself in one way, it should be practically treated in such a way. The Buddhist position would contradict the following: If the modes such as happiness and unhappiness, etc. were absolutely different, then the following introspective observation should not be possible: "Before I was happy; now I have become unhappy".

If one does not accept the self then the undesired conclusion is that there is no karmic retribution for what one has done, and deeds not committed befall someone who has not committed them.

Further, without accepting the self the processes of memory and recognition would not be possible. For instance, the following judgment could never occur: "It is I who has known that, and I now know it". A longer discussion of various accounts of recognition follows, including the Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist positions, with emphasis on the nature of the relation between what was experienced and what is being experienced, between the experience itself and its locus.

(Objection:) Affirmation and denial, which are mutually contradictory, can never occur at the same time.

(Answer:) It is wrong to reject something that occurs in an actual entity cognized through *pramāṇas*: a mad elephant does not kill both someone who is on its path and someone who is not, because that would lead to the undesired consequence that when someone who is near gets killed by the elephant also the mahout gets killed: the consequences are far-reaching. Such is the Buddhist argument, and their theory of momentariness has to be rejected.

(E524-527) (On PM 4.10) A differential particular is the transformation of dissimilar aspects in a distinct thing, e.g. a cow and a buffalo. A distinct thing is something which is different both from things of the same class (*sajātīya*) and things of a different class (*vijātīya*). For instance, among cows differentiation is a transformation of dissimilar aspects–e.g., calves with half-grown horns, young hornless cows, etc.; among buffaloes it is characterized by prominence or ranginess. What is meant is the unique characteristic of each of them which is not common to other, either similar or dissimilar, things.

(Vaiśeṣika:) It is wrong to maintain that an actual entity consists of both the universal and the particular, because there is no *pramāṇa* that proves an object to have such a double nature, and because the universal and the particular are completely different from each other since they are represented as completely different from each other, like a pot and a piece of cloth.

Further, one can experience two seemingly contradictory properties imposed one on the other, i.e. coexisting one with the other in the same locus. E.g. There is a piece of cloth that stands in relation to the universal piece-of-cloth-ness, is capable of executing causally efficient action directed at things different from it, and has a particular large size, whereas there are also the threads of which the piece of cloth has been made, and these are related to the universal thread-ness, they produce a

different effect and have a very small size; but these two, the piece of cloth and the threads, co-exist. In addition, the piece of cloth is different from the threads because it has a different maker than that threads, as a pot is made by a potter, i.e. has a different maker from its threads. But the pot and the threads do not exclude each other, whereas the universal and the particular do.

If one takes the Jaina thesis seriously and admits the identity of two contradictory things such as a universal and a particular, then the piece of cloth and the threads would be identical and one could say that the threads *are* the piece of cloth.

But it is not possible to say that the piece of cloth and the threads are both identical and dissimilar, because that would involve doubt. The nature of the doubt is: from what and in what sense are they different and from what and in what sense are they not different? And there might also be a contradiction: x is different from y, and x is not different from y. To say that a thing has two contradictory properties makes that things automatically amenable to doubt, and the doubt whether x has P or non-P cannot be resolved, since it is believed by the Jainas to have both!

Let us now analyze the structure of the world. A detailed description of the Vaiśeṣka ontology follows. First, there are some things which are absolutely different from each other, and these are the six ontological categories (substance, quality, motion, universal, individuator and inherence). Then there are nine substances, out of which four are divided into permanent and impermanent. The atoms are permanent, because they are existent on their own and do not have any cause. Atomic dyads and larger molecules are made of atoms and are impermanent, because they are effects, etc. All substances from earth to the mind are different from each other. Similarly, there are twenty-four qualities, and similarly some of these are different from each other, and some are not. So, indeed mutual difference of

things is a part of the structure of the world, and likewise a part of the structure of the world is the fact that some things are not different from each other. But this does not imply that each thing can be a locus of two properties which stand in contradiction to each other.

(E528-547) (Answer to the Vaiśeṣika:) It is not true that there is no *pramāṇa* which grasps a single thing as something consisting in numerous properties. In fact, any thing consists in numerous properties, because each thing is capable of executing causally efficient actions which are different from each other. E.g., the same Devadatta can be a father, son, grandson, brother, sister's son etc. This reason is not unproved. Other reasons used by the Vaiśeṣika against the main thesis (viz., that one thing is a multiplex, i.e. has many properties) are also fallacious. The multiplex character of things can be perceived. The fact that different properties of one thing are grasped by different *pramāṇas*, i.e., by perception, inference, etc. does not show that their common locus is contradictory. To claim that the whole and its parts are grasped by different *pramāṇas* is also faulty.

The examples to which the Vaiśeṣika refers, e.g. a piece of cloth and a pot which are mutually different, cannot be used as parts of a proof, because they have no proving power and they are inadequate. The attribution of coexistence to two seemingly contradictory properties does not prove the absolute incompatibility of a whole and its parts. Things are internally different, i.e. complex, also because they have different causal powers and capabilities, but such a difference is not absolute.

The Vaiśeṣika maintains that all six of his categories possess existentiality (*astitva*) and that they are a group of six categories which have something in common, but at the same time refuses to admit that existentiality is something over and above the categories. Further, how could this existentiality be related to its loci: through direct connection or through inherence? Neither is feasible.

Discussion of the ontological status of existentiality. Discussion of whether and in what sense the threads are different from the piece of cloth.

(Objection:) If an actual entity is endowed with difference and non-difference, i.e. with two contradictory properties, then the undesired consequence should follow that it would automatically be amenable to doubt.

(Answer:) This objection is off the mark, because doubt is justified only when one does not see either difference or non-difference, e.g., there is doubt only when has not seen whether the thing in the distance is a person or a pillar. But if one does see two mutually different properties, where is the problem or occasion for doubt?

Further, there cannot be any contradiction between things different from each other. The absence of another form is not tantamount to the presence of one's own form. The nature of a thing is not its presence in all its aspects, because of the undesired consequence that the object would be present only in its own form, not otherwise.

What is the nature of a contradiction? Is it characterized by the impossibility of joint concurrence (*sahānavasthāna*), or does it actually consist of mutual exclusion, i.e. the establishment of one excludes the establishment ot the other), or does it consists in the relation of a sublated idea and the sublating factor? The two initial types are rejected outright as not applicable to the present case. The third type will be rejected later.

Further, is the alleged contradiction of one thing being endowed with difference and non-difference a contradiction between two properties or a contradiction of a property and its locus? Prabhācandra demonstrates that it is neither. Let us suppose that there some kind of contradiction, but is it contradiction in every respect (*sarvathā*) or in a particular respect (*kathaṃcit*)? Further, is the contradiction something non-different or different from existing entities? In neither case can such contradiction contradict anything. Suppose the contradiction concerns the object and the agent in dependence on the relation between the contradicted and the contradicting factor, but this does not serve to reject the thesis that entities have multiplex natures either.

Suppose that contradiction is another particular kind of category, different from the six Vaiśeṣika categories. But that leads to paradoxes. And another problem is: How would it relate to members of the six categories: through direct contact, through inherence, or through being their qualifier? None of these is applicable.

(Objection:) First, since a substance (i.e. the self), the nature of which is different from the body, senses and awareness, which is the locus of such qualities as will etc., is permanent and has numerically one form, how can one possibly claim that everything is of multiplex nature? It is not the case that if it is permanent and one, one cannot ascribe such properties as doing harm, etc. to it, and that it could not be the ultimate product of karmic retribution etc. It is said in the *Nyāyasūtra* that harm is done to an agent the locus of which is the result of the combination of body, senses and awareness, since there is contradiction between repeatable and unrepeatable essential natures (i.e. the universal and the particular) characterizing one and the same thing, how could the self possibly have the nature of both?

Both these argument are rejected by Prabhācandra.

It is also wrong to maintain that only the six categories (substance, etc.) are things cognizable through *pramāṇas* because this classification and the number cannot stand the test of critical inquiry. For instance, the first four substances, i.e. elements such as earth etc, which are said to be both permanent (as atom) and impermanent (as molecules). The permanence of atoms (even in the strict sense) is contradicted by the paradox of a causally efficient action exercised by them either one after another or all at once. If the nature of atoms is to produce dyads and larger molecules, since atoms are

permanent they would be doing it all the time (and there could be no whole lasting for more than an instant, so everything would be momentary), or else they would do it all at once and no other combination of atoms will be possible.

Analysis of the three types of causes envisaged in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: the inherence cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*), the non-inherence cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*), and the instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*). None of these three causes is consistent with direct contact etc., and they cannot explain how an atomic dyad etc. could be produced.

It is wrong to maintain that atoms are permanent on the basis that they are existent on their own and do not have any cause. There is no dispute between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Jainas as regards the existence of atoms: both agree that atoms have no cause, but that should be understood in such a way that atoms have the minutest dimension possible, of which there is no cause. It is well known that atomic dyads can disintegrate and the result is atoms. Threads which exist after a piece of cloth has been torn into pieces can also have as their cause the piece of cloth.

Discussion of the relation between a whole and its parts follows. If the whole substance, e.g. a piece of cloth whose conditions make it amenable to apprehension have been reached, were absolutely different from its parts, e.g. the threads, then one could not see it and would have to conclude that it doesn't exist, or that the threads do not exist. Do the whole and its parts exist in the same place or not? Would that place be defined in scholarly terms or in commonsensical terms?

(Question:) How do we know that the whole exists? After we have seen some of the parts or after we have seen all the parts? The first is not correct for a number of reasons. First, because suppose there is a huge elephant immersed in water and one sees just its upper part: one would have to conclude that the elephant does not exist! Secondly, one always can see

only outer parts of a whole and under normal conditions can never see the inner parts, but that does not lead us to reject the existence of the whole. A similar problem arises in the case of an object seen from the front whereas one cannot see its back side; how can one put these two sides together? With the help of recognition, etc.?

It is not possible that the part-less whole can occur in several loci (parts) all at once. Would it occur in every one of all its parts through its whole essential nature, or only partly? Being part-less, either it would occur as a whole in just one locus but could not occur in any other loci, or it could not occur partially in every one of its loci because it is part-less. The same paradox occurs when we analyze the whole with respect to its occurrence in numerous spatial points. The idea that the whole is part-less leads to many other paradoxes, e.g. by covering just one part of it one wold cover the whole of it; similarly, by pointing one of its parts (e.g. one thread) red, the whole piece of cloth would be red, etc.

The relation of the whole to its parts is based on the relation of a thing pervaded and its pervader, which are at the same time the relation of a prover (*sādhana*) to what it proves (*sādhya*). But if there is no pervader there is no pervaded property.

Suppose the whole exists as absolutely different from its color, taste, smell, touch etc., to what would the idea of the whole refer? How would we know it?

(E547-564) The problem of the whole and its parts is discussed now in the context of a universal and its instantiations, i.e. the particulars. The Vaiśeṣika account of the elements, i.e earth etc., as absolutely different, i.e. permanent in their nature, is also faulty. The same is true of space (*ākāśa*).

A discussion of the nature of space follows. What is important is that the term "*ākāśa*" will be used with two different meanings, the Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina, in what follows.

First comes the Vaiśeṣika account of the substance space. The Vaiśeṣika says that it is permanent, part-less etc. This is how the Vaiśeṣika formulates proof of its existence: We can infer the existence of space as something endowed with the properties of permanence, part-less-ness etc. on the basis of sound only, even though sound does not possess those properties since it is impermanent, etc. In what relation does sound stand to space? Is space a substance, a quality, or a motion? Analysis shows that sounds can neither be substances or movements, so they must be qualities, and as qualities they must have a locus, which is space. Moreover, they are the unique kind of quality in space, because touch, color etc. do not reside (inhere) in space. Thus sound is the only inferential sign on the basis of which one can infer the existence of space. Space is omnipresent because its qualities, i.e. sounds, can be perceived everywhere, and it is permanent because people like us can always perceive its qualities, i.e. sounds. It is a permanent substance and a locus of all sounds.

All these arguments are rejected one by one. Is the existence of space proved because sounds generally rest in it or because sound rests in a substance which is permanent, numerically one, incorporeal and omnipresent? The first alternative is something which is already accepted, so there is no need to prove it, for from it it does not logically follow that the locus is permanent, numerically one, incorporeal and omnipresent. The second alternative suffers from a number of defects, e.g. the reason is inconclusive as being doubtful and lacking a counter-example (i.e. there is no *vipakṣa*, since there is nothing outside of space). Therefore it has to be rejected. Further, it is not true that touch does not reside in the locus of sound: the fact is that sound is endowed with touch, because it is a cause of the vibration of other objects with which it comes into direct contact.

It is not true that space is the locus of both the smallest and the largest object, either. This is neither perceived nor can it be

proved.

It is not the case that only space is a substance that is not directly perceived, because air (*vāyu*) is not directly perceptible. So why should one say that sounds are the qualities of space if they can be the qualities of air as well?

There is no way to prove that space is numerically one, because sounds are numerous. Discussion of other possible qualities of space follow. Some other possible ways of explaining the nature of space and sound follow. A sound is momentary, because inasmuch as it is perceptible to people like us it is a quality of a particular omnipresent substance, like the feeling of happiness etc. Or, a sound is produced by another sound, because a property can be produced by a property.

There is no basis for the claim that sound can be the unique referential sign to prove the existence of space: the usefulness of sound to prove that equals its usefulness to prove the beauty of the son of a barren woman, inasmuch as it is not possible to find any property which would point to space as a substance producing effects in the form of sounds.

If sounds are the qualities of space, how can one explain the fact that sound's being a quality of space is not accepted by the Vaiśeṣika? Is it because of its co-existence with another quality which stands in contradiction to it? No, because space does not possess other qualities. Is it because of a contrary quality with which it comes into direct contact? Etc. The conclusion is that sound cannot be a quality of space and therefore it cannot serve to prove the existence of space.

How can the existence of space be proved? Prabhācandra says: the existence of space is proved because it is an effect of space that all substances are simultaneously absorbed at *pralaya*. The proof is the following: Simultaneous absorption of all substances (at *pralaya*) depends on a common cause, because otherwise their simultaneous absorption is not explicable. This disproves any assumption that space is not a locus of anything because it is not corporeal.

(E564-568) The Vaiśeṣika account of time (*kāla*), a substance, is likewise faulty. The Vaiśeṣika says that substantiality of time is proved because of the reason that time is the only causal condition of what is previous, subsequent, simultaneous etc.

Discussion of the nature of time. Time is understood as something which separates one thing from another, etc. But it is different from spatial direction (*diś*) and place (*deśa*), which also differentiate particular things.

The Vaiśeṣika position is criticized. Is time, said to be inferable on the basis of the cognition of "before", "after etc., one substance or numerous substances? It cannot be one, because it is admitted by the Vaiśeṣika that time has two divisions: time *per se* and the time of human experience. It is wrong to say time is one because it is a general cause of the cognition of simultaneity. Further, if one admits that it is partless and numerically one, how can one explain the experience of the past, present and future? Such a person would have to accept that there cannot be any simultaneity either.

The idea of the syntactico-semantic categories (*kāraka*) is applied to analyze the nature of time. Time cannot be a cause of natural phenomena, e.g. of a sunrise etc., because otherwise it would be activity (*kriyā*) *per se*. It cannot be an agent (*kartṛ*) or an object (*karman*) of an action. Time has divisions: units (*samaya*), moments (*muhūrta*), night-watches, days and nights, fortnights, months, seasons etc. Therefore time is not an indivisible and absolutely permanent substance.

(E568-570) The Vaiśeṣika account of the substance called "spatial direction" (*diś*) is inaccurate, too, because there is no *pramāṇa* to prove its existence. The account of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is discussed. "The inferential sign of spatial direction is that on the basis of which one says 'it is on the left, right, east, west etc. of that'," and likewise the definition of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is given: "*Diś* is that on the basis of which the ten notions of cardinal direction arise, such as east, south, west, north etc., which are applied to one corporeal substance as a reference point (the limit or focal point) with respect to (other) corporeal substances". Both are rejected, because spatial direction cannot be proved as something different from space, which is responsible for the notions of the east, etc.

(E570-586) The Vaiśeṣika account of the substance of the self is likewise wrong. Clearly, the self cannot be omnipresent, because that is contrary to perception, introspection, and such accounts as "I am happy", "I am unhappy ", "I know a pot", etc. It is also contrary to inference. The self cannot have the maximum size (i.e. infinite dimension) because it would not be numerically one since it shares some general characteristics with other substances, like a pot; also because it is a substance of a different kind from spatial direction, space and time, like a pot; and also because it is capable of motion, like an arrow. Further, the self is not a locus of either atomic or maximum size, since it is conscious.

The properties of righteousness (*dharma*) and unrighteousness (*adharma*) are not qualities of a self. Further, the self is not the locus of the invisible principle of the merits and demerits of living beings (*adṛṣṭa*). What the Vaiśeṣika says, viz., that "*adṛṣṭa,* being directly connected to its locus (the self), impels movement with respect to other loci, because it–having just one substance (that self) as its locus–is the quality which is the cause of its action" is wrong for a number of reasons. First of all, *adṛṣṭa* is not a quality. Further, it is not possible that it could cause action.

Effort (*prayatna*) cannot be a quality of a self either. A number of Vaiśeṣika arguments to prove the existence of effort are rejected. One of them is the following: "The cattle come close to Devadatta, being drawn by a quality of Devadatta, because they are under the influence of a drawing force, like the influence of a flavor (of some tasty fodder)". That argument is not acceptable, because what is actually meant by the word "Devadatta'–the body, the self, their connection, the body

qualified by is connection with the self, the self qualified by its connection with the body, or a place of the self related to the body?

The Vaiśeṣika argues: "The self is omnipresent, because its qualities can be apprehended everywhere, as in the case of space". But how is that possible? Does it mean that all the qualities can be apprehended only in the self's own body or also in another body ? Neither alternative is possible.

(Question:) Is the self endowed with activity or not? If it were, it would be connected to corporeal things such as a lump of earth. But what does "corporeal" mean? Etc. Whatever the meaning, if it were endowed with activity, it could not be permanent, any more than a pot is. On the other hand, if it were free from activity, it would never be reborn into the mundane world. Or if it could, how would it accomplish it? Through its body, its mind or by itself?

Detailed discussion of the qualities of the self follows.

(E586-587) The Vaiśeṣika account of the internal organ is criticized. Prabhācandra refers to his previous account of self-illuminating cognition. The internal organ, as the Vaiśeṣika characterizes it, cannot be proved by an *pramāṇa*, and it cannot be admitted as a separate substance either.

(E587-600) Rejection of the Vaiśeṣika account of the category of qualities. It is not possible to accept all the twenty-four kinds of qualities in the Vaiśeṣika list as actual qualities, because they cannot be established with the help of *pramāṇas*. First comes the exposition of all the Vaiśeṣika qualities, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* mentioning seventeen, and seven additional ones added on the basis of word "and" ("*ca*") in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (following the *Praśastapādabhāsya* explanation). All the qualities in the list are explained and described in more detail. Relatively sizable space (just as in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*) is devoted to the idea that the quality of number (*saṃkhyā*) and the cognition of recurrent continuity (*apekṣābuddhi*) are responsible for the recognition of numbers.

Prabhācandra criticizes the Vaiśeṣika account of the twenty-four qualities one by one. First, color and other material qualities etc., the way they have been described, are not possible. It is not true that color occurs only in earth, water and fire (being particularly manifested in fire), because it occurs also in air. Here is the proof: Color etc. occur also in air, because air is material and is possessed of touch too, like earth etc. Similarly, water and fire possess smell, taste etc.

Number cannot be a separate quality, because number is even cognized without things that are numbered, so it cannot be postulated as a separate entity over and above such things. Further, there is no need to postulate any special kind of cognitive faculty such as the cognition of recurrent continuity to cognize numbers. A longer and detailed critique of number and the cognition of recurrent continuity (the assumption of which leads to infinite regress) follows.

The admission of atomic size in the case of dyads is not acceptable, because no example can be provided for an effect which is of the same size as its causes. We can observe everywhere that an addition of elements, e.g. of two stones, comprises an effect which is larger. Similarly, if we add two atoms together the result must be of larger size than atomic. And if the combination of two atoms is of atomic size, then the combination of even a large number of atoms will still be of atomic size.

The argument adduced by the Vaiśeṣika for maximum size is faulty. "The largest size is something different from color etc. (i.e. different from anything experienced directly), because it can be grasped through cognitive awareness different from a cognition of color, like happiness." Etc.

Equally faulty are all arguments adduced to prove the existence of separateness (*pṛthaktva*). Further, qualities such as color etc. are equally separate, so how can the Vaiśeṣika explain such a notion (of qualities being possessed of a quality of separateness) if he also holds that a quality cannot possess

another quality?

The quality of contact (*saṃyoga*) has to be rejected, and additional details will be discussed later on when the notion of inherence is criticized. However, a number of inconsistencies are pointed out. Suppose that contact exists as a separate quality. But then disjunction (*vibhāga*) should not be admitted, because it is in fact a mere absence of contact. The Vaiśeṣika may argue: "If there were no disjunction, how could one explain the cessation of contact?" The answer is: through motion only. For instance, the contact of a hand and an arrow is seen to be produced by movement, not by separation. That leads Prabhācandra to consider an idea of a disjunction produced by disjunction (*vibhāgajavibhāga*). It also can easily be demonstrated to arise only due to activity, and it in fact consists in the absence of contact, so such an idea does not necessitate the notion of contact.

The Vaiśeṣika may argue: "If there were no disjunction produced by disjunction, then–in the case when one touches a wall with a hand–even when contact between the body and the wall ceases the termination of the contact between the body and the wall could not take place." Such an argument is absurd because the contact of the body and the wall is not possible without the contact of the body and the wall. Therefore both contact and disjunction have to be rejected as separate qualities.

Similarly, remoteness (farness, *paratva*) and proximity (nearness, *aparatva*) in space and time cannot have the status of qualities. It can easily be demonstrated that the occurrence of the notion "that one is blue and so is the next one", with respect to qualities such as blue etc. which have occurred in a sequence, can also be explained even without admitting these two qualities of farness and nearness, because qualities cannot have other qualities. And if this (the idea of farness and nearness) can be demonstrated with respect to qualities, so it can be demonstrated with respect to substances as well, which

can be remote or proximate without any need of such qualities.

The alleged qualities of satisfaction or pleasure (*sukha*), frustration or pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), being just diffferent states of awareness (*buddhi*), cannot be claimed to be qualities. Gravity or weight (*gurutva*), liquidity (*dravatva*), viscidity (*sneha*) etc. can only be understood as qualities of matter. The Vaiśeṣika may retort: "Weight is extra-sensory because it can only be inferred through the perception of a thing's falling down". That is not true because when a particular object is placed on the palm of one's hand, its weight is directly felt even without it falling down. Why does one not perceive the weight of dust etc. in the same way? Because dust is not amenable to direct grasp, inasmuch as it is too small. Otherwise one would have to admit that also smell, taste etc. are extra-sensory for the same reason.

It is not correct to say that liquidity is also a quality of earth and fire. But it cannot be a quality of water either, because also ghee and similar substances, which are not water, are well-known from everyday experience and are frequently said in Vedic texts to be liquid (*snigdha*). But even if one admits that liquidity is a quality, then solidity (*kāṭhinya*), softness (*mārdava*), etc. should also be admitted as separate qualities, because they cannot be explained as a transformation or termination of liquidity.

The disposition or trace known as inertia (*vega*) is not only a quality of earth and other matter, but also a quality of the self, because the latter is also known to be endowed with activity, which stands behind inertia. But in fact, inertia is nothing different from activity. That is even reflected in verbal usage; one can say "he is moving with inertia " or just "he is moving". To recapitulate, there is no quality of inertia.

The qualities of righteousness and unrighteousness have already been criticized and rejected on the occasion of the discussion of the self, its nature and qualities.

In such a way one has to rejected the notion of qualities

propounded in the Vaiśeṣika.

(E600-601) Rejection of the Vaiśeṣka account of the ontological category of motion (*karman*), which is said to be of five kinds. There is no reason to maintain that there are just five kinds of motion. And there is no ground for it being different from activity. If there is anything like motion it is only possible in the case of an object which is undergoing some transformation.

(E601) Rejection of the Vaiśeṣika account of the universal property–it has been criticized before.

(E601-604) The category of individuator (*viśeṣa*) or particular, the way it is described in Vaiśeṣika, is not possible either. Here is what the Vaiśeṣika says: Individuators are said to occur in permanent substances, such as atoms, space, time, spatial direction, selves and internal organs, and are responsible for the notion of the absolute unrepeatability (or discreteness) of things. Individuators are said to be ultimate and include atoms in the period between the dissolution of the world and its re-creation, to liberated selves, to the minds of the liberated, and other entities which do not have their own distinct features which would distinguish one from another. The fact that we have the notion of the discreteness of things in our minds serves as a *pramāṇa* for the existence of individuators. They are also proved by the fact that the *yogins* can differentiate among such permanent entities which do not have any individual features of their own.

These arguments are criticized for a number of reasons. Individuators do not exist, because their defining features are impossible. Something which is said to inhere in permanent entities cannot exist because absolutely permanent entities cannot exist, as has already been demonstrated. Also the argument which takes recourse to the cognition of *yogins* who can perceive ultimate entities is faulty: their cognition can be demonstrated to be erroneous. More arguments are provided.

(E604-624) The category of inherence is likewise not

possible. A definition from the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is cited: "Inherence is the relation which is the cause of the notion 'x is here' concerning entities which cannot exist separately (*ayutasiddha*) and which are related as located (*ādhārya*) and locus (*ādhāra*)." There follows a closer description of the relation of inherence. That relation also helps establish the relation between space and sound: "The word 'space' as a referring term (*vācaka*) denotes here the air, which is the referent (*vācya*)." Inherence can be observed perceptually: a piece of cloth manifests itself as nothing but a connection of threads, and the connected wholes in the form of a piece of cloth etc. have the form of threads etc.; if there were no connection, there would be a representation of a disjunction of components, like the mountain ranges of Sahya (the Western Ghats) and Vindhya. Inherence can also be proved inferentially: The notion "here in the threads there is a piece of cloth" is a result of a relation, because of the notion of "here" which cannot be sublated, like the notion of sour milk etc. in this vessel. Counter-arguments are refuted.

This account is rejected by Prabhācandra. What is the actual meaning of "the entities which cannot exist separately (*ayutasiddha*)"? Is it defined in scholarly terms or in commonsensical terms? The first alternative is wrong because scholars would not say that a piece of cloth and threads cannot exist separately. Also ordinary people know it. A lengthy critique of the relation of inherence follows. The Vaiśeṣika confuses the relation of contact with that of inherence in many cases. He also makes a mistake in distinguishing just two kinds of relation: contact and inherence. Often we just have a relation *per se*. Inherence cannot be perceived and it cannot be inferred. The arguments to prove the existence of inherence suffer from a number of formal defects. And there is no other way to establish its existence. Further, the assumption of inherence leads to a number of *aporia*, e.g. the difficulty in explaining how would inherence relate existence (*sattā*) with existent

entities (*sat*). Could inherence relate existence to something already existent or to something not yet existent? Etc.

There is another problem with inherence: is it one or many? It could not be one, because we could not explain how one inherence relates many qualities to many loci. But it could not be plural either. In addition, if every property or relation relates to its locus or possessor, then also inherence, being a property or relation, somehow must be related to its loci, but that necessitates an admission of another (meta)inherence through which a primary inherence would be located.

In such a way all the six ontological categories of the Vaiśeṣika system have been rejected.

Now there is an additional problem of how to relate the six Vaiśeṣika categories with the sixteen epistemological categories of the Nyāya system, *pramāṇa, prameya,* doubt (*saṃśaya*) etc. They partially overlap, one type cannot be mapped on the other, but they also are not exhaustive, which is the main goal of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas behind their typologies.

Neither classification finds room for two important categories: the principle of movement (*dharma*) and the principle of rest (*adharma*). How can they be proved? Through inference: every sudden and simultaneous movement which involves the change of place of selves or material objects requires a common external factor, because this is a movement of co-existing entities (so that one cannot be the essence of the movement of the other), like waters moving in the same direction in one stream or the movement of many fish found in the same expanse of water. Similarly all selves and material things which are found at rest (not moving) must depend on some other common external factors common to all selves and material things as the principle of movement and the principle of rest. It is not the case that things exercise influence on each other prompting others to move or to come to a halt, because such an argument involves the defect of vicious circle; some things move because they are moved by others, which in turn

move because they are moved by the former. In this way one should also reject any assumption of an invisible principle (*adṛṣṭa*) which is believed to be the source of movement. Material things are not moved or put to rest by something which is invisible, i.e. imperceptible and immaterial.

(E624-628) (On PM 4..10-11) The differentiated result of *pramāṇa* is the elimination of ignorance as well as of avoidance (*hāna*), appropriation (*upādāna*) and indifference (*upekṣā*). This result is both different and not different from the *pramāṇa*. Out of these, the elimination of ignorance is a result which is not different.

(Objection:) Suppose ignorance is a result (of *pramāṇas*) which is not different; it is not logically consistent to say that a thing x is the result of thing x, because of a contradiction.

(Answer:) It is not the case that a property and its possessor are either absolutely different from each other or absolutely not different from each other. And the cause-effect relation between them is not contradicted if these two are not different from each other.

However, avoidance, appropriation and indifference are a result which is different from *pramāṇa*, but even then there the difference is only qualified, not absolute.

Whoever cognizes in a valid way is someone whose ignorance has been eliminated, and he avoids things which do not lead to the acquisition of desired goals, he appropriates things which lead to the acquisition of desired goals and is indifferent to things which are neutral with respect to the acquisition of desired goals, because of proper cognition concerning the results.

Since there is no difference between the cogniser, a *pramāṇa* and its result, it is not possible to establish any difference.

(Objection:) A *pramāṇa* prompts an action which is different from its own essence, because it is a causal factor, like an axe.

(Answer:) But then, if what you want to prove is that the difference is only qualified, then you merely prove what is already proved (which is a fallacy). If what you want to prove is that the difference is absolute, then you are not able to provide any relevant example because any possible example will be devoid of the *sādhya* property.

The adopted rule–that the action is always absolutely different from its cause–is incorrect. That can easily be demonstrated by the example of a lamp which illuminates things and manifests itself through its nature: its light is not different from its cause, the lamp.

CHAPTER FIVE: ON FALLACIES

(E629-640) (On PM 5.1–44) In his comments on a number of *sūtras* of this Chapter of the *Parīkṣāmukha* (5.1-72). Prabhācandra has hardly anything to add on his own. Anything which is different from all that has been explained above, i.e. on *pramāṇas*, their number, on the known object and its result, constitutes a fallacy.

Fallacious *pramāṇas* include (1) cognizing without self-awareness, (2) cognizing an object already grasped, (3) mere vision of something (without any conceptual component), (3) doubt etc. These are fallacies because there is nothing to represent the relevant application (object) of such cognitive activity, the examples being, respectively, (1) an awareness of another person, (2) an object previously cognized, (3) a touch of moving grass, (4) doubt concerning something which could be a pillar or a man, and (according to Nyāya) inherence in a substance of what is (i.e. of qualities, motions and universal properties which are) connected in such a way with the eye and taste.

A fallacy of perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) is perception in the case when there is no clarity, for instance the Buddhist idea of the perceptual cognition of fire upon an accidental, sudden vision of smoke.

A fallacy of indirect cognition (*parokṣābhāsa*) occurs also in the case where there is clarity, for instance, the Mīmāṃsaka idea of (subsequent) instrumental cognition (*karaṇajñāna*) to know the first perceptual cognition.

A fallacy of recollection (*smaraṇābhāsa*) is a cognition of the sort "that was x" with respect to non-x, for instance with respect to Jinadatta a recollection "that was Devadatta".

A fallacy of recognition (*pratyabhijñābhāsa*) is a cognition of the sort "this is x" in the case of someone of similar appearance who is not x, or the sort "he looks like that one" in the case where this is one and the same person, as in the case of twins.

A fallacy of *tarka* (*tarkābhāsa*), through which one can know pervasion, is a cognition of the sort "this is the relation of pervasion" in the case when things are not related, for instance the reasoning "since he is the son of x, he is dark-complexioned (because all children of x are dark-complexioned)".

The following cases are fallacies of inference.

The first variety among these is the fallacy of the thesis (*pakṣa*), the first kind of which is when the thesis is not accepted (*aniṣṭa*) by both sides of the dispute, for instance, that "speech is not permanent" for the Mīmāṃsakas.

The second kind is the already proved (*siddha*), for instance "speech is audible".

The third kind is where the thesis is sublated (*bādhita*), which has further sub-kinds: (1) sublated by perception, (2) sublated by inference, (3) sublated by scripture, (4) sublated by opinion prevalent among people and (4) sublated by one's own words.. Examples, respectively, are (1) "Fire is not hot, because it is a substance, like water", (2) "Speech does not evolve (*apariṇāmin*), i.e. is permanent) because it is produced and it is capable of causally efficient action", like a pot", (3) "Righteousness brings about unhappiness to the deceased, because it depends on humans, like unrighteousness", (4) "The

human skull is pure because it is a part of a living being, like a shell", since it is known that some parts of animal bodies can be pure and others impure, for instance a number of products of the cow are pure, e.g. milk, but not a cow's meat; (4) "My mother is barren, because even though sexual contact with a man takes place, there is no fetus, as in the case of other women who are known to be barren".

Fallacy of the reason (*hetvābhāsa*), which has as its basic varieties a reason which is unproved (*asiddha*), which is contradictory, which is inconclusive and which is irrelevant (*akiṃcitkara*).

An unproved reason is a reason which lacks either existence or certainty (*asatsattāniścaya*). The first variety of the unproved type is the reason which is not proved (i.e., accepted) to exist (*avidyamānasattāka*) for instance "speech is an evolute, i.e. is impermanent, because it is perceptible to the eye".[1] Prabhācandra additionally distinguishes a number of sub-varieties of this type of reason.

Then there is the second variety of the unproved type, the one which lacks certainty, an example of which is, said to a simple-minded person "Fire is here (on the mountain) because there is smoke" when there is doubt because there is a cloud of some material stuff in the form of vapor etc. Another example, said to the follower of the Sāṃkhya system: "Speech is an evolute, i.e. is impermanent, because it is produced"; this reason is for the Sāṃkhya doubtful since they doubt whether they know that language is produced.

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[1]The idea of this fallacy is that in order to prove "x is P" one avails himself of an unproved (i.e. false) reason "because x is Q", which everyone knows is false. So it is not necessarily "not accepted by the opponent" only. I doubt anyone in India would ever say that speech is visible. Such a fallacy (like a number of others) is a mere technicality–for the sake of classification–and I doubt any one in his right senses would ever use such a *hetu*. (PB)

Now comes the description of the contra(dicto)ry (*viruddha*) reason defined as follows: A contrary reason is such whose inseparable connection is determined in a reverse manner, for instance: "Speech is not an evolute, i.e. is permanent, because it is produced". Contrary reason subsumes all eight kinds distinguished by the Naiyāyika, out of which four are with regard to the *sapakṣa*, these being (1) a reason which does not occur in the *sapakṣa*, (2) a reason which does not occur in the *pakṣa* and the *sapakṣa* alone, but also occurs in part of the *vipakṣa;* (3) a reason which does not occur in the *sapakṣa* but does occur in the *pakṣa* and in part of the *vipakṣa.* (4) a reason which does not occur in the *sapakṣa* but pervades the *vipakṣa* and does not occur in part of the *pakṣa*.

Further, there is the reason which occurs in the *pakṣa*, in part of the *vipakṣa* class and whose *sapakṣa* does not exist. There is also the reason which pervades the *pakṣa,* which occurs in part of the *vipakṣa* and whose *sapakṣa* dos not exist. Lastly, there is the reason which occurs in part of the *pakṣa*, which pervades the *vipakṣa* and whose *sapakṣa* does not exist.

An inconclusive reason is defined as that whose occurrence in the *vipakṣa* class as well is not contradicted, in other words it may occur in the *pakṣa*, in the *sapakṣa* and in the *vipakṣa*. It is two kinds: that whose occurrence in the *vipakṣa* is certain (*niścitta*) and that whose occurrence there is suspect (*saṃdigdha*). The first one is, for instance, "Speech is impermanent, because it is a cognizable thing, like a pot"; the problem is that the reason can apply also to space, which is permanent. The second one, the reason whose occurrence is suspect, is for instance "He is not an omniscient person, because he is a speaker": it is suspect because the property of being a speaker is not necessarily contradicted by the property of being an omniscient person.

Prabhācandra distinguishes further kinds of the inconclusive reason: occurring in part of the *sapakṣa* class; in part of the *vipakṣa* class; pervading the *pakṣa* and the *sapakṣa*;

and occurring in part of the *sapakṣa;* occurring in parts of the three–viz., occurring in part of the *pakṣa,* in part of the *sapakṣa* and in part of the *vipakṣa*; occurring in the *pakṣa*, in part of the *sapakṣa* and in part of the *vipakṣa*; occurring in the *pakṣa*, in part of the *vipakṣa* and pervading the *sapakṣa*;, and pervading the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa* and occurring in part of the *pakṣa*.

The last variety of fallacies of the reason is a reason which is irrelevant, i.e. which does not accomplish anything: it is a reason used to prove a *sādhya* which is already proved or which is sublated by perception etc. For instance: "Speech is audible because it is speech"; it is irrelevant because it does not accomplish anything. A second kind is, for instance: "Fire is not hot because it is a substance", it is irrelevant because likewise it is incapable of accomplishing anything, since fire's heat is a matter of perception.

One may object that all these varieties of fallacies of the reason are irrelevant because the faults which they involve pertain to the fallacies of the *pakṣa* which were indicated by formulations of the fallacies of perception, inference, scriptural testimony and by opinion prevalent among the people.
Or, since all the fallacies of the *pakṣa* are irrelevant because they're already sublated, why should they be categorized here at all? The reply is: This deficiency of the reason is mentioned just for the sake of definition (and its completeness), because any inference, when it is demonstrated, is disproved.

(E640-645) (On PM 5.45-72) There follows a classification of the fallacies of the example (*dṛṣṭāntābhāṣa*). The first variety includes fallacies of the example with respect to the relation of positive concomitance: (1) an example in which positive relation to the *sādhya* is unproved; (2) an example in which its positive relation to the proving property is unproved; and (3) an example in which both positive relations are unproved. Consider (A) "Speech is of non-human origin because it has no physical form (*amūrta*). A case of a fallacious example for this of type (1) is :"like sensory pleasure" (in this case its being of

human origin, the *sādhya* "being of non-human origin" is "not proved" (*asiddha*) to reside in sensory pleasure. (2) The example "Like an atom". In this case "having no physical form", the *hetu,* is "not proved" to reside in an atom. (3) "Like a pot"–in this case both the *sādhya* and the *hetu* terms (properties) are "unproved", i.e., do not reside in the example, viz. a pot, which is both of human origin and has a physical form.

Still another type of fallacy of the example with respect to the relation of positive concomitance is an example with reverse positive concomitance (*viparītānvaya*). For example, in (A) above, viz., "whatever is of non-human origin has no physical form", lightning or a forest flower, which are indeed of non-human origin, do not necessarily lack physical form, because to accept such fallacious examples as proper would have consequences that range too far.

The second major variety of fallacies of the example are those with respect to the relation of negative concomitance. (1) an example in which the example's lack of the *sādhya*-property is unproved; (2) an example in which the example's lack of the *sādhana*-prperty is unproved; (3) a case in which the example's lack of both the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* properties are unproved. Still working with (A) above, a case of (1) would be "like an atom", of (2) "like sensory pleasure", and (3) "like space", respectively.

Still another type of fallacy of the example with respect to the relation of negative concomitance is an example's reverse negative concomitance (*viparītavyatireka*), for instance–in (A) again–"whatever is not something which has no physical form is not something which is of non-human origin". Here no actual instance of such an example is given.

A fallacious form of an argument (*prayogābhāsa*) is any pronouncement of an argument lacking either an application (*upanayana*) or a conclusion (*nigamana*) or both, which one views as inferior in form to the five-membered argument when it is formulated to an uneducated person, for instance.

Examples given.

But such a fallacious form of argument can occur in an erroneous form, e.g., if the stock kind of argument's conclusion were enunciated as "therefore this mountain has both fire and smoke". This badly-formulated conclusion, to be correct, should not contain as part of its conclusion something (in this case that the mountain has smoke) which is already assumed as part of the premisses.

A fallacy of scriptural testimony (*āgamābhāsa*) occurs due to utterances of a person who is under the influence of passion, aversion and/or confusion, who communicates things for fun or as a joke, etc. Take, for instance, such a statement as: "On the bank of the river there is a sweet shop, run boys, run!" said by someone full of aversion, or the statement "on the tip of my finger there is a herd of elephants", said by a Sāṃkhya in his ignorance. Why are such statements fallacies of scriptural testimony? Because of their fallibility..

Further, there are fallacies of the number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*) of *pramāṇas*, e.g., the claim of the materialist that "there is just one *pramāṇa*, namely perception". That is a fallacy because neither the negation of the after-world (*paraloka*) nor the proof of others persons' consciousness, pet theses of th᾽ ᾿okāyata (materialist) and thus based on perception acco᾽ ɡ to him, are in fact conclusions based on inference.

Similarly, such fallacies of the r ɔer are the classifications of (1) the Buddhists, (2) tᵇ ɹmkhya, (3) the Vaiśeṣika (Yauga), (4) Mīmāṃsā follov of Prabhākara, (5) Mīmāṃsā followers of Jaimini wh᾽ ,c (1) inference, (2) scriptural testimony, (3) compar᾽ , (4) presumption, (5) absence as negative proof (*abhā*- which are listed by the five schools in matched numerica᾽ ɥuence each greater than the previous.

Against the Cārvāka (Lokāyata) one can say that there must be still another *pramāṇa* besides perception, viz., inference, because such matters as the existence of the after-world and

other persons' consciousness are the scope of inference, not of perception.

Against the Buddhist one can say that there must be still another *pramāṇa*–other than perception and inference–because pervasion is in the domain of suppositional knowlefge (*tarka*) only and nothing considered by them to be a *pramāṇa* can establish it.

A fallacy of the content of a *pramāṇa* would be to say that that content is either a universal or a particular or both in their own right independently. Advaita Vedāntins accept only the universal, i.e existence (*sattā*), whereas Buddhists accept only the particular. The Vaiśeṣikas accept both, but each as existing independently. These views are fallacies of content because none of these, i.e. neither the universal nor the particular, are represented in our cognition in such a way, and also because such a thing–the universal alone, or the particular alone, or both independently–could not produce any effect. Why? It would have to be either capable or incapable of executing some act on its own. If it itself alone were incapable, it would not exercise any action, as has been explained before. If it were capable, it would produce its effects incessantly, because it would not have to depend on any additional causal factor to produce its effects. If, on the other hand, it depended on some additional causal factor, it would have to undergo some change, so it would not longer be a permanent universal or absolutely momentary particular, because it could not exist in any other form.

The fallacy of the result (*phalābhāsa*) is to say that the result (say, knowledge) is either absolutely non-different or different from its cause (say, a *pramāṇa*). If there were no difference between a cause and its result, it would go counter to everyday experience of the cause-effect relation and one could not explain the experience we have every day that the cause and the effect are different from each other. To assume absolute non-difference between cause and effect would lead to

the undesired consequence that a result could actually not be a result inasmuch as it could be a cause of still another result, and it could not be both at the same time. By being excluded from being still another *pramāṇa* an act of cognition as a result could not serve as a *pramāṇa* at all. But if such a real difference were absolute, neither a *pramāṇa* nor its result would be possible, being things of different natures. And the undesired consequence would concern the inherence relation between a *pramāṇa* and its result.

(E645-649) (On PM 5.73) A recapitulation and a discussion of the rules of debate follows: The whole section has mostly the Nyāya account of a debate in the background. A *pramāṇa* and (the establishment of) its fallacy are something which are pointed out as defective by respective sides of the dispute, as something the defects of which are either avoided or not avoided by the proponent and by the opponent respectively, and they constitute the correct argument and its fallacy respectively for the proponent and are a legitimate criticism and embellishment, respectively, for the opponent. Further, a *pramāṇa* and (the establishment of) its fallacy constitute a foundation for victory and defeat.

After four classes of participants involved in a debate, viz., the judges, the president of the assembly, the proponent and the opponent, have been identified, the proponent brings forward an argument to prove his thesis which, when applying *pramāṇa*(s) is correct but in the absence of *pramāṇas* should be judged defective.

(Naiyāyika objection:) A debate (*vāda*) does not require all four types of participants listed above, inasmuch as there is no stake for any one competitor striving to win; a debate proper fulfils the same objectives as sophistry (*jalpa*) and cavil (*vitaṇḍā*). As the *Nyāyasūtra* states, "Sophistry and cavil serve the purpose of the determination and protection of truth, as a shield of thorny branches serves to protect the growth of a sprout".

(Answer:) No. A debate has a stake for the winner and the loser, as the list of points of defeat (ways to lose an argument, *nigrahasthāna*) indicate.

(Objection:) But debate does not serve the purpose of the determination and protection of truth.

(Answer:) In fact, it is only debate proper which fulfils these objectives, because it is capable of proving something through *pramāṇas* and *tarka*; it does not contradict one's own doctrine and is carried out through a five-membered inferential argument, and it takes into account both the thesis of the proponent and the counter-thesis of the opponent in order to judge which is correct. None of these conditions are fulfilled by sophistry and cavil, as is seen from the *Nyāyasūtra*'s own definitions of a debate proper, of sophistry and of cavil, which are quoted and analyzed.

Certainty, shown through debate proper, is based on the determination of truth, and its protection is based on the refutation of all sublating arguments, which in turn is based on proper logical argumentation (*nyāya*). Neither sophistry nor quibble can accomplish this.

The only legitimate setting for a debate involves all four classes of participants mentioned; it is one where one can establish one's own thesis. If even one of the four classes is missing, the desired aim cannot be reached.

(Naiyāyika:) Let us tentatively accept that debate proper is carried out only within the setting of those four classes of participants. However, the determination of victory and defeat can only be accomplished through the use of quibble (*chala*), futile rejoinders (*jāti*) and points of defeat, not through a *pramāṇa* or the establishment of the fallaciousness of their use.

(Answer:) This is wrong, because quibble, futile rejoinders and points of defeat cannot serve to determine victory or defeat in a debate because they, being false, cannot prove or disprove anything.

(E649-663) There are three types of quibble: quibbling

over, i.e. misrepresentation of a sentence's meaning (*vākchala*), misrepresentation based on generalization (*sāmānyachala*) and misrepresentation based on metaphorical usage (*upacārachala*). Their description, based on the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, follows. None of them can guarantee the victory of the proponent and defeat of the opponent, even though in some cases they may lead to the establishment of one's own thesis.

A critical discussion of futile rejoinders, i.e., rejoinders based on false analogies, follows. Its types are based on similarity (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) and there are numerous of them. The discussion involves quotes from the *Nyāyasūtra*, the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and occasionally the *Nyāyavārttika*. In fact, Prabhācandra points out, all these represent faults or fallacies of criticism (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*), and could be reduced to classification as a kind of fallacy of the reason. But would the advocate of a rejoinder based on false analogies admit this? If he does, he should also admit that what causes a fallacy in an argument is a fault in its reason, and it is this which should be viewed as relevant, not rejoinders based on false analogies, because they would serve no purpose. If he does not, he has to face a number of inconsistencies. In fact, it serves no purpose to teach either how to misrepresent a sentence's meaning or to use futile rejoinders because they are irrelevant for who wins and who is defeated in the debate proper, because the victory or defeat cannot be determined through them.

(E663-675) Who wins cannot be determined through the presence of points of defeat (or the ways of losing the argument) either. A general definition, quoting the *Nyāyasūtra*, the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and the *Nyāyavārttika*, is provided.

CHAPTER SIX: MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS

(E676-693) So far only *pramaṇas* and their fallacies have been explained. Now is the time to characterize perspectives and their fallacies. The *sūtra* (6.74) of the *Parīkṣāmukha* says: "Other possible (issues) should be examined", and what is meant by that is that we should examine perspectives and their fallacies." The main division of perspectives is two fold: mode-expressive (*paryāyārthika*) and substance-expressive (*dravyārthika*), of which the first has three kinds: comprehensive, general, and practical, and the second has four kinds: immediate, linguistic, etymological and factual. A detailed description follows.

The last three when they are dependent (*sāpekṣa*) are correct, but when they are independent of each other are incorrect. Further, the first four, from comprehensive through immediate, take the object as primary, whereas the last three, i.e., linguistic etc. take the word as primary.

Out of these seven kinds, the first has the largest scope of reference, whereas each subsequent one has a smaller scope. When the last one refers to something, the preceding one necessarily refers to the same thing, but the reverse does not hold. A description is proved of how these seven perspectives are applicable, examples are given. A consistent application of the whole set of seven perspectives is known as seven-fold predication through perspectives (*nayasaptabhaṅgī*).

What, then, is the sevenfold predication through *pramāṇas*, it being distinct from the sevenfold predication through perspectives)? The difference between them lies in the fact that the latter provides a complete account (*sakalādeśa*) whereas the former gives an incomplete account (*vikālādeśa*), i.e. refers to just one aspect of an actual entity. A short description of the sevenfold predication through *pramāṇas* follows.

Is it a coincidence that both are of seven types? It is because of the sevenfold rule (*saptabhaṅgīniyama*) of questioning and inquiry (*jijñāsā*), for doubt (questioning) occurs in such a sevenfold manner. The first (of the sevenfold perspectives) is: existence ("x's being P") is a property of an actual entity; then, its nonexistence ("x's being non-P") is its

property too. And in this way gradually, including the property of being inexpressible (*avaktavyatva*), by combination we reach seven. Further, in some cases the seven properties (in sevenfold predication through *pramāṇas*) are emphasized (*arpita*), e.g. in the first and second, whereas in the remaining ones, when combined, some are not emphasized.

The debate explained previously as based on four classes of participants relies on the support of documents (*patra*). A linguistic passage (*vākya*) which consists of a set of well-known (commonly understood) verbal elements is called a "document" (*patra*), but "document" may also consist of a set of unobjectionable but secret (*gūḍha*) words as long as it proves one's desired point and is communicated with the help of the members of an inference. It is language in a metaphorical sense. A linguistic passage which consists of a particular collection of words of an audible nature and which reaches a hearer is used metaphorically to refer to a script, and that collection when transferred to writing constitutes a document, because what is written in it is what "stands there in the language", i.e. what is written reflects what can be expressed verbally: the text and speech are convertible.. A document can be described as a collection of words in which the words are preserved, protected and defended against opponents by the proponent striving to win an argument.

A brief description follows of how language can be written down letter by letter and then decoded from the written text. A discourse on derivation and how the meaning of words is obtained through the derivation process. An example is the term "*sainyalaḍbhāj*" ("the one taking delight in/enjoying the pleasure of what comes together with the self in the context of the four strata (*varṇa*) of a society") being synonymous with "body" ("*deha*").

That leads to a discussion of liberation (*mokṣa*) and its meaning. Can it be compared to the experience of deep sleep and every day experience to the state of dreaming? The starting

point is two verses of Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda* (16.28-29), with a minor alteration: "An oil lamp which has attained its expiration neither reaches to the ground nor to the sky, neither to any cardinal point nor to any intermediate point. Because its oil has been consumed, it enters nothing but peace. In the same way a living being who has attained its expiration neither reaches to the ground nor to the sky, neither to any cardinal point nor to any intermediate point. Because its afflictions (*kleśa*) have been consumed, it enters nothing but peace". The discussion is based on grammar and grammatical analysis. the *Jainendravyākarqṇa* is regularly quoted.

There follows a teleological discussion on the nature of a locus and the purpose it is supposed fulfil. The purpose of this discussion is to prove, with logical means and by taking recourse to ontological necessity (because the existence of properties ontologically necessitates the admission of the existence of their loci), the existence of a locus which is capable of attaining liberation (here treated as a property). Such a locus (here: of omniscience and liberation) is the self (*jīva, puruṣa*). That leads Prabhācandra to a (grammatical/etymological) analysis of the concept of the omniscient person (*sakalavid*) and to the denial of God (*īśvara*).

A discussion of the role which a document may play in a debate. Suppose a discrepancy may be found between what the opponent's document says and what the debater says that the opponent says, and is told "this is not the meaning of my document". What should be done in such a case? The debater should be asked about the proper meaning of the document. Considered are three options: the meaning of the document is (1) only what occurs in the debater's mind; (2) what transpires from the document directly on the basis of its sentences, (3) what occurs in the debater's mind and what transpires from the document. In the first case, the document serves no purpose, there is no way to establish its real meaning or how the opponent's understanding of it relates to the contents of the

document: it is not possible to prove or refute anything, and any debate with such an opponent is not possible because there is no point of textual reference which could be verified and it is not possible to establish any linguistic convention governing the proper understanding of the contents of the document; it is like a situation where the opponent says "cow" but what is understood from the text at its face value is "horse".

If the opponent claims (2) is the case, then it is "as if a rain of jewels fell to the feet of the Jainas", because that is precisely what the Jainas hold: the proper meaning of the document is obtained through a detailed analysis of its meaning with the help of manifold hermeneutical instruments, including an analysis of inflective bases (*prakṛti*), suffixes (*pratyaya*), etc. If this were not the meaning, how else could one determine its meaning?

(3) is not satisfactory, because on the basis of what could we determine whether the meaning of the epistle expounded by the opponent according to his own understanding is correct or not? On the basis of the opinion of the proponent, or of the opponent, or of the umpires?

(E693-694) (On PM 6.1) A treatise (*śāstra*) in the form of a mirror (*ādarśa*) serves as an introduction (*mukha*) to analysis (*parīkṣā*), or else an inquiry (*tarka*) has been composed. Just as a good-quality mirror correctly reflects ornaments on the body of a person in front of it, or the oval of the face of the person, so that the person can avoid defects of appearance and achieve the desired effect in the form of beauty, in the same way this treatise teaches the nature of what one should avoid (*heya*) and of what one should achieve (*upādeya*). It has been composed to stimulate the correct understanding of these two things by people who are like the author of the treatise himself, who in fact is still immature (*bāla*). This is what the author of the *Parīkṣāmukha* says of himself, "people who are immature like myself" ("*mādṛśo balaḥ*"). But that is precisely the idea of the text: someone like him can teach immature and simple people

who can profit from the text, as an expert in inquiry, a savant, may compose a treatise for his disciples who are like him in order to foster their understanding. One might object: How can someone who is still immature and of limited understanding teach others? There is nothing wrong about this, because such an author demonstrates that he has denounced insolence, whereas an expert with excellent knowledge is recognized through the result of his achievement which is an excellent treatise, but it is not possible that an excellent result would be produced from a cause which is not excellent. But in fact the *sūtra* text (viz., PM 6.1) allows for an alternative reading: instead of "immature" one should read "mature" (*abāla*), because of *saṃdhi* (*mādṛśo 'balaḥ*). So the proper understanding of the closing passage of the *Parikṣāmukha* in fact is: this treatise has been composed for the understanding of the nature of what one should avoid and of what one should achieve for someone who is mature like me, i.e. who has profound knowledge, and it has been composed by an author who is like a real expert in inquiry.

8.17 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Ṭīkā* on Yogīndudeva's *Paramātmaprakāśa*[28]

8.18 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Ṭīkā* on Pūjyapāda's *Samādhitantra*[29]

8.19 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Tattvārthaprabhākara* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*[30]

8.20 PRABHĀCANDRA, Commentary on Kundakunda's *Samayasāra*[31]

8.21 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Pramāṇadīpikā*[32]

8.22 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Ṭīkā* on Jinasena's and Guṇabhadra's *Ātmānuśāsana*

In the Introduction to the edition by Hiralal Jain, A. N. Upadhye and Balacandra Sastri to the edition of the *Ātmānuśāsana*,[33] it is remarked about this work that "Generally it gives word-for-word meaning, and adds some explanatory remarks here and there. There are instances where crucial references and allusions are silently passed over." The authors raise the question whether the author of this commentary is the same as the author of most of the other works here ascribed to Prabhācandra, and conclude that "it is highly probable that it is one and the same Prabhācandra who has composed these....the explanatory pattern is similar and style of annotation is alike. Secondly, a comparison of the opening verses shows certain or nearly identical expressions and ideas. Thirdly, the prose introductory paragraphs in all...are very much alike. Lastly, the concluding *maṅgala* verse mentions the name alike, i.e. Prabhendu; and the meter employed is the Sārdūlavikrīditam". They go on to further arguments as well.

8.23 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Siddhāntasāra*[34]

8.24 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Mokṣapañcāśikā*[35]

8.25 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Ṭīkā* on Devanandin's *Iṣṭopadeśa*[36]

8.26 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Bhāsvara* (?) on Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*[37]

Some Prabhācandra has written a *Sarojabhāskara* on the *Pravacanasāra*; a manuscript is noted in Strasbourg, Series #74 (pp. 134-135). The following remark is found there: "Upadhye (RJS 5, 1964, Intro. pp. 103-104, assigns the present Prabhācandra a date in the first quarter of the 14th century A.D.–There are many persons called "Prabhācandra...Upadhye says that the commentary is a word-for-word explanation of the Prakrit text and that there is no special profundity in it."

8.27 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Pradīpa* on Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāya*[38]

9 VĀDIRĀJA SŪRI (1042)

A. N. Upadhye succinctly identifies this author as follows: "Vādirāja belonged to the Nandi Saṃgha of Jaina teachers. Śrīpāla was his grand-teacher; Matisāgara, his Teacher; and Dayāpāla, the author of the *Rūpasiddhi* on the Sanskrit Grammar of Śākaṭāyana, was his co-student. His residential colony was Siṃhapura, either modern Singavaram (Dt. Ganjor) or Simgatta-kuricchi (Dt. Trichy) in Tamilnāḍu. He was a contemporary, and highly honored at the court, of the Chālukya king Jagadekamalla Jayasiṃha II (A.D. 1018 to 1042).." He "has to his credit two Sanskrit poems: the *Pārśvanāthacarita* (completed in A. D. 1025)...and the *Yaśodharacarita*."[39]

Asim Kumar Chatterjee[40] confirms this: "Another epigraph from here (Śravaṇa Belgola) dated A. D. 1129 informs us that the Jaina philosopher Vādirāja was honored by Jayasiṃha II." Later (p. 205) Chatterjee adds: "According to his own statement in the *Pārśvanāthacāritra*, he wrote that work in...A.D. 1025, in the court of the western Cālukya king Jayasiṃha II (A.D. 1015-43), when the latter was stationed near the river Ghaīaprabhā.

9.28 VĀDIRĀJA SŪRI, *Vivaraṇa* on Akalaṅka's *Nyāyaviniścaya*[41]

A. K. Chatterjee[42] says that this commentary "has been hailed by no less an authority than Satkari Mukherjee as 'an encyclopedia of Indian logic, which is noted for its stupendously wide range and its appalling dialectic.' In it the author has effectively refuted the arguments of the Buddhist Dharmakīrti. Several authorities like Aśvaghoṣa, Kumārila, Praśastapāda,

Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Maṇḍanamiśra and others have also been mentioned in this great work. It is divided into three sections, namely Perception (*pratyakṣa*), Inference (*anumāna*), and Testimony (*pravacana*), but these run to almost one thousand pages "of close print in super royal size".

Satkari Mookerjee has written a "Foreword" to Mahendra Kumar's edition, excerpts from which we quote here: "Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka is an author of stupendous scholarship and super-ordinary insight. One of the greatest luminaries of the Digambara Jaina school, he has set out in forcible and dignified language the principles of logic that were presupposed by the Jaina philosopher. But the full implications of the writings of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka have been brought out by the subsequent writers of the school who wrote illuminating commentaries on these philosophical classics. The *Nyāyaviniścaya*, as is apparent from the very title of the book, is a work on Jaina epistemology that I have had the good fortune to study. The commentary of Vādirājasuri on the *Nyāyaviniścaya* seems to me the most elaborated, exhaustive and comprehensive of all. The language and the arguments of Vādirājasūri are admittedly exceedingly abstruse and incisive. The value of this work is particularly augmented by the elaborate criticism of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* and the exposition of Prajñākaragupta, called *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*, a work which is encyclopaedic in its scope and comprehensive in its treatment of all the relevant problems that exercised in the past the minds of the stalwarts of every school of Indian logic. This work, though primarily it professes to be the exposition of the Jaina logical tenets, has a super-added value as the faithful exposition and elaborate critique of all the tenets of the Buddhist schools of thought, particularly of Dharmakīrti and his exponents. The work is no doubt extremely stiff and a hard nut to crack. It requires concentrated attention even on the part of the best equipped scholar who has made the acquaintance of these intellectual titans and their classical products..." Mookerjee continues for

several more paragraphs in the same vein, though whether his encomiums celebrate Akalaṅka or Vādirāja Sūri or both is not entirely clear.

9.29 VĀDIRĀJA SŪRI, *Pramāṇanirṇaya*[43]

9.30 VĀDIRĀJA SŪRI, *Adhyātmaśataka*

Edited in *Tattvānuśāsanādhi*.

10 PRADYUMNA SŪRI (1043)

H. D. Velankar[44], identifies this writer as of the Pūrṇatalīya Gaccha and says that his grand-pupil Devacandra wrote a commentary on Pradyumna's work in *samvat* 1160 (=1103 A.D.). He is said to have composed his literary work *Puhaicaṃdacariya* in 1105 A.D.

S. C. Vidyabhusana[45] dates Pradyumna Sūri "about 980 A.D.)" and says "He belonged to the Rājagaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect. In Māṇikyacandra's [Vādirāja Sūri's?) *Pārśvanāthacāritra*, his prowess in logical discussions is referred to in the following terms:–"

"'There was born the preceptor Pradyumna Sūri–the first healer of disease of the world–who entirely removed all corruptions from the body of men (or detected all defects in disputation committed by men) and who, using sharp logical expressions, made his irrelevant opponents to sweat and thereby to be cured of the fever of pride.'"

"In the same work reference is made to his victory over the Digambaras of Veṅkapaṭṭa in the presence of the king of that province. He delighted the kings of various countries by no fewer than eighty-four triumphs in discussion...he was the preceptor of Abhayadeva Sūri..."

10.31 PRADYUMNASŪRI, *Vicārasāra*[46]

11.32 RĀMASENA or NĀGASENA (1050), *Tattvānuśāsana*.

Originally, Jugalkishore Mukhtar in his preface to his edition of this work (in our E, MDJG 13, 1918) had ascribed it to Rāmasena and had labeled Nāgasena as his guru. "E" is the edition, with Hindi translation by Sreyans Prasad Jain, that has been published by the Bharatvarshiya Anekanta Parishad as part of the Hirak Jayanti Prakashanamala of Acharya Vimalsagar (Silver Jubilee Publication Series) No. 15. The editor mentioned on the title page is Upadhyaya Bharatsagarji, who adds that Ayyaka Syadvadmati has added some commentary on certain sections, as has Upadhyaya Bharatsagarji. There is a preface by Dr. Phoolchand Jaina Premi which provides a brief English summary. Excerpts from this are used as headings to various sections in our summary here.[47]

Summary by Ratna Lahiri

1 (E1) Benediction.

2 (E2) The real existence of the omniscient (*sarvajña*) has been posited here as the one whose four obstructing (*ghātīya*) states have been eradicated, resulting in the revelation of the four infinite qualities of infinite vision, knowledge, power and pleasure.

3-5 (E2-5) The all-knowing one has preached, for liberations from the three pains of existence, birth, old age and death, that there are two kinds of fundamental actions: those that should be avoided (*heya*), and those that are beneficial for spiritual uplifting and therefore are to be undertaken (*upādeya*).

6 (E5-6) Out of these the space-points of the self and actions are mixed up due to false views which is bondage. This bondage can be of four types (*prakṛti, pradeśa, sthiti*, and *anubhāga*)--the last two are products of passions, the first two of actions.

8-11 (E7-11) Briefly, the causes of bondage are three: false or wrong vision, wrong awareness, and wrong conduct. Indiscipline etc. are subcategories of these three. Wrong vision is wrong interest in and attachment to the nature of substances due to the rise of vision-deluding karmic matter. Wrong awarenesses arise due to awareness-obstructing karmic matter concealing the true nature of substances, which can be of three types--illusory, ignorance-produced or doubting. Character-veiling karmic matter affects the mind, speech and actions of an inauspicious kind that are under the influence of passions.

12-14 (E11-12) Out of the three causes of bondage, the primary one is wrong view or delusion (*moha*). It has been personified here as a king in battle. Wrong view is his minister, and he has as his lieutenants two strong sons called possessiveness (*mamatva*) and pride (*ahaṃkāra*). Together they create an impenetrable formation (*vyūha*). The signs of possessiveness are defined--accepting outer appendages other than the self, such as "the body is mine, wife, son, house, etc. are mine", is known as possessiveness. To accept the results of actions created by wrong vision, such as "I am the King", is pride.

21-22 (E17-18) The destruction of the causes of bondage results in liberation. Once the primary causes of bondage are removed, the remaining attachments and denials also gradually dissipate. Finally, in the absence of all bondage-causing phenomena, bondage also disappears resulting in emancipation.

24-27 (E19-23) The cause of liberation is the co-presence of right vision, right awareness and right conduct. Right vision consists in having total faith in the nine substances according to Jaina beliefs. Right awareness is the clear perception of *pramāṇas*, perspectives, and standpoints, i.e. positing or ascribing meaning in accordance with knowledge, perspectives and popular understanding. Right conduct is the mental, verbal and bodily renunciation of all demerit causing activities, either through oneself or through others, or by acquiescing to and

praising those who indulge in such actions.

28-31 (E22-36) Causal instruments for liberation have been divided on the basis of ultimate and practical viewpoints. The ultimate will always maintain the identity of the doer, deed and instrumental cause, while the practical viewpoint will see these as distinct. Both are ways to liberation. The practical viewpoint consists of right vision of the *dharma*, and to know what is right view is right awareness. To follow the austerities ([, i.e., to do penance, *tapas*] constitutes right conduct from this practical viewpoint.

The ultimate path to liberation is that of the renunciant who establishes the three fundamentals of right vision, right awareness and right conduct, neither accepting anything nor rejecting or renouncing it.

33 (E26) Both kinds of liberation can be achieved by meditation alone. Thus intelligent beings should continue to practice proper meditation abandoning all laziness.

34-35 (E27-28) There are four kinds of meditation possible. They are called *ārta*, *raudra*, *śukla* and *dharma*. The first two types of meditation, done for relief (*ārta*) or agitation (*raudra*), are not advisable. They should be abandoned. Only the white (*śukla*) and virtuous (*dharma*) types of meditation should be accepted. However, the white type was possible only for the *yogins* of yore who had perfect-jointed bone structures and were able to fulfil the exalted requirements. In these days it is not possible, as those conditions do not exist. Therefore, for the aspirants of this era, I will detail the *dharma* type of meditation.

37 (E29-30) Whoever wishes to meditate must know the following well:

1. the one meditating,
2. the act of meditation,
3. the purpose of meditation, i.e. cessation of all inflow and destruction of existing *karman*,
4. the qualities of the subject for meditation,

5. what to meditate on,
6. when to meditate,
7. how to meditate.

38-39 (E30-31) One who has controlled his sense-organs and mind is known as (1) the meditator. Substances in their natural state are known as acceptable subjects of meditation. Applying thought to one substance to the exclusion of all others continuously is known as (2) the act of meditation, and the cessation of inflow and dissipation of existing *karmans* is (3) the purpose of meditation. The meditator must also know (6-7) the appropriate time, place, manner and modes so that without any obstacles the meditation may be completed.

41-45 (E32-33) (4) The nature of the best meditator has been outlined here, ensuring the path has been well followed even as a householder previous to this. One who is ready to abandon all causes of activity in the near future, whose liberation is near at hand, one who has found cause for total renunciation, one who has approached a proper preceptor for initiation, one who is bereft of negligence, is able to control and abstain through austerities, one who has analyzed the nature of substances properly, one who has abandoned those meditations intended for the sake of worldly gain, relief of pain, etc. and has completed all his prescribed duties, etc., are enumerated as qualifications for further progress.

46 (E33) Relation of the stages of progress to the one practicing the virtuous type of meditation. Those who are in the fourth to the seventh stage of spiritual evolution are eligible for this kind of meditation. One with false beliefs cannot have this type of meditation.

47-50 (E34) Types of virtuous meditation. Two main types have been identified as primary and secondary related to the stages of spiritual evolution, with the seventh (*apramatta*) stage having the primary and other three still having the formal or secondary (*aupacārika*) type of meditation. Further divisions are made according to the instruments required for perfect

meditation in the form of physical, mental and other substances, whose types are called highest, medium and lower. An intelligent being, even if not well read in the scriptures, is considered eligible for virtuous meditation.

The indications, scope and nature of the prescribed form of meditation is described in 52-57 (E35-40) and summarized in 58 (E40-41) as follows: having the ability to concentrate the mind continuously in the chosen form of the substance--either in its essence or its mode--is known as meditation.

62-64 (E42) One who knows is the first or foremost (*agra*). The self is also known as the first for this reason, and due to the fact that it is the first in the list of essentials. From the substantial generic viewpoint the self has been called one or complete (*kevala*). Controlling internal agitation is known as stopping anxieties (*cintānirodha*). Thus knowledge of the self without any other agitation whatsoever is known as the foremost self. The knowing self and the total lack of agitation are one and the same state, the complete self.

69-70 (E43-44) From the substantial point of view (*dravyārthikanaya*) the meditator and the one meditated upon are the same.

75-77 (E46-47) Ingredients for meditation have been enumerated. Abandoning all possessions, controlling the passions, and undertaking vows are possible only if one has won over the mind and the sense organs. On controlling the mind the rest of the sense-organs are in control; therefore, win over the mind and become your pure self. This is possible through knowledge and renunciation.

79-81 (E50-52) Methods of controlling the mind are suggested. Disregarding sense-pleasures the mendicant should immerse himself in contemplation, reflection and self-study. With concentrated mind the repetition of the five *mantras* of obeisance (*namaskāra*) should be considered the best self-study.

85-86 (E54-55) resolves the doubt about whether in these

turbulent times (*kāliyuga*) it is at all possible to find the required erudition, etc. and then if *dharma* meditation should be attempted. One should do what one can and practice austerities, as well as the best conduct, according to one's best ability, although the highest (white) meditation may not be possible.

90-95 (E57) prescribes (6) the place, time and manner of meditation.

99-100 (E59-77) (5) Substances fit for meditation, their nature and types are outlined. The four substances, viz., type-determining *karman* (*nāman*), representation (*sthāpana*), (*dharma*) and condition (*bhāva*) should be meditated upon as the guidelines provided by knowers of the spiritual path. They should be meditated upon separately as well as collectively. *Nāman* is what is implied by a word, *sthāpana* is an image (*pratimā*), that which has qualities and modes is a substance, and the qualities and modes are its states.

101-108 (E77-84) Meditation in the heart, upon the names of the perfected beings (*arahanta*) that engulf all literatures is known as *nāmadhyeya*. In the luminous four-petalled lotus of the heart, meditate circumambulatingly on the later of the realized states (*parameṣṭhi*). Similarly, to realize awarenesses like immediate awareness (*mati*), etc.[one should] meditate higher (throat-*cakra*) upon the five letters signifying the five awarenesses as a-, i-, u-, e-, and o-*mantras*. In the five orifices of the face meditate on the seven-lettered *mantra* while willing to remove hearing, etc. faults by listening to exhortations of the *guru*. In the heart, visualize the eight-petalled lotus, and establish the eight squares (first letters of alphabet groups) in them consecutively. In the central pericarp establish the name "*arhat*". Then visualize this lotus as central to the spiral with the three circles of *māyā* and as established in the center of the earth. Meditate on and worship this lotus. Meditate on the potent letters from *a* to *ha* and the *mantras* arising therefrom that are fruitful in both the worlds. Thus meditation on *mantras*

alone with the *arahanta* name is certainly the *nāmadheya* type of meditation.

109-116 (E85-87) Meditation without any doubt upon images, whether actual or imagined, as *per* the directions given in the manuals is the nature of representation-meditation. Meditation on actual entities is the meditation that recognizes the eternal changing forms of a substance as origination, persistence and destruction. The nature of meditation on condition consists of looking at living and nonliving substances in the order that they are organized, and in the condition that they may be in, which is their real essence. Qualities in a substance are co-existential while the modes are in sequence. Thus meditate on the continuous origin, existence and destruction and the meaning-modes as found in sequence in the embodied or unformed varieties of substances.

117-119 (E88-92) Out of the six types of substance the self (*jīva*) substance is the best for meditation. Out of them the five realized beings (*parameṣṭhi*) are the best. Four of them have embodiments and the fifth, their Lord, is formless.

120-130 (93-98). The five highest beings and the highest one among them are situated on the topmost layer of the Jaina universe. His 1008 signs and infinite qualities have been described in superlatives. Meditation on this highest self leads to liberation. Similarly other highest beings should also be meditated on. Their qualities are non-separate from their beings and the meditator should become one with that even without their physical presence, abiding with disinterest and equanimity.

141 (E104) The above were meditations from the practical point of view because from that viewpoint the self depends on the other as an content of meditation. Now the ultimate point of view (*niścayanaya*) is explained.

143 (E105) One should discriminate between non-self and self and know them as they are. Then abandoning the other substances have faith in the self. Abandoning all thought of otherness, meditate on the self by itself.

147-153 (E108-110) How to meditate on the self. Meditate thus: "I am consciousness, of infinite points in space, without embodiment, the pure self, realized and of the nature of right awareness and belief. I am not the other, there is no other in me, I do not belong to the other, there is no other substance, the other (divisions etc.) is the other and I am the self."

"The body is distinctly separate, I am not the body. I am conscious; the body is not. This is many, I am one. This is perishable, but I am not...."

160 (E112) Contrary to those who do not have right belief the absence of worries is very important in Jainism. It is not a lack of something, but a positive trait of equanimity and self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) that brings balance in the perception of right awareness, vision and conduct. Self-perception is the knowing (by *yogins*) of the self as it is, both the knower and the object known being the same.

165-167 (E114-115) The self that is bereft of wrong vision and wrong belief is known as the *mādhyastha*. One should experience that self by oneself. Not having a form it is not perceptible through the senses. Arguments and counter-arguments cannot help either.

Once the self is full of this balance and disinterestedness it is very clear in spite of being beyond the senses. It is of a nature that can be experienced by the self, so one should then perceive it through self-awareness. Though not of the nature of bodily awareness, this conscious knowledge is illumined independently and reveals itself. If a meditator in concentration (*samādhi*) is not experiencing this self that is of the nature of knowledge, then he is not experiencing true meditation. It is just a false perception.

183-218 (E120-129) Worldly meditative methods are described and glorified.

219-220 (E129) But one should not insist upon the worldly benefits of meditation. Those having the desire for such worldly

effects are the *ārta* and *raudra* types of meditators. One should renounce that (desire) and do the meditations that lead to liberation, viz. the white and *dharma* types.

224-229 (E131-132) Those who reach the highest bodiless state are immediately liberated due to the destruction of deluding (*mohanīya*) *karmans*, and others who do not acquire the perfected bodily states are gradually liberated. For the latter, huge merits accrue regularly so that they become like gods in the higher heavens. Then later, after taking an illustrious birth in a well-jointed body of kingly splendor, one again renounces everything to undertake the four types of white meditations and thus destroying the eight types of *karman* he attains liberation.

231-233 (E133-135) A realized being situated at the highest point of the world does not have any more shrinking or expansion. Due to the origination of karmic traces worldly beings suffer, but this realized self does not. Therefore, the liberated being becomes slightly less in dimension from the just-laid-down body, but of the same shape, and has the qualities of the self.

236-239 (E137) Just as a precious stone regains its basic nature (effulgence) when the adhering dirt is removed, every soul has the intrinsic ability to remain in its pure state when the karmic matter is destroyed. Then one neither gets deluded nor sleeps, nor indulges in selfishness, nor favors or disfavors, but remains steady in the self. Then he knows each substance and its true nature and seeing and knowing thus remains aloof.

248-248 (E140) Thus liberation is the highest attainable and desirable state, and this can happen only to Jaina believers in the theory of sevenfold or conditioned predication, not the others (who do not see the true self). Those who falsely see only the one-sided viewpoint (*ekāntavāda*) do not have the bondage-following freedom described above, as they do not understand bondage, its causes, liberation, and its causes.

12 (PADMA)JINEŚVARA (SŪRI) (1052)

NCC 7, p. 280 identifies this author as "Founder of Kharataragaccha (1017 A.D.); pupil of Vardhamānasūri of Candrakula and teacher of Navāṅgi commentator Abhayadevasūri, Dhāneśvara (author of *Sūrasundaravicārīya*, composed in 1038 A.D.) and Jinacandra; Brahmin converted to Jainism (original name Śrīdhara, son of Kṛṣṇa); brother of Buddhisāgara (pre-conversion Śrīpati (author of Pañcagranthī)).

Asim Kumar Chatterjee[48] has a good deal to say about Jineśvara. "He was not only a brilliant Jaina philosopher, but also at the same time, a successful writer...From the literary point of view, Jineśvara's *Kathākośa*, written in Prākṛta in VS 1108" (i.e., 1051 A.D.) "is one of the most celebrated Jaina Prākṛta works of the eleventh century. It reveals several popular stories which were known previously, as for example, that of Śālibhadra of Siṃhakumāra, of Dhavala, etc. Some of the stories are frankly erotic, as for example, that of prince Tosalī and Sundarī. Here we find the prince making love to a married lady, and they are further represented as living as husband and wife in a different kingdom. It appears that Jineśvara himself approved of such love affairs. A story has been told that testifies to the intense rivalry between the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras in the eleventh century. Another tells us about the very intense rivalry between the Śvetāmbaras and the Buddhists. In another story, Jineśvara attacks the orthodox Brāhmaṇa, who blindly follow the teachings of Smṛti texts."

H. C. Bhayan[49] provides some information about this author: "Jineśvarasūri was born in a Brāhmaṇa family of Madhyadeśa in c. 990 A.D. After completing his education he and his younger brother went to Dhārā in Mālava and became disciples of the Jaina Ācārya Vardhamānasūri. After some time Jineśvara and his brother Buddhisāgara went to Aṇahilapura in Gujarat. There the Jaina monks used to stay in temples and as such came to be called *Caityavāsins*. This practice caused

considerable lowering of the norms of monastic conduct. Jineśvarasūri successfully carried out a reform in this way of monastic life and became the founder of *Vasativāsa,* i.e., the practice of staying in special residences set up by laymen for the Jaina monks. Jineśvarasūri had numerous learned and distinguished disciples like Abhayadeva, Jinacandra, Jinabhadra, Haribhadra, etc. For propagating his reform of the Jaina church, he frequently moved through various parts of Gujarat, Malva, Mewar and Marwar. Because of his reformist movement and scholarship Jineśvarasūri has been honored by his disciples and grand-disciples as a Yugapradhānācārya i.e. a leading light and teacher of his age."[50]

Besides the philosophical texts listed below, he was the author of several other literary works: *Nirvāṇalīlāvatīkathā*, composed in Prakrit at Āśāpalī in 1036 A.D., and *Kathāṇaya-kośa* (also called *Kathākośaprakaraṇa*), composed at Ḍiṇḍadānaka in Marwar in 1052 A.D.

Kristi Wiley[51] adds: "Jineśvarasūri, Acārya (11th century). Mendicant leader who was the pupil of Vardhamāna, the founder of the Śvetāmbara Mūrtipūjaka Kharatara Gaccha. He apparently was from a Brahmin family. It is said that in a debate at the court of King Durlabha of Patan, Gujarat, in 1024 C. E. he defeated Surācārya, a prominent temple-dwelling monk (*caityavāsī*) who had argued that it was proper for mendicants to live permanently at temple complexes and to own property. He was given the title Kharatara, "Extremely Sharp [in debate, or in conduct]," which subsequently became the name of the mendicant lineage."

12.33 JINEŚVARA , *Vṛtti* on Haribhadra's *Aṣṭaka* (completed by Abhayadeva Sūri)

NCC I, revised edition, p. 444 tell us this work was "written in 1023 A.D. at Jāvālipura, corrected by Abhayadeva and hence sometimes ascribed to the latter."

Kapadia[52] reports that this work was written in 1023. "The Paīya portion occurring in this commentary has been rendered into Sanskrit by his disciple Abhayadeva Sūri. The text together with the commentary and the Sanskrit rendering was published by the late Mansukhbhai Bhagubhai, Ahmedabad."

12.34 JINEŚVARA, *Pañcaliṅgīprakaraṇa*

JRK p. 227: "Prākṛta, in 101 *gāthās* on *upaśama*, *saṃvega*, *nirveda*, *anukampā* and *āstikya* of *saṃyaktva*..." [53]

12.35 JINEŚVARA *Pramālakṣaṇa* and commentary thereon

It consists of 405 Sanskrit *karikās* and their commentary, both intended to explain the first *śloka* of the *Nyayāvatāra* of Siddhasena Mahāmati. Both are composed by Jineśvara, spiritual brother of Buddhisāgara.[54] It was composed sometime after 1024 A.D., says Vadekar in JRK, p. 269.

12.36 JINEŚVARA, *Upadeśamaṇimālākulaka* or *Upadeśaratnakośa*

26 verses on Jaina virtues. Published several times. It is translated into English by M. Govind (and into Hindi by Surendra Sagar Jain) from Aliganj, (Etah), U. P., India in 1950. This is our ET.

Translation by M. Govind

1 (ET1) Having bowed down to Lord Mahavira, I recount (this) jewel-garland of precepts, (which is also) a treasure-house of sage counsel, and which does entirely undo the misery of mankind.

2 (ET2) Be thy delight in being kind to (all) living beings; keep thy senses always under restraint; utter only the truth–this alone is the secret of Virtue.

3 (ET2) Do nothing to impair thy character; do not associate with evil doers, nor do thou slight the words of thy elders, if thou wouldst know the whole truth about virtue.

4 (ET3) Be not unsteady in thy gait, nor ever ostentatious in thy dress, nor be thy looks crooked: what (harm) can even the fretful backbiters do thee?

5 (ET3) Hold thy tongue, never do any thoughtless deed; omit not doing thy family-duties; what (harm) can the evil-times do thee?

6 (ET3-4) Never let out others' secrets; nor ever defraud any one; do not revile others; this is the straight way of the good natured.

7 (ET4) Do good unto every one, nor forget the good done to (thee) by others; hold up the distressed: this is the precept of the wise.

8 (ET4) Do not implore others, nor refuse (to comply with) the entreaty of any one; prattle not wretchedly; do thou (thus) live life-long in (this) world.

9 (ET5) Praise not thyself, nor ever insult even a villain; do not burst out laughing; thus will thou gain honor.

10 (ET5) Do not trust the enemy, nor ever deceive the trustful, nor do thou be ingrate: this is the way of prudence.

11 (ET6) Take pleasure in the company of the virtuous, nor rear that of the unfriendly (i.e., those unworthy of friendship); discriminate between the good and the bad (among friends): this is the touchstone of the clever.

12 (ET6) Do not commit any misdeed, nor draw reproach upon thyself; withhold from (all sorts of) violence, lest the world should lift its hand against thee.

13 (ET6-7) Be not perplexed even in adversity, nor ever abandon thy self-respect even unto death: be charitable even in the reverses of fortune; this indeed is the sword-blade vow of the steadfast.

14 (ET7) Neither be over-friendly, nor do thou vex thy friends every day; do not stir up strife: (thus) do thou bid farewell to the perfidious.

15 (ET7) Do not live in bad company, take counsel even of a child; keep off from imprudence: thus will thou not undergo

any reproach.

16 (ET8) Exult not even in opulence (or prosperity), nor do though grieve in calamity; (but) bear thyself with equanimity; then there will be no anguish of regretful longing.

17 (ET8) Commend not the merits of thy servant in his absence (i.e. commend them in his presence), nor of thy son in his presence (i.e. commend in his absence); and of women otherwise (i.e. neither in their presence nor in their absence), lest their excellence should fall off.

18 (ET9) Speak endearing words, be courteous, and charitable; appreciate the merits of others; this is an invaluable spell (self-sufficing) to draw others (to thyself).

19 (ET9) Speak (only) when occasion demands; honor even a rogue, when in the midst of many; know (well) the difference between thyself and others; he who does so will have every object fulfilled.

20 (ET9-10) Resort not to sorcery, nor go thou without a second to another's house, keep thy promises: this bespeaks noble birth.

21 (ET10) Eat thou, and make others eat with thee (i.e. when invited by others, go and eat with them, and likewise invite others to eat with thee); inquire of others about their thoughts (or opinions) and communicate thine own to them; give and take befittingly, if thou wouldst that (mutual) love should last long.

22 (ET10) Despise none, nor be proud of thine own merits; admire not thyself, for this earth abound(s) in gems (good or excellent men).

23 (ET11) Begin with a small deed, whereafter thou shalt accomplish even great deeds; but never do anything to excess: thus shall thou win honor.

24 (ET11) Meditate on the supreme self; reckon thyself and all others alike; have no likes and dislikes (i.e., be free from affection as well as disaffection): thus wilt thou break the bonds of worldly life.

25 (ET11-12) He, who thus sets this necklace of precepts duly around his neck (i.e. studies this poem, takes the advice given in it, and acts accordingly), will fully enjoy the glory of blissful felicity (lit., "will sport at pleasure on the breast of the Goddess of bliss and felicity").

26 (ET12) May every good man wear round his neck this great garland of precepts, which has been so beautifully strung with words of advice by the scholar Padmajinesvara.

12.37 JINEŚVARA, *Caityavandanavivaraṇa*

Composed at Jabaliputra in 1040 A.D.

13 NEMISĀDHU (1069)

A "disciple of Śīlabhadrasūri", who composed a work in 1069 A.D.[55]

13.38 NEMISĀDHU, *Vṛtti* on Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍāvaśyakasūtra-Śiṣyahitā*[56]

JRK p. 37 says: "It is only on the *Pratikramaṇasūtra*. This commentary [is] published in the Vijayadhānasūrīśvara Granthamālā No. 9, Surat 1939", and gives manuscript citations.

13.39 NEMISĀDHU, *Padavivṛti* on (a part of) the *Āvaśyakasūtra*

Composed in 1066 A.D.

14 ĀNANDA SŪRI (1070)

Identified as a "pupil of Jineśvara".[57]

14.40 ĀNANDA SŪRI, Commentary on a *Kṣetrasamāsa.*[58]

15 (MALADHĀRIN) ABHAYADEVA SŪRI (1080)

Abhayadeva Sūri was the "42nd in the Bṛhat Khatara *gaccha*; successor (to) Jinacandra and predecessor of Jinavallabha; born at Dhārā of Dhānadevī and Dhana, a Śreṣṭhin; name Abhayakumāra; pupil of Jineśvara and Buddhisāgara of the Candrakula; mentions one Droṇācārya of Nirvṛtakula as a contemporary of his who had approved of his writing; ordained in A.D.1031; died at Kappaḍa vaṇija grāma in Gurjara country, c. 1075 or 1082 A.D.; known as Navāṅgī commentator."[59]

Asim Kumar Chatterjee says that Abhayadeva Maladhārin was the *guru* of Maladhārin Hemacandra. As for the term "Maladhārin", Chatterjee explains: "We are told that he never owned more than one suit of clothes (in two pieces) at a time, and that he was as dirty without as he was pure and purifying within. Hence his name 'Maladhārin', the filthy one."[60]

Peterson says he was "Founder of the Brihat Kharatara *gaccha*", citing Weber II, p. 626. "He was made *sūri* by Jineśvarasūri, at the request of Vardhamanasūri, in *saṃvat* 1135, or, according to other authorities, *saṃvat* 1139."[61]

"Abhayadevasūri (11rh century C.E.). Śvetāmbara mendicant leader who authored commentaries on nine *aṅgas* of the Śvetāmbara canon (*agāma*), He was born in UjJainaand was initiated in the Candra Kula, a prestigious mendicant lineage that the Kharatara Gaccha and Tapā Gaccha both incorporated into their mendicant lineages. He was appointed *acārya* in 1063, some 40 years after the defeat of the temple-dwelling monks (*caityavāsī*) by Jineśvarasūri at Patan, Gujarat, in 1021 and the establishment of a new mendicant lineage based on mendicant conduct prescribed in the scriptures. According to tradition, a tutelary goddess appeared to Abhayadevasuṛi and told him he should compose new commentaries on the *aṅgas* because all but those on the first two *aṅgas* had disappeared at the time of a severe famine. When he expressed doubts about his ability to do such work,

the goddess assured him that whenever he needed clarification, she would travel to the continent of Mahāvideha and consult with the Tīrthaṅkara Sīmandhara Svāmi, who was preaching there. Thus, his commentaries are understood to be inspired by direct knowledge from an omniscient Tīrthaṅkara. It is also believed that he suffered from a skin disease, possibly leprosy, which was cured when he discovered a lost image of Pārśvanātha at Cambay."[62]

15.41 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* on Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa*[63]

15.42 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Viśeṣavṛtti* on the Bhagavatīsūtra

"Written at Anahilwad in A.D. 1071, assisted by Yaśascandra and approved" [Wiles says 'revised'] "by Droṇa."[64] Wiles says it consists of 15,616 *ślokas*.[65]

"Abhayadeva wrote this work at Anandapattana in the house of the merchant Achchupta" in *saṃvat* 1128."[66]

15.43 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Anantakṛdaṅga* (and *Anuttarapātika*)-*sūtra*[67]

Wiles, p. 92, says it was "very likely composed *saṃvat* 1127" (1070 A.D.)

In *Illustrated Upāsak-Dashā & Anuttaraupapātik-dashā Sūtra*, edited and translated by Amar Muni, with the Seventh and Ninth Aṅgas by Sudharma Swami (Delhi 2001), one or two passages refer to Abhayadeva Sūri's commentary on selected passages. We provide the following remark found in the volume cited.

"*Sūtra* 183: "Mahāmahān--Ācārya Abhayadeva has explained it as under *ma-hān*, he who neither commits violence nor propagates violence, *ma-hān*–Do not kill any one. Here *ma-hān* is used for the prime propagator of non-violence." (p. 111)

15.44 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*

"Written at Anahilwal in A.D. 1063, assisted by Yaśodeva and approved by Droṇācārya and other scholars."[68] It is said he wrote this work in *saṃvat* 1120 at Anahilapattana "in the home of the merchant Achchupta, for an assembly of pandits under the leadership of Dronacharya. Vasodevagani, pupil of Ajitasinhacarya, assisted him".[69] Wiles calls the work "*Ṭīkā*" or "*Vivaraṇa*", says (based on Peterson IV, 1894, p. iv, from whom the information in NCC I above is also drawn) it was composed *saṃvat* 1120 (1063) comprising 14,250 *granthas*.[70]

Amar Muni Maharaj has edited the *Ilustrated Sthānāṅgasūtra* with Hindi and English translations, in two Volumes (I and II below), from Delhi in 2004. In footnotes to his translation he indicates particularly interesting comments by the several commentators on these *sūtras*, and we borrow these comments here. References are to *Sthāṇāṅga* followed by numbered line, then a "T" reference ("I or II.1, e.g.) to the page of the edition quoted, e.g., (*Sthāna)* 1, line 1 (TI.6) refers to page 6 of the first Volume of the two and indicates that the line being commented on is line 1 of *sthāna* 1.

1.211; TI.31) Abhayadeva Sūri defines this term ("*leśyā*")as follows: "The association through which a being attracts bondage of *karmans* is called *leśyā*".

II.169 (TI.84) "To emaciate the body while subduing passions during the last moments of life is called *sallekhana*. To weaken passions for achieving spiritual purity while abstaining from good and water intake for the purpose of cleansing the body of its disorders during the last moments of life is called *bhakt-pān-pratyakhyn samadhimaran*. To stop all activities of the body and lie still on the bed like an uprooted tree is called *pādopagaman santhara*."

II.435 (T1.165) "To get liberated after destroying all *karmans* is *Anantakriyārādhanā*. *Kalpavimānopapattikārādhanā* is the practice leading to reincarnation in *Graiveyaka* and

Anuttara vimānas (the higher levels of divine dimension). This is done by...accomplished sages including *śruta kevalins*."

III.38 (T1.199) "An ascetic endowed with three qualities crosses this beginingless and endless expanse of the wild that is this world of four genuses", the three qualities being "lack of desire for mundane pleasures,...acquisition of right perception/faith,...and (*yogavāhitā)* study of scriptures observing austerities...Abhayadeva Sūri has given two meanings of *yogavāhitā*–(1) *śrutopādhanakāritā*, which means to reduce sleep, food intake and speaking during study of scriptures. Also top avoid gossip and other types of entertainment. (2) *samādhisthayitā*–to abstain from lust, anger and other passions to attain peace and tranquility."

IV.540 (II.22) The passage speaks of four kinds of clouds. "The commentator informs [us] that like clouds the aforesaid quads [?] should be applied to men...(1)..some donor or preachers satisfies seekers for a very long period with just one donation or sermon.(2)..some donor or preacher satisfies seekers for a long period with just one donation or sermon.(3)...some donor or preacher satisfies seekers for a few years with just one donation or sermon.(4)...some donor or preacher may or may not satisfy seekers for one year even with many donations or sermons."

V.189 (II.192-193) The passage classifies five kinds of ascetics. Abhayadeva adumbrates this, and the passage is summarized by Amar Muni Maharaj as follows (we have eliminated some of the Sanskrit terms):

"(1) Two kinds of *pulāka*:(a) an ascetic who employs the special powers, acquired through austerities, for the protection of the *saṅgha*. (b) An ascetic who misuses his knowledge, perception and other qualities.

"(2) Two kinds of *bakuśa:* (a) an ascetic who, for beautifying his body, washes his hands, feet, face, hair and other parts time and again. (b) an ascetic who, for beautifying his bowl, garb, ascetic-broom and other equipment...applies oil, color and other such things time and again.

"(3) Two kinds of *kuśīla*: (a) an ascetic who commits faults in observing auxiliary cotes (?); (b) an ascetic who gets overwhelmed with passions including anger due to precipitation of extremely mild passion.

"(4) Two kinds of *nirgrantha*: (a) a detached ascetic who through the rising path of the pacification of *karmans* reaches the eleventh *guṇasthāna* after pacifying all *mohanīyakarman*. (b) a detached ascetic who through the rising path of destruction of *karmans* reaches the twelfth *guṇasthāna* after destroying all deluding and who is going to destroy the remaining three vitiating *karmans* within one *antarmuhūrta*.

"(5) Two kinds of *snātaka*: (a) the life span of a *sayogi jina* is eight years to one *antarmuhūrta* less one *pūrvakoṭi* year. During this period he moves around preaching religion to the worthy. When only one *antarmuhūrta* is left of his life-span he terminates the three associations (mind, speech and body) and becomes *ayogi snātak Jina*. (b) The life span of an *ayogi Jina* is equal to the time taken in uttering five short vowels (*a, i, u, ṛ,* and ḷ). Within this brief time he destroys all the four vitiating *karmans* and becomes [an] immortal *siddha*."

15.45 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Śiṣyahitā (Vyākhyā)* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Pañcāśakaprakaraṇa*[71]

Peterson IV, p. v and NCC 11, p. 75 says this was "composed at Dhavalakkaputra (Dholka) in 1068 A.D. It took its name from the fact that each *prakaraṇa* consisted of 50 *gāthās*. The number of *prakaraṇas* is 19."[72]

15.46 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Bhāṣya* on Devagupta Sūri's *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*[73]

15.47 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Āgamastottarī*

: "Importance of *saṃyaktva* (right faith), etc. pointed out in 114 verses in Prakrit.[74]

15.48 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Paramāṇukaṇḍaṣaṭtriṃśikā*

This is a work "in 36 Prakrit verses, on *pudgalas*, with Sanskrit. elucidation; based on *Bhagavatīsūtra* V. 7."[75]

Wiles describes this work as follows: "Exposition of karmic products (*pudgala*) regarding their duration from four different aspects, in 36 Prakrit verses based upon (*Bhagavatīsūtra*) V.7, together with their elucidation in Sanskrit."

It is not clear whether the work is by Abhayadeva or was written previously and this is a commentary.

15.49 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Praśnavyākaranāsutra*[76]

Wiles calls it "*Ṭīkā*", says it was "corrected by Droṇasūri". "Abhayadeva states that this was submitted to the revision of the company of *paṇḍitas* under Drona's leadership". The *Praśnavyākaraṇasūtra* "consists of ten chapters treating of the five great sins ands the five *saṃvaras*."[77]

"The *Praśnavyākaraṇa* itself was one of the 12 original *aṅgas* but that has been lost. It is supposed to have been a very long work dealing with questions, termed "mirrors" (*darpaṇa*) questions, about a variety of topics of astrology and divinations, i.e., how to go about foreseeing the future."

"But there is now extant a much shorter work under the name *Praśnavyakārana* containing none of the chapters ascribed to the original in other *sūtras* such as the *Samavayāṅga* and the *Nandī sūtras*. This shorter work is ascribed to Devārdhigaṇi, which doesn't deal with divinations but deals with *saṃvara* and *āśrava*. According to Abhayadeva this is because the earlier topics were dangerous if misused, so the safer and more pertinent topics of inflow and its cessation were substituted."

"The present work deals with the proper cure for mental illnesses. The first section on *āsrava*, [inflow of] incoming karmic particles, discusses such illnesses and the problems arising due to them. The second section deals with *saṃvara*, the cessation of such inflow, five beginning with non-violence, truth, etc. *Āsrava* is the reason for worldly life and *saṃvara* , its antidote, for liberation. Any aspirant who understands the nature of *saṃvara* and *āśrava* knows all the essentials of spiritual practice."

15.50 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Vipāka(śruta)sūtra*[78]

It treats of the forms of karmic maturation with the help of stories, in twenty chapters. For its original form cf. Schubring, *Worte Mahāvīras*, p. 6.

15.51 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Aupapātikasūtra*[79]

NCC 3, p. 101 says it was composed in 1059. Wiles p. 105 says Abhayadeva composed this in 1058, and cites additional publications of it.[80]

The *Illustrated Aupapatik Sutra*, edited by Amar Muni (Delhi 2003) provides occasional explanations of certain terms used in this commentary, most of which are not philosophical terms. We here quote from one or two bits of the editor's "elaboration"s of philosophical terms:

Sūtra 152: "This aphorism describes the progression of attaining the perfected state through termination of association (*yoga*). The same order is also mentioned in *Uttarādhyāyana-sūtra* 29/73-74. The two technical terms used here are briefly explained as follows–"

"*Guṇaśreṇi*–The process of shedding karma particles every *samaya* in exponential progression, from few to more to much more to much-much more, in order to end all the four kinds of residual *karmans* including feeling-producing (*vedanīya)* is called *guṇaśreṇi* (qualitative sequence). This means that in the first *samaya* of this sequence only a few karma particles are shed; in the second *samaya* innumerable times more karma particles are shed (etc.): this process continues for one *antarmuhūrta* and more and more karma particles are shed exponentially....A *kevalin* destroying these prearranged

sequences while he is in the *śaileṣi* state sheds infinite number of karma particles."

"Untouched movement in *ṛjuśreṇi*–A being moves two ways, straight and crooked. A liberated being or soul rises upwards in a straight line. During this rise the soul does not touch any external space-point (*pradeśa*). This movement or instantaneous jump without touching the intervening space-points is called untouched movement in *ṛjuśreṇi* (straight line)."

15.52 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Pradeśavyākhyā* on the *Jñātādharmakathāsūtra*

(It) was written in A. D. 1063.[81] "Abhayadeva finished this book on the Dusserah of *saṃvat* 1120."[82]

15.53 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Nigoḍaṣaṭtriṃśikā*[83]

It is an exposition of the *nigodas* in 36 verses in Prakrit together with the Sanskrit commentary. The exposition is based on (*Bhagavatīsūtra*) XI.10. It is not clear whether the work is by Abhayadeva or was written previously and this is a commentary.

15.54 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Pañcanirgranthasaṃgrahaṇī*

"107 Prakrit *gāthās* on the five kinds of Nirgranthas, based on *Bhagavatīṣūtra* XXV. vi.."[84] It is based on sixth *uddeśaka* of the 25th *śataka* of the (*Bhagavatīsūtra*).

15.55 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Pudgala(ṣaṭ)triṃśikā*

On *pudgalas* based on *Bhagavatīsūtra* V. 8. It is held by some to be old and only quoted by Abhayadeva in his commentary on *Bhagavatīṣūtra*. Published with *Nigoḍa-* and *Paramāṇuṣaṭ-triṃśikās* by this author and Ratnasimha's commentary on all three in JAG 13, Bhavnagar 1913. Royce Wiles, p. 75, says it is an "exposition of both the types of [karmic products] (*pudgala*) viz. *sapradeśa* and *apradeśa* [i.e., with and without space-points] from four viewpoints. It is based

on (*Bhagavatīsūtra*) V.8". It is not clear whether the work was written by Abhayadeva or written previously and this is a commentary.

15.56 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Prajñāpanatṛtīyapādasaṅgrahaṇī*

"In 133 Prakrit *gāthās* on the *alpa-bahutva* [or relative numerical strength] of beings, based on *Prajñāpanasūtra*, III."[85] "Prakrit in 133 verses by Abhayadevasūri; based upon *Bahuvyaktavyatā*, the 3rd *pāda* of *Prajñāpanasūtra*; deals with the *alpabahutva* of living beings as compared with each other."[86] Velankar says it is "based on the third chapter of the Sūtra" (giving the title as *Tṛtīyapadasaṃgrahāṇi*) "and consisting of 133 *gāthās*".[87] Wiles, p. 108 says "3,125 granthas.

15.57 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Bhāṣya on* Jineśvara's *Satsthānaprakaraṇa*[88]

15.58 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Vyākhyā* (or *Vṛtti*) on Haribhadra Sūri's *Ṣoḍaśākaprakaraṇa*

Velankar (JRK p. 405), thinks it may be the same as the commentary on the same work by Yaśobhadra Sūri.

15. 59 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Bhāṣya* on Candrarṣi Mahattara's *Saptatịkā*

"(A) commentary in Prakrit on the *gāthās* on *karman*...supplemented by Devendra." (NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 276) JRK p. 414 says it is in about 190 *gāthās*.[89]

15.60 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Bandhaṣaṭtriṃśikā*[90]

Wiles, p. 75, gives a description: "A portion of (*Bhagavatīsūtra*) VIII.9 together with the corresponding *gāthās* in Prakrit and the *ṭippaṇaka* in Saskrit, deals with the numbers of living beings having various kinds of bodies, each having different types of *bandhas*."

Velankar, JRK p. 281, says that some have found this work

attributed to Dharmaghoṣa.

15.61 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Saṃgrahaṇī* on the third *pada* of the *Jīvājīvābhigamasūtra*

Wiles, p. 112 cites *Jaina sāhitya kā itihāsa* 1, 66n1.

15.62 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, Commentary on the *Upāsakadaśasūtra*[91]

15.63 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI, *Laghuvṛtti* on Jineśvara Sūri's *Pañcaliṅgī*

Velankar (JRK p. 227) suggests this may be the same as a *Laghuvṛtti* on the same work attributed to Sarvarājagaṇi.

16 ŚĀNTI SŪRI (1080?)

His dates are given as "993-1118 A.D."[92] Wiles, p. 161, says he "is reported to have died in *saṃvat* 1096 (1039 A.D.)".[93]

Jarl Charpentier[94] says: "Śāntisūri...gives some scanty account of himself in the *praśasti* (in seven verses) of the end of his work [his commentary on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*]. According to this he belonged himself to the Thārāpaddragaccha, which again originated from the Kāthakarṇānvaya; this latter had sprung from the Candrakula, and the Candrakula was a division of the Vairī *śākhā*, which had sprung from the Koṭika *gaṇa,* founded by Susṭhita and Supratibuddha, two disciples of the pontiff Suhastin. His teachers were Sarvadeva and Abhayadeva, who cannot, of course, have been the famous Abhayadevasūri, the *navāṅgavṛttikṛt*, as the latter died *saṃvat*. 1135 or 1139 (=1079 or 1083 A.D.), and was consequently somewhat younger than Śāntisūri. For it is reported in Dharmasāgaragaṇin's *Gurvāvalīsūtra*, under Sarvadeva No. 36, that Śāntisūri, surnamed the *vādivetāla,* the author of a commentary on the *Uttarādhyāyana*, died [in] *saṃvat* 1135 (*kecit* 1139). [This] is reported to have taken place in the time of Yaśobhadra and Nemicandra, who were separated from Sarvadeva by two generations of teachers, viz. Devasūri and another Sarvadevasūri."

"Śāntisūri further tells us that there existed at his time several other commentaries (*vṛtti*) on the *Uttarādhyāyana*, but that, nevertheless, he undertook his task at the instigation of Guṇasena. He wrote his work in Aṇahilapāṭaka, in a *caitya* established by Sāntyamātya, who was an ornament (*śekhara*) of the Bhillamāla family. In what year the work was brought to an end is not stated, and so this is all we know of the origin of this the greatest of the preserved commentaries on our text (i.e., the *Uttarādhyāyana*)."

16.64 ŚĀNTI SŪRI, *Bṛhatsaṃgrahaṇīprakaraṇa*[95]

16.65 ŚĀNTI SŪRI, *Jīvavicāraprakaraṇa*

Edited many times. The Prakrit text is edited and translated into French by Guerinot at JA 19, 1902, 231-288. This is our ET.[96]

Summary by Karl H. Potter

PART ONE

1 (ET237) Having paid homage to the light of the world, I propose to explain the natures of living beings.

2 (ET238) Living beings are either transmigrating or liberated. Those transmigrating are either animate or inanimate. Inanimate beings include earth, water, fire, air and plants.

3-4 (ET239) Earth covers metals, minerals, rocks, etc.--several species identified.

5 (ET241) Water includes that on the earth and in the atmosphere, examples given.

6 (ET241) Fiery things include meteors, flames, etc.

7 (ET242) Airy things are, e.g., respiratory breath, ordinary winds, violent winds, etc.

8 (ET243) Plants are divided into two groups: those having each a body for itself, and those which do not. They are innumerable in quantity.

9-11 (ET243-244) Examples of plants are reviewed.

12 (ET246) There are three kinds of plants each having a body for itself: (1) which appear to have an even surface, (2) those which are resinous; (3) those which reproduce themselves by cutting.

13 (ET247) For the first kind of plant, only one self lives alive in a specific body: this includes fruits, flowers, trees, roots and leaves, e.g.

14 (ET248) Those which do not have bodies for themselves, including the five species of living things, the earth, etc. are found in subtle forms throughout the universe: the length of their existence is necessarily no more than a *muhūrta*, and they are invisible.

15 (ET249) A list of living beings having precisely two sense-organs includes: shells, leeches, intestinal worms, snakes.

16-17 (ET250-251) Beings with three-sense-organs include bugs, lice, ants, roaches, (a number of the terms are of unknown application), bottle-flies, etc.

18 (ET253) Living beings with four sense-organs include: scorpions, wasps, bees, locusts (and/or grasshoppers), horseflies, mosquitoes, etc.

19 (ET254) Five-sensed living beings are of four sorts: hell-beings, animals, human beings and gods. The inhabitants of hell are considered to break down into seven classes following the (seven) parts of hell itself.

20 (ET254-255) Five-sensed animals are of three sorts: aquatic, terrestrial and airy. Aquatic animals include fish, turtles, sharks, dolphins.

21 (ET255) Terrestrial animals are of three kinds: quadrupeds, snakes (?) and lizards.

22 (ET255-256) Airy animals are two sorts: those with wings made of feathers and having membranes--i.e. birds--and those whose wings have the form of a round box (?) or who sleep with their wings deployed.

23 (ET256-257) All aquatic animals belong to one of two groups: those born by spontaneous generation or those born from a womb.

Human beings comprise three groups: those who inhabit the land of *karman*, those who inhabit a land of non-*karman*, and those who inhabit the inferior regions (i.e., hells).

24 (ET257-258) The last divide into four types: 10 kinds of *bhavanādhipatis*, eight kinds of *vāṇamantaras*, five kinds of *jyotiṣkas*, and 2 kinds of *vaimānikas*.

25 (ET259) Living beings in a state of perfection are divided into fifteen species which are [again] divided, depending on their (degree of) perfection, into *tīrthas* and *atīrthas*.

These are, briefly indicated, the different sorts of living beings.

PART TWO

26 (ET260-261) We now explain the relation of these categories of living beings to the following five questions:

(1) What is the size of a body in each type of existence?

(2) What is the length of life in that existence?

(3) How many times will they be reborn in that form?

(4) How can they possess the vital principles?

(5) How many successive births will they live?

27-33 (ET261-266) The size of the bodies of the various beings is calculated.

34-39 (ET266-270) The length of the various lives is calculated.

40-41 (ET270-271) The number of rebirths in that form is

calculated.

42 (ET271) The vital principles of living beings are of ten kinds--(five) sense-organs, breath, length of life, and (three) vital powers.

44-47 (ET273-275) An indefinite number of lives will follow for those who have not satisfied the religious prescriptions. The number for living beings is 8,400,000. This number is justified by assessing the relevant numbers for each of the various kinds of living beings.

48-50 (ET275-276) Perfected beings have neither bodies nor length of life, etc. They live forever. As for those living beings who are not instructed in the Jaina doctrine, they will continue in *saṃsāra* until they acquire knowledge. That is why those of you who consider a human life difficult to obtain should apply yourselves to the religious law as explained by the venerable Śāntisūri!

16.66 ŚĀNTI SŪRI, *Laghusaṃgrahaṇīprakaraṇa*[97]

16.67 ŚĀNTI SŪRI, *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*[98]

16.68 ŚĀNTI SŪRI, *Jainatarkavārttika* on Siddhasena Mahāmati's *Nyāyāvatāra*

Balcerowicz[99] refers to this as a "quasi-commentary...being inspired by certain ideas from the *Nyayāvatāra*". He says that Śānti Sūṛi wrote an auto-commentary, *Vārttikvṛtti*, on his commentary as well.[100]

16.69 ŚĀNTI SŪRI, *Nayacakra*[101]

16.70 ŚĀNTI SŪRI, *Śiṣyahitā* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

Alsdorf 1966 says this is "the oldest and best of all commentaries (on Utt.)".[102]

Jarl Charpentier, in Charpentier 1914, pp. 275-409, leans heavily on this commentary and makes many references

characterizing its contents. At Charpentier pp. 54-55 he offers some useful remarks about this work. "The *Śiṣyahitā* only seems to exist in a very few manuscripts, probably because it was little used, having been superseded by the commentary of Devendra. It is a rather large work, the Berlin- Ms. containing 400 leaves of large size with 3-7 lines of text...(E)ach single verse of the *niryukti*–generally constituting the introductory part of the several chapters–as well as of the *sūtra* itself, is duly explained, and it is generally quite possible from the words of the commentary to find out the exact structure of the text followed by Śāntisūri. But not only so, for Śāntisūri diligently collected and embodied in his commentary all the alternative readings and meanings known to him...Consequently, it seems quite clear that, in working out his commentary, Śāntisūri did not follow only one of his predecessors, but made a selection from all the materials he had available." Charpentier goes on to offer some remarks comparing Śānti Sūri's commentary with that of Devendra.

16.71 ŚĀNTI SŪRI, *Bhāṣya* on the *Caityavandanamahābhāṣya*[103]

In 922 *gāthās*, says JRK p. 125.

16.72 ŚĀNTI SŪRI, *Dharmaratnaprakaraṇa* or *-śāstra* and *Vṛtti*[104]

JRK p. 191 says it is in Ardhamāgadhi and consists of 145 Prakrit *gāthās*.

17.73 ANANTAVĪRYA (1065-1243, *Prameyaratnāmālā* on Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha*

Though this work is regularly ascribed to the Anantavīrya whose works are summarized in Volume Ten of our Encyclopedia and whose date we estimated as 980 there, that identification is hardly possible, since in the present work its

author clearly pays his respects to Prabhācandra, whose date, as we have seen, falls in the middle of the 11th century. True, Prabhācandra himself refers to an Anantavīrya, which might suggest that the two were contemporaries. A more probable solution, however, is that there was more than one Anantavīrya. Thus we place the present work here.

NCC gives the date of our present author as "c. 1065-1243", and quotes (without citing) Kapadia 18, p. 99: "he wrote this commentary for Śāntisena at the instance of Hīrapa, son of Vaijaya. Quotes *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* of Prabhacandra..."[105]

The work has been edited several times.

Our "E" and "T" refer to the edition and translation by Sarat Chandra Ghoshal, Lucknow 1940. Ghoshal's "translation" is very free and contains much useful information along with an epitome of the text. The summary of the present commentary needs to be read together with the summary of Māṇīkyanandin's work in Volume Ten of this Encyclopedia; quoted passages are from that summary.[106]

Summary by Karl H. Potter

INTRODUCTION

1 (E1-3; Txliv) Among a number of verses of invocation, there is this: "When there is a moon like the work of Prabhācandra, how can I resembling a firefly expect to be counted". (The translation is by S. C. Ghoshal.)

CHAPTER ONE

1 (E3-4; T12-30) "Not ascertained before" by any *pramāṇa*. The Jaina definition of *pramāṇa* is contrasted with that of the Naiyāyika, Buddhist, Mīmāṃsaka, Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools.

2 (E4; T30-32) By this *sūtra* the view that a *pramāṇa* can be something other than an awareness--such as the connection of the senses with external objects--is refuted.

(Buddhist objection): Definition is a requirement, not for *pramāṇas* in general, but for only one kind of *pramāṇa*, viz., inference, but not for perception, since it is construction-free.

(Answer:) That is one reason why the next *sūtra*, which specifies that a *pramāṇa* must be a definitive ascertainment.

3 (E4; T32-36) A "mistaken" reason is one of three kinds: doubt (*saṃśaya*), non-ascertainment (*anadhyavasāya*), or error (*viparyaya*). Examples given.

9 (E6; T40) This *sūtra* (giving grammatical analysis) "denies the views of those who maintain that knowledge ascertains only the object but not itself, others who hold that knowledge ascertains either itself or an object, others again who lay down that in knowledge there is understanding of only the subject and the object, and of others who say that in knowledge there is understanding of subject, object and a verb." (T, p. 40)

13 (E6; T45) (Objection:) How can the validity (of a *pramāṇa*) come through that instrument itself (without it depending on an infinite regress of *pramāṇas*)?

(Answer): When the object is familiar to us, e.g., when we go to bathe in a lake we have swum in many times before.

CHAPTER TWO

4 (E14; T59) By "without any intervening awareness" is meant "without any intervening awareness of a different object." "For example, in inference...we have knowledge of one object, smoke and a quite different object, fire, later on. But in practical perception we have knowledge of the same object in four stages. For example, first we are merely conscious of a man; then we desire to know his particulars. In the third stage we ascertain the particulars--that he belongs to such and such a country, etc., and in the fourth stage we get a lasting impression." (T, p. 59-60) (It is this "practical perception" that is referred to as "commonsensical" (awareness) in the (summary of) the next (fifth) *sūtra* (in Volume Ten of this

Encyclopedia).

CHAPTER THREE

41 (E34; T197-198) Knowledge that pervasion holds between *hetu* and *sādhya* is not demonstrated by giving the example. "Only a thing experienced before can be remembered. So universal concomitance can be reminded of only due to the *hetu* and not by hundreds of examples." (T, pp. 107-108)

59 (E37; T122) "In the Buddhist philosophy it is held that an inference proving the affirmation of a fact is only of two kinds, *svabhāva* [(inference] from a thing's own nature) and *kārya* ([inference] from a thing's effect). But in this *sūtra* six varieties of non-contradictory affirmation (*aviruddhopalabdhi*) establishing *vidhi* have been mentioned. So in the following five *sūtras* the view of the Buddhist logicians is refuted and that of the Jaina logicians established." (T, p. 122)

64 (E39; T126) "The efficient (*sahakāri-*) cause is also not included within the effect as cause, nor is it the instrumental (*karaṇa*) cause nor the things's own nature as cause. As the [two] things [, the efficient cause and its effect] have separate and independent existence, this efficient cause cannot be the same as the cause which is the thing's own nature, which signifies identity [with the effect]. Also, as the efficient cause arises simultaneously (with its effect), it cannot be said to be either the effect itself as cause or the instrumental cause." (T, p. 126. We have translated the technical terms for the various kinds of causes in accordance with the precedents set in Volume Nine of this Encyclopedia).

CHAPTER FIVE

2 (E62; T154) "The propounders of Nyāyavaiśeṣika philosophies maintain that *pramāṇa* is different from its result and the Buddhists say that the result is identical with the *pramāṇa*. Refuting these views, it is laid down by Māṇikyanandī that result is in one sense different from

pramāṇa and in another, identical with it." (T, p. 155)

CHAPTER SIX

9 (E65; T161) "In the case of twins, we may falsely take one of them as the other from their similarity or we may fail to recognize that the person really wanted and say that he resembles that one (without understanding that that is the one really wanted). There are therefore two kinds of fallacy of *pratyabhijñā,* one referring to identity (*ekatva-pratyabhijñābhāsa*) and the other to similarity (*sādṛśyapratyabhijñā-bhāsa*). (T, p. 161)

18 BHĀSKARANANDIN (1100?)

Suzuko Ohira[107] has exhaustively discussed the evidence concerning the life and times of this author, though unfortunately no certain conclusion seems to follow. Thus the date hazarded here should be considered just that, a hazard!

18.74 BHĀSKARANANDIN, *Dhyānastava*

Edited (E) and translated (T) in Ohira. Ms. Ohira on pp. 9-10 provides the following outline:

Summary by Suzuko Ohira

1-2 (E47; T57) "Saluting the perfect soul, the aim of the poem is laid down concerning the attainment of perfection."

3-7 (E47; T57-58) "The nature, definition, and purpose of *dhyāna* are summarized. The meditator is required to be a right believer free of attachment and endowed with the knowledge of Reality."

8-23 (E47-49; T58-62) "Four types of *dhyāna,* i.e., *ārta, raudra, dharma,* and *śukla*, are described."

24-32 (E49; T62-64) "Four types of *dhyāna.* i.e., on the body (*piṇḍastha*), on an object (*padastha*), on a form

(*rupastha*), and on past forms (*rūpātīta*), are explained."

33-36 (E50; T64-65) "The highest self is described."

37 (E50; T65) "The external self is mentioned as incapable of performing *dhyāna*."

38 (E50; T66) "Introduction to nine categories of Reality and six substances."

39 (E50; T66) "Introduction of *pramāṇa, naya, and nikṣepa*."

40-57 (E50-52; T66-70) "Nine principles are explained. The nature of the soul as consciousness is described in reference to the categories of knowledge and perception."

58-67 (E52; T71-73) "Description of six substances."

68-76 (E52-53; T73-75) "Definition and subdivisions of *pramāṇa, naya* and *nikṣepa*."

77-92 (E53-54; T75-79) "Right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct are explained as the cause of liberation."

93-100 (E55; T79-81) "Adoration of the Lord, and author's statement."

Ohira (pp. 10ff.) provides tables showing that many of the passages in this work are identical to those in the same author's *Tattvārthasūtra-Vṛtti*.

Of the classification of four types of meditation in verse 24, Ohira remarks that "Pūjyapāda and Akalaṅka are silent about this classification. Nor does Bhāskaranandi refer to them in his *Vṛtti*. Dr. A. N. Upadhye draws my attention to the *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta (X: 241 etc.) where *piṇḍyastha* etc. are described..." (p. 18). Ms. Ohira gives a useful review of the contributions of other Jaina writers--Śubhacandra, Hemacandra, Amitagati (pp. 15-22).

18.75 BHĀSKARANANDIN, *Vṛtti* or *Sukhabodha* on Umāsvāmi's *Tattvārthasūtra*[108]

Suzuko Ohira (Ohira p. 13) remarks that this work "follows the interpretations of...Pūjyapāda...Akalaṅka,..and Vidyānandī. It is, in fact, the reduction of them in general. The original sentences are frequently quoted in his *Vṛtti* without alteration. He does not even attempt to make any novel or original interpretations of the aphorisms, but tries to convey the traditional purports of these predecessors in his own simple words and style, particularly for the sake of slow students."

19 ŚUBHACANDRA (1100)

A. K. Chatterjee remarks "Śubhacandra was the author of the well-known Digambara work on philosophy called the *Jñānārṇava*, which was probably composed in the eleventh century. According to Premi,[109] "this work was definitely written before the *Yogaśāstra* of Hemacandra and certainly influenced that great master. Others tend however to assign this work to the last quarter of the twelfth century. Its earliest manuscript is dated in vs1284" (=1227 A.D.) "and Premi claims that many of Hemacandra's passages are borrowed from the *Jñānārṇava*...According to a tradition recorded by Premi, Śubhacandra was a contemporary of Paramāra Bhoja."[110] In that case, Śubhacandra definitely lived before Hemacandra.

Velankar 1930 on #1609 thinks the author of the *Jñānārṇava* was "a Digambara writer and probably a very old one. He is, however, younger than Akalaṅka, Jinasena, Devanandī and Samantabhadra whom he mentions in the introduction" (of the *Jñānārṇava*).

19.76 ŚUBHACANDRA, *Jñānārṇava*

This is a monumental treatise of more than 2230 verses. The section treated here has been divided into sections which may not have been the author's own division as the chapters include topics outside the scope of the titles given. The chief editor of E is Kailasanath Sastri, who has written the main editorial introduction and mentions that the critical edition is by Dr. A. N. Upadhye. The Hindi translation and introduction

in E on which this summary is based is by Pandit Balacandra Siddhanta Sastri (from his edition with Hindi explanation, Srimad Rajacandra Jaina Sastramala 4 (Agasa 1975). It is also edited by Balacandra Sastri with a *Nayavilāsa*. (author unknown) in JJG 30, 1977.

Summary by Balacandra Siddhanta Sastri, translated by Ratna Lahiri

1. Background and Purpose (E1-49) 4-22. Bowing to the Jinas Ādinātha, Candraprabhā, Śāntinātha and Vardhamāna, the first, eighth, sixteenth and twenty-fourth Jinas of the tradition, implies obeisance to all of the Jinas. After duly bowing to Gautama Gaṇabhūti for perfection in meditation, it is proposed to write the *Jñānārṇava (Ocean of Knowledge)*. Praising earlier scholars like Devanandī, Jinasena and Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka, the author states that his purpose stems neither from poetic ego nor from a desire for fame, but that the sole aim is to reaffirm himself in the path of Yoga that has been prescribed by kings among *yogins*.

2 Twelve Attitudes (E50-193) 23-85. The twelve mental attitudes for liberation have been mentioned in other books as well. By keeping them in mind the self does not get overly attached to family, wealth, etc., and realizes the temporality of the material world. This gives rise to a pure discrimination leading to right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. Thus the traveler on the path achieves the first step of meditation (*bhavya dhyāna*).

3 Signs of Meditation (E194-283) 86-96. As a substance the human form is rarely achieved. Having got it, it is best made use of to attain the aims of man (*puruṣārtha*). Objectives of human life are four: *dharma* (the prescribed path like worshiping gods and preceptor), *artha* (material gain), *kāma* (desire fulfilment), and *mokṣa* (liberation of self.) The first three are related to the world and therefore temporary and to

be avoided. Even the worship of gods, etc. are causes of heaven, etc. but not truly liberating. Only the three jewels of right faith, knowledge and conduct can lead to a permanent solution. However, until these three can be practiced, it is advisable to follow the prescribed paths mentioned above, in order to avoid lower hells and therefore continue to follow the householders' prescribed way (*gṛhasthadharma*).

The cognitive faculties of a living being may thus be good (*śubha*), bad (*aśubha*) or purely oriented (*śuddha*). The potential human (*bhavya jīva*) who uses good methods and pure self-colorings achieves the proper meditation. Others, who have bad intent, get ineffective meditation (*durdhyāna*). A pure undertaking (*śuddhopayoga*) or pure intent (*śuddha āśaya*) is the self-realization achieved by experiencing bliss within the self after all attachments have been shed. Good meditation results in reaching the heavenly states (*deva/indra vaibhava*) and bad meditations result in infernal states of existence. Good efforts ultimately (help to) reach omniscience (*kaivalya*).

Thus the knower of reality relinquishes the first three of the aims of man and focuses on the last, i.e. liberation, and continues his efforts exclusively in that direction. The eternal liberation consisting of perpetual right belief, knowledge and conduct, is the source of eternal bliss, which can be achieved only on destruction of all karmic particles adhering (to the self). This destruction of *karman* is not possible without right knowledge and that in turn not possible before the correct meditation is perfected. Therefore those potential humans desiring liberation must depend upon perfecting this meditation and to achieve steadfastness in the same must give up worldly attachments.

4 Good and Bad Qualities of Meditation (E284-353) 96-121. A proposal is made to first summarize the meditational know-how available in previous treatises and traditional knowledge. Then four subjects have been discussed in detail: the meditator, meditated, meditation and results.

The nature of the meditator should be that of a renunciant who is established in his control over the senses and is totally bereft of material attractions and is detached from the cycle of birth and death. This type of meditation is not possible either by illusion-ridden householders or by monks with false belief (non-Jainas). One-sided opinions (*ekāntavāda*) like permanence, impermanence, and *vijñānādvaita* have been criticized in this context. Right belief, right knowledge and right conduct lead to liberation. Some wrong beliefs may include one or the other of these, while others do not accept any of them. Seven such wrong beliefs have been identified. The silence of meditation negates such wrongful beliefs and also those fickle-minded aspirants who do not follow the Jina way. Appropriate and inappropriate behavior of aspirants have been discussed in detail and strong words are used for those who wear the monk's habit for the sake of making money. Having been blessed with the human form and becoming an aspirant on the respected path, one should discriminate between the derogatory and the acceptable.

5 Praise of *Yogins* (E354-382) 123-133. The controlled *yogin* has been praised as one who has renounced all physical pleasures and desires. His mind is so steadfast that he will not lose his control even if it a question of losing his life. This kind of meditator is worthy of praise. He is the owner of the wealth of meditation (*dhyāna dhaneśvara*). However, only those aspirants of right conduct are candidates fit for such perfect meditation.

6 Purifying Belief (E383-448) 134-158. The glory of right belief is that the wealth of liberation befalls only one with right belief, right knowledge and right conduct. Interest in the nature of reality is right belief, understanding it is right knowledge, and relinquishing any acts of demerit is right conduct. These are the three jewels. The substance of living, etc. (as enumerated in the Jina way) are to be believed and that is right belief. Two, three types of right belief have been detailed which

may be either with or without attachment. Twenty-five faults that may arise in them has been discussed, followed by a detailed sequence of living and nonliving substances.

7 Application of Knowledge (E449-471) 157-172. The nature of knowledge is discussed. Knowledge must include all possible qualities, in all three times, that could at all arise in a substance, and all its modes. Natural qualities of awareness are enumerated and five types of awareness including immediate awareness (*matijñāna*) have been outlined. Out of these five, *matijñāna* has been divided into 336 subtypes. Extrasensory awareness and telepathy have two subyptes each, and the nature of complete awareness (*kevalajñāna* or omniscience) has been discussed and lauded.

8 The Vow of Non-injury (E472-530) 173-187. Renouncing any kind of blameable action, right conduct has been highlighted and discussed. Ṛṣabha, etc. *jinadevas* have categorized them into the five types of temporary, etc. Vardhamāna Jinendra has explained five great vows, five kinds of care and three restraints). The sign of these vows being successfully undertaken is total non-injury. The great vow of non-injury has been described in detail. Violence is the cause of detriment and non-injury is beneficial.

9 The Vow of Truth (E531-572) 188-201. Untruth is contraindicated and truth is beneficial. Whatever is beneficial for living things, even though it may be untrue, is advisable. And that which may be true but is a generator of demerits is therefore also untrue. The result of telling untruths will be dumbness, lack of intelligence, foolishness, deafness and diseases of the mouth.

10 Abnegation of Stealth (E573-592) 202-208. The high quality of non-stealing is mandatory as without it no aspirant can remain established on the path. Stealing is denigrated in many ways. The tree of *dharma* has as its roots the aversion from objects of sense. Self-controls are the branches. The many kinds of mental and physical self-abnegation are its leaves, the

flowers are the resulting deliverance from passions, the fruits are the play of knowledge, and the birds resting on it are the scholars. That tree of *dharma* will get burnt with the ravaging fire of stealth if the aspirant were to indulge in stealing.

11 The Epidemic of Desires (E593-640) 209-221. The virtue of celibacy has been extolled as the quality by which *yogins* reach Brahmā the ultimate Lord. The chapter promises to explain it in detail. It is not for the weak-minded. Although appearing to be attractive on the surface, the act of sex is destructive in its results. Ten types have been enumerated with an exhortation to relinquish them totally. Men sometimes lust for their daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, daughter, nurse, wife, female monks and even animals. Fearful of such aberrations *yogins* maintain celibacy.

12 The Nature of Woman (E641-699) 223-239. Women have been denounced as maddened with passions and as snakes and vampires. They have honeyed words but poisoned hearts. Later, a concession is made that although self-controlled monks have denounced them as such, not all women should be considered sinful. Some well-mannered and self-controlled women, ornamented with truth and traditional teachings, illuminate the family name. They are also ornaments of the earth due to their devotion to their husbands, greatness, humility and discrimination.

13 Coitus (E700-725) 240-247. Trying to quench desire with the sex act is like pouring butter in fire. It could result in faintness, fatigue and even tuberculosis. Also, it is a cause of violence to living things. Thus it is despicable and should be avoided.

14 Proximity of Women (E726-770) 246-280. Contamination by women dislocates the self-control of human beings. Even well-established celibates lose control in the presence of women. First there is a glance, then obsession, then desire for speech with each other, then love arises between the hearts resulting in faith in each other. After the meeting of hearts there is a loss of shame resulting in misbehavior. Thus the aspirant does not even look towards women, the cause of all this downfall. Thus the aspirant is exhorted to remain away from women and those despicable persons who indulge in female company.

15 Caring for the Elderly (E771-818) 261-276. For the sake of purity on all stages and results, and for increasing know-how and humility, one must serve the elderly. "Elderly" does not mean just physically old, but anyone senior in austerities, scriptural studies, patience, meditations, discrimination, and physical and mental self-control. Those whose conduct is laudable and never alters from ideals are considered old even if they are younger in age. The physically old, if fallen in conduct and indulging in low acts, is not to be considered fit for this service. Even the lost regain the path in the company of the old with right conduct. Thus the company of the aged with right conduct has been extolled.

16 On the Negative Value of Acquisitions (E819-863) 277-290. Unnecessary acquisitions and excessive attachment to them drown even the most self-controlled man like an overloaded ship in midstream.

Acquisitiveness is of two types, internal and external. The external may be animate like mother, son, lover, or inanimate like house, wealth, etc. Internal acquisitions are fourteen--falsehood, Vedas, attachments, hatreds, humor, love, etc.; there are six quasi-passions, anger, etc. are the four passions.

17 The Scourge of Expectations (E864-884) 291-296. As long as there is any kind of longing for any gains regarding the body or wealth, there can be no proper renouncing of acquisitions. Thus one should abandon any longing of any kind as longing is full of pitfalls on the path.

18 Controlling Sense-Attractions (E885-1050) 297-348. Earlier, in Chapters 6-8, the concepts of right belief, knowledge and conduct were introduced. Those who can perfectly follow those and the latter non-injury, etc. ultimate ideals to

perfection, are called the *mahāvratas*, as they fulfill these immensely difficult vows. To further purify them one should meditate on their twenty-five states (*bhāvanā*). Five right undertakings and three restrictions of body, speech and mind are detailed. These eight give birth to full self-control, hence they are also known as the eight advisory mothers (*pravacanamātṛkā*) that save the aspirant from slipping on the path. Thus five major vows, five undertakings and three restrictions together lead to right conduct which enlightens the self. Anger, etc., passions and faults resulting from enslavement to the senses, are detailed. The merits of conquering them are elaborated and many methods advocated by which such passions may be conquered.

19 Three Realities (E1051-1070) 340-372. It is believed by innumerable *yogins* that meditating on the three realities leads to desired fruits. Addressing them, it is said that these are not different from the self. The self itself is eternal knowledge, etc. and that alone is Śiva, Garuḍa and Karman (the god of desires). Here God, the earth, etc., represented by Garuḍa and Karman, have been explained in the heavily erudite prose commentary.

20 Purification of the Mind and Its Aspects (E1071-1106) 373-384. Patañjali and many other scholars have enumerated physical and mental controls, postures, breath regulations, withdrawing from sense objects, meditating, understanding and transcending into bliss as the essentials of yoga. Others have accepted three instead of these eight, leaving aside the physical and mental controls. Still others label enthusiasm, determination, patience, contentment, knowing the realities, and renouncing human habitations as the ingredients of success in yoga. All these are for achieving a calm and steady mind. Therefore purity of the heart is the essence.

A pure heart leads to pure meditation and also releases the aspirant from bondage of *karman*. Only that can be truly labeled meditation knowledge, or the object of meditation by which the aspiring human can remain forever steadfast in the

self. Without purity of heart, the controls, austerities and learning are like so much chaff-grinding. Thus purity of mind is critical.

21 Negation of Attachments, etc. (E1107-1146) 385-395. Having emphasized the steadfastness of mind as the essential ingredient in achieving successful meditation, it is stated as not possible unless attachments, etc. are removed from the mind. The *yogin* wishes to remain stable in the self but the appearance of associations to attachments at any pretext do not allow him to remain steadfast in the self. These attachments, etc. sometimes fix, sometimes misguide, sometimes scare, sometimes create doubts and sometimes confuse the mind. Thus, knowing the real nature of substances, one must cease imagining any positive or negative results from association to sense objects. Attraction and disenchantment are two sides of the same thing, if one is there, the other aspect will follow. They are two aspects of delusion (*moha*) and ignorance (*ajñāna*). They are to be abandoned.

22 The Treasure of Equanimity (E1147-1179) 396-408. The best method to get released from the aforementioned opposites of love and hate is equanimity. Nothing remains desirable or undesirable for the *yogin* who is equanimous in his dealing with substances that appear to be either beneficial or harmful. This kind of a *yogin* remains unruffled and unaffected by either the praise or the denigration by other folks. Once this steady state is acquired, neither is he pleased by praise nor does he get upset by great calamities engineered by evil men. He bears them peacefully, considering them as the cause of the dropping off of karmic adhesions.

23 Pained (the Lowest Type of) Meditation (E1180-1222) 409-422. Equanimity and meditation are parallel corollaries. Without one the other is not possible. Some people have used the power of meditation for worldly purposes like killing, charming, etc. That leads to infernal existences.

There are two kinds of meditation based on thought-

control, favorable and unfavorable. The favorable meditations lead to emancipation, the unfavorable ones to doom in continued life-cycles. The unfavorable are of two types, *ārta* and *raudra*, and the favorable is also of two kinds, *śukla* and *dharma*.

The *ārta* type of meditation is complex attention focused and undertaken for release from physical or world-related pain and anxiety, or even in the hope of future luxuries. They are of four types in turn and are related to the stages of evolution, the last one (*pramattadhyāna*) reaching up to the sixth stage of spiritual development. The fourth, *nidāna*, can reach the earlier fourth stage only.

24 *Ārta Raudra* (for Relieving Pain and Anger Type) (E1233-1266) 423-436. The second type of unfavorable meditation is the one undertaken with a cruel purpose or in anger. It too has four types, reveling in injury (*hiṃsānanda*), reveling in falsehood (*mithyānanda*), reveling in theft (*cauryānanda*) and reveling in giving patronage (*saṃprakāśānanda*)

25 Places Not Conducive to Pure Meditation (E1267-1301) 437-446. The meditator who has knowledge and renunciation is praised. He is exhorted to focus upon the four mental states that have been described extensively as friendship, compassion, pleasantness and meditation. He is asked to avoid places not conducive to meditation. They have been described in detail as wherever foreigners and low people live, kingdoms ruled by evil kings, amidst pretenders (*pākhandi*), people of wrong belief, amidst Kaulikas and Kapālikas (sects preaching tantric rites), places ridden with evil spirits and ogres, in the company of gamblers, those drinking alcohol, clowns, artists, craftsmen, madmen, rioters and fallen women.

26 Breath Control (E1301-1309) 447-487. Places conducive to quality meditation are enumerated as the pilgrim centers and places where realized beings have earlier attained liberation. Apart from these, tree-caves, dilapidated gardens, burning grounds, caves, Jaina temples and empty rooms outside heavily populated areas. Any place where there may be change of attachments arising should be avoided for stay especially during the time of meditation.

(E1310-1325) The seat conducive to proper meditation has been detailed as wooden plank, stone, ground, or sandy place, on a hard bed, half bed, in the *vajrāsana, vīrāsana, sukhāsana, malāsana* or in the *kāyotsarga* posture. Again, whether peopled or lonely, in happiness or sorrow, any place conducive to a steady mind should be chosen. The direction to face is either east or north.

(E1326-1329) The master of the *dharma* type of proper meditation is in the stage of *apramattasannyatā* (a stage of spiritual evolution). A different opinion states that he is situated between the four stages from right view to the above stage of spiritual evolution.

(E1330-1341) According to purification of self-colorings, the meditator and meditations have been classified into three types and some techniques have been advocated.

(E1342-1455) After detailing the right meditation, the method of breathing has been elaborated. In order to stabilize the mind, it is a good technique. Therefore intelligent beings should learn it, without which it is not possible to control the fickleness of the mind. Earlier teachers have described three aspects: inward breath, holding the breath and expelling breath. All three have been described and the positive effects of breath control is described.

Therefore, the four regions in the nose, the four kinds of air circulating in these regions, their effects, the right and left nerves, questions related to the science of breath flow, life and death, victory and defeat, etc. have been analyzed. Also related to this are rain, grain production, charms, sex of the child in the womb and the birth, air intakes related to yellow and white points and the rationale behind it, the time of the air flowing in the nerves, and entering into another dead or living body using

this knowledge have been referred to.

In the end the art of penetrating into the bodies of many types of flowers, camphor, etc. substances, bees, fireflies, birds, humans and horses is described. It is said this action of entering bodies is for mere curiosity.

In controlling the flow of wind, the *yogin* conquers passions, dangerous poisons, the mind, diseases and stabilized the body. A monk who has conquered his passions can eradicate the accumulated sins of hundreds of lives by practicing two seconds of breath control.

27. Withdrawing the Senses from Objects (E145-1469) 488-491. Withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*) involves drawing back the mind along with the senses from objects. This is instrumental in order to realize the blissful state of *samādhi*. There should not be too much emphasis on breath-control. In fact, too much breath-control can be detrimental to the path of liberation and cause unhealthy mental states. Therefore do not labor too much for breath control.

The places of rest for the mind, the ten areas or places of meditation have been described. These are places where the mind can rest during meditation and elaborate upon the subject of meditation. New realizations arise here out of the personal experiences of the aspirant.

28 Dynamic Meditation (E1470-1512) 492-505. The nature of the unrealized self has been described as being in karmic bondage form time immemorial. Its nature and state is discussed. From the viewpoint of knowledge the self and God are one and the same. The only difference is that in the Lord the group of qualities of unlimited knowledge, etc. are already realized, but in me it is just a potentiality.

Today, I need to assess the qualities in me in order to liberate myself from karmic bondage, using the right kind of meditation (*dharmadhyāna*) and in case of special abilities the pure white meditation (*śukladhyāna*). This is the vow taken. In this meditation there are living and nonliving substances and

nature of the supreme self. If the *yogin* constantly thinks of the Lord he becomes one with it. This is known as dynamic meditation (*savīryadhyāna*).

29 Pure Application of Thought (E1513-1616) 506-535. One who does not know the self does not know the aforementioned Ultimate Lord or Supreme Self. The aspirants are therefore exhorted to first know their own self. Three selves are discussed, the outer (*bahir*), the inner (*antar*), and the supreme (*paramātman*). One who does not separate the body, etc. from the self knows only the outer self. One who knows the aggregates as different from the self to which they adhere knows the inner self. One who has rid himself of this karmic filth and has achieved total bliss after getting release from all agitation becomes the highest Lord.

Thus the difference between the three is shown. The outer self knows his father and son and his material possessions as his own, and remains enamored of all this, and is bound by his actions. This continues his birth and death cycle forever. Therefore, the one wishing to benefit the self must first become the inner self by relinquishing the outer self as detailed here, so that ultimately he may become himself the supreme self by meditating on it. Both *dharma* and *śukla* types of meditation make this supreme self the subject of meditation with a minor difference of purity and ownership.

30 Meditational Examination of Traditional Knowledge (E1617-1639) 536-542. To facilitate the establishing of the mind in the nature of the self, the four types of subjects of *dharma* meditation have been enumerated as examining scriptural knowledge (*ājñāvicaya*), methods of destroying *karman* (*apāyavicaya*), methods of destroying results of action (*vipākavicaya*), and examining forms of world substances (*saṃsthānavicaya*). The first is the meditation in which substances are deliberated upon in accordance with recommendation of the realized omniscient beings as delineated in the scriptures. The qualities of living and

nonliving substances and their infinite modes are continuously arising, stabilizing and extinguishing. Decisions regarding them should be based upon *pramāṇas*, perspectives and ascription (*nikṣepa*). In this context the importance of scriptural knowledge has ben underscored and one is advised to meditate on it. Thus accepting the order of the omniscient, the meditation that focuses upon the true nature of substances as described in the instruments of scriptural knowledge is the *dharma* meditation of the first type.

31 Meditation of Examinations of Methods of Destruction of *Karman* (E1617-1639) 543-548. *Apāya* means destruction. In the second type of subject of *dharma* meditation, in order to destroy the karmic adhesions which have survived from time immemorial, the aspirant focuses on issues like who am I?", why does the inflow of my karmic matter take place? how then does bondage take place? and how can the bonds be gradually weakened? what is liberation? and what is the nature of the realized self? He also thinks that when I know myself I will have known all the three world. "I am truly bereft of any karmic-dirt and therefore I am omniscient and all-seeing." Thus by many ways can the *apāya* be focused.

32 Examination of Karmic Result (E1658-1688) 549-558. When earlier actions are due for fruition, and give results, they are known as maturation (*vipāka*). According to substance, area, time and state, it can be of four types of results to different species. Examples are given. Basic types of karmic results like the knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇa*), etc. are eight in number, and their further subdivisions are many. They are explained in brief. Just as fruits that are not ripe are kept in hay, etc. to ripen them before time, the *karman* can be brought to manifest and decay before it is due. In this way, when progressively purer states are brought about by decaying, the fourth state--of *vyucchinnakriyānivartin*--is arrived at by pure white meditation. They detach from the self which becomes liberated in the form of the same form of man bereft of its

karmic aggregates and physical body. Thus thought regarding how the self under bondage bears agony and how the aspirant can meditate and perform austerities to liberate himself from these *karmans* and attain permanent and blemish-less bliss, is the subject of this type of meditation.

19.77 ŚUBHACANDRA, *Ṭīkā* on Kundakunda's *Samayasāra*[111]

19.78 ŚUBHACANDRA, Commentary on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*[112]

19.79 ŚUBHACANDRA, *Apaśabdakhaṇḍaṇa*[113]

20 PARAMĀNANDA (1100)

NCC 3, p. 212 says "pupil of Abhayadevasūri; in the reign of Kumārapāla." But NCC 11, p. 180 advises: "For a Paramānanda with the same spiritual genealogy and to whom is attributed the authorship of *Dvatriṃśikās*, see *Viśvatattvaprakāśa*, Intro. p. 87.[114]

20.80 PARAMĀNANDA, Commentary on Gargarṣi's *Karmapradīpa*[115]

21 SIDDHASENA SĀDHARAṆĪ or SŪRI (1100?)

In Strasbourg pp. 207-208 it says he "composed his Apabhraṃśa work *Vilāsavatī kathā* in *saṃvat* 1123 or 1193". So he is apparently not the same Siddhasena Sūri as ours dated 1191.

21.81SIDDHASENA SĀDHARAṆĪ, *Ekaviṃśatisthānaprakaraṇa*[116]

22 CANDRAPRABHĀ SŪRI (1102)

This person was the "founder of Pūrṇimāgaccha"[117]; that was "in *saṃvat* 1149" (= 1092), who says Candraprabhā Sūri was a "pupil of Jayasiṃha of the Cāndra Kula, Vajra sākhā."[118] Vidyabhusana adds that he was "born in Guzerat" and was "preceptor of Dharmaghoṣa...He was a great logician, and in debate appeared as a lion before the opponents who resembled elephants".[119]

22.82 CANDRAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Darśanaśuddhi* or *Saṃyaktvaprakaraṇa/Svopajñasiddhi*[120]

22.83 CANDRAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Prameyaratnakośa*[121]

22.84 CANDRAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Cittasamādhiprakaraṇa*

It is not clear whether this is by this author or another of the same name. It is in 354 *gāthās*.[122]

23 NEMICANDRA SŪRI or DEVENDRA GAṆI (1104)

"Pupil of Āmradeva; teacher of Jinacandrasūri", but later "pupil of Āmradeva; teacher of Jinacandrasūri and grand-teacher of Āmradeva"![123] He received the name "Nemicandra after initiation"...reports he was "before *dikṣā* called Devendra (fl. 1072-83), pupil of Āmradeva, pupil of Uddyotanasuri of the Bṛhad Gaccha."[124] Jarl Charpentier, reports that "according to the *praśasti* at the end of his work, Devendra Gaṇi completed the commentary called the *Sukhabodha* at Anhilapāṭaka in the house of the merchant Dohaṭṭi *saṃvat* 1129 = 1073 A.D. In the same *praśasti* Devendra gives us further particulars of his life and work: he himself--belonging to the Tapāgaccha according to Klatt IA. IX--had as his teacher Āmradeva, who was himself the pupil of Uddyotana of the Bṛhadgaccha, that belonged to the Candrakula, a teacher who was praised by Pradyumna, Mānadeva and other *sūris*. And he also tells us that his

work...was undertaken on the advice of his fellow-disciple, the *ācārya* Municandra."[125] He lived after Śānti Sūri, since he quotes that writer's commentary in the third verse if the *praśasti*. Charpentier gives a lot of additional information which may prove helpful.

Asim K. Chatterjee is apparently referring to the same person, but has different information. "Another well-known Śvetāmbara writer of the eleventh century was Nemicandrasūri, whose *Ākhyānamaṇikośa* was written in *vīrasaṃvat* 1129, corresponding to A.D. 1073. He belonged to the Bṛhadgaccha and the *vṛtti* of this work was completed in *vīrasaṃvat* 1190 (AD 1134) by Āmradevasūri, a pupil of Jinacandra and a friend of Nemicandra. It was written at Dhavalakkapura (Dholka), during the reign of Jayasiṃha Siddharāja. This work (along with the *vṛtti*) has been described 'as the treasure-house of stories'."[126] Chatterjee notes several other literary works of Nemicandra (ibid., pp. 168-170).

H. D. Velankar says that the Nemicandra presently being discussed is not a pupil of Āmradeva, etc.--that Nemicandra is the well-known author whose works are mostly covered in Volume 10 of this Encyclopedia.[127] But the same Velankar says that both the Nemicandras--this author (=Devendra Gaṇi) and the author of the *Pravacanasāroddhāra*--were pupils of an Āmradeva, but that whereas Devendra Gani's teacher was also a pupil of Jinabhadrasūri of the Bṛhat Gaccha, the other Āmradeva was a pupil of Uddyotana Sūri.[128] Both of these two were Śvetāmbaras, in contrast with Nemicandra Saiddhāntika (980 and discussed in our Volume 10) who was a Digambara. Velankar doesn't consider the possibility that Devendra Gaṇi and the author of the *Pravacanasāroddhāra* are after all the same person whose teacher Āmradeva had (at least) two teachers, Jinabhadrasūri and Uddyotanasūri. This appears to be the position held by Sagaramal Jaina in the article from which the summary below is culled.

Mahopadhyaya Vinayasagara writes as follows:[129]

"The author belonged to the Vṛhadgacchiya tradition of Devasūri...The religious heirs (*pattadhārī*) of Devasūri were Ājitasūri, and then Ānandasūri held the authority. Ānandasūri had two disciples, 1. Nemichandra Sūri and 2. Jinachandra Sūri. The first, Nemichandra Sūri was a supreme scholar of Prakṛt Language and Āgama Literature. Before being anointed as the Ācārya, his name was Devendragaṇi. On becoming the Ācārya he was named Nemichandra Sūri. Later writers named him Saiddhāntika Śiromaṇi, (literally, the crest jewel of theoretical knowledge). Five of his works found in Prakṛit are:

1.*Uttarādhyāyanasūtra Sukhabodhatīkā*, written in *saṃvat* 1129, having 14,000 *ślokas*. In this work he refers to himself as Devendragaṇi.

2.*Ākhyānamāṇikośa*, with 52 primary *gāthās*. Has named himself as author Devendragaṇi.

3. [In] the *Ratnacūḍākatham* in 3981 *ślokas*, [he] has referred to himself as Nemicandra Sūri, therefore this must be a work written after 1129.

4.*Laghuvīracāritra*, also known as *Mahāvīracāritra*. Written in *saṃvat* 1141, consisting of 3000 *ślokas*. A palm-leaf manuscript of this work handwritten in 1161 is available in the Jaiselmer Jnana Bhandra.

5. *Ātmabodhakulaka*, also known as *Dharmopadeśakulaka*, has 22 *gāthās*."

"Āmradeva Sūri was the disciple of Jincandra Sūri, the *guru* brother of [the] first Nemicandra Sūṛi. He wrote a work on the *Ākhyānamaṇikośa* of the first Nemicandrasūṛi in 1190 at Dhavalapura in the kingdom of Siddharāja Jayasiṃha...Āmradeva Sūri had many disciples out of whom only two are mentioned as important authors: 1. Haribhadrasūṛi and 2. the present author Nemicandra Sūri (presumably the second)."

"A second work by the same author is found named *Ananta nāha Jinacariyam*" [?]. The language is Prakṛit and the creation date is 1216 of the *saṃvat* era. It has been written in Dholkar

city in the kingdom of Mahārāja Kumārapāla. The number of verses are 12,000. Edited by Rupendra Kumar Pagariya, this has been published by the Lalbhai Dalparbhai Bharatiya Samskrti Vidyamandir of Ahmedabad in 1998."

There seems no way to get a consistent account out of these varying opinions. We shall here suppose (!) that an author named Nemicandra Sūri, who was not the same as the Nemicandra Saiddhāntika treated in Volume 10, and who as the student of (some) Ājita Sūri, was alive in the first part of the 12th century and wrote the two works attributed to him in what follows. We leave it to subsequent historians to unravel the confusions this may generate!

23.85 NEMICANDRA SŪRI, *Pravacanasāroddhāra*

The *Pravacanasāroddhāra* "is a detailed exposition of Jaina Philosophy in 1599 *gāthās*."'[130]

In his Hindi Introduction to Vinayasagara Sagarmal Jaina has provided the following outline of the contents of the work.[131]

Summary by Sagarmal Jain, translated by Ratna Lahiri

In the beginning..., after the auspicious verses, mention has been made of the divisions called 276 doors (*dvāra*). The names of these divisions suggest that an effort has been made here to fit in the various significant facets of the Jaina religion and philosophy. Although the number of verses are only 1599, even then many significant issues related to Jainism have been included...

1 In the first door (the author) describes the method of *caityavandana* (worshiping the temples). The ten *trikas* are discussed–(1) three taboos, (2) three circumambulations, (3) three types of bows, (4) three worships, (5) three conditions, (6) three [ways of] refrain from looking in three directions, (7) three types of cleaning the floor, (8) three colors? (*varṇa*), (9)

three hand-poses, (10) three surrenders.

While entering a *caitya*, do not take conscious things (*cit*) like flowers or betel-leaf but you may wear unconscious items like jewelry, etc. Wear one lower garment, one untailored upper-covering. According to some *ācāryas* the emblems of ego like umbrella, fan, crown, etc. should also be avoided even though they are unconscious items. It the Jina image is visible then two hands should be folded and according to the previously mentioned ten *trikas* [threes] should bow and pray with concentration...

2 discusses the details of *guruvandana*, i.e. the ways to worship the preceptor. In the *Mukhavastrikā*, for example, method of how to clean each area of the body, how to pronounce the apologies, etc. are given. 192 such areas are mentioned regarding how to please and worship the *guru*. Besides the 25 areas in each of the three major sections, they have enumerated 32 faults that may occur and 5 misplaced venerations to those types of *śramaṇa* who do not deserve to be worshiped. In this context, types of *śramaṇas* have been enumerated.

3 In the third *dvāra* daily, fortnightly, monthly and quarterly and yearly expiation/repentance techniques for the monks are enumerated, which include physical (*kāyotsarga*) and apologetic (*khamāsanā*) exercises. There are four in the day, two every night, 12 per fortnight, 20 in quarterly, and 40 meditations on worldliness that need to be explained. The number of expiation verses and breathing cycles are also enumerated.

4 In the fourth *dvāra* ten abandonments or renunciations are discussed, viz. (2) regarding the future, (2) regarding the past, (3) *re koṭi*, (4) controlled, (5) formed, (6) unformed, (7) *parimāṇa* vows, (8) *nirviśeṣa*, (9) symbolic and (10) related to time. Among the symbolic, indications of methods by which by which this renunciation is to be done–by eyes, fists, knots, etc. are discussed. Afterwards, ten abandonments related to time are discussed.

5 is related to *kāyotsarga*–giving up the body–19 faults that may occur are enumerated.

6 describes the excesses that are likely in the process of repentance. 5 errors in method of voluntary giving up of the body (*saṃlekhanā*), 15 of action, 8 of the process of knowledge, 8 of right view, 8 of right conduct are described.

7 enumerates the realized beings from the Erāvat and Bhārat areas. Past and future sets of 24 realized beings are given for Bhārat but only those of present times are enumerated for the Erāvat area.

9 enumerates the primary nuns (*sādhvī*) among the realized beings.

10 enumerates the rank (*sthānaka*) of those that are to be worshiped to realize the name *karman*.

11 lists the names of the parents of the realized persons.

12 gives the details of beliefs regarding the rebirths of these parents.

13 Ths number of lesser and higher types of Jinas appearing in each epoch.

14 The minimum and maximum number of Jinas existing at the time of any particular Jina...

15 Total number of ancient Jaina primary followers (*gaṇadhara*).

16 Then, number of *munis*.

17 Number of female *sādhvis*.

18 *Munis* achieving the state of *vaikraya labdhi* (a type of supernatural attainment).

19 Number of debaters (*vādin*).

20 Number of those attaining clairvoyance.

21 Number of omniscients.

22 Number of extra-sensory attainers.

23 Number of holders of the 14 *pūrvas*.

24 Number of seekers (*śrāvaka*) under the Jinas.

25 Number of female monks under them.

26 Names of the *yakṣas* who help the *tīrthaṅkaras* to reign.

27 Names of the *yakṣiṇīs* who help the *tīrthaṅkaras* to reign.

28 Size of the *tīrthaṅkaras*, especially height.

29 Special body sign (*lāñchana*) of the realized soul.

30 Color of the body of a Tīrthaṅkara.

32 Number of people who have accepted the *munidharma* way under each specific Tīrthaṅkara.

32 Life-span of a Tīrthaṅkara.

33 How many *munis* (under him) the Tīrthaṅkara has taken to realization along with himself.

34 Which Tīrthaṅkara realized *nirvāṇa* in which place.

35 How much time elapsed between the appearance of one Tīrthaṅkara and other highly placed ("iron-rod") beings (*śalākāpuruṣa*).

36 How long was the duration of the reign of each realized being and how much time elapsed between two reigns.

37 Ten *āśātanas*.

38 84 *āśātanas* (?) are mentioned. As part of this, how much time a *muni* (mendicant) can spend in a temple is discussed.

39 The 8 *mahāpratihāryas* by the Tīrthaṅkaras.

40 34 *atiśayas* by them.

41 18 errors that they avoid.

42 discusses the four possible connotations of the word "*jina*". Ṛṣabha, Śānti, Mahāvīra are named Jinas while those acquiring total emancipation like *kaivalya* and *mukti* are *bhāva jinas* or *yathārthajina*.

43 Which Tīrthaṅkara did how many ears of austerities before reaching the *kaivalya* state.

44 How many years each Tīrthaṅkara spent in austerities before his final attainment.

45 lists those who are going to be Tīrthaṅkaras in the future.

46 How many people can attain liberation simultaneously

from the different worlds, namely *ūrdhvaloka, tiryak-loka,* the waters, land, etc.

47 enumerates how many men, women and transvestites can atttain perfection simultaneously.

48 Types of perfected beings–usually they are the same, but depending upon in which state they attain, there can be 15 types.

49 The depth (*avagāhanā*) of the area occupied by the selves of perfected beings. Of the higher type there can be only two, lower type four, and medium type 108 beings can attain perfection simultaneously.

50 How many can attain perfection given the distinguishing mark of their specific positions in life.

51 How many can continue to attain perfection, how many simultaneously and how many consecutively without any time interval.

52 20 women, 108 men and 10 sexless bodies can attain simultaneously. More details of various cosmological areas of the Jaina world view are mentioned as areas from which a maximum number of simultaneous achievers are possible. E.g., those born as humans after having been *kalpavāsin* may attain only 108 such beings at a time, etc.

53 Area occupied by the self in Jaina terms.

54 Placement of perfected beings.

55-59 Higher, medium and lower types of spread (*avagāhanā*) of perfected beings.

60 *Munis* who are practicing the Jaina ordinances (*jinakalpa*).

61 *Munis* who are practicing the precepts of the elders (*sthavira kalpa*). Their instruments.

62 Female aspirants and their instruments.

63 Number of *jina kalpika*.

64 The 36 qualities of the preceptor (*ācārya*).

65 The 52 subcategories of *vinaya*.

66 *Caraṇasattari.*

67 *Karaṇasattari* (70 types).

68 Special abilities to fly in space like Jaṅghācaraṇa and Vidyācaraṇa.

69 Types of austerity (*parihāraviśūddhitapa*).

70 Nature of another [austerity?] (*yathālandhika*).

71The 38 *niryamakas* (executors) and the division of their duties.

72 Five high-vows and 25 contemplations.

73 The 25 mal-contemplations to be avoided.

74 Different numbers of the high vows in the reign of different Tīrthaṅkaras.

75 The fourteen *kīrtikarman* actions, meaning those related to veneration of the *ācaryas*,

76 The *cāritra* (right) actions possible in the Bhārata, Airavat, etc. areas. During the term of the first and last Tīrthaṃkaras in the Bhārata and Ervata area, there are five *sāmāyikas*, whereas for the reign of the other 22, there are three *sāmāyikas*, *sūkṣma*, *samaparāya* and *yathākhyāta* types of right action.

77 and 78 talk about ten *sthitikalpaṣ* during the reign of the middle 22 Tīrthaṅkaras.

79 Five types of *caityas*.

80 Five types of books.

81 Five types of punishments.

82 Five types of *tṛṇa* (straw? grass?).

83 Five types of leather.

84 Five types of cloth.

85 Five types of residing space.

86 22 types of discomfort (*pariśaha)*.

87 Seven types of groups (*maṇḍāla*).

88 The ten separations at the time of Jambusvāmi's life.

89 The *kṣapakaśreṇi*.

90 The *upaśama śreṇi*.

91 Ideal place for *sthāṇḍila* land (appropriate for excretion, urination, etc.

92 The fourteen ancient works (*pūrva*) and the number of their verses, etc.

93 Five types of *nirgranthas*.

94 Five types of *śramaṇas*.

95 Five faults in eating habits like adding condiments for taste, etc.

96 Seven types of other desires.

97 The eight type of begging alms.

98 The ten types of *prayaścitta*, repentance-penance-expiation.

99 Details of the average type of *sāmācārī*. Right conduct.

100 Holy words (*padavibhāga*), those described in the *chedasutra* tye of *samācārī* (practitioner of right conduct).

101 *Cakravāli* type of right conduct.

102 Analysis of *kṣapakaśreṇi* and *upaśamaśreṇi*.

103 Travel purposes. *Gītārtha*-considering time and place. What precautions to take while traveling.

104 Four months stay in one place only during rainy season, else on month only.

105 Types of journeys undertaken with aspirants.

106 Method of eliminating body fluids, etc.

107 The 18 types unfit for initiation.

108 *Upayoga, dīkṣā.*

109 Unsexed (neither male nor female) that are unfit for initiation. Out of 16 types of unsexed people, 10 are not fit but 6 are fit for initiation.

110 Handicapped people are unfit for initiation.

111 For what maximum price the mendicant may accept garments. In this context the relative value of different currencies in different places is also discussed.

112 Food may not be accepted from a person who has offered a place to stay.

113 The relation between *śrutajñāna* and *samyaktva* (right balance of view, belief and conduct) has been discussed.

114 Five types of knowledge of the five *nirgrantha* types,

and the four *gatis* or states they achieve thereby.

115 Food to be taken from the place where the sun rises and food brought from elsewhere not acceptable.

116 Food/drink brought from a distance of more than two *krośas* is unacceptable.

117 Food taken in the first *prahara* (time division of the day) can remain edible up to the third division but not beyond that.

118 A man should eat only 32 spoonfuls (handfuls); more is excess.

119 Four types of residence produce *duḥkha*, where disrespectful people live, where others are asked for favors, where pleasing words, beauty and food is abundant, and where the bod is massaged–these are unfit for residence of a *muni*.

120 Four opposite types fit for a *muni* are enumerated.

121 Thirteen *kriyasthānas*.

122 *Śrutasāmayika* etc.–four types of right conduct groups.

123 The 18,000 types of *śīlāṅkas*.

124 The seven perspectives: mode or point of view.

125 Method of accepting cloth for a *muni*.

126 The five conducts: *āgama, śruta, ājñā, dhāraṇā* and *jīta*.

127 Instruments used at the time of birth of (*yathājata*) of a *śramaṇa*.

128 Method of waking and study through the night (for mendicants.

129 How to find a person before whom repentance for sin can be confessed.

130 Time of re-awakening.

131 How to wash the *upadhi* (pillow?) of a monk and after how many days.

132 How much mendicants should eat. For men, 32 portions the size of an *amlā* fruit; for women, 28 such morsels are prescribed.

133 How to purify/clean the living quarters of a *muni*.

What kind of quarters are acceptable for a *muni*.

134 Detailed method and taboos during the process of religious suicide.

135 A township has to be visualized as a bull seated facing east. Then decide which area of this bull is worth residing upon. Each limb is discussed as to giving certain results.

136 Water remains edible according to weather. Heated water remains good until five time-periods (*praharṣa*) in the day in summer, four in winter and only two in the rainy season after which life forms in it, so it is unacceptable. Lime may be added to keep it longer.

137 The female of species of animals and birds have been discussed.

138 In the present downward-spiraling time period (*avasarpiṇi kāla*) the ten types of wonders like women, Tīrthaṅkaras are discussed.

139 Truth, combined truth and falsehood, combined false with false, etc., four types of language are discussed.

140 Sixteen types of manner of speech.

141 The five months.

142 The five years.

143 The size and shape of the world. The world-leader qualities are also discussed.

144-147 discuss nouns of three, five, ten and fifteen types respectively.

148 The 66 types of right balance (*saṃyaktva*) are mentioned.

149 discusses the above different types in detail.

150 The six *jīvakāya* (bodies), species and their families are discussed. According to Jainatradition they are 15,750,00.

151 84 lacks of births are detailed.

152-153 The eleven types of images for the householder worshiper.

154 Different types of cereal seeds, how long they remain with life, and when they become lifeless is detailed.

155 Which cereals become *acita* after crossing a certain area.

156 Within the above, the categories of wheat, rice, moo lentils, and sesame, etc. 24 types of seeds are discussed.

157 The seventeen types of deaths (as in *Samavāyāṅgasūtra*) have been discussed.

158-159 The nature of *sāgaropama, palyopama*, etc. are given.

160-162 The nature of upward-spiraling and downward-spiraling time.

163-164 The fifteen places fit for *karman* and the 30 *akarmabhūmis*.

165 The arrogance (*mada*) of caste, family, etc. Eight types of arrogance.

166 Two and 43 types of violence.

167 The 108 types of transformation (*pariṇāma*).

168 Eighteen types of continence (*brahmacarya*).

169 24 types of desire (*kāma*).

170 Ten types of breath, five senses, mind, body, incoming and outgoing breath and age are all considered *prāṇa* in Jaina theology.

171 Ten types of desire-fulfilling trees (*kalpavṛkṣa*).

172 The names and castes of the seven areas of hell (*narakabhūmi*).

173-184 are all related to life in hell, their colors, their age, their sensations, types and nature of their extrasensory perception, how and where they are reborn.

185-191 The one-sensed animals are discussed in detail–their color, objects of their sense, where they ultimately go.

192-193 Those with handicapped senses.

194-199 The celestial beings like *bhavanapatis* and *devas*.

200-203 Birth of gods, their time frame and their destiny (*gati*).

204 The time lag after birth into the perfected state and

durations thereof.

205 Nature and food of beings.

206 Detailed description of 363 heretical doctrines.

207 The 8 types of misconception.

208 Twelve religious age rulers (*cakravartin*).

209 The nine *baladevas* (the power beings co-existent with the *vāsudevas*).

210 the nine Vasudevas.

211 The nine anti-Vasudevas.

212 The 14 types of gems: Vāsudeva, Cakravartin, etc. and the seven gems.

213 The nine treasures like Vāsudeva, Cakravartin, etc.

214 Number of beings taking birth in the different species.

215-220 discusses the theory of *karman* according to Jaina philosophy.

221 The mental inclinations of beings (*kṣayika*, etc.).

222-223 The fourteen *jīva* and fourteen *ajīva* tes.

224 The fourteen stages (*guṇasthāna*).

225 The fourteen *mārgaṇās* (stages of searching).

226 The twelve cognitive faculties.

227 The fifteen types of activity (*yoga*).

228-236 Dying while in the *guṇasthāna* stages, their time periods, the attainments, the problems and unacceptable language, etc. are detailed.

237 Types of bad behavior (or demerit, *pāpa*).

238 The 27 basic qualities of a *muni*.

239 The 21 qualities of a seeker (*śrāvaka*).

240-243 The animal types; their food habits.

244 When it is possible to conceive.

245-246 How many sons can one father have, and how many fathers can one son have.

247 When man and woman are unfit for procreation.

248 Amount of sperm. How much blood and sperm is there in a body.

249 What is the interval between achievements of

samyaktva, etc.

250 Who cannot be born in the human world is detailed.
251 Size and proportion of the eleven limbs.
252 The total size of the 16 ancient *pūrvas*.
253 Amount of a *lavaṇa śākha* (flame of salt?).
254 Measurement of different units.
255 Nature of the mobile being (*trasa*) type of life.
256 The six types of perennials (*anantakāya*).
257 Eight limbs of theory (*śāstra*).
258 is missing (!).
259 Different scales of measurement.
260 Six states of profit and loss.
261 Life forms that cannot be destroyed.
262 The 56 peninsulas.
263 Relative portions (*alpabahutva*) of beings.
264 Important preceptors (*sūri*) of the age.
265 Ṛṣabha to Mahāvīra.
266 How the different gods satisfy their desires in different worlds.
267 Kṛṣṇarājī.
268 Non-study and its nature.
269 Nature of Nandīśvara Island.
270 Different types of attainments of powers (*labdhi*).
271 Six internal and six external austerities.
272 Nature of the six sub-terrestrial vessels (*pātālakalaśa*).
273 Nature of the *āhāraka* body.
274 The non-Aryan countries.
275 Aryan countries.
276 The 21 qualities of perfected beings).

23.86 NEMICANDRA or DEVENDRA SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* or *Sukhabodha* or *Laghuvṛtti* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*[131]

Wiles p. 160 says it is in 14,000 *granthas*, and composed in 1072. Roth says it was finished in *saṃvat* 1179 (1123) . Alsdorf says "Devendra is not troubled by any metrical scruples; he explains the traditional text before him without the slightest regard to metrical correctness."[132]

A. K. Chatterjee writes: "It is based on the commentary of Śāntyācārya entitled *Śiṣyahitā*. Nemicandra has incorporated several stories in his *vṛtti*, making his commentary a readable work. It was written, according to the *praśasti*, at Aṇahilapātaka in *vīrasaṃvat* 1129" (=1072 A.D.) "in the temple of (a) Dohaḍi merchant of that town."[133]

24 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI or GAṆI (1110)

"(Died 1111 A.D.). 43rd in Kharataragaccha; pupil of Abhayadevasūri, the Navāṅgīkāra and teacher of Jinadattasūri (author of *Gaṇadharaśataka*) and Padmānanda (author of *Padmānandaśataka*) and Rāmadevagaṇi (author of a commentary on *Āgamikavastuvicārasāra*); well-versed in Sanskrit. and Prakrit. and author of several *stotras*...[134] For a detailed account of his life see the Sanskrit Introduction to GOS 37, which has copious accounts of lives, works, etc. of Jinavallabha Suri, Jinadatta Suri and Jinapala Upadhyaya, also Suraprabha Upādhyāya.

"In *saṃvat* 1167 he was consecrated *sūri* by Devabhadracarya and died six months afterwards..."[135]

He was the founder of the Vidhisaṅgha (Kharatara gaccha), according to Indian Antiquary XI.

"Jinavallabha's pupil Rāmadeva wrote the *Ṣaḍāśīticūrṇī* in *samvat* 1173. In that work it is stated that Jinavallabha inscribed all his *citrakāvyas* on the stones of the Vīracaitya *at Chitrakūṭa* (Chittore), and the *Dharmaśikṣā* and *Saṃghapaṭṭaka* on both sides of the doors of the *caitya*. Among these was also inscribed what goes by the name of *Jinavallabhapraśasti* or *Aṣṭasaptatikā* which Jinavallabha composed in *saṃvat* 1164."[136]

Some 24 works are listed in NCC 7, p. 266 as having been written by this author, most of which do not seem to be philosophical in nature. Moreover, most of the works listed

below are not found in the list at NCC 7, p. 266

For the collected works of Jinavallabha cf. *Jinavallabhasūrigranthāvalī* (Jaipur 2004).

24.87 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI, *Vivaraṇa* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Anekāntajayapatākāvṛtti*[137]

24.88 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Dharmabindu*[138].

24.89 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI, *Ṭippaṇaka* on a *Karmaprakṛti*[139]

24.90 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI, *Āgamikavastuvicārasāraprakaraṇa* or *Sadāsīti/Bhāṣya*[140]

"Exposition of the doctrine of *karman* and that of the soul regarding its grade of existence, sense-organs etc. in verse in Prakrit. For some remarks about this *Ṣaḍāsīti* see GOS 21, p. 34...This work is looked upon as an older *Karmagrantha* out of four. It is published with Malayagiri Sūri's commentary by Jaina Atmananda Sabha in *saṃvat* 1972."[141]

24.91 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI, *Bṛhatsaṃgrahaṇī/Vṛtti*[142]

24.92 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI, *Dvādaśakulaka*

Velankar tells us that it is in Prakrit, and "contains 232 stanzas in different meters divided into 12 chapters. It is published with Jinapāla's commentary in the Jinadattasūri Pracina Pustakoddhara Fund Series, Bombay 1934."[143]

24.93 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI, *Jinavijñapti*[144]

24.94 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI, *Mithyātvamathanacaccarīprakaraṇa*[145]

24.95 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI, *Praśnasataka* and *Avacūri* thereon[146]

The author of this work is identified by Velankar[147] as a pupil of Jineśvara Sūri, which if so would suggest that this author is different from the author of some or all of the other works here ascribed to this Jinavallabha Sūri.

Devasthali, p. 827, says it is "a small philosophical poem in 106 stanzas".

24.96 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI, *Sūkṣmārthavicārasāraprakaraṇa* or *Sārdhaśatakaprakaraṇa*[148]

24.97 JINAVALLABHA SŪRI, *Piṇḍaviśuddhi*

Devasthali 1944, p. 825 (#2389) says it "is a philosophical tract in 104 stanzas..." [149]

25.98 HARICANDRA GAṆI (1110), *Praśnapaddhati*

JRK p. 273 identifies Haricandra as a pupil of Abhayadeva Sūri.[150]

27 HARIBHADRA SŪRI (1115)

Yajneshwar S. Sastri has given very specific details about the evidence concerning the author of the following work. "The colophon given at the end of the commentary on *Praśamarati* by Haribhadra himself tells us that he was a pupil of Jinadeva who was a disciple of Devasūri."[152]

27.100 HARIBHADRA SŪRI, Commentary on Umāsvāti's *Praśamaratiprakaraṇa*

The passage quoted above from Yajneshwar Sastri continues: "This commentary was composed after going through all other commentaries existing before him, during the

king Jayasiṃhadeva's rule at Aṇahilapura Pāṭaṇ in *vīrasaṃvat* 1195. From this colophon we learn that this commentator Haribhadra flourished in the first half of the 12th Century A.D. and there were many commentaries on *Praśastamati* already composed prior to the period of this commentator."

"Haribhadra's commentary is very lucid and simple, but satisfied with giving only the literary meaning of the verses. There are no additional philosophical discussions which can be distinguishedly" [distinctively?] "pointed out nor are there any standard quotations from earlier works. Very few passages from Āgamas are quoted, here and there, and the commentators aim seems to be limited to giving literary meaning of the text."[153]

27.101 HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Jinavallabha Suri's *Ṣaḍāśīti*[154]

27.102 HARIBHADRA SŪRI, Commentary on Candraprabhasri's (?) *Darśanaśuddhiprakaraṇa*[155]

27.103 HARIBHADRA SŪRI, Commentary on a *Bandhasvāmitva*[156]

Composed in 1115, says JRK p. 281, who identifies the author of this work as Haribhadra, pupil of Jinadeva Upādhyāya of the Bṛhad Gaccha.

27.104 HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Sārdhaśatakaprakaraṇa*

According to Velankar, JRK p. 435, it was composed in *saṃvat* 1172, i.e., 1117 A.D. But he cites no manuscripts.

28 YAŚODEVA SŪRI or DHANADEVA (1118)

According to NCC 9, p. 220, "Dhanadeva" was the "name of Yaśodeva before his *dīkṣā*", and he was a "pupil of Siddhasūri of

Upakeśagaccha. JRK p. 392 calls him "pupil of Vīra, pupil of Candrasūri".

28.105 YAŚODEVA SŪRI, *Apauruṣeyadevanirākāraṇa*[157]

28.106 YAŚODEVA SŪRI, *Bṛhadvṛtti* on Devagupta's *Navapadaprakaraṇa*[158]

28.107 YAŚODEVA SŪRI, *Vivaraṇa* on Devagupta Sūri's *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*

NCC 9, p. 393 states that this work was "composed in 1118 A.D.", but Velankar at JRK p. 208 gives the date of composition as "*saṃvat* 1165" which is 1108. It is also called *Bṛhadvṛtti*.[159]

28.108 YAŚODEVA SŪRI, *Cūrṇi* on the *Pañcāśakasūtra* (NCC XI, 75)[160]

28.109 YAŚODEVA SŪRI, *Cūrṇi or Prākṛtavṛtti* on Bhadrabāhu's *Āvaśyakaniryukti*

JRK p. 38 gives manuscript citations.

28.110 YAŚODEVA SŪRI , *Cūrṇi* on an *Īryopathikādaṇḍaka*

Composed in 1117. Cf. JRK p. 41.

28.111 YAŚODEVA SŪRI, *Cūrṇi* on the *Caityavandanasūtra*

Composed in 1117; "it is really a Prākṛta commentary on the (anonymous) *Cūrṇi*" cited previously on the same page, says Velankar at p. 125 of JRK.

28.112 YAŚODEVA SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Śrāvakadharma*

"The *Śrāvakadharma* is the first of the 19 *Pañcākaśas* (see *Pañcāśakasūtra*). It contains 44 *gāthās*" says JRK p. 392, going on to say that this *Ṭīkā* "was composed in *saṃvat* 1172 (=1150.". The commentary is in Prākṛta."

29 JINADĀSA GAṆI or MAHATTARA (1118)

NCC 7, p. 255 calls him "pupil of Pradyumna Kṣamāśramaṇa."[161]

29.113 JINADĀSA GAṆI, *Cūrṇi* on the *Bhagavatīsūtra*[162]

29.114 JINADĀSA GAṆI, *Cūrṇi* on the *Anuyogadvārasūtra*[163]

29.115 JINADĀSA GAṆI, *Cūrṇi* on Bhadrabāhu's *Āvaśyakasūtraniryukti*[164]

29.116 JINADĀSA GAṆI, *Cūrṇi* on Bhadrabāhu's *Acarāṅgasūtraniryukti*[165]

29.117 JINADĀSA GAṆI, *Cūrṇi* on Bhadrabāhu's *Sukṛtaṅgasūtraniryukti*[166]

29.118 JINADĀSA GAṆI, *Cūrṇi* on Bhadrabāhu's *Uttarādhyāyanasūtraniryukti*[167]

29.119 JINADĀSA GAṆI, *Cūrṇi* on Umāsvāti's *Praśamaratiprakaraṇa*[168]

29.120 JINADĀSA GAṆI, *Upadeśamālā*[169]

29.121 JINADĀSA GAṆI, *Cūrṇī* on the *Nandīsūtra*[170]

29.122 JINADĀSA GAṆI, *Cūrṇī* on the *Niśīthasūtra*

Edited by Amaracandaji and Kanhaiyalal, two volumes, Delhi 1982, and again in four volumes, same date. The work constitutes an exhaustive review of Jaina ethics. The English Introduction by B. B. Rayanade to the four volume version, found in Volume One of the Second Edition, pp. 1-31, provides a lengthy, rather unsystematic summary of the entire corpus

consisting of the *gathās* and older commentaries of Bhadrabāhu and Jinadāsa, whom Rayanade thinks is Jinadāṣa Mahattara of the seventh century. We provide here passages from his summary that, it appear, Rayanade believes pertain to Jinadāsa's input to the material.

"Jinadāsa Mahattara is quite eloquent when he interprets *sūtra* 19, that since fundamental and the exceptional rules have broad connotations, it is imperative for a *sādhaka* to do his duties, his mind fixed on self-control and purging of *karmans* (*nirjarā*). Thus balanced attitude becomes an imperative doctrine; plainly speaking, it is impossible to observe the fundamental doctrines as ultimate truths; hence the interpretation of such principles should be made subject to the substance, span, time and idea or psychic factors. The commentators have laid emphasis on the meaning of the word, and not the word itself. Ethical rules stand for an act and not for the word itself. If the dogmas are to be followed strictly in literal sense then what was the need of several commentaries such as *ṭīkā, bhāṣya, niryukti*, etc. for their interpretation? This very fact simply proves that the words are not by themselves sufficient to convey the meaning, to expound what is contained in the words is the chief concern and aim of the commentators. The *sūtras* connote various meanings. Teachers give various interpretations and bring out the veracity, cogency and force of the words. Hence, the necessity of commentaries. Thereby, one can come to know from these exegetical literature what is the fundamental (*utsarga*) principle in contrast with the exceptional (*apavāda*). Sometimes the exact import of the word may be applicable to the recluses (*nirgrantha*) or sometimes to the naked saints (*nirgranthis*) or to both. In order to avoid such ambiguity, the *ṭīkās* are to be referred to for exact interpretation and application of the meaning to the situation as and when there arise such demands." (pp. 4-5)

"Jainism has passed through various types of vicissitudes: sometimes saints, lady saints, property of the community,

temples, etc. has to be protected against the persistent onslaughts by the miscreants, ruffians. Now the question arose, how to defend without ceasing to be a follower of *ahiṃsā*. The method suggested is itself unique, because it is the product of the unique situation. For example, if any criminal tries to destroy the temple, insult or beat the *ācārya* or tries to molest a *sādhvī*, such characters should be killed in the larger interests of the custodians of religion; such acts are also the deeds of morality - *evaṃ karento viśuddho*." (p. 11)

"One thing appears to be so vivid and so very challenging as to how the commentators could agree to accommodate exceptions which were intrinsically opposed to the teachings of Lord Mahavīra; the members of the Jaina community had to resort to such acts, contrary to the ethical principles, only because if the Jaina *saṃgha* was not protected, nothing will be left; hence their exceptional acts became normal or general acts; they gained momentum later on. A very strange incident, although it sounds unrealistic, is narrated; a Brāhmaṇa king ordered all the Jaina saints to bow to the Brāhmaṇa ascetics in the court of the king. The Ācārya told his followers to obey the order of the king. When the *ācārya* reached the court along with his followers, he asked the king to call the Brahmins, so that they (*sādhus*) would express their respect by bowing to them. As soon as the Brahmins assembled in the court, the Jaina saints, some of whom were experts in *mantras*, used the efficacy of some *mantras* and killed the Brahmins with the help of the leaves of Kanheri; even the king was slain with this spiritual power. Such use of spiritual power has the sanction and dignity of moral principles, in that case, it is regarded as an act of *ahiṃsā*." (pp. 11-12)

"It must be remembered here that the commentator, Jinadāsa Mahattara, has flung some exceptions to the basic principles embedded in the *sūtras*; but any attempt to trace the origin of such exceptions is bound to be a failure because the *sūtras* do not mention the sources in the original works in which exceptions (*apavāda*), even by implication, were provided. Then how would the commentator propound and propagate such exceptions? It seems he has succeeded in projecting an image of the then prevalent social situations. In order to safeguard the interest of the society, exceptions become social obligations; in this process, one has to transgress the limits of the accepted rules and regulations." (p. 12)

"The crowning phase of exceptions (*apavāda*) to solve the problems of the saints are discussed in great length. The most notable amongst such exceptions is like this: in general the saints have not the freedom or liberty to move about in the forbidden areas. If none can recognize the particulars of the saints, the saints have the full liberty to change the dress, can cook for themselves, can procure fruits from others; this is not all. They can freely accept non-vegetarian preparations..." (p. 15)

30 MUNICANDRA SŪRI (1120)

NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 219 says he died in A.D. 1121. This is Municandra Sūri of Bṛhadgaccha, pupil of Vinayacandra Sūri and preceptor of Vādideva Sūri; also four generations prior to Hemacandra. Asim K. Chatterjee reports a genealogy which makes him the immediate ancestor of Ajitadeva and Vādideva Sūri. If we date those two around 1137 we can bring these reported facts into some semblance of reasonableness.

Kapadia[171]: "There are very few details available about the life of Municandra Sūri. The two hymns *Municandrācarīyathī [?]* and *Guruvirahavilāva* (these are given in *Prakaraṇasamuccaya* (pp. 44-49) published by Rsabhadevaji Kesarimalaji Samstha, Ratlam) composed by Vāda Deva Sūri, throw some light on it. He was born in Dharbanagari. He was a disciple of Yaśobhadra Sūri, and in a way that of Vinacandra Upādhyāya of the Bṛhadgaccha. He gave *dikṣā*, *śīkṣā* and the *ācāryapadavī* to his brother-disciple Ānanda Sūri. Further he

had another brother-disciple in Candraprabhā Sūri who propounded *paurṇika mata* in *saṃvat* 1159. He was made an *ācārya* by Nemicandra Sūri who has written a commentary on *Uttarājhayaṇa* at the suggestion of this Municandra Sūri. Moreover, our *ṭippaṇikāra* is a *guru* of Ajitadeva Sūri and Vādi Deva Sūri, the celebrated author of *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṃkāra* and its commentary *Syādvādaratnākara*. He died in *saṃvat* 1178."

30.123 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, Commentary on
Haribhadra Sūri's *Anekāntajayapatākoddyotadīpikā*

H. R. Kapadia has edited this work together with Haribhadra Sūri's text in Gaekwad's Oriental Series 105. On pp. xx-xxi he describes the nature of the commentary: "It is in prose intercepted by verses most of which are quotations. Dissolution of compounds, elucidation of difficult words and that of relative pronouns, incidental mention of the source of quotations and the things indicated by *ādi* are the most prominent features of this commentary." Municandra also alludes to some *nyāyas*, identified by Kapadia.

Kapadia[172] remarks "Municandra Sūri does not deal with each and every word or phrase occurring in the commentary (of Haribhadra Sūri) but explains only those which are knotty from his angle of vision. At times he admits his ignorance by saying that the required *sampradāya* (tradition) is missing."

30.124 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, *Āvaśyakasaptati* or
Pākṣikasaptati[173]

30.125 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, *Ṭippaṇaka* or *Cūrṇi*
Viśeṣavṛtti on Śivaśarman's *Karmaprakṛti*

Edited more than once.

30.126 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, *Kālaśataka*[174]

30.127 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, Commentary on
Haribhadra Sūri's *Dharmabindu*

Published several times.

30.128 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, *Upadeśapañcāśikhā*

Presumably this is the same as *Jīvopadeśapañcāśikā* containing 51 *gāthās*, which is published in the *Pravacanasamuccaya* (Indore 1923) according to JRK p. 144.[175]

30.129 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, *Sukhasambodhanī* on
Haribhadra Sūri's *Upadeśapada*

Kapadia[176] reports that this commentary has been completely published by Pratapa Vijaya Gaṇi from Baroda in two parts in *Muktikamalajainamohanamālā* 19-20, 1923-1925 "It explains by means of narrations mostly in Pāiya, the illustrations hinted at in the text."

30.130 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, *(Lalitavistara)Pañjikā* on
Haribhadra Sūri's *Caityavandanavṛtti*[177]

30.131 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, Commentary on
Cirantanācārya's *Devendranarakendraprkaraanā*

NCC 9, p. 159 says this was corrected by Cakradevasūri at Anhilvāḍ. JRK, p. 180b says:"*Devendranarakendraprakaraṇa* by Cirantanācārya is by some ancient Ācārya whose name was unknown even to the commentator. It consists of 378 *gāthās* in Prakrit and is published in the JAS Bhavanagar (Series no. 74), 1922, together with the commentary by Municandra."

30.132 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, *Darśanasaptatikā*

Listed under this title with one manuscript in Baroda cited at JRK p. 167, together with an *Avacūri* thereon. Since Municandra is a regular commentator on Haribhadra Sūri's works, it seems likely that this work is itself a commentary on that author's *Darśana-* or *Saṃyaktva-saptati* titled *Avacūri*.

30.133 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, *Cūrṇī* on Jinavallabhasūri's *Sārdhaśatakaprakaraṇa*

Composed in *saṃvat* 1170 (= 1113 A.D.). JRK p. 435 cites locations of manuscripts.

30.134 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

Cf. JRK p. 45 for manuscript locations.

30.135 MUNICANDRA SŪRI, *Mokṣopadeśapañcāśat*

JRK p. 315 says it is published in *Prakaraṇasamuccaya*, Indore 1923.

31.136 GUṆĀKARA SŪRI (1122), *Saptakṣetrī*

NCC 6, p. 59: "composed in 1122 A.D. See *Jinaratnakośa*. p. 413."

32.137 SAKALAKĪRTI (1125), *Dīpikā* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*

JRK pp. 153-154 calls the author "successor of Padmanandin". NCC VIII, 79 says "in verse", cites Jainagranthavali, p. 89; Strassburg Dig. p. 6 says this work is "in 12 chapters on the principles of Jaina philosophy. For a summary of contents, cf. Bhand. IV p. 106 ff. The work is not a commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*, as may appear from its title". [Ed.'s comment: Perhaps the title is a misprint for *Tattvārthasāra*, below.]

32.138 SAKALAKĪRTI, *Dīpikā* on Amṛtacandra Sūri's *Tattvārthasāra*

NCC VIII, 72 refers us to a number of manuscript citations.

32.139 SAKALAKĪRTI, *Trivarṇācāra*

NCC VIII, 263 for ms. citations.

32.140 SAKALAKĪRTI, *Pradīpa or -dīpikā* on the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*

NCC 2, p. 32. Velankar, JRK p. 25, says "This seems to be an independent work containing 12 chapters", citing more manuscript locations.

32.141 SAKALAKĪRTI, *Ṭīkā* on Devasena' s *Tattvasāra*

NCC 8, p. 72 cites one manuscript location.

33.142 YAŚOBHADRA (1125), *Pratyākhyānasūtra*

JRK p. 263, says he is also the author of a *Pākṣikasūtravṛtti*, and dates him at 1125 A.D. The present work "consists of 360 *gāthās*." Manuscripts cited.

33.143 YAŚOBHADRA, *Vivaraṇa* on Jinavallabha's *Ṣaḍaśītibhāṣya*

Edited in Prakrit as (BL2015.K3.J55 1974). But the University of Chicago Library makes the author of this work a Yasobhadra of the 13th century.

34 VIJAYASIṂHA (SŪRI) (1126)

JRK pp. 37 and 390 variously describes this author as a pupil of Śāntisūri (or Śāntimuni on p. 390), pupil (and/or successor) of Nemicandra and Sarvadeva.

34.144 VIJAYASIṂHA (SŪRI) (1126), *Cūrṇi* on the *(Ṣaḍ)Āvaśyakasūtra* or *(Śrāddhapratikramaṇasūtra)*

Velankar (JRK p. 37) says "composed in *saṃvat* 1183" (=1126 A.D.) by Vijayasiṃha, pupil of Śāntisūri, pupil of Nemicandra. Also cf. JRK p. 390, where the author is said to be "pupil of Śāntimuni, successor of Nemicandra and Sarvadeva". The date of this work is given as *saṃvat* 1183, i.e., 1126 A.D.

35 VIMALAGAṆI (1127)

H. D. Velankar, JRK p. 167, dates this author at 1127 A.D., says he was "pupil of Dharmaghoṣasūri, pupil of Candraprabha. He was also the teacher of Śāntibhadrasūri and of Devabhadra (ca. 1150), for whom see below. Manuscripts are extant in several locations.

35.145 VIMALAGAṆI, *Ṭīkā* on Candraprabha Sūri's *Darśanasiddhi* or *Saṃyaktvaprakaraṇa*

JRK p. 167, says the work was composed with the help of Śāntibhadra Sūri, who was this author's pupil; cites manuscripts.

36 AJITASENA (1129)

NCC I, Rev. ed., p. 86 concerns a Jaina teacher who died in A.D. 1128; "for his self-composed epitaph, [see] IO. 7601".
]

36.146 AJITASENA, *Nyāyamaṇidīpikā* on Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha*

NCC 11, p. 235 says "ascribed to Ajitasena".[178] S. C. Ghoshal comments: "Two manuscripts of this work are preserved in Jaina Siddhanta Bhavan, Arrah. The name of the author is not found in the mss. Pandit Subayya Sastri says that in some palm leaf manuscripts. of this work the name of the writer is mentioned as Ajitasenācārya. Pandit K. Bhujavadi Sastri says that this is supported by [the] Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrita Manuscripts in the Central Provinces and Berar by R. B. Hiralal, Appendix B."

"The author has made obeisance to Akalaṅka, Anantavīrya, Māṇikyanandi and Prabhācandra in the *maṅgalācaraṇa* of his work."

37.147 HARIBHADRA , *Jñānādityaprakaraṇa*

NCC VII, p. 344, says the work is in 83 *gāthās* and give

manuscript locations. JRK pp. 149-150 says "The work contains philosophical advice...it would seem that *Naṇacītta*...is the correct title."

37.148 HARIBHADRA, *Vṛtti* on Jinabhadra's (?) *Kṣetrasamāsa*

NCC V, 159 says "by Haribhadra, written in 1129 A.D.", and cites numerous manuscripts. Velankar, JRK p. 98 repeats the date and cites many more manuscripts.

37.149 HARIBHADRA, *Vivaraṇa* on Umāsvāti's *Praśamaratiprakaraṇa*

Edited by J. S. Javeri in DLP 88.

38 MALADHĀRIN HEMACANDRA (1130)

Asim Kumar Chatterjee[179] provides a lot of information about this Hemacandra, who is to be distinguished from the Hemacandra whose works are better known to philosophers and who lived the better part of a century later. "Maladhārin Hemacandra, according to a few contemporary sources, exercised great influence on Jayasimha Siddharāja," whose reign spanned some fifty years from 1093 to 1143. We are told that, at his suggestion, Jayasiṃha restored the annual grant to Jaina temples. We further learn that the great Cālukya king set up golden knobs on the Jaina temples out of deference for Maladhārin Hemacandra and also attended the funeral procession of this great Śvetāmbara monk. Two other works (besides the *Jīvasamāsavṛtti*, written in 1106) were written in *vīrasaṃvat* 1170 (1112) and 1175 (1116), during the reign of Jayasiṃha Siddharāja."

Concerning the term "Maladhārin" see the explanation above under the introductory remarks concerning author #15 above, viz. (Maladhāriṇ)Abhayadeva Sūri.

Esther Solomon[180] tells us "Maladhārin Hemacandra was a pupil of Abhayadevasūri. The account given by Hemacandra's

pupil Śrīcandrasūri is illuminating. He was highly learned in many subjects and had about 50,000 books. His discourses in a sonorous voice were very popular and enlightened the people. Even King Jayasiṃha attended his discourses..Like his preceptor Abhayadeva, he also fasted for seven days before death came to him. King Siddharāja himself joined the funeral procession. He had three chief disciples (*gaṇadhara*)--Vijayasiṃha, Śrīcandra, Vibudhacandra--of whom Śrīcandra officially succeeded him as a *sūri*...We do not find any references to a date beyond (*saṃvat*) 1177" (=1125 A.D.).

38.150 MALADHĀRIN HEMACANDRA, *Vṛtti* on the *Anuyogadvārasūtra*[181]

Esther Solomon[182] explains: "*Anuyogadvāravṛtti* is a very lucid commentary on the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* which helps us to appreciate the very core of the Āgamas. Though there was an earlier Prakrit commentary (*cūrṇi*) and also one in Sanskrit by Haribhadra (this being mostly by way of explanation of the Prakrit commentary), neither went far in giving an easy interpretation of the original text. So Hemacandra's *vṛtti* was a welcome addition, especially in view of the simple charming style."

In 2001 there was published from Delhi in two volumes the *Illustrated Anuyogadvar Sutra*, containing an English translation of the *sutras* by Surendra Bothara, and edited by Amar Muni with Tarun Muni and Srichand Surana 'Saras". In preparing this publication the chief editor, Amar Muni, has provided helpful "elaborations" in the course of which he from time to time invokes the thought of Maladhārin Hemacandra as conveyed in the commentary now under examination. We have provided in what follows some of the sections from this work. *Sūtras* are identified by number, followed by page references (in Volumes I, II).

"The basis of all ascetic-praxis is *Āvaśyaka Sūtra*. Therefore priority has been given to this book over all other *Āgamas*.

Confirming this view Ācārya Mūladhari has stated–As this (activities mentioned in this book) is obligatory or essential activity or conduct to be performed every morning and evening by every seeker *śrāvaka* (a householder who has accepted the religious code of conduct) it is named '*Āvaśyaka*'. That is why it is discussed first of all." (17, p. I.152)

"*Sūtra* 107...(is) informing that *anupūrvi* (sequential), *ananupūrvi* (non-sequential) and *avaktavya* (inexpressible) substances are infinite. The reason for their being infinite numerically is that in every space-point they are found in infinite number."

"A question arises here–*Anupūrvin*, etc. substances are infinite, how then can they exist in the *lokākāśa* (occupied space), which is made up only of innumerable space-points? Answering this it is stated that material particles are infinitely minute and the capacity of space to provide occupancy is unlimited. For example in a house filled with the light from one lamp, every space-point has the capacity to provide occupancy to the light from numerous other lamps. In the same way it is possible for the infinite *anupūrvin*, etc. substances to exist in the ...occupied space having innumerable space-points." (107; p. I.172)

"The phenomenon of *acitmahāskandha*, the largest *anupūrvī* substance that is an aggregate (*skandha*) of infinite-times-infinite atoms occupying the whole *lokākāśa* (occupied space) for one *samaya* (the smallest unit of time) can be understood with the example of the *ātmapradeśas* (soul-space-points) enveloping the whole occupied space (*lokākāśa*) during the fourth stage of *kevalinsamudghāta* (the process through which an omniscient destroys the residual karmic particles). It is as follows–

"How the *acitmahāskandha* envelops the whole occupied space has been explained by Maladhārin Hemacandra, the commentator, giving reference to the *Prajñāpanasūtra*. The natural activity of the *acitmahāskandha* is to occupy the whole

lokākāśa. This is done by transformation for (an) indefinite period (eight *samaya*) into a huge spheroid with a transverse expanse of (an) innumerable number of *yojanas* (one *yojana* being approximately fourteen *rajjus* (a linear unit defined as the distance covered by a god flying non-stop for six months at a speed of 2,057,152 *yojanas* per second) occupying the vertical space. During the first *samaya* it is stick shaped (cylindrical), in the second it is door shaped (cubical), in the third it is churning-stick shaped, and in the fourth *samaya* it envelops the whole *lokākāśa*. After this it starts shrinking in reverse order..." (108; p. I. 277)

313 states that *pramāṇas* are of four kinds: *dravya, kṣetra, kāla* and *bhāva*. "Here the commentary (*Vṛtti*) says–'The standards and means and concepts of measuring and assessing and knowing full range of dimensions and attributes of a thing have all been included in the meaning of the term *pramāṇa*.' As long as a subject is not examined and discussed in the four contexts...it cannot become explicit...*Dravya pramāṇa* includes the standard units of measurement of physical dimensions prevalent during that period. *Kṣetra pramāṇa* includes the standards of measurement of area including *aṅgula* (breadth of (a) human finger) and *puruṣa* (length of the human body). *Kāla pramāṇa* includes the units of time including *samaya, ghāṭika, muhūrta, palyopama* and *sāgaropama*. *Bhāva pramāṇa* includes the philosophical and logical meanings of *pramāṇa*, including *pratyakṣa* (direct or evident reality) and *anumāna* (postulation)..." (E313; p. II.52)

"Seven reasons for not accepting the doctrine of others are mentioned–

(1) *Anartha* (perverse)–According to *svasamaya vaktavyatā* (explication of one's own doctrine) soul exists. According to *parasamaya vaktavyatā* (explication of the doctrine of others) it does not. As the refuter of the existence of soul is itself a soul this propagation of (the.)...explication of others is perverse.

(2) *Ahetu* (irrational)–The reason for denying the existence of soul is given as–it is invisible. In fact this it not (a) reason but (a) semblance of (a) reason. Knowledge is an attribute of (a) soul and it is perceivable. Therefore the reason given for denying the existence of soul is irrational, it is no reason.

(3) *Asadbhāva* (unreal)–As it denies the existent realities like good deeds, bad deeds and the other life (reincarnation) it is unreal.

(4) *Akriyā*–As it denies the existence of soul, by inference it also denies actions and goes against evident reality.

(5) *Unmārga* (wrong path)–It propagates mutually contradicting concepts. Sometimes it states that no being should be killed and at others formulates codes for animal sacrifice in *yajña*.

(6) *Anupadeśa* (non-teaching)–According to the doctrine that every substance is destroyed every moment, every soul gets destroyed the next moment. In such (a) fluid state who can teach whom?

(7) *Mithyā darśana*–False belief.

For these seven reasons the doctrines of absolutism are illogical. Therefore, *śabda nayas* (verbal viewpoints) do not accept *parasamaya vaktavyatā* (explication of (the) doctrine of others). When the dogmatic attitude is shattered...explication of doctrine of others gets included in...explication of one's own doctrine by incorporating the prefix '*syāt*' for relativity."(525; II.393)

38.151 MALADHĀRIN HEMACANDRA, *Pradeśavyākhyā* on Haribhadragaṇi's *Āvaśyaka(laghu)vṛtti*

Discussed in German in Leumann, *Übersicht uber die Āvaśyaka-Literatur* (Hamburg 1934), pp. 53ff., who says (p. 15) that it has 28,250 *granthas*, and dates it at 1118 A.D.[183]

38.152 MALADHĀRIN HEMACANDRA, *Vivaraṇa* or *Bṛhadvṛtti* on Jinabhadra's *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*

Edited several times. It is also known as "Gaṇadhara". It has

been partially translated twice, once by Esther A. Solomon in Ganadharavāda and again by Acharya Vijay Bhuvanabhanusuri, *The Essentials of Bhagavan Mahavir's Philosophy,* Delhi 1989.

Solomon provides a lot of information as well as a translation of an extensive section of the work. In her Introduction (pp. 18) she writes: "(The work) was completed in *vikram saṃvat* 1175" (=1118 A.D.) "as the author himself says. We are, further, told that four monks--Abhayakumāragaṇi, Dhanadevagaṇi, Jinabhadragaṇi and Vibudhacandramuni--and two nuns, Śrīmahānanda and Śrīmahattarā Vīramatī Gaṇinī, helped in the composition of this work. This commentary is the best and the most popular of all the commentaries on the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, and can be said to have eclipsed the others."

The *Gaṇadharavāda* section of Jinabhadra's *Bhāṣya* comprises the commentary on *sūtras* 1549-2024 of the *Viśeṣāśyaka.* Professor Solomon provides us with the text (pp. 267-304 of her book), a translation (pp. 1-65) and an explanation based on Maladhārin Hemacandra's commentary (pp. 76-265). Although very readable it is too long to be presented in its entirety here. What we have done below is to summarize this explanation, indicating the number of the *sūtras* the commentaries on which the summary pertains to.

I. Existence of the Self

1549-1553. Question: (Indrabhūti to Mahāvīra): Since none of the five *pramāṇas*--perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison and presumption--suffice to prove the existence of a self, the self must be the objectt of the sixth instrument, absence (*abhāva*), and thus must be itself an absence!

1554-1558. (Mahāvīra's answer): No *pramāṇas* are needed (other than direct perception), since knowledge is self-illuminating; the self is directly perceived. Otherwise how could we be aware of ourselves? Who could raise your question? Who could it be that raises the doubt?

1564-1570) (Objection:) O.K., I am directly aware of myself, but how do I know other bodies have selves?

(Answer:) Through inference from the fact that, like us, others pursue what is attractive and avoid what is unattractive. A jar does not do this. Other inferences are reviewed.

1571-1574) To doubt something assumes the existence of that something. To speak of "not-self" entails that its counter-positive, self, exists.

(Objection:) Then a donkey's horn must exist (since it is denied)!

(Answer:) That is correct. What is denied exists, in this case a relation between donkey and horn.

1581-1585. There are many selves, not just one.

1586-1588. A self is not all-pervading; it is the size of its body.

1589-1604. (Objection:) A self is just a mass of consciousness (citing a Vedic passage) in a body. When the body dies, its consciousness dies with it.

(Answer:) No. "Mass of consciousness" is used to describe a self because there are infinite modes of consciousness in every space-point of the self. True, these modes are momentary, thus it may seem that a self is transitory; but at each moment infinite new modes are born, so that consciousness itself cannot disappear. What happens is that one awareness replaces another.

(Objection:) But awareness must be material, since it arises only when a material object is present.

(Answer:) No. Even in the Upaniṣads (e.g., BrUp 4.3.6) the self is admitted to be self-illuminating.

2. *Karman*

1606-1614 (Agnibhūti to Mahāvīra) *Karman* really doesn't exist, as is shown by Vedic scriptures (e.g., BrUp 4.4.5), and it is not proved by a *pramāṇa*.

(Mahāvīra's answer) I can perceive it directly, and you can infer it, e.g., from the following (valid) argument: A cause (viz., *karman*) of pleasure and pain exists, because they are effects, as a seed is the effect of a sprout. Again, the body of a new-born child must have been preceded by another body (its karmic body), since it has sense-organs, pleasures and pains, vital organs, etc., like the body of the youth which is preceded by the child's body.

1615-1624 Animate beings' actions always have results, like e.g. farming. So giving, etc. must have a result, and that result is *karman*.

(Objection:) No, the result of farming is a good crop, not *karman*, and likewise the result of giving, etc. are fame, etc.

(Answer:) Activities that have such tangible results also have intangible results, good or bad, as well. And merit or demerit is such an intangible result. We see that the result of an action follows performance of that action whether that result is intended or not. Likewise, merit or demerit follows the performance of a good or bad act respectively whether that result is intended or not.

1625-1628 The inherence cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of material a thing like the body, etc. is itself material, and the inherence cause of an immaterial result is immaterial, i.e.., the self. The material nature of *karman* is proved by various inferences:*karman* is material, (1) because in relation to it one gains pleasure, etc., as e.g. in eating food; (2) because it is felt; (3) because while not being a self or a self's quality it increases (or decreases) through material factors, like a jar; (4) because while not being a self it becomes modified, as milk (is modified into curds).

1632-1634 *Karman* is material; it is known as the subtle body. If there were no such thing a self would never be reborn, all would already be liberated; there would be no rebirth whatsoever. And if rebirth did not require a body, then transmigration would affect everyone, even the liberated selves.

1635-1639 (Objection:) How can a karmic body be related to a self? Not by contact or inherence.

(Answer:) Why not? A pot is related by contact to the sky, and the movement of a finger is related to the finger by inherence. Likewise a self, though immaterial, can be influenced by material *karman*. However, a self is not entirely immaterial; it can be affected by *karman*, even though the latter is material. And so the stream of *karman* is beginningless, both karma and a self being (at least partially) material.

1640 (Objection:) The Vedas do not accept *karman*.

(Answer:) Oh yes, they do. E.g., the *agnihotra* sacrifice is taken there to produce an unseen (=*karman*) in a self leading it to heaven in a future life.

1641-1644 (Objection:) Various other things--God, unmanifest *prakṛti*, time or a thing's nature-- can as easily be regarded as the cause of the differences among bodies, etc.

(Answer:) Not easily. Each of them requires help, and in each case the helper is *karman*.

3.Identity or Difference of Body and Self

1645-1651 (Vāyubhūti to Mahāvīra) (Objection:) Though scripture denies it, a self, i.e., his consciousness, is not different from his body; rather, consciousness is something that arises when there is a certain combination of the four elements (earth, water, fire, air).

1652-1656 (Mahāvīra's answer:) If the elements were totally lacking in consciousness themselves it couldn't arise in any combination of them.

(Objection:) Then each of the elements must itself be partly conscious!

(Answer:) No, since consciousness is not found in the aggregate of the elements alone. If it were it would be present in a dead body, e.g., or in one or another of the elements taken singly.

(Objection:) But we perceive consciousness as present in

aggregates.

(Answer:) Just as we see green grass when earth and water combine, but still the grass is not a product of those--a material cause, i.e. a seed is still needed. Likewise in the case under discussion it is a self that needs to be postulated as the cause for consciousness. Indeed, since consciousness is not perceived in any of the elements, it cannot be present in an aggregate.

1657-1670 More arguments showing that the self is distinct from the elements or the sense-organs, etc.

1671-1675 (Objection (a Buddhist):) Since all is momentary, each self would die at every moment along with its body--so there is no point in assuming the existence of a self distinct from the body.

(Answer:) A self remembers its previous existence, so could not have died when its previous body did.

(Buddhist:) There is a stream of momentary awarenesses, even though the self is momentary.

(Answer:) O.K., then you accept a self persisting through time, only you called it a "stream". Anyway, consciousness can't be completely momentary since then memory couldn't be explained (as was said above). And how can the Buddhist know about momentariness, since according to his assumptions he can have only one awareness of one object at a time, and to know that all is momentary one would have to know all things together!

1676-1679 (Buddhist:) Even though an awareness can only last one moment and have a single content, still it can cognize the momentariness of everything through inference.

(Answer:) Since a veridical inference requires a well-known *pakṣa* (citing *Nyāyapraveśa, "tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī"*), the *pakṣa* in this case being "everything" (i.e., all awarenesses and their contents). It can't be (well-)known if one can only cognize one (present) object.

(Objection:) Though each awareness in a series is momentary and has only one thing as its content, it may impose

(a) trace(s) on the next one, so that next one can cognize the properties of the previous one, etc.

(Answer:) No it can't, not unless the two awarenesses meet, i.e., occur at the same moment, in which case there is an awareness that is not of only one object.

The difficulties in the momentariness position are shown to rapidly get out of hand!

1680-1683 The kinds of awarenesses are reviewed (immediate awareness, etc.)

(Objection:) If the self exists independently of the body, why can't we see it entering and leaving?

(Answer:) There are many reasons why we fail to see something--twenty-one of them are listed! In this case the failure is due to the self's being bodiless and so imperceptible.

1684-1685 The Vedas are cited to show that the self is distinct from the body.

4.Entities Actually Exist

1687-1689 (Vyakta to Mahāvīra) Do elements (*bhūta*, lit. "things that have come to be") exist or not? Conflicting Vedic passages cause this puzzle. One says "everything is a dream", so there are really no elements, but the other (TaittUp I.1.3) speaks of the earth and water, which are elements, existing.

1690-1696 Various arguments for emptiness are rehearsed.

1697-1708 (Mahāvīra's reply:) If there are no objects at all no one would be puzzled in the way you describe. Doubt, error, etc. all are modes of awareness concerning objects.

(Objection:) A doubt can arise even when there are no actual objects. One asleep can doubt whether the content of his dream is an elephant or a mountain.

(Answer:) Dreaming depends on waking conditions--either certain events, or at least the contents of the dream having been experienced when awake. If there were nothing at all how could we tell the difference between a dream and what is not a dream? If everything were alike (in being nothing) there

would be no kinds of dreams.

(Objection:) Differences in kinds of dreams are themselves due to error.

(Answer:) Is this error itself real or not? If it is real not everything is nonexistent, is it is unreal a valid awareness can be about real objects.

1709 (Objection:) It is impossible to prove something by itself, by another, or by both, or by anything else.

(Answer:) If nothing exists there can be no ideas of "self" or "other" or both or neither.

(Objector:) I do not accept those ideas to represent anything, but merely use them in argument since my opponent understands them.

(Answer:) Then you shouldn't say that you believe in emptiness.

1710-1715 (Objection:) My view is that nothing is absolute. E.g., we call a thing long or short relatively to other things.

(Answer:) Really relative, or only relatively relative?! On your account nothing can be really anything, including really relative. If a thing has no essential nature, then there is no self and no other.

If existence were actually relative a long thing could not exist if there were nothing that is short. But we find that not to be the case: rather, what would happen is that nothing would be called "long". This shows that various familiar qualities are self-established and that emptiness is mistaken.

1716-1723 From the commonsense point of view some things are self-established, some or established by something else, and some are established both ways. But from the highest standpoint everything is self-established, the instrumental causes it depends on are external to it. This can be seen from the fact that even when such instrumental causes exist a thing without an actual essence--a donkey's horn, e.g.--does not come into existence, since it is not self-established.

Are a jar and emptiness identical? If not, what is emptiness? All we see is a jar.

1737-1747 There is no necessity that everything have a sufficient condition (*sāmagrī*, i.e. a collection of causal conditions sufficient to produce the effect without further assistance). An atom is uncaused: there is no sufficient condition for it.

Responses to the arguments presented in verse 1696.

1751-1759 The elements, of five kinds, exist. An element is animate, sentient, the support of a body and enjoyed by a self in various ways. Earth, water, fire and air have a self; space is only a container of selves, being itself immaterial. Examples are given to prove these descriptions. E.g., trees (a form of earth) are animate, being born, exist and die, suffering wounds, eating food, etc. Water springs up from the earth, falls from the clouds. Air moves about as it wishes. Fire (like humans) grows stronger or weaker depending on food intake.

1760-1766 An indefinite number of selves must thus be admitted. But one should not worry that there will be widespread injury because of so many selves. Injury depends on intention. A man who intends to kill is a killer, but a doctor, who has to cause pain, does not injure his patient.

1767-1769 "Everything is a dream", cited by Vyakta as authority for emptiness, does not mean that. It is intended to warn aspirants for liberation of the dangers of over-attachment to worldly objects. And here "dream" does not mean what is unreal or nonexistent, but that one should not place his faith in ordinary things but rather try to become liberated. The things of the world do exist.

5. Is the Next Life Like This One?

1770-1782 (Sudharman to Mahāvīra) The Vedas make a number of conflicting statements about the nature of one's next life--that one's type of being--animal, human, etc.--and one's sex are retained, but that one can be reborn as a jackal, etc. Which

is the case?

(Mahāvīra's response:) There is no rule that an effect must resemble its cause. And since *karman* is various and is what determines the next life, it follows that kinds of rebirth are various. And the variety in *karmans* is due to one's actions.

1783-1791 (Objection:) Why should actions produce results in a world other than the one where they were performed?

(Answer:) Then what would cause rebirth in the next world? And what could determine the similarity between the two lives (in subsequent worlds)? There would be no reason for either similarity among or dissimilarity between any two lives.

(Objection:) Well, those things just happen naturally.

(Answer:) But things don't happen like that--we find that a jar requires a maker; likewise a body requires something to cause its production having a certain form.

What is this thing called "one's nature"? It can't be an entity, for we don't perceive it, like a flower in the sky. And if you say it exists even though it is not perceived, then we say that *karman* exists even though not perceived. So "*svabhāva*" can as well be another term for *karman*.

When you say "things just happen naturally", you should not suppose "naturally" to meaning "without cause", since you are assuming the next world is similar to this one, and "nature" won't guarantee that. Moreover, if everything happens "naturally" there is no assurance the world will not end in the next moment. "Naturally" cannot mean uncaused.

1792-1801 (Objection:) "Naturally" means "according to one's nature".

(Answer:) Then a thing cannot naturally remain the same (in the next life). The modes of a thing are found to be varied from moment to moment. Furthermore, does "nature" mean "according to a self's nature" or "according to one's material nature"? The former, being immaterial, cannot be the cause of a material body, any more than empty space can. And if

"nature" means "according to one's material nature" then it is the same as (our) *karman*, since we view *karman* as a qualitiy of karmic products (*pudgala*), which have spatial extension.

(Objection:) Some things change, but one's genus remains constant (e.g., the child becomes a man, but he is still a human being). This is what scripture tells us.

(Answer:) Not all scripture. There are plenty of passages which speak of change in the next life, e.g. "one who desire heaven should perform the *agnihotra*", which implies a better life in heaven. There is no necessity that one's genus should remain the same. And the passage(s) that bothered you by seeming to suggest that a man remains a man in the next life doesn't mean that literally--rather, it is meant to suggest that one can by good deeds, etc. cause it so that he can remain a man in the next life; it does not entail that he has to. Not every human is reborn a human; not every animal is reborn as an animal. It depends on one's *karman*.

6.The Possibility of Bondage and Liberation

1802-1811 (Maṇḍika to Mahāvīra) The Vedas are not clear as to whether bondage and liberation are possible for a self. Some (e.g., "The self is ubiquitous, free from qualities, unbound and non-transmigrating; it is a non-agent") deny that the self is liberated, others imply that it can be.

Furthermore, liberation requires bondage, but the bondage alleged to be caused by *karman* is impossible. A self cannot exist before its *karman* does, since then it (the self) would be without cause; but *karman* cannot exist before the self does, since the self is the doer. And they cannot be simultaneous, for both reasons!

(Objection:) The self is beginningless, so the question of its beginning does not arise.

(Answer:) Then its bondage to *karman* cannot be caused to occur, or if it is uncaused, it could occur to liberated selves as well, and then no one would care to be liberated. Empty space

is not liberated. Liberation requires bondage preceding it, but a timeless self cannot precede anything.

1812-1836 So what can those Vedic statements that puzzle Maṇḍika mean? In fact, what is beginningless is the stream of body followed by *karman* followed by (another) body, etc. It is like seed and sprout: one seed causes a sprout which lays down another seed, etc. Likewise one body causes some *karman* which causes another body, etc. These streams are beginningless.

(Objection:) A body and *karman* form a beginningless stream; but what does that have to do with a self?

(Answer:) Because neither body nor *karman* could be produced without a self

(Objection:) No one ever has seen *karman*--how do we know it exists?

(Answer:) *Karman* is proved through its results. Like a pot, a body must have a cause *par excellence* (*karaṇa*, i.e., something without which it would not occur, a necessary and sufficient condition), and this is *karman*.

(Objection:) If the union of self and *karman* is beginningless it must also be endless, so there can be no liberation.

(Answer:) This (supposed) rule (that what is beginningless is endless) is not always true. The continuity of seeds and sprouts occasionally terminates, as does the continuity of chickens and eggs, or fathers and sons.

(Objection:) But the relations between two beginningless things must be endless. And you said that a self and *karman* are beginningless.

(Answer:) There are two kinds of cases. One is exemplified by the relation between, say, a self and space, and is found in the relation between the selves of *abhavyas* (e.g., the hell-guardians) who will never be released. The other kind of case, where the relation has no beginning but has an end, is found in the case of *bhavya* (ordinary) selves, and is exemplified in the relationship, e.g., between gold and earth (which can be destroyed by heat).

(Objection:) A self's *bhavyatva* is beginningless and so cannot end.

(Answer:) No, some things that are beginningless have an end, e.g., the prior absence of a jar.

(Objection:) An absence is not a thing, and so does not count as a beginningless thing.

(Answer:) No. The prior absence of a jar is a collection of karmic products (*pudgala*), and so it counts as a thing, even though not yet in the form of a jar.

(Objection:) If *bhavya* selves can disappear (i.e., become liberated) they will eventually disappear from the universe.

(Answer:) Not so: selves are infinite in number, and so subtracting from the number doesn't reduce it, just as subtracting moments of time doesn't detract from the infinity of time.

(Objection:) If so, then even some *bhavya* selves will never achieve liberation, so what is the point of the distinction of *bhavya* from *abhavya*?

(Answer:) "*Bhavya*" means "capable of being liberated", not one who will necessarily be liberated, whereas "*abhavya*" means someone who is incapable of liberation.

1837-1850 (Objection:) Liberation cannot be eternal, because it is caused, i.e., it has a beginning.

(Answer:) The reason is equivocal (*anaikāntika*), because the *hetu*-term ("caused") is present in *vipakṣas* (e.g., the destruction or posterior absence, e.g., of a jar after it has been smashed, which is never-ending, i.e. eternal, thereafter). And again, posterior absence is a positive thing, being again an assemblage of karmic products (e.g., pot-shards).

But actually, liberation is not really caused at all (and thus the above discussion is beside the point). Liberation is the separation of a self from karmic matter, but the self itself does not change--nothing is added to or subtracted from its nature.

"Destruction" of a pot, for example, does not refer to an odd type of thing--an absence--but refers to space (*ākāśa*). So here "destruction of *karman*", that is, liberation, refers to the self existing by itself alone (*kevalin*).

(Objector:) Then liberation is non-eternal!

(Answer:) Well, in a sense (since any entity is both eternal and not eternal, for instance, in Jainism), or both a substance and modes, etc. But liberation is not absolutely non-eternal. The liberated self will not be bound again. Bondage is not merely a self and karmic matter occurring at the same time; it requires defects (*doṣa*) and activity (*yoga*).

The upward-movement of the self upon liberation is explained.

(Objection:) Since a self is not a body it cannot move, and so cannot move upwards.

(Answer:) Bodiless things, e.g., space, are non-sentient; nevertheless the self both bodiless and sentient. And motion is another of its specific qualities. And a self moves because it is doer and enjoyer, like the potter, or because its movements are directly perceived.

(Objection:) The self's efforts cause movements of his body, not its own motion.

(Answer:) But effort is not found in motionless things like space, etc., so if the self makes efforts it itself must be able to move. and anyway, why can't the self directly cause the effort that causes bodily movements?

(Objection:) *Adṛṣṭa* causes bodily movement, not the self, which is immobile.

(Answer:) Is this *adṛṣṭa* corporeal or not? If it isn't the self, which is incorporeal, might as well do the job. If it is corporeal it must be the karmic body, which can only cause bodily movement if it itself moves, which then requires something else to move it, etc. ad infinitum.

(Objection:) A karmic body has movement as its essential nature.

(Answer:) Then so can the physical body, and we can dispense with the karmic body. But the physical body is insentient, so that won't do. And if a body moves of its own nature it will go on doing so forever. But in fact a body only has certain kinds of motions, which can be explained by reference to a self and its *karman*. And as we have seen, not only the bound self but the liberated one as well are capable of motion.

(Objection:) Why should the liberated self not move beyond the home of the perfected ones (i.e.., the top of the universe).

(Answer:) Because that place is non-worldly (*aloka*) and instigators of motion (*dharmāstikāya*) cannot operate there.

1851-1863 (Objection:) Why do you suppose all this (about *aloka* and instigators of motion)?

(Answer:) Well, the world (*loka*) exists, and grammar requires that what is denoted by its negation, viz. the non-world (*aloka*) also exist. (Grammatical explanation of how the word "not" operates.) And so the instigators of motion and of non-motion, i.e., of rest, must exist, since they are needed to distinguish motion from non-motion. If all this were not so moving things would move indefinitely unobstructed and the world would not be as we find it to be.

Etymological derivation of "the place of the perfected" (*siddhasthāna*) is offered.

(Objection:) Then the perfected ones might fall down, as is possible from the top of a cliff.

(Answer:) No. The liberated self has no *karman*, and it is *karman* that causes activities such as falling, etc.

(Objection:) Then it must cause the upward movement of the liberated self.

(Answer:) No. As we said before, that upward movement is natural.

(Objection:) The place of the perfected is finite. How can an infinite number of perfected beings inhabit it?

(Answer:) Their selves are not corporeal, so there is no

problem.

7.Do Gods Exist?

(1864-1884 (Maṇḍika, now become the monk Mauryaputra, to Mahāvīra) There is Vedic authority for both the proposition that gods exist and that they don't. And anyway, we never see a god, even though gods have the freedom and the power to go wherever they wish. So how did those who wrote the scriptures know about them?

(Mahāvīra:) You can see gods--the sun, the moon, etc.

(Objection:) The sun and the moon are places, but gods are not perceived there.

(Answer:) A place must have some inhabitants, and since men, etc. do not inhabit the sun and the moon they must be inhabited by gods, if not now at least in the past or in the future.

(Objection:) The sun and the moon are uninhabitable: one is a ball of fire, the other pure water.

(Answer:) No, for they are made of stones and move in the sky, unlike other things in the sky like clouds or wind.

(Objection:) In fact, the sun and the moon were illusory creations of gods.

(Answer:) They are not illusory, since they are permanent.

(Objector:) Then why do we never see them here?

(Answer:) They do sometimes on special occasions.

The Vedic statements that posed the problem do not conflict if properly understood.

8.On Hell-Beings

1885-1904 (Akampita to Mahāvīra) There are conflicting Vedic statements about hell-beings. Do they really exist? I think not. There are statements like "No beings after death become hell-beings" (*na ha vai pretya nārakaḥ).* And unlike gods (the moon, etc.), or those who can be inferred, the objects denoted by the word "hell-being" (*nāraka*) are never directly

apprehended anywhere, nor can they be demonstrated by inference.

(Mahāvīra's reply:) But I can see them, since I am omniscient. And anyway one should not fail to pay attention to what has been perceived by others if they are reliable persons. Sense-perception is not the only kind of perception--in fact, sense-perception is called "perception" only figuratively. Supersensory awareness is the only really true perception, since it does not depend on anything but the self alone. Sense-perception is not really direct awareness, since the perceiver is not in direct contact with that object but is related to it only through the senses.

(Objection:) But still, the sense-organs themselves are in direct contact with the objects, so that constitutes "perception" in the direct sense after all.

(Answer:) No. Sense-organs are matter, insentient, like a pot. They are merely the doors through which a self's awareness grasps an object. And other than clairvoyance, telepathy and knowledge all other types of awareness are indirect.

And hell-beings, besides being vouched for by my direct awareness, are inferred as follows: Someone must experience the karmic results of very bad acts, since they are results, like the karmic results of animals and humans. Animals and human beings exist to experience those intermediate level results, so some beings must experience the results of very bad acts, and these are the hell-beings.

The complicating Vedic statements are explained. E.g., the statement quoted does not mean that no hell-beings exist, but that they are not eternal, since great sinners become hell-beings after death.

9.Is There Good and Evil?

1905-1920 (Acalabhrātā to Mahāvīra) The Veda says "there is nothing in the world except the self" (*puruṣa evedaṃ sarvam*). And there are conflicting testimonies to the effect (1)

that merit exists, but not demerit; (2) that demerit alone exists, not merit; (3) that only one thing exists, which is both meritorious and demeritorious; (4) that meritorious and demeritorious things are distinct in kind from each other; and (5) that there is no *karman*, no merit and demerit at all, only nature (*svabhāva*). Arguments for each are provided.

(Answer:) Of these five arguments only the fourth is reasonable; the others can be refuted by valid arguments. As for (5), e.g., what is this "nature"? It is not a thing, since we don't cognize such an entity, and if we are thought to do so, we can equally well cognize *karman* in the form of merit and demerit, or another name for *karman*. If "nature" means to be without a cause, then a donkey's horn can be produced as well as a jar, but it can't, because there is no cause for it to be. And if "nature" refers to being a self's property, then merit and demerit are a self's properties, namely good and bad *karman*.

1921-1938 (Objection:) *Karman* may exist, but why should we suppose it has two kinds, good and bad?

(Answer:) Because an effect must resemble its cause, and good and bad (pleasure and pain) are two kinds of effect.

(Objection:) If *karman* causes pleasure and pain and resembles its effect then it should be formless; but if pleasure and pain are formless they should not be results of *karman*, which is form-filled, i.e., material.

(Answer:) An effect doesn't resemble its cause completely, nor do they differ completely. So a cause (here, *karman*) and its effect (here, pleasure and pain) need not both be formless or form-filled. Everything in the world resembles each other in some respects and differs in others. Now the cause of pleasure is a self's merit, being its mode, and likewise the cause of pain is a self's demerit, being its mode. Since pleasure is considered good its cause is too, and so also pain is considered bad.

(Objection:) But it is food, women, etc. that are the causes of pleasure and snakes, poison, etc. of pain, so make them the causes and dispense with merit and demerit.

(Answer:) No, since the same food may please one person and cause pain to another. So *karman* must be assumed.

(Objection:) But no one can see (or otherwise sense) *karman*.

(Answer:) Nevertheless it is material, since it gives strength or weakness to a person's body. Because atoms, e.g., though unperceived, are assumed to be material *karman* may be deemed material as well, being the cause of the material body.

(Objection:) But it causes pleasure and pain, which are immaterial, so it should be immaterial too!

(Answer:) It's not that a thing is material (or immaterial) all its causes must be material (or immaterial) too. Pleasures and pains are caused by various factors: some, e.g., the self which is the material cause, are inherence-causes, others, e.g., *karman*, are non-inherence (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) causes. So one needn't suppose that *karman* has to be material just because its effects are.

Argument (1) was that only merit exists, not demerit. But if it were so, then lack of merit would occasion merely failure to find the food one desires, not the presence of large amounts of undesired food. Again, if there were no demerit one's body should be large or small depending on one's virtues alone, but then how to explain an elephant's large size in comparison with a meritorious king?!

Parallel arguments apply to argument (2) Both merit and demerit are needed to explain pleasure and pain. And (3) there is no action that is both good and bad.

(Objection:) Surely there is! Consider one who considers giving away his possessions but in a way violating what is prescribed: his mental act is both good and bad. (Other examples given.)

(Answer:) True, but activity (*yoga*) is of two kinds, physical (*dravya*) and psychical (*bhāva*). Physical activity can only be held to be both good and bad from the commonsensical viewpoint; from the ultimate viewpoint such an act must be

either good or bad. Even so, its cause, viz., the intention justifying it, must be either good or bad, not both. As for psychical activity, this kind of act cannot be both good and bad from any point of view, since it requires an ascertainment, and an ascertainment must be either one or the other, good or bad, but cannot be both. A psychical activity is a mixture of meditation (*dhyāna*) and coloring (*leśyā*). Neither can be of a mixed nature, both good and bad.

(Objection:) If *karman* is not of a mixed nature, how can deluding (*mohanīyakarman* be said to be of a mixed nature, both right and wrong, so both good and bad?

(Answer:) The mixed-ness is not from the point of view of activity, but what is meant is that his previously-bound *prakṛti* is either bad or good depending on its ascertainment. E.g., bad (*aśubha) karman* that was bound earlier to a perverted attitude can be changed into good *karman*, a right attitude, by a good ascertainment, and vice-versa. In that way mixed deluding *karman* is possible, but at the time of binding it is not possible.

1939-1949 Change of matter from one of the eight basic kinds (viz., knowledge--covering, etc.) of *karman* to another is impossible, but change from one sub-kind to another is possible except in the case of age-determining and vison-obscuring *karman*.

Only those karmic products that are fit to be themselves good or bad, and are within the space-points the self occupies, are bound to that self.

(Objection:) All space-points are crowded by karmic products, and the good or bad ones are not segregated into distinct areas. So the self can distinguish between gross and subtle among the things it binds, but not between good or bad.

(Answer:) As long as a piece of karmic matter is not bound by a self it is neither good nor bad; it becomes good or bad as soon as a self binds it through its ascertainment, transforming it into one or the other (good or bad) kind of matter, as well as perhaps transforming it into one or another size or duration.

Only some selves can e.g. transform bad karmic matter into good; others can do the reverse (good *karman* into bad), but none can do both.

10.Existence of Another World

(1949-1971) (Metārya to Mahāvīra) The following argument seems to prove that there is no possibility of being reborn into another world, whether of gods or demons.

(1) An effect is of the nature of its cause. Consciousness arises from material elements--earth, etc.--and so is of their nature. Since those elements are perishable, consciousness is also. there can be no other world.

(2) Even if consciousness is not of the nature of the elements, it arises from them, and since they are non-eternal, it is too. So there can be no other world.

(3) If there is only one self pervading all worlds and inactive (*Brahmabindūpaniṣad* quoted) it would be present in all bodies everywhere and wouldn't be able to move, so it couldn't go to another world.

(4) Heaven and hell (other worlds) are not perceptible.

(Mahāvīrya's answer:) (1-2) have been dealt with before (in Section 3 above). (3) has been answered in Section 1 above, which showed that many selves must exist and cannot be all-pervasive or inactive. And (4) was the topic of Sections 7 and 8).

(Objection:) Whether or not a self and (its) consciousness are the same, still the next world cannot be proved. For if the self is identical with consciousness, then like consciousness it would have to be non-eternal and destructible. And if the self is eternal and thus different from consciousness, then there might be another world, but the self could not know it, and could not be the doer or enjoyer. If the self were not the doer there is no other world, since there would then be other worlds even for perfected beings. And if the self is not an enjoyer, it cannot inhabit (experience) another world. Not being conscious

it would not transmigrate.

(Answer:) Everything is originated, endures, and is destroyed. This includes consciousness. (Thus the assumptions the objector makes cannot stand.)

And there is a counter-argument to those Metārya presented. It is: Consciousness cannot be completely perishable, because it is a thing, like a jar. Just as a jar is both a persisting substance and a collection if perishable modes, so likewise is consciousness--consciousness per se persists, but consciousness of this or that cease. And what persists is of such a nature that it is found to be born, persist and disappear. But an originated thing cannot be absolutely nonexistent; otherwise a donkey's horn could arise. So there must be rebirth into another world.

11.Liberation

(1972-2001) (Prabhāsa to Mahāvīra) The Vedas are inconsistent about liberation. Some passages suggest that one should perform such a sacrifice as the *agnihotra* as long as he lives. Other passages appear to speak of liberation, e.g., the passage about the higher and lower Brahmins. Furthermore, what is liberation? Is it like the extinction (*nirvāṇa*) of a lamp, or is it a state free from pain (or frustration, *duḥkha*), as the Jainas maintain? And is not the connection between a self and its *karman* beginningless, and so endless?

(Mahāvīra's answer:) The last question was answered in section 6 above. And since the self is not in its essential nature *karman*, there is not problem about their connection ending. And (as we have seen) the supposed rule that what is caused must end has exceptions. And anyway, liberation is not caused, as we have also seen.

That the self is eternal follows from the argument that the self is incorporeal like space (*ākāśa*).

(Objection:) Then the self must be all-pervading like space.

(Answer:) No, since we do not find the qualities of self outside the body.

(Objection:) Then a self, being a substance and incorporeal, cannot be bound or liberated, any more than space can.

(Answer:) The self's bondage by merit and demerit is due to contact, and since contact can be destroyed, the self's bondage can too.

Others of the arguments in Chapter Six are rehearsed.

As for the similarity to a lamp, when a lamp is said to be extinguished (*nirvāṇa*) it is modified but does not completely perish, likewise a self when it attains liberation (*parinirvāṇa*) attains a state of unobstructed perfect happiness that is free from misery. And notice that this state is not merely the absence of frustration/pain but it is a positive experience of the bliss which is natural to a self.

(Objection:) A liberated self has no sense-organs so it must not have awareness, like space.

(Answer:) Then it must be that the liberated self is not a self at all, which goes against good sense.

(Objection:) It follows from your position, so its being nonsense is your problem!

(Answer:) Actually, the liberated self is not non-self nor is it without awareness, since its essential nature is to be a self and to have awareness. A thing cannot lack its essential nature. And lack of sense-organs does not preclude possession of awareness.

(Objection:) How can something without sense-organs have awareness?

(Answer:) The sense-organs are not aware; they are merely the doors through which the self cognizes. It is the self that is intrinsically conscious, and so remains conscious even in the absence of sense-organs. And that one's self is conscious is something unquestionably known directly to each of us. Indeed, without the limitations born of sense-organs, passions, etc. every self is omniscient.

(2002-2024) (Objection:) Well, a liberated self may be a cognizer, but how do we know he is happy? It is merit that

brings happiness, and you say it is the body, not the self, which is the locus of a happy cognition.

(Answer:) No. Both pleasures and pains are the result of *karman*. Indeed, they are illusory. Really there is no pleasure in the world, only temporary relief from excessive pain. The only true pleasure is the bliss of the liberated self. Quotations from various works are cited in support of this.

As for the apparently inconsistent Vedic statements that you cite, your worries are the result of misinterpreting those statements. (The explanations require an understanding of Sanskrit grammar and we don't attempt to summarize them here.)

38.153 MALADHĀRIN HEMACANDRA, *Upadeśa(ratna)mālā* or *Puṣpamālā(prakaraṇa)/Vṛtti* or *Vivaraṇa*

Edited Ahmedabad 1911, 1987, 2003. NCC 12, pp. 161-162, says "in 505 Pkt. *gāthās*". See JRK p. 254, which says that the commentary was written in 1118. Kapadia 18, pp. 415-416 says the work " gives us advice of leading life to the best of our intent".

38.154 MALADHĀRIN HEMACANDRA, *Vṛtti* on a *Jīvasamāsavivaraṇa*[184]

Solomon[185] says: "written in his own hand in *saṃvat* 1164" (=1107). On p. 17 she adds: "*Jīvasamāsavivaraṇa* is a commentary on *Jīvasamāsa* by some early *ācārya*. In this work the fourteen *guṇasthānas* (stages of spiritual development) are discussed, and Hemacandra in his commentary besides clarifying a number of subtle points has given a thorough treatment of the *jīva*." Velankar, JRK p. 143, calls this "*Bṛhadvṛtti*"; provides manuscript citations. He says the *Jīvasamāsa* has 267 *gāthās*.

38.155 MALADHĀRIN HEMACANDRA, *Pradeśavyākhyā* on Haribhadra's *Āvaśyakasūtra-Śiṣyahitā*[186]

Solomon (op. cit., p. 16) "It is a commentary on parts of Haribhadra's *Laghuvṛtti* on *Āvaśyakasūtra*...(T)he author first gives the meaning of hard words and then the substance of the relevant passage."

38.156 MALADHĀRIN HEMACANDRA, *Vinayahitā* on Śivaśarman's *Bandhaśataka*

Solomon (op. cit., p. 16):"*Bandhaśataka Vinayahitā* is a commentary on a century of stanzas--really they are 106--called *Bandhaśataka*, dealing with *karman* in its details composed by Śivaśarman who himself says that the work is based on the *Dṛṣṭivāda*. Hemacandra's commentary is very lucid and easy and shows a thorough grasp of the subject."[187]

38.157 MALADHĀRIN HEMACANDRA, *Bhavabhāvanāsūtra* with *Vivaraṇa* thereon

Solomon, op. cit., p. 17: "*Bhavabhāvanāsūtra* in 531 Prakrit *gāthās* deals predominantly with *bhavabhāvanā* (contemplation on metempsychosis) of the twelve *bhāvanās*, though Hemacandra seizes the opportunity of referring briefly to the other *bhāvanās* also. *Bhavabhāvanāvivaraṇa* is a lengthy commentary in Sanskrit on the above work by the author himself. It too like *Upadeśamālāvivaraṇa* is full of tales, but the author has very wisely given tales other than those related in the *Upadeśamālāvivaraṇa*. The two together provide a very good collection of tales, especially of those pertaining to the code of conduct in Jainism, though not without interest to others. This commentary was composed in *vikram saṃvat* 1180" (=1123)..."

H. D. Velankar (in Velankar 1930) says "The author composed his *Bhavabhāvanā* and its *Vṛtti* in *saṃvat* 1170...see Peterson, Reports, III. p. 156.""

38.158 MALADHĀRIN HEMACANDRA, *Ṭippaṇa* on Haribhadra's *Nandīsūtra-Ṭīkā*

Solomon, *Gaṇadhara* p. 17: "No copy of the *Nandīṭippaṇa* has been found...dealing with five kinds of knowledge. Hemacandra himself has referred to this work as one written by him...his last work."

38.159 MALADHĀRIN HEMACANDRA, *Bhāṣyavṛtti* on the *Sāmayikādhyayana* section of the *Āvaśyakasūtra*

There is a Gujarati translation published by the Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay 1927. Cf. JRK p. 431.

39 SIDDHA SŪRI (1136)

NCC 5, p. 158 says this author was a "pupil of Devaguptasūri of the Upakeśa *gaccha*." If this is so, he wrote the work below at the end of a very long life!

39.160 SIDDHA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Jinabhadra's *Kṣetrasamāsa*

NCC V, 159 cites manuscripts in various places, some containing the opening and/or closing verses. Velankar, JRK p. 98 says it was composed in 1135.

40.161 KULABHADRA (1139), *(Grantha)Sārasamuccaya*

Cf. NCC 4, p. 437 for the date. NCC 44, p. 237 says "in 328 verses.[188]

41 RĀMADEVA GAṆI (1140)

Rāmadeva Gaṇi was a pupil of Jinavallabha Sūri of the Kharataragaccha.

41.162 RĀMADEVA GAṆI, *Bhāṣya* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Sūkṣmārthavicārasāraprakaraṇa*.

Edited at least twice, in BL2013.K3.J56 as well by Oubdavara in 1974 (BL2015.K3).

41.163 RĀMADEVA GAṆI, *Ṭippaṇī* on Candarṣi Mahāttara's *Saptaṭīkā*

Edited by Virasekhara Vijaya. Pindivara, Rajasthan 1974. JRK p. 414 says it consists of about 547 *gāthās*. The author says it is based on an old *Cūrṇī*.

41.164 RĀMADEVA GAṆI, *Vṛtti* on Jinavallabha Suri's *Ṣaḍaśītibhāṣya*

NCC 2, p. 16 cites manuscript locations. Edited (BL2015.K3.J55).

42.165 BĀLACANDRA (1142), *Ṭīkā* (in Kanarese) on Nemicandra's *Dravyasaṃgraha*

JRK p. 182 gives the date of composition of this work as "*Śaka* 1195" (i.e., 1142 A.D.), lists the locations of a few manuscripts.

43 VĀDIDEVA SŪRI (1143)

NCC 9, p. 125, makes this author the famous debater Deva Sūri who defeated Kumudacandra, the great Digambara dialectician of Karṇāṭa country, in *vīra saṃvat* 1181 (i.e., 1124 A.D.) in Paṭṭana in the court of King Jayasiṃha Siddharāja. Dayanand Bhargava gives his dates as 1086-1159 A.D.[189] (On the other hand, OCLC gives 1143 as the date of his birth.)

S. C. Vidyabhusana[190] provides more details: He was "called Vādipravara or the foremost of disputants, belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was a pupil of Municandra Sūri...He totally vanquished the Digambara Kumudacandrārya in a dispute over the salvation of women (at the court of Jayasiṃhadeva at Anahillapurapaṭṭana in N. Guzerat) and thereby

practically stopped the appearance of the Digambaras into that town...."

"In *saṃvat* 1204 or 1147 A.D. Deva Sūri founded a *caitya*, raised a *bimba* at Phalavardhigrāma, and established an image of Neminātha at Arāsana. He was born in *saṃvat* 1143 or 1086 A.D., attained the rank of Sūri in 1174 *saṃvat* or1117 Ā.D., and ascended to heaven in *saṃvat* 1226 or 1169 A.D."

Peterson IV, pp. lv-lvi, gives more: "Mentioned as pupil of Municandrasūri and guru of the Ratnaprabhāsūri who wrote an *Upadeśamālāṭīkā* in *saṃvat* 1238. Reference is made to his victory over the Digambaras in the matter of the salvation of women at the court of king Jayasimha...where Devasūri "*vādavidyāvan*" is declared to be greater than the *guru* of the gods (Devasūri, i.e., Bṛhaspati), on the ground that the latter has not yet left school (*lekhaśāla*='the writing school' as 'the hall of the immortals')....Mentioned as the *guru* of Ājitasūri...(and) as one of the predecessors of Amaraprabhā... In *saṃvat* 1204 Devasūri founded a *caitya* and raised a *bimba* at Phalavarddhigrāma (Phalodi), and made a Nemināthapratiṣṭhā at Ārāsaṇa..."

43.166 VĀDIDEVA SŪRI, *Pramāṇanayatattvālokalaṃkāra*

"ET" refers to the edition and translation by Hari Satya Bhattacharya (Bombay 1967). The work has been edited many times. The summary provided here is by the General Editor (Potter). Bhattacharya, in ET, provides copious explanations in English of each passage. S. C. Vidyabhusana provides a summary at HIL pp. 200-205.

CHAPTER ONE

I.1 (ET5) In order to determine the nature (meaning) of *pramāṇa* and of *naya*, this (work) is undertaken.

I.2 (ET13) A *pramāṇa* is [correct] awareness concerning self and (what is) other (than self).

I.3 (ET22) A *pramāṇa* is capable of helping us acquire actual entities (*vastu*) which are worthwhile (*abhimata*) and making us get rid of objects which are not worthwhile. So it constitutes knowledge.

I.4 (ET23) Nonconscious things such as proximity (to senses or objects) cannot be (counted as) *pramāṇas*, since like any other object they are not conducive to knowledge about the self and (what is) not (the self).

I.5 (ET24) (Proximity) is not the instrument (*karaṇa*) for knowing the self, since it is nonconscious like a pillar; nor is it capable of determining (*niścaya*) a thing as being something incapable, like a pot, of ascertaining the self.

I.6 (ET28) Knowledge is essentially definite (*vyavasāya*), since it is opposed to awareness involving superimposition (*samāropa*), or because it is an instrument of knowing.

I.7 (ET37) Awareness involving superimposition consists in ascertaining (*adhyavasāya*) something (as being) that which it is not.

I.8 (ET37) It (viz., awareness involving superimposition) is of three kinds: error (*viparyaya*), doubt and indecision (*anadhyavasāya*).

I.9 (ET38) Error is taking one aspect (*koṭi*) (as the thing), (an aspect) which is different (from the other aspects of that thing).

I.10 (ET38) For example, taking a shell to be a (piece of) silver.

I.11 (ET47) Doubt consists in an awareness of the many aspects that are undetermined due to (our) not having valid awareness of what establishes or sublates them.

I.12 (ET48) For example, "is it a post or a man?"

I.13 (ET48) Indefinite awareness consists merely in thinking "what is it?"

I.14 (ET48) For example, the awareness of the grass one is walking on.

I.15 (ET49) (What is) other (than self) is an object (*artha*)

and is different from awareness.

I.16 (ET65) Definite awareness of oneself is its illumination as if (the self were) facing oneself, just as one's awareness of an external object facing one. I cognize the elephant (in the same way) as I do my self.

I.17 (ET65) Who, viewing an external object as a supporting object of knowledge, will not also view that knowledge too is knowable, just like a light (is illuminated and itself constitutes illumination)?

I.18 (ET73) The validity (*prāmāṇya*) of an awareness consists in its non-deviation (*avyabhicārita*) from the (validly-known) object (*prameya*).

I.19 (ET73-74) Invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) is what is other than that.

I.20 (ET74) Both (validity and invalidity) are due to another in respect to their origination (*utpatti*), while with respect to the awareness of them (*jñapti*) the one (viz., validity) is due to itself and the other (invalidity) due to another.

CHAPTER TWO

II.1 (ET89) That (viz., awareness) is of two kinds (*pratyaksa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*).

II.2 (ET97) The direct (kind) is vivid (*spaṣṭa*).

II.3 (ET97-98) Vividness consists in the illumination of a particular thing in more detail than by inference.

II.4 (ET98) It (viz., direct awareness) is of two forms: practical and ultimate (*pāramārthika*).

II.5 (ET98-99) The first (i.e., practical awareness) is (itself) of two kinds, sensory and non-sensory.

II.6 (ET107) Each one (of those two, sensory and non-sensory (awareness), has four kinds: indistinct (*avagraha*), directed (*īhā*), determinative (*avāya*) and retentive (*dhāraṇā*).

II.7 (ET108) Indistinct awareness is the grasping of a particular actual entity in its lower general aspect, that being preceded by the sight (*darśana*) of the field (*gocara*) (of the object) in its aspect of merely existing, which (sight) immediately follows the proper placement of the two things, viz., the object and the one who is aware of it.

II.8 (ET109) Directed awareness is expectancy concerning the details of an object of indistinct awareness.

II.9 (ET109) Determinative awareness involves determining those details.

II.10 (ET109-110) Concentrated awareness is the steadiest retention (*avasthāsthāpana*) of that.

II.11 (ET110) Directed awareness is different from doubt, which precedes it.

II.12 (ET110-111) Though those (four) are somewhat alike, yet they are different in their particular transformations (*pariṇāma*).

II.13 (ET111) They are seen to be different in nature since they occur at different times, and since each shows itself in the mode of actual things which are earlier and later, and since they occur in an order, they must be deemed different.

II.14 (ET112) They have such an order because they are perceived so and because their origination is due to the gradual abatement and destruction of their *karman*.

II.15 (ET113) Otherwise there would be the absurd result (*prasaṅga*) that no objects would ever be known!

II.16 (ET113) For what is not seen (*adṛṣṭa*) could not be indistinctly grasped, what is not indistinctly grasped cannot be doubted, what is not doubted is not directed, what is not directed cannot be determined, and what is not determined is not concentrated.

II.17 (ET114) Sometimes this order (of the four) is not noticed because their order is not evident, because of their occurring at such a close time to each other, just as one does not notice the order in which each of the hundred petals of a lotus are pierced.

II.18 (ET114) The ultimate (form of clearness), on the other hand, is dependent for its origination on the self alone.

II.19 (ET115) It (i.e., clearness) is either partial (*vikala*) or complete (*sakala*).

II.20 (ET115) The partial (ultimate form of clearness) is of two kinds, extrasensory awareness and telepathy..

II.21 (ET115) Extrasensory awareness is an awareness which arises when its particular kind of obstruction subsides. It can be either natural (*bhava*) or (acquired through) a meritorious quality (*guṇa*). Its contents are things having a form (*rūpadravya*).

II.22 (ET133-134) Telepathy arises from the subsidence of its particular covering through control (*saṃyama*) and purity, and its supporting object is the mental substance and its modes.

II.23 (ET134-135) The complete (ultimate form of clearness) is complete knowledge involving direct awareness of all substances and their modes. It arises when, due to a particular set of jointly-sufficient conditions, all coverings are removed.

II.24 (ET145) The *arahant* has that (ultimate clearness), as he is without faults.

II.25 (ET146) He is without faults, since his words are not contradicted by any *pramāṇa*.

II.26 (ET146) Since the account he prefers (*iṣṭa*) is not sublated by any *pramāṇa*, his words are not contradictory.

II.27 (ET154) His omniscience is not proved by his not eating food, for eating and omniscience are not opposed to each other.

CHAPTER THREE

III.1 (ET165) The indirect (kind of *pramāṇa*) is (that which is) not clear.

III.2 (ET165) There are five kinds of (indirect *pramāṇas*): remembering (*smaraṇa*), recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), *tarka*, inference (*anumāna*) and scriptural knowledge (*āgama*).

III.3 (ET165-166) Remembering is the self-awareness, due to the awakening of a trace, of a form (*ākāra*) previously

cognized through such a sentence as "(He was) loaded with ornaments involving glittering pieces of diamonds".

III.4 (ET166-167) E.g., (remembering) a Tīrthaṃkara.

III.5 (ET172) Recognition is produced from experiencing (*anubhava*) and memory (*smṛti*) and consists of the joint awareness of a thing as having properties similar to and characteristic of its universal nature.

III.6 (ET173) E.g., "that cow has that universal property (of cowness)", "a *gavaya* is like a cow", "this is (that) Jinadatta", etc.

III.7 (ET181) Reasoning (*tarka*, *ūhā*) involves the awareness of the aspects (*ākāra*) of a thing--since it has such a property it must be that kind of thing--arising from one's knowledge of facts about it both observed and not observed (by oneself) and having as its content a relation between a thing to be proved (*sādhya*) and a proving (property) (*hetu*) that is constant through all the three times (past, present and future).

III.8 (ET186) E.g., "whatever is smoke, all that is fire; if that (fire) is not there, it (smoke) will not be there."

III.9 (ET187) Inference is of two kinds: for oneself and for another.

III.10 (ET192) Of these, inference for oneself consists in the awareness of the *sādhya* as being caused by the awareness of the *hetu* together with memory of its relation (to the *sādhya*).

III.11 (ET192) A *hetu* has as its unique mark its being ascertained as what does not occur otherwise (than with the *sādhya*).

III.12 (ET193) (That mark is) not the threefold (mark of the Buddhists, etc.).

III.13 (ET195-196) since even what has that (threefold) mark may constitute a fallacy.

III.14 (ET203) A thing to be proved (*sādhya*) is not previously ascertained, not opposed to perception, and is desired (by a debater) to be proved.

III.15 (ET203) "Not previously ascertained" are such things as are doubted, wrongly understood or uncertain.

III.16 (ET203-204) "Not opposed to perception" excludes something opposed to direct experience (from constituting a *sādhya*).

III.17 (ET204) "Desired (by a debater to be proved)" excludes what is not desired to be proved.

III.18 (ET204) That property is a thing to be proved through its involvement with the grasping of pervasion.

III.19 (ET205) For it is not the case that wherever there is smoke there is a mountain, although there is fire.

III.20 (ET205) The possessor of (the *sādhya-*) property (*dharmin*), known as the *pakṣa*, is the thing being inferred to have that property.

III.21 (ET206) That property-possessor should be (already) known either through conceptual construction or through *pramāṇas* or through both.

III.22 (ET206) E.g., the (existence of an) omniscient being in the inference that an omniscient being knows the existence of all actual entities, the (other side of the) hill in the inference that the hill is on fire, (unheard sounds in the inference that) sounds are evolutes (all three of which involve conceptual constructions, i.e., the postulation of entities not directly experienced).

III.23 (ET208) An inference for others, i.e., for the sake of others, involves the statement of a thesis and a reason.

III.24 (ET209) It is necessary to state explicitly that the property being inferred is present in the subject (*pakṣa*), just as it is necessary to state explicitly the relation of the *hetu* to the *sādhya*.

III.25 (ET210) One who says that the mark (of a valid inference) must be shown to be of three sorts (i.e., a Buddhist) must surely also admit the necessity of explicitly stating (that) the *pakṣa* (satisfies one of those three conditions).

III.26 (ET211) A statement referring to objects one perceives is called "perception for others" since it causes perception by others (of what he has perceived).

III.27 (ET212) E.g., "Look, here is the image of Jina having various jewels about his person.".

III.28 (ET213) For convincing others only the statement(s) of the thesis (*pakṣa)* and the reason (*hetu)* are necessary, not the statement of members (of an inference), examples, etc.

III.29-30 (ET214) There are two ways of indicating the reason, (1) by showing that the *hetu* is present only when the *sādhya* is present, (2) by showing that the *hetu* is absent whenever the *sādhya* is absent.

III.31 (ET215) An example of (1) is "that kitchen has fire in it, since only if there is fire there can smoke be perceived there"; of (2), "without fire there, smoke would not be perceived there".

III.32 (ET215) The use of only one (of (1) or (2)) is sufficient; the use of any other is unnecessary.

III.33 (ET216) For convincing others the provision of examples, etc. is not necessary, since that is accomplished through (providing) the thesis and the reason.

III.34 (ET216) Nor is it (the provision of an example) required to demonstrate the nonoccurrence otherwise of the *hetu* (in the absence of the *sādhya*), since that is accomplished through *tarka*, which was explained above.

III.35 (ET217) And since an example is necessarily particular in nature it does not prove general pervasion. So, since another example would be required (to prove the example in question), the fallacy of infinite regress would be hard to avoid.

III.36 (ET218) Nor does it (the example) function to remind us of (the) invariable concomitance (between *hetu* and *sādhya*), for one is reminded of it as soon as the thesis and the reason are indicated.

III.37 (ET218-219) And since because of its (involving or not involving) internal pervasion (*antarvyāpti*) the *hetu* is

capable or incapable of indicating the *sādhya*, the appeal to external pervasion (*bahirvyāpti*) is useless.

III.38 (ET219) There is internal pervasion when the reason (*sādhana*) is pervaded by the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) in just the object which has been made the subject (*pakṣīkṛta*). External pervasion occurs in cases different (from that).

III.39 (ET220) For example, "an actual existent object has many aspects, because it is cognized as such", or "that place is fire-possessing, because it is smoke-possessing; whatever is so (smoke-possessing) is so (fire-possessing), like a kitchen."

III.40 (ET220) Likewise, in convincing others the application and conclusion are unnecessary, for their functions are accomplished through (specifying) the thesis and the reason.

III.41 (ET221) For convincing others, showing the reason is essential; without that, that (conviction of others) is not possible even though examples, etc. are provided.

III.42 (ET221-222) To convince the dull-minded, however, provision of example and specification of the application and conclusion, etc. may be used.

III.43. (ET223) An example is a place where the (invariable) connection can be ascertained.

III.44 (ET223) There are two sorts of example, positive (*sādharmya*) and negative (*vaidharmya*).

III.45-46 (ET223-224) When, the prover being present, the (thing to be) proved is found to exist necessarily, that is a positive example. A case of this is:"Wherever there is smoke there is fire, e.g., in a kitchen".

III.47-48 (ET224) When, the (thing to be) proved being absent, the prover is found to be necessarily absent, that is a negative example. A case of this is: "Where there is no fire there can be no smoke, e.g., in a pond".

III.49 (ET224-225) The application is showing that the *hetu* is present in the possessor of the property to be proved.

III.50 (ET225) For example, that there is smoke in that

place.

III.51-52 (ET225) The (argument's) conclusion (predicates) that (property to be proved) as (having been) proved, for example, "There is fire here".

III.53 (ET225) These five--stating the thesis, etc.--are also technically called (*saṃjñāyate*) "members" (*avayava*).

III.54 (ET226) The reason, whose definition has been given above, is of two sorts, positively cognized (*upalabdhya*) and negatively cognized (*anupalabdhya*).

III.55 (ET226) Both the positively and the negatively cognized provide an affirmation (of some aspect) and a denial of some aspect.

III.56 (ET226) The affirmation is (of) an aspect (of a thing) deemed existent

IIII57 (ET227) The denial (*pratiṣedha*) is (of) an aspect (of a thing) deemed nonexistent.

III.58 (ET227) The latter is of four kinds of absences: prior (*prāg*), posterior (*pradhvaṃsa*), mutual (*itaretara*) and absolute (*atyanta*).

III.59 (ET228) A thing which arises only when something subsides (*nivṛtti*) is (that thing's) prior absence.

III.60 (ET229) For example, a lump of clay is the prior absence of the pot which arises when the lump of clay ceases to exist.

III.61 (ET229) When a thing that has arisen as an effect necessarily comes to an end, that is (its) posterior absence.

III.62 (ET230) For example, the potsherds constitute the posterior absence of the pot, which has necessarily been destroyed when the potsherds arise.

III.63 (ET230) Mutual absence is the exclusion of being of one essential nature for a thing having a different essential nature.

III.64 (ET230-231) For example, a pot has a different essential nature from a stump.

III.65 (ET231) The absolute absence (of a thing) is the

absence in all the three times of any change in, i.e., any manifestation of (its) identity in another thing..

III.66 (ET231) As, for example, what is conscious (is absolutely absent) from what is nonconscious.

III.67 (ET232) There are two kinds of positively cognized reasons, non-contradictory and contradictory.

III.68 (ET232) Of these, the non-contradictory positively cognized reason is of six varieties:

III.69 (ET232-233) (1) pervaded, (2) effect, (3) cause, (4) antecedent, (5) subsequent, (6) concomitant.

III.70 (ET233-234) If it is admitted that an inference about a thing, e.g., a mango in the dark, having color/form (*rūpa*), etc. on the basis of its having a fruity taste, then (even a Buddhist) should admit a (3) cause can be a reason when its (causal) power is unimpaired and the other conditions are present.

III.71 (ET236) The (4) antecedent and (5) subsequent reasons cannot be reduced to identity and causality, since those (identity and causality) are not found to relate things which are separated temporally and/or spatially.

III.72 (ET237-238) One's being awake in the past is not the cause of one's being conscious now, and that one will die in the future is not the cause of one's seeing omens now, since these things are unrelated.

III.73 (ET238) One thing is said to be the cause of another when the latter depends on the former's operation as, e.g., in the case of a jar's dependence on the potter.

III.74 (ET239) To predicate (causal) regularity between two things separated from each other is wrong, since that would constitute over-extension (*atipraśakti*),

III.75 (ET240) and because it would be impossible to deny the possibility (of causal regularity) between (any) two things which are discrete.

III.76 (ET242) Two things that are concomitant cannot have the same essential nature, as they would lose their

essential natures, and since they arise simultaneously, neither can arise from the other. So the concomitant (positively cognized, non-contradictory) reason cannot be reduced the other types (listed in III.69).

III.77 (ET243) "Sound evolves, since it is preceded by effort: whatever is preceded by effort is a product, e.g., a stump. On the other hand, "whatever is not preceded by effort does not evolve, as, e.g., a barren woman's son. Now, sound is preceded by effort, so it evolves." (Here,) the non-contradictory positively-cognized reason is pervaded by the *sādhya*, and by the positive and negative examples.

III.78 (ET244-245) "There is fire in this grove (of trees) on a mountain, since smoke is seen (here)." Here the *sādhya* is (2) the effect.

III.79 (ET245) "There will be rain, since clouds are seen." Here the *sādhya* is (3) a cause.

III.80 (ET245-246) "(The constellation) *tiṣyatāraka* will rise in a short time (*muhūrta*), since (the constellation) *punarvasu* is seen to have (just) arisen". Here the *sādhya* is (4) an antecedent (positively-cognized, non-contradictory) reason.

III.81 (ET246) "(The constellation) arose a short time before (now), since *uttaraphālagunī* is (now) being seen to rise." This is a case of (5) subsequent (positively-cognized, non-contradictory) reason.

III.82 (ET246) An example of the concomitant (positively-cognized, non-contradictory) reason: "A particular kind of shape is to be found in a mango, since a particular kind of juice is what I taste".

III.83 (ET247) However, there are seven kinds of positively-cognized contradictory reason:

III.84 (ET247-248) The first is (1) that which is essentially contradictory,

III.85 (ET248) for example, "A thing cannot have just one aspect, for we find many aspects (in a thing)".

III.86 (ET249) The other six are:

III.87 (ET250) (2) A reason that is positively cognized as pervaded by what is incompatible (with the *sādhya*), e.g., "That man has not determined the truth, since he has doubt (regarding it)."

III.88 (ET250) (3) A reason that is the effect of what is pervaded by what is incompatible (with the *sādhya*), e.g., "This man's anger has not abated, for he has an angry face."

III.89 (ET251) (4) A reason that is the cause of what is pervaded by what is incompatible (with the *sādhya*), e.g., "This man's words are not false, for his awareness is not conditioned by attachment and hatred."

III.90 (ET252) (5) A reason that is the antecedent of what is pervaded by what is incompatible (with the *sādhya*), e.g., "(The star) *puṣyāntara* will not rise soon, since (the star) *rohiṇī* is seen to have just arisen."

III.91 (ET252) (6) A reason that is subsequent to what is pervaded by what is incompatible (with the *sādhya*), e.g., "(The star) *mṛgaśiras* did not arise recently, since (the star) *pūrvaphālagunī* is rising (now)."

III.92 (ET253) (7) A reason that is concomitant with what is pervaded by what is incompatible (with the *sādhya*), e.g., "This man has no false awarenesses, since he has right vision."

III.93 (ET256) A negatively-cognized reason is also of two kinds, contradictory (to what is accepted) and non-contradictory (to what is accepted).

III.94 (ET256) A negatively-cognized, non-contradictory reason that leads to a negative conclusion is of seven kinds:

III.95 (ET252-253) (1) essentially identical (with what is accepted), (2) a pervader (of what is accepted), (3) an effect (of what is accepted), (4) a cause (of what is accepted), (5) an antecedent (of what is accepted), (6) subsequent (to what is accepted) and (7) concomitant (with what is accepted).

III.96 (ET257) An example of (1) is: "There is no pot here, for it is known to not be cognized (here)."

III.97 (ET258) An example of (2) is: "There is no jackfruit tree here, because there is no tree here".

III.98 (ET258-259) An example of (3) is: "There is no non-impotent seed here, for no sprouts are found."

III.99 (ET259) An example of (4) is: "This person is not at peace, etc., for he has not faith in those things that constitute the (Jaina) categories."

III.100 (ET260) An example of (5) is: "(The constellation) *svāti* will not shortly rise, since *citra* has not been seen to rise."

III.101 (ET260) An example of (6) is: "*Pūrvabhādrapada* did not recently arise, since *uttarabhādrapada* was not seen to arise."

III.102 (ET260) An example of (7) is: "This man does not have right awareness, since he does not have right vision."

III.103 (ET262) A negatively-cognized, contradictory (to what is accepted) reason and leading to an affirmative conclusion, is of five kinds,

III.104 (ET262) viz., that which is contradictory to (1) the effect, (2) the cause, (3) the nature, (4) the pervader or (5) what is concomitant with what is accepted.

III.105 (ET262-263) An example of (1) is: "This person is sick, since the signs of good health are not found in him".

III.106 (ET263) An example of (2) is: "This animal is in pain, for it is not in contact with what it desires".

III.107 (ET263-264) An example of (3) is: "Every thing has many aspects, since the having of only one aspect is not found (anywhere)."

III.108 (ET264) An example of (4) is: "This place is shady, for heat is not felt (here)."

III.109 (ET265) An example of (5) is: "This man's cognitions are false, since he lacks right vision."

CHAPTER FOUR

IV.1 (ET266) Scriptural knowledge is the knowledge of things that arises from the utterances of worthy persons (*āpta*).

IV.2 (ET266) Metaphorically, the words of a worthy person

are called ("worthy") also.

IV.3 (ET271) For example, "in this locale there is a diamond-mine", "there are (such things as) diamond valleys".

IV.4 (ET271) A worthy person is one who knows a thing as it is and speaks of it in accordance with his knowledge.

IV.5 (ET272) What he says is non-deviant (*avisaṃvādin*) (from the truth).

IV.6 (ET273) He is either (an) ordinary (person) or otherworldly.

IV.7 (ET273) Janaka, etc. are ordinary persons, while *tīrthaṅkaras*, etc. are otherworldly.

IV.8 (ET285) Speaking consists of (uttering) phonemes (*varṇa*), words (*pada*) and sentences (*vākya*).

IV.9 (ET286) Phonemes spoken by humans constitute the vocable *a* (*akāra*), etc.

IV.10 (ET302) A word is a combination of phonemes related to one another and which are unrelated (to the phonemes of another word); (a combination of) words constitutes a sentence.

IV.11 (ET302) Linguistic elements are connected to the thoughts of the objects they mean both naturally (*svābhāvika*) and conventionally (*sāmarthya*).

IV.12 (ET330) The natural function of language is to illuminate objects, like a lamp. But whether the revelation is correct or not depends on the merits or faults of its speakers).

IV.13 (ET332) In every case a sound expressing its object follows the sevenfold predication through affirmation and negation.

IV.14 (ET333) Sevenfold predication involves using seven sort of expressions in regard to indicating a single real object consistently in one or another of its aspects by means of affirmation and negation separately or together. The seven sorts of expressions are indicated by "maybe" (or "in some respects") (*syāt*).

IV.15 (ET334-335) The first predication (of sevenfold

predication) is in the form of a positive sentence (*vidhi*): (1) "In some way or another every thing exists".

IV.16 (ET336) The second is: (2) "In some way or another each thing is nonexistent."

IV.17 (ET338) (3) "In some way or another each thing is existent, and in some way or another each thing is nonexistent." This is the third predication, consisting in affirmations and negations made in sequence.

IV.18 (ET338) (4) "In some way or another each thing is inexpressible (*avaktavya*)"--the fourth predication, involving affirmation and negation considered simultaneously (since both affirmation and negation of a thing at once is impossible to express).

IV.19 (ET339) (5) "In some respects, each thing exists and is inexpressible simultaneously."

IV.20 (ET340) (6) "In some respects each thing is nonexistent and is inexpressible simultaneously."

IV.21 (ET340) (7) "In some respects, each thing exists, is nonexistent and is inexpressible simultaneously."

IV.22 (ET341) It is not right to say that a word's meaning is chiefly affirmative,

IV.23 (ET341) because then it couldn't express negation.

IV.24 (ET342) It is not right either to say that a word's meaning is chiefly indirect (*apradhāna*),

IV.25 (ET342) because its indirect meaning cannot be understood without its somewhere, somehow and at some time being understood positively.

IV.26 (ET342-343) It is not right either, and for the same reasons, to say that a word's meaning is chiefly negative.

IV.27 (ET343) The (third) view, that a word functions both affirmatively and negatively in order, is also not correct,

IV.28 (ET343) because everyone knows that language is sometimes affirmative and sometimes negative (in no particular order) in its function.

IV.29 (ET344) Nor can a word function both affirmatively and negatively simultaneously,

IV.30 (ET344) even though a thing cannot be expressed by the word, because of the absurd result (*prasaṅga*) of such a word's becoming inexpressible.

IV.31 (ET344-345) Likewise, it is not a (satisfactory) conclusion, being one-sided, to say that since language can indicate only an object having a positive nature, it cannot signify the objects (of the world) since they have both positive and negative natures simultaneously.

IV.32 (ET345) For it is evident that though a word can indicate something negative, it signifies something which is both positive and negative in nature.

IV.33 (ET345-346) But that--i.e., that a word may signify something both positive and negative in nature simultaneously--is unattractive,

IV.34 (ET346) because language functions otherwise as well (i.e., it can connote something positive in nature).

IV.35 (ET346) It is even wrong to hold that though language can successively express an object's positive and then an object's negative nature, it then could not function, being unable to express an object that has both natures simultaneously,

IV.36 (ET347) because it is evident that a word can function merely to affirm, etc.

IV.37 (ET347) One should not suppose that the theory of sevenfold predication is incoherent because there may be an infinite number of aspects, positive and negative of one and the same thing and so an infinite number of predications about the same thing accordingly,

IV.38 (ET348) because even though an infinite number of attributes may be made about a thing, if we pick one particular property of a thing or its modes only seven alternatives are available.

IV.39 (ET348) For the relation of a mode to a thing can be

of seven sorts,

IV.40 (ET349) and they are only seven because there are only seven kinds of inquiry,

IV.41 (ET349) and there are only seven (kinds of) modes because there are only seven kinds of doubt (about the nature of a mode).

IV.42 (ET349) And doubts are of seven kinds because there are only seven kinds of properties of an actual entity under one's scrutiny.

IV.43 (ET350) Each of the seven predications is both complete and partial.

IV.44 (ET350-351) A complete predication is a description of a thing with an infinite number of qualities and modes as one undifferentiated whole, its identity in time, etc. highlighted or at any rate imputed to it.

IV.45 (ET354) A partial predication is the opposite of that.

IV.46 (ET354-355) Both kinds of predication (the complete and the partial) reveal their objects through their capacity for doing so when obstacles are removed in a particular way,

IV.47 (ET355) not because they are born from those objects or share their forms--since those features are found in other things.

CHAPTER FIVE

V.1 (ET 359) The object cognized (by a *pramāṇa*) is an actual entity having a nature involving many aspects,

V.2 (ET367) because it is perceived to be similar in nature to other things as well as its own nature, and because it is efficient (*arthakriyā*) through the transformation of its nature consisting in its persisting while giving up its older forms and acquiring new ones.

V.3 (ET368) (A thing's) general nature is of two kinds: (its) kind (*tiryak*) and (its) persistence (*ūrdhvatā*).

V.4 (ET369) The general nature of its kind consists in the same kind of features found in the individuals of its class, for

example, cowhood in the various cows.

V.5 (ET373) The general nature of persistence is the substance which remains the same through all its modifications earlier or later, as for example gold which remains the same through its forms as various ornaments.

V.6 (ET389) (A thing's) particular nature is likewise of two sorts, viz., qualities and modes.

V.7 (ET389-390) A thing's quality is always there with the thing, e.g., a self's specific and potential awarenesses.

V.8 (ET390) Modes come in an order, for example, the feelings of pleasure and pain, etc. in (a person).

CHAPTER SIX

VI.1 (ET404) What is produced by a *pramāṇa* is its result (*phala*).

VI.2 (ET404) It has two sorts, direct and indirect.

VI.3 (ET404) The direct result of all the *pramāṇas* is the destruction of ignorance.

VI.4 (ET405) The indirect fruit of pure knowledge is neutrality (*audāsīnya*).

VI.5 (ET405-406) The indirect result of the other *pramāṇas* is either acquisition or avoidance or indifference.

VI.6-7 (ET406-407) As it cannot be understood otherwise it is in some respects separate from and in some respects identical to a *pramāṇa*.

VI.8 (ET407) The result should not be considered different from the *pramāṇa*, for both have the same cognizer,

VI.9 (ET407-408) because the same self which evolves into the *pramāṇa* evolves into the result.

VI.10 (ET408) The same one that cognizes also acquires, avoids or neglects (the contents of his awarenesses)--this is attested by everyone.

VI.11 (ET408) Otherwise there would be a confusion between one's own awareness and its result and those of

another person.

VI.12 (ET409) The reason (in VI.6, viz., that VI.5 cannot be understood otherwise than its being in some respects separate from and in some respects identical to a *pramāṇa* should not be connected to the fact of the result being the same as knowledge, i.e., the subsidence of ignorance,

VI.13 (ET410-411) for in some respects that (subsidence) is taken to be separate from (a *pramāṇa*),

VI.14 (ET411) because a *pramāṇa* and its results are respectively a reason (*sādhana*) and a thing proved (*sādhya*).

VI.15 (ET411) An instrument of knowledge, constituting the causal condition *par excellence*, is the proving, because it is the most instrumental in proving one's self and others.

VI.16 (ET412) The result, termed the subsidence of ignorant beliefs in the activities and forms residing in oneself and others, is the thing proved, since it is what is brought about by *pramāṇas*.

VI.17 (ET413) The knower (*pramātṛ*) as well is different in some respects from the activities residing in oneself and others,

VI.18 (ET414) since an agent and his actions are observed to be related as prover and thing proved.

VI.19 (ET414-415) Because of being independent, the agent is called the "prover" (*sādhaka*). The action (of knowing) is the thing proved, because it is dependent on the agent.

VI.20 (ET415-416) An action is not the same as its agent, nor is it different from him, since otherwise their natures as action and agent would be undermined.

VI.21 (ET416-417) This theory--that the distinction between an instrument and its result is (only from) a conventional (*saṃvṛti*) point of view--is mere babble, since that contradicts its own establishment.

VI.22 (ET418) Thus talk of a *pramāṇa* and its result must be real (*pāramārthika*), and it is the cause of the satisfaction for oneself of all human purposes.

VI.23 (ET418) Fallacies about *pramāṇas* include what is

contradicted by any of the four (aspects of a *pramāṇa*), its intrinsic nature, etc.

VI.24 (ET429) Such fallacies are: that a *pramāṇa* is without awareness (*ajñāna*); that such an instrument cannot grasp a self; that it can grasp only a self; the theory of construction-free perception; and (the theory that awareness by nature involves) superimposition (*samāropa*),

VI.25 (ET419) thus taking as veridical such things as (sense-object) contact, etc., which are not conscious, an awareness which does not involve anything other (than itself), mere vision (*darśana*), error, doubt and uncertainty,

VI.26 (ET420-421) since those do not provide us with certainty about either the self or anything else.

VI.27 (ET421) What merely appears as if it were the practical perception (of a thing) is a false (perception) of that thing.

VI.28 (ET421-422) For example, mistaking clouds for the city of the Gandharvas, or taking one's misery as happiness.

VI.29 (ET422) What only appears as if it were the highest truth (*pāramārthika*) is a false (perception) of that thing.

VI.30 (ET422) For example, awareness of a King (referring to him) as Śiva, or of seven islands and seven seas among the countless islands and seas.

VI.31 (ET423) Fallacious memory is awareness of something's occurrence which was not previously perceived as an actual object previously perceived.

VI.32 (ET423-424) E.g., to take a group of people not previously known to be a congregation of wise men.

VI.33 (ET424) Fallacious awareness is to take two things as the same which are only similar, or (the reverse), to take a single thing as two different things,

VI.34 (ET423) e.g., twins.

VI.35 (ET423) Fallacious *tarka* involves ascribing pervasion where there isn't any,

VI.36 (ET423) e.g., when arguing for a son of Maitra being dark-complexioned, to assume "whoever is Maitra's son is dark-complexioned."

VI.37 (ET426) Fallacious inference is awareness arising from what is only an apparent *pakṣa*, etc.

VI.38 (ET427) There are three kinds of fallacious inference about the *pakṣa*: (1) where (the *pakṣa*) is already known, (2) where it is opposed (by other data), and (3) where it is not desired (to be proved).

VI.39 (ET428) An example of (1) occurs when one claims against a Jaina (*arahant*, who admits that selves exist,) "a self exists".

VI.40 (ET428-429) There are many varieties of (2), since the "other data" may be found through direct experience, inference, verbal testimony or popular understanding.

VI.41 (ET429) For example, "there is no self other than the (various) elements": here the "other data" come from perception.

VI.42 (ET430) Or, "there is no being who is omniscient or totally without passions"--here the "other data" come from inference.

VI.43 (ET431) Or, "A Jaina should eat at night"--here the "other data" come from scripture (which warns against eating at night).

VI.44 (ET431) Or, "Knowledge and its objects are not the (highest) reality (*na pāramārthika*)"--here the "other data" come from popular understanding.

VI.45 (ET432-433) Or, "there is no *pramāṇa* cognizing objects of knowledge"--here the property to be proved violates (the speaker's) own claim.

VI.46 (ET434) (3) An example of (3) (of VI.38) would occur if a Jaina, who believes in the theory of maybes (*syādvāda*) claims that a jar is eternal, or that it is noneternal.

VI.47 (ET437) There are three varieties of fallacy of the reason): unproved, contradicted and inconclusive.

VI.48 (ET437-438) An unproved reason is one whose

inseparable connection (with the *sādhya*) is not in keeping with any *pramāṇa*.

VI.49 (ET438) There are two kinds, (1) unproved to both parties, and (2) unproved to (only) one (of the two parties).

VI.50 (ET439) An example of (1) is "sound is transformable, because it is visible".

VI.51 (ET439) An example of (2) is "a tree is unconscious, because it is free from the death due to the extinction of consciousness and senses".

VI.52 (ET465) The (fallacy of the reason called) "contradictory" (consists in) there being invariable concomitance between (the *hetu* and) the opposite of the *sādhya*.

VI.53 (ET465) For example, "the self is eternal--or the self is non-eternal--because it has (the power of) recognition, etc.

VI.54 (ET474) The (fallacy of the *hetu* called) "equivocal" is one where the invariable concomitance is doubted.

VI.55 (ET474) It has two kinds, one where the *vipakṣa* is certain, the other where the *vipakṣa* is itself doubtful.

VI.56 (ET475) An example of the first (kind) is: "sound is eternal, because it is knowable."

VI.57 (ET476) An example of the second (kind) is "this person is not omniscient, because he speaks".

VI.58 (ET488) The fallacy of the example based on similarity is of nine kinds,

VI.59 (ET488-489) viz., (1) Opposed to the property being proved, (2) opposed to the proving property, (3) opposed to both those properties, (4) a doubtful property of what is being proved, (5) a doubtful property of the proving property, (6) a doubtful property of both; (7) something to which both (the *hetu* and the *sādhya*) are unconnected; (8) something in which the connection (between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*) is undemonstrated; (9) something in which the connection (between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*) is reversed.

VI.60 (ET489) An example of (1) is: "sound is not produced by human beings, because it is immaterial, like frustration."

VI.61 (ET490) An example of (2) is: "sound is not produced by human beings, because it is immaterial, like an atom".

VI.62 (ET490) An example of (3) is the same argument, with the example "like a pot."

VI.63 (ET491) An example of (4) is: "that man has passions, etc., because he is a speaker, like Devadatta".

VI.64 (ET491): An example of (5) is: "that man is mortal, because he has passions, like Mautra."

VI.65 (ET492) An example of (6) is: "that man does not see everything, because he has passions, etc., like a certain sage".

VI.66 (ET492-493) An example of (7) is: "that man has passions, etc., because he is a speaker."

VI.67 (ET493) An example of (8) is: "sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot".

VI.68 (ET494) An example of (9) is: "sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, whatever is non-eternal is a product, like a pot."

VI.69 (ET495) The fallacy of the example based on difference is also of nine kinds:

VI.70 (ET495-496) (1) where the opposite of the *sādhya* is unproved; (2) where the opposite of the *sādhana*, (i.e., of the *hetu*) is unproved; (3) where the opposites of both (the *sādhya* and the *hetu*) are unproved; (4) where the opposite of the *sādhya* is doubtful; (5) where the opposite of the *hetu* is doubtful; (6) where both (the opposite of the *sādhya* and the opposite of the *hetu*) are doubtful; (7) where there is no opposition (between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*); (8) where the opposition is not shown; (9) where the relation is shown in the reverse order.

VI.71 (ET496-497) An example of (1) is: "inference is erroneous, because it is a *pramāṇa*; whatever is not fallacious

is not a *pramāṇa*, like a dream-awareness."

VI.72 (ET496-497) An example of (2) is: "perception is construction-free, because it is a *pramāṇa*; whatever is not construction-free is not a *pramāṇa*, like inference."

VI.73 (ET496-497) An example of (3) is: "sound is both eternal and non-eternal, because it exists; whatever is both eternal and non-eternal is nonexistent, as for example a post."

VI.74 (ET497-498) An example of (4) is: "Kapila is a non-omniscient worthy person, because he maintains momentariness; whoever is an omniscient and/or worthy maintains momentariness, like Sugata (i.e., the Buddha)".

VI.75 (ET498-499) An example of (5) is: "someone is one whose words should not be listened to, because he has passions, etc.; someone whose words should be accepted is free from passions, etc., e.g., the son of Śuddhodana (i.e., the Buddha)."

VI.76 (ET499-500) An example of (6) is: "Kapila is not free from passions, because he has not compassionately given his own flesh to others who deserve help; one who is free from passions gives his own flesh to others who deserve help, for example, Tapanabandhu (i.e., the Buddha)".

VI.77 (ET500-501) An example of (7) is: "that person is not free from passions, because he is a speaker; one who is free from passions is not a speaker, as for instance a piece of stone."

VI.78 (ET501) An example of (8) is: "sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, as, for example, space." (This is a fallacy, since the statement of pervasion is not given.)

VI.79 (ET501-502) An example of (9) is: "sound is non-eternal because it is a product; whatever is not a product is eternal, as for example, space."

VI.80 (ET502) The fallacies of the application and the conclusion involve stating them in a way that violates what is implied in their definitions.

VI.81 (ET503) For example: "sound is modifiable, because it is a product; whatever is a product is modifiable, like a pot." is a fallacious application.

VI.82 (ET503) Examples of fallacious conclusions can be found by, in the inference in II.81, concluding "sound is a product" or "a pot is modifiable".

VI.83 (ET504) A scriptural fallacy is an awareness arising from hearing the speech of an unworthy person.

VI.84 (ET504-505) Example: "On the bank of the Mekalakanyakā, at the foot of the Tāla and Hintāla, dates are found in abundance; make haste, go on, go on, o ye calves!"

VI.85 (ET505) A fallacy of enumeration is, for instance, "perception is the one and only *pramāṇa*."

VI.86 (ET506) The fallacy of content is, for example, taking either the universal property, the particular, or both together, by themselves to be an object of true cognition.

VI.87 (ET506-507) The fallacy of the result is taking the result of cognizing to be identical with a *pramāṇa*.

CHAPTER SEVEN

VII.1 (ET508) A perspective consists in the viewpoint of a cognizer who is aware of part of an object cognized through, say, the scriptural *pramāṇa* [viz.., vernal testimony] while not paying attention to the other parts.

VII.2 (ET511) A fallacious perspective consists in denying the aspects (of a thing) other than those (aspects) one is concerned with (at the moment).

VII.3 (ET511) There are two kinds (of perspective), the disconnected (*vyāsa*) and the connected (*samāsa*).

VII.4 (ET511-512) The disconnected kind is of many sorts.

VII.5 (ET512) The compounded kind is (itself) of two kinds: substantial and modal.

VII.6 (ET514) The former (i.e., the substantial) has three varieties: (1) the comprehensive, (2) the general and (3) the practical substantial perspectives.

VII.7 (ET514) Of a property and its possessor, the

conventional indicates one as the chief topic and the other as subordinate.

VII.8 (ET515) For example, (taking) the property "belonging to a self" (as chief) and another property, "consciousness", (as subordinate).

VII.9 (ET515) Or, in "a real entity possessing modes is a substance" we are taking two property-possessors, one as chief, the other subordinate.

VII.10 (ET516) Or, in "for only one moment does a self dealing with objects have pleasure" a property is chief and the property-possessor subordinate.

VII.11 (ET517) A fallacious substantial perspective involves taking the two properties completely separately.

VII.12 (ET518) For example, to think "in a self existence and consciousness are completely separate from each other" illustrates the fallacious substantial perspective.

VII.13 (ET518) The general substantial perspective considers the universal (aspect) only (of a thing).

VII.14 (ET519) It has two varieties, higher and lower.

VII.15 (ET519) The higher (general substantial) perspective involves indifference to the ultimate particularities (of a thing) and concentrating solely on its bare locus as pure substance.

VII.16 (ET520) E.g., The universe (*viśva*, lit. "all this") is one, for there is no difference in Being (*sat*).

VII.17 (ET520) A fallacious higher (general substantial) perspective consists in taking everything as non-dual and denying all distinguishing characteristics.

VII.18 (ET520-521) For example, "(pure) existence is the only category, since separate distinct entities are not found."

VII.19 (ET521) Having the lower general substantial perspective is considering (a thing's) lower universal properties such as substance-ness and being indifferent to their various specific modes.

VII.20 (ET522) For example, "motion and rest, space, time, matter and self are each one substance, because each of them has substance-ness, etc."

VII.21 (ET522-523) A fallacious lower (general substantial) perspective would be to recognize only substanceness alone and to deny the reality of its modes.

VII.22 (ET523) For example: "substanceness is the only category (of reality), since no other objects than substances are experienced."

VII.23 (ET523-524) The practical substantial perspective divides systematically the objects of the general perspective.

VII.24 (ET524) For example: "whatever exists is either substance or mode."

VII.25 (ET524-525) A fallacious practical substantial perspective would divide the substances and modes into kinds it considers unreal.

VII.26 (ET525) As, e.g., (is done by) the Cārvāka philosophy.

VII.27 (ET525-526) The modal compounded kind of perspective is of four kinds: (4) (temporally) immediate (*ṛjusūtra*), (5) verbal (*śabda*), (6) etymological and (7) factual perspectives.

VII.28 (ET526) The (temporally) immediate perspective emphasizes or features a mode that is presently existent.

VII.29 (ET526-527) For example "pleasure, now".

VII.30 (ET526) It is fallacious when it denies substances altogether.

VII.31 (ET527) As, e.g., the theory of the Tathāgata (i.e., the Buddha).

VII.32 (ET528) The verbal perspective takes a word to have a different sense due to differences in tense, etc.

VII.33 (ET528) For example, of the one Mt. Sumeru, etc.: "it exists", "it existed", "it will exist".

VII.34 (ET529) It is fallacious when (taken seriously so that) objects are supposed to be actually different on the mere basis of differences in tense, etc.

VII.35 (ET530) For example, for one who supposes that the Mt. Sumeru that existed is a different mountain from the one that exists now or will exist in the future.

VII.36 (ET530) The etymological perspective occurs when synonyms are taken to have different meanings from each other because of the divergences in their etymological derivations.

VII.37 (ET531) For example, "Indra is one who rains", "Śakra is a potent person", "Purandara penetrates (into the enemy's city)", etc.

VII.38 (ET531) The fallaciousness of the etymological perspective comes when one takes the objects to be distinct because of the differences between the synonymous expressions.

VII.39 (ET532) For example, if one were to suppose that "Indra", "Śakra", and "Purandara" name different entities merely because they different words like "elephant", "deer" and so on.

VII.40 (ET532) The factual perspective assumes that words signify those objects which perform the activities denoted by them.

VII.41 (ET533) For example, that Indra is so-called because he rains, Śakra because he is powerful, Purandara because he penetrates the city.

VII.43 (ET533-534) The fallaciousness of this perspective comes if one refuses to give an object its name when it is not behaving in the relevant way.

VII.44 (ET534-535) Of these (seven perspectives), (1)-(4) are objective perspectives (*arthanaya*) since their functions concern objects.

VII.45 (ET535) Perspectives (5)-(7) are linguistic perspectives (*śabdanaya*) as they concern the meanings of words.

VII.46 (ET535) The range of each preceding perspective is wider and wider, and those of each succeeding one more and more limited.

VII.47 (ET535) The things indicated within the comprehensive perspective , which include existing things as well as absences, is wider than that of the general perspective, which considers only things that exist.

VII.48 (ET536) (Likewise,) the contents of the general perspective, which ranges over all existents, is wider than that of the practical perspective, which concerns only some modes of the existents.

VII.49 (ET536) The range of coverage of the practical perspective, which includes things of the past, present and future, is wider than that of the (temporally) immediate perspective , which includes present things only.

VII.50 (ET536) Various objects are indicated from the (temporally) immediate perspective in accordance with differences in tense, etc., but the (linguistically) implied (perspective) connotes their opposites (too), so it is wider.

VII.51 (ET537) The scope of the linguistically-implied perspective, which tends to attribute a different meaning to each of a set of synonyms, is smaller than that of the etymological, which does something quite different.

VII.52 (ET537) The strict-constructionist perspective is confined to dealing with the differences between objects due to their different functions. The etymological perspective does something quite different, and its contents constitute a larger field than that of the other (viz., the strict-constructionist).

VII.53 (ET537) A statement of a perspective respectively to its contents follows the sevenfold principle through affirmation and negation.

VII.54 (ET538) Its result is determined in the same way as that of a *pramāṇa*.

VII.55 (ET538) The cognizer (*pramātṛ*) is the self, as is evident from direct perception, etc.

VII.56 (ET560) That (self) is in its nature consciousness, undergoing changes, doing (acts). He is the enjoyer (of the results of those acts). There is a different self in each (body)

and (each self), being attached to karmic products, is born again and again.

VII.57 (ET588) That (self), embodied as a man or woman, attains through right awareness and right actions its essential nature with the destruction of all *karman*.

CHAPTER VIII

VIII.1 (ET616) A discussion (*vāda*) consists in proposing and attacking statements for the purpose of supporting one's own and refuting an opponent's position where the two positions contradict each other.

VIII.2 (ET620) In such (a discussion) the one who begins is someone who (1a) wants to win or (1b) wants to discover the truth.

VIII.3 (ET621) An opponent who wants to win (=1a) desires to defeat another (the proponent) through proofs and refutations in order to establish his own position.

VIII.4 (ET622) An opponent who wants to discover the truth (=1b) proceeds in the same way (i.e., through proofs and refutations).

VIII.5 (ET622) He (the one who wants to discover the truth, (1b)) is of two kinds: either ((1b1) he wants to convince) himself or ((1b2) he wants to convince) others.

VIII.6 (ET623) The first sort (1b1) are the students (*śiṣya*), etc.

VIII.7 (ET623-624) The second sort (1b2) include teachers (*guru*), etc.

VIII.8 (ET624) This second sort (i.e., the teachers, etc. (1b2) in turn has two kinds: (1b2a) those whose understanding is based on partial destruction and subsidence (of *karman*), and (1b2b) those who are perfect knowers.

VIII.9 (ET626) These (numbered alternatives) also apply to the proponent (in a discussion) (the same alternatives as above preceded by (2)).

VIII.10 (ET627) If the proponent is a (1a) and the

opponent is either (2a) or (2b2a), the discussion must have four participants (lit., "limbs"). If any one of these (four) parties are lacking it will be difficult to determine who wins or loses the argument.

VIII.11 (ET629) When the proponent is a (1b1) and his opponent is either a (2b2a) or a (2b2b) the discussion has two or sometimes three participants.

VIII.12 (ET630) Where the proponent is a (1a1) and the opponent is a (2a2a) the discussion has two participants.

VIII.13 (ET631) Where the proponent is a (1b2a) and the opponent is (2a), the discussion has two or sometimes three participants. Where the proponent is either (1b2a)and the opponent is either (2b1) or (2b2a) the discussion has two or sometimes three participants. Where the proponent is (1b2a) and the opponent is (2b2b) the discussion has two participants.

VIII.14 (ET631) Where the proponent is (1b2b) and the opponent is (1a) the discussion has four participants. If the opponent is either (1b1) or (1b2a) the discussion has two participants.

VIII.15 (ET632) The four (possible) participants in a discussion are the opponent, the proponent, the audience (*sabhya*) and its president.

VIII.16 (ET632) As in wrestling, one (the opponent) begins and the other (the proponent) responds.

VIII.17 (ET632-633) Each tries to establish his own position and refute the other's through use of *pramāṇas*.

VIII.18 (ET633-634) The audience is accepted by both (opponent and proponent), of whose positions its members are aware; they understand the positions of the two debaters, are bright, capable of keeping a thing in mind, impartial and forgiving.

VIII.19 (ET635) Their job is to make the participants accept the prescribed procedures in regard to the points at issue, to determine their right to speak first or later, to discover the good qualities and/or faults in each participant's arguments, to stop

the debate when necessary in order to indicate the truth, and to determine the result of the debate.

VIII.20 (ET636) The president should be wise, understanding, lordly, forgiving and impartial.

VIII.21 (ET637) His responsibility is to determine the positions held by the parties debating and by the members, and to settle disputes, etc.

VIII.22 (ET638) In a debate that involves one or more debaters who want to win the parties may speaks as many times are they wish provided the audience allows them to do so.

VIII.23 (636) Where both debaters are truth-seekers they shoould argue as long as the truth is not determined and as long as argument is possible.

43.167 VĀDIDEVA SŪRI, *Syādvādaratnākara* on his own *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṃkāra*[197]

43.168 VĀDIDEVA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Jīvājīvābhigamasūtra*[192]

43.169 VĀDIDEVA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on a *Jīvānuśāsana*

K. M. K. Sarma[193] says that a manuscript "exists in the Anup Sanskrit Library, Bikaner. It consists of a Prakrit text and Sanskrit commentary by Devasūri. A chronogram at the end mentioned the date *saṃvat* 1162. The work was written in Aṇhilla Pāīakanagar in Ghūrjaradaśa when Jayasiṃha, son of Karṇadeva, was ruling. The manuscript was copied in *saṃvat* 1561 (A.D. 1504) by Śivadeva. The extent of the work at the end is stated to be 333 *gāthās*". The names of its 39 sections is then given.

"It was corrected by Jinadattasūri (Saptagṛhanivāsin). It is in Prakṛit and contains 333 *gāthās*.[194]

43.170 VĀDIDEVA SŪRI, *Avacūri* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Praśnaśataka*

This commentary is ascribed to the Vādideva who is the pupil of Municandra.[195]

44 JINADATTA SŪRI (1145)

NCC 7, p. 253, based on Peterson IV, p. xxxv: "Pupil and successor of Jinavallabhasūri, grandpupil of Abhayadevasūri, Navāṅgīvṛttikā; of Kharatara-gaccha and preceptor of Jinacandrasūri; born in Dholkā in *saṃvat* 1132 (1075 A.D.) and died in *saṃvat* 1211 (1154 A.D.) at Ajmer." A number of works in addition to those listed below are cited on pp. 253-254 of NCC 7; it is not clear whether any of them are works on philosophy. For a discussion of Jinadatta Sūri's literary output see Granoff/Shinohara.

"Jinadatta Suri succeeded Jinavallabha in the Kharatara *gaccha*. Born *saṃvat* 1132, died *saṃvat* 1211, he propagated the Jaina religion by miracles which he performed in many cities.[196]

"Jinadattasūṛi, Ācārya (1075-1154). Śvetāmbara Mūrtipūjaka Kharatara Gaccha mendicant leader and the first Dādāguru. He was born in Dholka, Gujarat, and was named Somacandra. He was initiated as a child at the request of a senior monk who came to know of auspicious marks ono his body that were indicative of greatness. He succeeded Jineśvārasuṛi as *ācārya* in 1112 and under his guidance the mendicant community grew rapidly. He initiated large numbers of temple-dwelling monks (*caityavāsī*) and converted many non-Jains. Like the other Dādāgurus, he is famous for his magical powers, which he is said to have acquired through asceticism and from his discovery of a hidden text written centuries earlier. Most of his miracles are associated with subduing the various non-Jainadeities with supernatural powers and with the protection of the Jaina community. It is reported

that at the time of his cremation, his clothing and mouth cloth (*muhpatti*) did not ignite and that they were preserved in Jaisalmer. A shrine was established at the site of his cremation in Ajmer, which is known as the Dādābāri. It is believed that he was reborn as a heavenly being (*deva*) and that in his next birth he will be reborn in Mahāvideha and will attain liberation (*mokṣa*)."[197]

44.171 JINADATTA SŪRI, *Upadeśarasāyana*[198]

Phyllis Granoff[199] treats this work as (apparently) not a commentary but an Apabhraṃśa poem composed by Jinadatta Sūri himself. She translates a number of the verses in a fashion which would imply that the work she is translating is a literary and not a philosophical work. She also provides a lot of information about Jinadatta's life and times drawn from various literary sources. Velankar, JRK p. 52, says it is also called *Dharmarasāyana* and has 80 stanzas.

44.172 JINADATTA SŪRI, *Carcarī*[200]

NCC 6, p. 292, treating it as a commentary, says it was "composed in the second half of 12th century A. D. at Vyāghrapura in Bāgaḍ (Vāgjaḍa) District Tod. 114." However, Vadekar at JRK p. 121 says the *Carcarī* itself is by Jinadatta Sūri, in 47 stanzas and in Apabhraṃśa, citing the same publication.

44.173 JINADATTA SŪRI, *Caityavandanakulaka*

In Prakrit.[201]

44.174 JINADATTA SŪRI, *Upadeśakulaka*

Cf. NCC 2, p. 346 for citations of the location of manuscripts.

44.175 JINADATTA SŪRI, *Kālasvarūpakulaka*[202]

44.176 JINADATTA SŪRI, *Sandehadolāvalī*

Velankar says it "is a discussion of doubtful points connected with Jaina religion in 150 *gāthās*".[203]

44.177 JINADATTA SŪRI, *Lokanālikā*

Manuscript cited at JRK p. 339.

45 DEVABHADRA (1150)

On pp. 21-22 of his Introduction to his 1928 edition of the *Nyāyāvatāra* (cited below) Prof. Vaidya remarks: "As (the author) does not expressly mention his name in the concluding verses or in the colophon, the *ṭippaṇa* was wrongly attributed to Rājaśekhara of the Maladhārin *gaccha* (14th century), a writer of numerous works including a *ṭippaṇa* on the *Ratnākarāvatārika*", going on to remark that two other scholars "attribute this commentary to Candraprabha (Śrīcandra?), which statement also is not correct." He goes on to indicate the genealogy of the Maladhāri gaccha, arguing that Devabhadra, though formally pupil of Śrīcandra, "was studying under him during the life-time of Hemacandra...Maladharin..." and that "one of the pupils of Hemacandra, Lakṣmaṇagaṇi, the author of the *Supāsanāhacarin*. finished this work in 1199 *vikrama*, i.e. 1142 A.D.", estimating this date "as the approximate date of Devabhadra".[204] Piotr Balcerowicz, writing more recently, estimates Devabhadra's date as "about 1150".[205]

45.178 DEVABHADRA, *Vṛtti* on Jinavallabha's *Dvādaśakulaka*.

Cf. NCC 9, p. 191.

45.179 DEVABHADRA, *Ṭīkā* on (Padma)Jineśvara's *Upadeśamaṇimālākulaka* (?)

Cf. NCC 2, p. 352.

45.180 DEVABHADRA, *Vivaraṇa* on Candraprabha Sūri's *Darśanaśuddhiprakaraṇa*

NCat IX, 115 remarks that this Devabhadra is "a pupil of Vimalagaṇi...(This work was) composed with the help of his pupil Śāntibhadrasūri", and cites manuscript citations in *Jainagranthāvalī* published the JainaŚvetambara Conference, Bombay 1902, p. 179 as well as in GOS 76.

45.181 DEVABHADRA, *Ṭippaṇa* on Siddhasena Mahāmati's *Nyāyāvatāra*

Edited by P. L. Vaidya. Bombay 1928, with English introduction. Bombay 1928. Piotr Balcerowicz writes "The [Devabhadra's] gloss is of rather secondary philosophic value, but it is a useful source of quotations, thus attesting that Devabhadra was well-acquainted with current philosophic discourse, though perhaps not an original and ingenious thinker himself."[206] In his the copious footnotes contained in Part One of his publication Balcerowicz translates some passages from Devabhadra's work, also providing the textual passages.

45.182 DEVABHADRA, *Dvātriṃśikā*

Pattan I. p. 64, gives final verses.

46.183 AUTHOR UNKNOWN (1150), *Sarvasiddhāntapraveśaka*.

Translated by K. W. Folkert, *Scripture and Community. Collected Essays on the Jainas.* (ed. John E. Cort), Atlanta 1993, pp. 346-357.[207] The work discusses the views of seven systems, including those of Jainism. We provide here Folkert's translation of the section on Jainism, p. 353.

Translated by Kenneth W. Folkert

"*Jaina darśana.* Now, the following is furnished in order to

set out clearly the true nature of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* according to Jaina doctrine. Now someone says: 'If this is so, then declare what is that *pramāṇa* and *prameya*." [Response] Therein, *prameya* is: "The *tattvas* (that) are *jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, saṃvara, nirjarā,* and *mokṣa*." [*Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* 1.4] Therein, the *jīva* is characterized by the evolution of pleasure, pain, knowledge, etc. Its opposite is *ajīva*, "Wrong faith, incontinence, carelessness, passion, and activity are the causes of bondage (*bandha*)." [*Tattvārtha* VIII.1] "Activity consists in the acts of body, voice, and mind." [*Tattvārtha* VI.1] "Inflow (*āsrava*) consists of it (it meaning *karman* of the activities just mentioned)" [*Tattvārtha* VI.2] "Pure (inflow) consists of merit"; [*Tattvārtha* VI.3] its opposite of demerit. The effect of inflow is bondage. Cessation (*saṃvara*) is the opposite of inflow. Decay (*nirjarā*) is the fruit of cessation."

"Next, *pramāṇa* is *pratyakṣa, anumāna,* and *āgama*. Thereunder, *pratyakṣa* is determinate, non-erroneous knowledge occasioned by the sense-organs and the internal organ. This is the common definition of *pratyakṣa*; from the point of view of closer determination (of its nature), extrasensory awareness and other (sub-types of perception are present). *Anumāna* is knowledge of a thing possessing a mark, by means of the mark, which does not occur elsewhere (than in concomitance with the thing to be known), such as knowledge that there is fire by means of (seeing the mark, namely) smoke. *Āgama* consists of such things as (the teaching that) "Heaven comes from doing penance" and such like, because it brings about determinate and uncontroverted knowledge, as do the eyes, etc."

47 CAKREŚVARA (1150)

There are recorded a number of authors named Cakreśvara. In NCC 6, p. 290 we find at least two who wrote works on Jainism. One is the author of the *Bhāṣya* on *Bandhaśataka*: he

is identified as "pupil of Vardhamāna, composed (that work) in *saṃvat* 1197". This would place that author in the period we are now considering.

The other Cakreśvara in NCC 6, p. 290, the author of "*Ratnamahodadhi* on *Samyaktvaprakaraṇa*", is said there to have been "finished by his grand pupil Tilakācārya in *saṃvat* 1277". 1277 *saṃvat* equals 1223, and that would approximate to the same period, so we will guess these are the same person, though with a note of caution. Two other works of some Cakreśvara are also placed here for want of a better suggestion.

47.184 CAKREŚVARA, *Bhāṣya* on Śivaśarman's *Bandhaśataka*

NCC 6, p. 290 informs us that this work has been printed.[208]

47.185 CAKREŚVARA, *Padārthasthāpanasaṃgrahaprakaraṇa*

NCC 11, p. 114 says this work is in 119 *gāthās*, cites a manuscript location.

47.186 CAKREŚVARA, *Ratnamohadadhi* on Candraprabhā's *Darśanaśudhi*

This is said at NCC 6, p. 290 to hav e been "finished by his grand-pupil Tilakācārya in *saṃvat* 1277".

47.187 CAKREŚVARA, *Sūkṣmārthasattari* or *-saptatikā*

NCC VI, 290 says this is in 75 *gāthās*. JRK p. 449 says it is published in *Prakaraṇasamuccaya* (Indore 1923) together with a *Ṭippaṇa*.

47.188 CAKREŚVARA, *Vṛtti* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Sārdhaśatakaprakaraṇa*[209]

47.189 CAKREŚVARA, *Siddhāntoddhāra*

JRK p. 441 says it is in 213 *gāthās*, and is published...in *Prakaraṇasamuccaya* at Indore, 1923.

48.190 RĀMACANDRA and GUṆACANDRA (1150?), *Dravyālaṃkāra*

According to H. D. Velankar, JRK p. 183, Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra were "pupils of the famous Hemacandra". We might suppose this to be the Hemacandra whose date we have given here as 1180, except for the fact that a manuscript mentioned by Velankar is dated *saṃvat* 1202, which is 1145 A. D. So we assume the Hemacandra in question is the earlier Maladhārin Hemacandra, and estimate the date of our authors accordingly. The work is "a treatise on the principles of Jaina philosophy. The three chapters respectively treat of (1) the substantial self (*jīvadravya*) and *pudgaladravya*; (2) merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*), (3) the substance space (*ākāśadravya*)." Printed (B162.5.R26 2001).

48.191 RĀMACANDRA, *Vicāraśataka*

JRK p. 351 says: "in 116 stanzas composed by Rāmacandra, pupil of Hemacandra".

49.192 DHANAVIJAYA GAṆI (1153), *Bhāṣāvṛtti* on Dharmaghoṣa Sūri's *Lokanālikā*

JRK p. 339 gives date and a manuscript citation Peterson IV, p. lxii says he wrote this work "apparently in *saṃvat* 1141. When he wrote Vijayadevasūri was at the head of his *gaccha*, and Vijayasiṃha was flourishing." This last must be our 34.Vijayasiṃha Sūri who, in *saṃvat* 1183, wrote a *Śrāddhapratikramaṇasūtravṛtti*.

50.193 CANDRAKĪRTI GAṆI (1155), *(Niḥśeṣa)Siddhāntavicāra* or *Siddhāntoddhāra*

NCC 6, p. 348 identifies this author as a "pupil of Vimalasūri" and says he composed the work below in 1155 A.D. NCC VI, 348. JRK p. 441 says "It is a work in two parts containing about 3500 *siddhāntas* about Jaina religion and philosophy. It was composed in *saṃvat* 1212 by Candrakīrtigaṇi, pupil of Vimalasūri, when he was studying under Dharmaghoṣasūri."

51.194 VIJAYASIṂHA (1158), *Vṛtti* on Jinabhadra Gaṇi's *(Bṛhat)Kṣetrasamāsa*

JRK p. 98 gives the date of composition as *saṃvat* 1215, i.e., 1157.

52 JAYASENA (1160)

A.N. Upadhye[210] has determined the date of Jayasena. He has discovered that "Jayasena, in his commentary on *Pañcāstikāya* (p. 8) quotes two verses from *Ācārasāra* (IV.95-96) of Vīranandin...Vīranandin wrote a Kannaḍa commentary on his own *Ācārasāra* which he completed in 1153 A.D., and this period can be confirmed by various inscriptions at Śravaṇa Belagoḷa. The Sanskrit *Ācārasāra* might have been written a few years earlier even before the author was tempted to write a Kannaḍa commentary to make it more useful in the Kannaḍa country. So Jayasena must be later than c. 1150 A.D. Then from the comparison of Jayasena's commentaries with those of Bālacandra," (who wrote commentaries in Kannaḍa on the same three works as did Jayasena) "it is quite clear that Bālacandra has based his commentaries mainly on those of Jayasena" (as Upadhye shows on pages of this Introduction following this quote); and Bālacandra has written his commentaries, to take the earliest period, in the first quarter of

the 13th century A. D. So with a slight adjustment of a few years for which there is scope but no definite proof, we can say that Jayasena might have written his commentaries in the second half of the 12th century A.D."

Upadhye also gives an assessment of Jayasena as a commentator (Introduction to PK, p. 98). "His style is simple, and with a purpose he writes in simple Sanskrit ignoring, as he himself says, the grammatical strictness for which he solicits the indulgence of sensible readers. His commentaries are studded with quotations here and there; it is rarely that their sources are mentioned; and very often they are off-hand quotations indicating the wide learning of Jayasena. The number of quotations is abnormally great in (his commentary on) *Pañcāstikāya*, and in proportion to the length of the text the number is comparatively smaller in (the commentary on) *Samayasāra*. He often draws the attention of readers to Prakrit peculiarities, but no *sūtras* of any Prakrit grammar are quoted by him. The text preserved in his commentary is valuable in various ways; and his fidelity to the longer recension is really creditable, though the shorter recension of Amṛtacandra was already before him. Excepting in the matter of text-preservation, influence of Amṛtacandra's commentary is very great on him...he follows Amṛtacandra very closely. The scholarship of Amṛtacandra is terrific, and it might even bewilder students, but Jayasena is easy and sympathetic, and with students who want to understand Kundakunda he will certainly be a favorite...."

52.195 JAYASENA, *Tātparyavṛtti* on Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāyasāra*

Edited in PK. Also edited by Manoharalal Jain, MDJG Prakrit Series 24, New Delhi 2000 . Also edited Varanasi 1998.

52.196. JAYASENA, *Tātparyavṛtti* on Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*[211]

A section on the liberation of women (pp. 275-280 of Upadhye's edition) is translated and summarized by P. S. Jaini in GandS, pp. 139-147, reproduced below.

Summary by P. S. Jaini

Now the commentator explains this verse by emphasizing the prohibition of liberation to women. The disciple who follows the views of the Śvetāmbara offers this *prima facie* assertion:

6. The Dharma preached by the Lord of the ascetics (Jina) does not seek this world or the next. Why is it, then, that (in the same teaching) a different kind of distinguishing mark (*liṅga*) (i.e., that of wearing clothes) has been advocated as an option for women?

This teaching does not seek this world--that is, such things as fame, honor, and gain, which bring about the destruction of that practice through which one obtains forever one's own pure consciousness that is freed from all passions. Except for the attainment of liberation, which is one's own nature, this *dharma* preached by the Lord of the Jinas, the Tīrthaṅkara (does not seek) even the heavenly world, let alone this one. This means that both heaven and the means for obtaining pleasures in the next life are also not desired. Separate from the mendicant emblem of total non-possession (i.e., total nudity), there has been established (another emblem), which is that women are to be covered by clothes. Why is this? This verse has put forward the prima facie assertion.

In answer to this it is said: In reality, liberation for women is not perceived to occur in this very life. Therefore, an optional mendicant emblem (allowing her to wear clothes) has been enjoined, because it is appropriate for them.

(Liberation) is not possible for those (women in that very

body) because it is opposed to such destinies as hell and to the nature of infinite happiness and so forth. For that reason, a mendicant emblem has been enjoined separately that allows the wearing of clothes and is therefore different from the emblem of nudity. For whom? For women.

Now the author shows that women have excessive negligence (*pramāda*) that prevents the attainment of liberation:

The nature of women is full of negligence...

By nature women are born full of negligence. Their mental transformations lend women the appellation *pramadā*, which is found in lexicons as a synonym for women. Therefore, women are said to be those in whom are destroyed those practices by which one attains that highest state which is free from negligence.

The author now explains the excessive delusion and so forth that women have: There is no liberation for women because they are invariably subject to the following: delusion, anger, fear, and disgust; and their minds are filled with various forms of deceit.

There invariably exist in women such passions as delusion and so forth, which are obstructions to the causes leading to liberation--namely, the realization of one's own nature consisting of infinite bliss, which arises only when one is freed from delusion and so forth. There also exists in women various forms of feminine guile, which are contrary to the transformation of the self that leads to the highest knowledge which is free from such defects as guile and so forth. The purport of the verse is that women cannot have liberation, that state which is the support for such qualities as infinite bliss free from all suffering.

The author reinforces the same view: In the whole world, there is not a single woman who is without even one of those (passions). Women's limbs are not covered (at birth); therefore, they need to cover themselves (with clothes).

Among those various passions described above that destroy the realization of the highest self freed from all impurities, there is not one that is not to be found in women. Manifestly their bodies or limbs are not covered (at birth). Therefore, it is enjoined in their case that they be covered with clothes.

The author again explains the impurities inherent in women that prevent their attainment of liberation: Women are subject to the sudden oozing of blood (i.e., the menstrual flow) which brings about both fickleness of mind as well as weakness of body and generates extremely subtle human organisms.

There exists in women that kind of moistness of mind, as it were, which is produced by the flow of desire. This is because of their excessive libido, which destroys the mind that is capable of experiencing the pure consciousness of the self freed from all desires. Women also have that fickleness of mind which is a state lacking in the mental strength and firmness that make one worthy of attaining liberation in that very life. They also are subject month after month to the oozing of blood in the form of menstrual flow, which can state suddenly and last for three days; it is capable of destroying their purity of mind. (During that time,) their bodies generate subtle organisms capable of reaching completion of their potential as human beings (under certain circumstance).

The author describes the places where these organisms are born: It is said (in the scriptures) that subtle organisms grow in the female's organs of generation, in between her breasts, and in her navel and armpits. How can she observe the mendicant vows?...

(Question:) Are not men also subject to the same faults (in that similar organisms may also be generated in similar places in their bodies)?

(Answer:) One should not say so, because such organisms are born in excessive qualities in women. There is no equality between the two sexes just because these organisms are found also in men. In the case of (men), there is only a speck of poison; but for the others (i.e., women), that poison is ubiquitous. So how can equality exist between them? Moreover, because of the strength[ening] of the first (three) joints (*saṃhanana*) in the case of men, these blemishes may be removed; therefore, they have those (mendicant) restraints that result in the attainment of liberation (in that very life). This being the case, how can women practice similar restraints.

Now the author rejects any possibility of women destroying the totality of *karmans*, which alone can bring about liberation in that very life: Even if women are in possession of pure faith, engage in scriptural study, and practice a severe course of conduct, (the scriptures) do not mention their ability to bring about the complete exhaustion of *karmans*.

Although women are pure by virtue of having the right view and engaged in studying the canonical texts (the *Aṅga-sūtra*, or even if they practice severe austerities, such as fasting for a fortnight or two and so forth, even so, the scriptures do not proclaim that women have the ability to exhaust the *karmans* completely in that very life.

Moreover, just as women are not reborn in the seventh hell on account of the absence of the first joint, so (for the same reason) they do not attain liberation.

(Question:) But what about the following verse, according to which you admit that liberation is possible for (a male) who is psychologically female (*bhāvastrī*) (i.e., a male who experiences female libido and desires a male)?

Those who have climbed the ladder of destruction of the *karmans* while experiencing male libido, as well as those in whom the other libidos occur--they too, engaged in meditation, will attain liberation. (*Prākṛta-Siddhabhakti*, verse 6)

(Answer:) Those (males) who are psychologically female can attain liberation because they possess the first type of joint (the *vajra-vṛṣabha-nārācasaṃhanana*, i.e., the adamantine or perfect joint of bones noted for extraordinary sturdiness and strength). In the absence of biologically female bodies they are

not subject to the severe manifestations of sexual desire that obstruct the attainment of liberation in that every life.

(Śvetāmbara:) Why is it not stated in the scriptures that a person with a female body does not possess (the first type of) joint?

(Digambara:) (It is so stated as), for example, in the following verse: It has been declared by the Jinas that women born in the *karmabhūmi* have only the last three joints; they cannot have the first three joints. (*Gomatasāra-Karmakāṇḍa*, verse 32)

(Śvetāmbara:) If indeed there is no liberation for women, then how do you account for the fact that the nuns (*āryikā*) of your sect assume the great vows?

(Digambara:) Women assume great vows in only a conventional (or figurative, *upacāra*) sense, in order to establish them in the "family" (i.e. the group of those who renounce the world). Surely a conventional usage does not deserve to be taken as an absolute one, as, for example, in the sentence "This Devadatta is fire," which can only mean that (Devadatta) is cruel (and not that Devadatta is literally fire). Moreover, it is said that a conventional meaning prevails in the absence of the primary meaning and when that is the intention of the speaker.

Moreover, if indeed (as the Śvetāmbaras believe) a nun may attain liberation in that very life, then how is it that in your mendicant order a monk who has been ordained only that very day is worthy of being reverentially greeted by a nun who was ordained a hundred years earlier? Why is it that she is not to be reverentially greeted first by him?

In your doctrine, it is also said that the Tīrthaṅkara Malli was female. But that too is not proper. One becomes a Tīthaṅkara by having first practiced in a former life the sixteen practices beginning with the purification of the right view and not otherwise. A person who possesses the right view can never bind those *karmans* that will produce a female body. Such being the case, how can a Tīrthaṅkara be born a female?

Moreover, if indeed the Tīrthaṅkara Malli or anyone else attained liberation while having been born as a female, then why is it that you do not worship a female image of her?

(Śvetāmbara:) If indeed, as you allege, the foregoing blemishes do exist in women, then what about (the statement in the scriptures that) such women as Sītā, Rukmiṇī, Kuntī, Draupadī, Subhadrā, and others were ordained as Jaina nuns, practiced extraordinary austerities, and were born in the sixteenth heaven?

(Digambara:) This is not a problem. Having returned from that heaven, such women will be reborn as males and then will attain liberation in that life; it is just that there is no liberation for a woman in that very life. But if women attain liberation in some other life (when they are reborn as men), then what fault would there be?

This is the purport of the discussion. One should understand the true nature of things for oneself and should not engage in disputes with others. Why so? In disputes there arise attachment and aversion, which destroy the contemplation of the pure self.

Now, as a conclusion, the author presents the definitive position (on this topic):Therefore, the Jinas have prescribed a mendicant emblem for women that is appropriate to them (i.e., that they must wear clothes). Those women will be called female ascetics (*śramaṇī*, i.e., nuns) who have (good) family, (proper) form and age, and who practice the vows.

Since women cannot achieve liberation in that very life, the Tīrthaṅkaras have declared an appropriate mendicant emblem for them--that is, covering their bodies with clothes. By the word "family" is meant that which is not considered disreputable in the world; hence, she is worthy of being initiated as a nun. The ford "form" means the external features (of body) that show no blemishes--that is, that which conveys the purity of mind that is born of internal freedom from passions, or that which is free from any deformities of the body.

"Age" means that which is free from such inadequacies as being too old, too young, or mentally deficient. A nun should therefore be one who has proper family, form, and age. Such women are called nuns because they practice the conduct that has been laid down in the books of mendicant discipline as being appropriate to them.

52.197 JAYASENA, *Praśnottara*

NCC 13, 112 says "36 questions and answers on Jainadoctrines and religion".

52.198 JAYASENA, *Tātparyavṛtti* on Kundakunda's *Samayasāra*.

This commentary has been edited several times.[212]

53 DEVABHADRA (1161)

NCC 9, p. 115 identifies this "Devabhadra II" as a pupil of Ajitasiṃha and preceptor of Siddhasena". The Siddhasena in question is the commentator on the *Pravacanasāroddhāra,* whose date Johrapurkar, p. 87, gives as 1192. Velankar 1930, 5#1640-41, says he was the teacher of Siddhasena.

53.199 DEVABHADRA, *Pramāṇaprakāśa/*Commentary

NCC 13. Vadekar, JRK p. 268, says it is a work "on Logic (metrical)" and is mentioned by Siddhasena in the commentary mentioned above.

53.200 DEVABHADRA, Commentary on (Śrī)Candrasūri's *Kṣetrasamāsa*

NCC 5, 160.

54 AMBĀPRASĀDA (1163)

On p. 361 of NCC 1, Rev. ed., p. 361, two entries are given

over to persons (or a person?) with this name. One is the author of the work cited as #134 above, the date of which is given to be 1163 A.D., citing *Jainagranthāvalī*, p. 124. The other is a person "described as 'Sacivapravara', author of a C(ommentary)*Kalpalatā,* who is quoted in the *Syādvādaratnākara.*" We are referred to V. Raghavan's "Writers quoted in the Syādvāda", Journal of the Kalinga Historical Society I (1946), p. 255. This *Kalpalatā* and (its) C(ommentary) are "being printed now" (i.e., whenever this citation in NCC I, Rev. ed., was composed) by L. D. Bhāratīya Saṃkriti Vidyā Mandir (Ahmedabad).

54. 201 AMBĀPRASĀDA, *Navatattva(prakaraṇa)/Svopajña Ṭīkā*

Velankar, JRK p. 206, dates its composition at *saṃvat* 1220 (= A.D. 1162).

55 RATNAPRABHĀ SŪRI (1167)

Ratnaprabhā Sūri is reported by Johrapurkar, p. 87, to have been a pupil of Vādideva (or Devasūri), and wrote his most important commentary on his teacher's work. Johrapurkar gives his date as 1167. Velankar, JRK p. 267, calls him "pupil of Devācārya".

55.202 RATNAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Ratnākārāvatārika* on Vādideva's *Pramāṇānayatattvāloka*

Edited several times. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 6, 16, 24 are the three volumes of (BC25.D38), (BC25.D48), and (B162.6.D472). (BC25.R3714 2001) is an edition by Har Govinda Das and Bechara Das, which has a Sanskrit table of contents.

55.203 RATNAPRABHĀ SŪRI, *Doghaṭīkā* on Dharmadāsa's *Upadeśamālā*

NCC II, 351 lists various manuscripts. Velankar, JRK, pp. 49-50, comments: "*Vṛtti* called *Doghaṭṭī*...so called probably owing to the words in the first verse; composed in *saṃvat* 1238" (=1181) "by Ratnaprabhasūri, pupil of Devasūri of the Bṛhad Gaccha". The beginning and end of this work are provided on pp. 206-208 of Pattan I by C. D. Dalal, who says its author's date is *samvaṭ* 1293, which will = 1236 A.D., which suggests this work may be by another Ratnaprabha than the author that we are considering in this section (or that someone has read a *saṃvat* date as an A.D. date).

55. 204 RATNAPRABHA SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* on the *Rājapraśnīyasūtra*

See JRK, p. 330.

56 JINABHADRA SŪRI (1170)

NCC 7, p. 262 identifies the author of *Apavargamālā* (below) as a "pupil of Jinapriya, Jinadatta and Jinavallabha Sūris of Kharataragaccha." The last two are ascribed to the 12th century at NCC 1, rev. Ed., p. 253.

56.205 JINABHADRA SŪRI, *Apavarga(nāma)mālā(kośa)*

NCC I, 252 cites manuscripts. JRK p. 227 says it is also called *Pañcavargaparihāranāmamālā* and "is a kind of dictionary"; also cites manuscripts.

56.206 JINABHADRA SŪRI, *Guṇasthānakramāroha* with *Lokamālā* thereon

NCC VI, 57 cites manuscripts.

57 MAHEŚVARA (SŪRI) (1170)

NCC 12, p. 4: "pupil of Vādidevasūri".

57.207 MAHEŚVARA (SŪRI), *Sukhaprabodhinī* on Municandra's *Āvaśyakasaptati*

NCC 12, p. 4 cites manuscripts. Velankar at p. 241 of JRK, says that Vajrasena Gaṇi, who is evidently different from the *guru* of Hariṣeṇa, the author of the *Karūraprakara*, helped in the composition of this commentary, and cites additional manuscript locations.

58 PADMANANDIN (PAÑCAVISĪ) (1175?)

NCC 7, p. 121 says: "Second quarter of [the] twelfth cent.; contemporary of Nimbadeva, feudatory of Śīlahāra Gaṇḍarāditya." Twenty-five of his works are published in PDV.

Yajnesvar S. Shastri, in Traverses on pp. 190-193, considers the question of the identity of this Padmanandin, specifically of his date. "This Padmanandin clearly mentions his guru's name as Vīranandin...It is very difficult to fix the exact date of this Padmanandin, still we can say that he flourished in the first or second quarter of the 12th century A.D. on the basis of the following observations. Out of 95 small treatises of Padmanandin *Ekatvasaptati* is very famous and it is often quoted by Jainawriters. We find verses quoted from *Ekatvasaptati* in the works of 12th century writers such as Jayasena and Padmaprabha. Jayasena flourished in the beginning of the 12th century and commented upon *Pañcāstikāya* and Padmaprabha Maladhārideva flourished in the middle of the 12th century A. D. and commented on *Niyamasāra*...We also find verses quoted from Padmanandin's work in Āṣādhara's *Svopajñavṛtti* on *Dharmāmṛta*, who lived in the 13th century A.D....The Kannada commentary on *Ekatvasaptati* clearly mentions that Padmanandin is a contemporary of Nimbadeva who flourished in 1136 A.D..."

The 25 works comprising the contents of Padmanandin's *Pañcaviṃśati* comprise the works numbered below.

58.208 PADMANANDIN, *Paramātmaprakāśa*

NCC 11, 178 says "in Prakrit prose and verse" and cites at least one manuscript (which may not be by this author).

58.209 PADMANANDIN, *Ātmabodha* or *Ālocana*

Yajneshwar S. Shastri, in Traverses has edited and translated this work in pp. 198-208 and provides a summary on pp. 195-196, which we reproduce here.

Summary by Yajneshwar S. Shastri

"The way shown by the Jina leads one to the state of self-realization. Self-awareness is nothing but a state of complete desirelessness and the realization of sameness of all (*samatā*). Jina is a perfect soul and treasure of bliss. Meditation on him, with an unflinching faith, constantly remembering his name and following the path of three jewels, which consists of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct, one attains the highest object of life (i.e. liberation). Firm faith in Jina will save one from the fear of birth, old age and death. Jina is like a good parasol of shower-bath, for the worldly people who are tormented by the strong heat of mundane life. Everything in the world is momentary and worthless, Jina--a perfect soul--is the only Reality, and knowledge, faith, bliss and vigor belong to this Reality. If Jina--the ultimate Reality--is realized, then everything else automatically becomes known and nothing remains to be attained. Thus, Jina should only be prayed (to), remembered and saluted."

"Whatever blemishes occur through negligence and doubt in the practice of religious duties and whatever sins occur thereby will become null and void after confessing one's own faults in the presence of Jina. Jineśa is omniscient, knows

everything. Still, for purification of one's own minds, one has to confess one's own faults in the presence of (the) omniscient Lord. The main purpose of self-confession is to divest one's self from similar faults further and attain internal purification. Man's mind is very perplexed, deluded and thus, man commits endless faults. And it is well-nigh impossible to expiate them. It is only possible by withdrawing the mind from external objects and uniting oneself with the Universal *ātman* by deep meditation and solemn contemplation. It is the only method to attain to the state of Jina. Mind is very fickle and (the) nature of it is such that even after renouncing all worldly objects and taking shelter in (a) forest, it runs towards worldly objects. Control over the mind is possible only through concentrating it on the Supreme Self."

"This mundane life is full of miseries and *nirvāṇa* is the only happiness. In this transitory world the only solace is the Jina's feet--the highest indeterminate *brahman*. The state of Jina is the state of *nirvāṇa*, eternal bliss. *Nirvāṇa* is nothing but the realization of one's own self. It is the realization of pure knowledge which is indescribable in terms of human language. In this state, the self is neither gross, neither male nor female nor neuter; neither heavy nor light. It is a formless state of pure absolute consciousness. It is a body that is affected by birth, old age, disease, agony and death. The self is pure spirit and untouched by all these. Thus attachment to everything including the body has to be given up. It is on account of enjoyment of worldly objects though senses and the mind that karmic particles enter the soul and the individual self to the wheel of mundane life. Attachment and aversion are the root causes of *karmabandha*. They are very powerful enemies on the path of spiritual progress. Thus, attachment and aversion have to be avoided. Duality thy name is *saṃsāra* (=mundane life). Liberation--the state of immortality--is the non-dual state, free from al kinds of dualities. One has to reach from duality to non-duality, from lower to higher. The real is above all duality and

is beyond speech and intellect. It can be realized only in the innermost self of all."

"The rigorous path of conduct preached by Jina is very difficult to follow in these days of Kālī. The contemporary environments are not favorable for practice of code of conduct. So, unflinching devotion towards Jina alone works as a boat to cross over the ocean of mundane life. It is Jina's feet which will make one free from the cycle of births and deaths and bestow liberation. Even recitation of this hymn which is written in praise of Jina will lead one to the permanent abode of bliss."

The team of A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jainahas also summarized this work on pp. 158-168 of PDV. Here it is.

"Recounting, Reporting or Confessing One's Acts. Glorifying the great qualities of Jina, the author offers a sort of prayer, recounting, repeating or confessing his shortcomings and defaults in thoughts, words and acts, direct as well as indirect; and seeks shelter of the Jina with a view that they might be *mithyā*, null and void in effect. It is a self-analysis and self-introspection in the presence of Jina who knows everything; and the purpose is to divest oneself of similar faults further and attain internal purification. The mind is often perplexed and deluded, and endless defaults are there in life; and it is well-nigh impossible to expiate them. It is not possible, at present, to experience self-realization. *Saṃsāra* is *dvaita* and *mokṣa* is *advaita*: one has to each from one to the other. The rigorous path of conduct preached by Jina is difficult in these days, so devotion or *bhakti* towards Jina alone is one's rescue or shelter (30). Recitation of this *ālocana* leads one to the abode of
."

58.210 PADMANANDIN, *Dharmopadeśāmṛta*

The work is printed on pp. 1-77 of PDV. The summary is found on p. 3 of the Introduction. The work totals 198 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"I. The Nectar of Religious Instruction: This is a lengthy disquisition on *dharma*, partly systematic and partly anthological in its makeup, and written in a fluent style and high didactic tone. It opens with (a) *maṅgala* glorifying Ṛṣabha, Jina in meditation, Śāntinātha etc., who are the promulgators of *dharma*. '*Dharma*' has varying connotations in different contexts. It means compassion to living beings; it is twofold, for laymen and for monks; it consists of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct; it is tenfold *uttamakṣamā* etc.; and ultimately, it is the spiritual manifestation, pure and blissful, and divested of the deluding distractions of mind, speech and body (7)."

"Compassion or kindness to life is most important, the veritable basis of all religious life, which, for a layman, is covered by 11 *pratimās* (14) for the practice of which must be relinquished the 7 *vyāsanas*, *dyūta* etc., which are obviously foul, anti-social and full of sin. The *yatidharma*, the religious duty of a monk, consists of fivefold *ācāra*, tenfold *dharma*, *saṃyama* or control, *mūla-* and *uttara-guṇas* etc. culminating into *samādhi-maraṇa*: this enables one to reach final bliss (38)."

"Attachment for everything, including the body, has to be given up: negligence, passions and possessions are all harmful for spiritual progress. An omniscient teacher is not accessible now; but his words are available in the scriptures which must be followed. Great monks who practice equanimity, forbearance etc. and meditation deserve respect and glorification. Human birth is difficult to be obtained; if it is there, the best advantage of it has to be taken for the practice of penance and consequent termination of *saṃsāra* which is full of temptations. The words of Jina are a guide to all, and enable one to experience the eternal sentient effulgence. The unique nature of the sentient Real has to be realized: it is separate from and above everything else which is all worthless. One should seek shelter of those

who have realized this. This exposition is concluded with eloquent glorification of *dharma*."

58.211 PADMANANDIN, *Dhānopadeśana*

PDV pp. 78-92. The summary is on p. 4 of the Introduction. The work consists of 54 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Instruction on Charity. King Śreyasṭhin is the ideal example of a donor who gave gift of food to the first Tīrthakara with a religious object. A layman incurs a good bit of sin in his domestic and vocational routine: pious giving of gifts is a balancing and redeeming feature for him. So, he should give food etc. to a worthy recipient. The houses and house-holders who have no contacts with monks are not in any way commendable. The merit acquired by giving (*dāna*) is highly fruitful, and hence wealth must be expended in that direction without waiting for this or that, which is all uncertain. The riches spent on temples, worship, entertaining monks and sustaining the learned and on redressing the poverty of the miserable: that alone belongs to oneself and the rest goes to others. A man's life without charity is not worth living: the fourfold gifts given properly yield great benefit here and elsewhere."

58.212 PADMANANDIN, *Anityapañcāśat*

PDV pp. 93-110. The summary is on p. 4 of the Introduction. The work consists of 55 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Fifty Stanzas on Transitoriness. It is expounded here with suitable illustrations and similes that the body, relatives, pleasures etc. are all transitory: the end certainly comes according to one's *karmans*, so one should not lament over one's lot. Meeting in this life is like that of birds for a night on the tree. Meeting and separation have to be faced with detachment, without any joy or sorrow. One should ever be devoted to *dharma*."

58.213 PADMANANDIN, *Ekatvasaptati*

PDV pp. 111-124. The summary is on p. 4 of the Introduction. The work consists of 80 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Seventy Stanzas on Oneness or Separateness (of a self). The eternal *paramātman* characterized by sentiency, bliss and existence is glorified; and the sentient effulgence is hailed with reverence. The sentient Real, the self, is, like fire in wood, in every one of us; but, being under long-standing delusion, one does not realize this. If a beneficial Teacher explains it, a few respect it, but most behave like the blind feeling the elephant. The *vītarāga* shows the correct path, and a *bhavya*, by virtue of his *labdhis*, is on the path of liberation consisting of three jewels. The sentient Real alone is worth realizing by experience. Attachment and aversion (*rāga* and *dveṣa*) have to be avoided, and the sentient Real is above dualities and too great to be described in words. It is realized in the Great Meditation which is variously named and described."

58.214 PADMANANDIN, *Yatibhāvanāṣṭaka*

PDV pp. 125-127. The summary is on p. 4 of the Introduction. The work consists of 9 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Eight Stanzas of Reflections on *munis*. The author glorifies the *yatis*, *munis* or monks by specifying their outstanding

qualities. They have accepted renunciation, and are free from attachment even for the body. They control their senses and concentrate their mind on the self. They practice penances and are plunged in meditation even under unfavorable climate and adverse conditions."

58.215 PADMANANDIN, *Upāsakasaṃskāra*

PDV pp. 128-137. The summary is on pp. 4-5 of the Introduction. The work consists of 62 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Molding of a Layman. This is almost a manual on householder's *dharma*. Ṛṣabha preached the *dharma* and king Śreyaṣthin was the first to practice it. *Mokṣa* is reached through *dharma* constituted of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct, and practiced in two ways, one by a *nirgrantha*, a monk, and the other by a *gṛhin, śrāvaka*, householder or layman. The *śrāvaka* or layman is the support of the temple, monk, piety and charity: these constitute the religious routine today. He has to observe six duties, *devapūjā* etc. (7); has to be a religious balanced and integrated personality; and must cultivate *sāmāyika* (8) which is possible only by giving up the *vyasanas* (10). He should also practice 8 *mūlaguṇas* and 12 vows etc., and live in such a place and practice such a profession as will not come in the way of his religious life. He should practice *ahiṃsā*, be philanthropic and sociable, reflect on 12 *anuprekṣas* and be intent on tenfold *dharma*. He should meditate inwardly on his pure self and practice outwardly kindness to all beings. Lastly, his mind should ever be fixed on the realization of sentient effulgence which is separate from everything else."

58.216 PADMANANDIN, *Deśavratoddyotana*

PDV pp. 138-146. The summary is on p. 5 of the Introduction. The work consists of 27 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Light on the *Deśa-* or *Aṇu-Vratas*". It is an exposition on the career of a *śrāvaka*. By penances and through meditation all the *karmans* must be consumed and liberation attained: that is the highest object for the human being. If that is found beyond the reach of any individual, he should lead the life of a sincere *śrāvaka* or layman by practicing the prescribed code of behavior (5-6). Giving gifts to the worthy is a great balancing virtue for him. *Śrāvakas* are a great support of the community life, both social and religious (20). With devotion, it is they who build temples, consecrate images of Jina and celebrate religious festivities: and thus, through *dharma*, they are on the path of *mokṣa*."

58.217 PADMANANDIN, *Siddhastuti*

PDV pp. 147-157. The summary is on p. 5 of the Introduction. The work consists of 29 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Prayer to *Siddha*. In a dignified style, the author offers salutations or prayers to *Siddha* soliciting shelter from him and incidentally presenting a fine discourse on *Siddha*, his status, his achievements, his great qualities (especially *ananta-darśana, -jñāna, -vīrya* and *-sukha*) his being the eternal sentient effulgence etc. All the excellences of *Siddha* cannot be comprehended, much less can they be described; and so even to remember his name with *bhakti* or devotion is beneficial."

58.218 PADMANANDIN, *Sadbodhacandrodaya*

PDV pp. 169-180. The summary is on p. 6 of the Introduction. The work consists of 50 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Moon-rise of Real Knowledge. This is an elegant exposition on the sentient Real *cit-tattva* = *ātmatattva*, also called *haṃsa* [*(a)haṃ sa*]. Though this Real is known to some, it is difficult to be described: very few experience it and attain liberation. Even men of learning get deluded in comprehending it: it is a fact of experience wherein other faculties do not function. It is in oneself, but the deluded ones wander for it outside. It is something unique, though in the midst of all that is commonplace. *Karman* is different and the self is different: this is the pure meditation whereby one get emancipation. The deluded soul has wandered long in sleep in the *saṃsāra*, and now it needs to be woke up by the moon-rise of Real knowledge: the great *yogin* is exerting himself to achieve this."

58.219 PADMANANDIN, *Niścayapañcāśat*

PDV pp. 181-192. The summary is on p. 6 of the Introduction. The work consists of 62 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Fifty Stanzas on the Real". This is a discourse on the experience of self-realization from the Real (*niścaya*) point of view. The body is ephemeral, and its contact with the self temporary. The self, however, is real and eternal; its experience, its realization as unique, sentient effulgence is beyond thoughts and words. When the mind is separate from physical and other distractions and plunged in the ocean of joy, this sentient effulgence dawns in one's experience. It is rare and unique, and can be comprehended only from the *niścaya* point of view wherein the three jewels (*ratnatraya*) are realized as the self itself. Body is different, *karman* is different from the self: this experience of isolation or separateness is important. When all the distractions are eschewed, intelligence suddenly flashes into that sentient effulgence of self- realization like moonlight on the ocean when the moon rises. When the distinction of *sva* and *para* is grasped, the self is realized. Even the ideas of 'bound' and 'liberated' presume duality, so one has to rise above them to attain self-realization."

58.220 PADMANANDIN, *Brahmacaryarakṣāvarti*

PDV pp. 193-200. The summary is on pp. 6-7 of the Introduction. The work consists of 22 verses.

Summarized by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"A Medicinal Wick Preserving Celibacy. A woman's body is full of blemishes, its allurements are deceptive, and any attachment for it is a fall for a monk who is aspiring after self-realization. One should be engrossed in one's self relinquishing all attachment, conquering senses and treating all women as mothers and sisters. Self-restraint is possible through suitable diet etc., and all incentive to sex-passion has to be abandoned: then and thus alone human life is made fruitful by practicing severe penances which, in due course, lead one to the bliss of self-realization. The concluding verse explains how this *prakaraṇa* is a veritable medicinal wick."

The next four works in PDV are hymns (*stotra, stuti*) praising, respectively, Ṛṣabha, Jina, the *śrutadevatā* and the twenty-four Tīrthankaras.

58.221 PADMANANDIN, *Suprabhātāṣṭaka*

PDV pp. 233-236. The summary is on p. 7 of the Introduction. The work consists of 8 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Eight Stanzas on the Blessed Morning. The blessed morning has a symbolic meaning here. When the night and the consequent sleep of the *ghātiyākarmans* have reached their termination, the two eyes of omniscience, *jñāna* [knowledge] and *darśana* [vision], open for the Jina: his omnipresent knowledge enlightens the whole universe, all perverted views are dispelled and the right path is shown to all for their spiritual benefit. It is this *suprabhāta*, the dawning of omniscient blessedness, that is glorified here in a florid style."

The next three works in PDV (not summarized here) concern "Praise addressed to Śāntinātha", "Eight Stanzas for Offering Worship to Jina" and "Eight Stanzas Soliciting Divine Mercy".

58.222 PADMANANDIN, *Kriyākoṇḍacūlikā*

PDV pp. 245-249. The summary is on pp. 8-9 of the Introduction. The work consists of 18 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"A *Cūlikā* (crest, appendix or concluding recitation) at the Close of the Routine of Duties...Devotional thoughts and prayers directed towards Jinendra achieve [mastery of] all the [desired end]s (*nikhilārthasiddhi*). Devotion to the feet of Jina is the highest solicitation and the greatest benefit. Study of all scriptures and practice of all conduct are not possible today; and hence, at present, devotion (*bhakti*) to Jina is the highest panacea, a gradual step to *mokṣa*. The feet of Jinendra are the highest shelter wherethrough one might get the threefold jewel and be free from all evils. Whatever blemishes have occurred through *pramāda* (carelessness, negligence, lack of vigilance etc.) in the practice of religious virtues and whatever sin has accrued thereby, the aspirant appeals to Jina, should become null and void by his remembering the feet of the latter. The Jinavāṇi [the speech of the Jina] characterized by the glow of *syādvāda* and shedding light on the entire range of reality, is the supreme authority and *pramāṇa*: she is like a mother who should overlook the aspirant's shortcomings in the prayers offered. This *cūlikā*, if recited thrice daily, eliminates all the blemishes in the daily routine arising out of physical, verbal and mental limitations of an individual."

58.223 PADMANANDIN, *Ekatvabhāvanādaśaka*

PDV pp. 251-252. The summary is on p. 9 of the Introduction. The work consists of 11 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Ten Stanzas of Reflection on Oneness or Separateness. One who realizes oneself, one's own self, the great effulgent and sentient principle, is a great *yogin* who is not afraid of *karmans* and who crosses this *saṃsāra*. Thus one attains the highest bliss of liberation which is immune from attachment and aversion.."

58.224 PADMANANDIN, *Paramārthaviṃśati*

PDV pp. 252-259. The summary is on p. 9 of the Introduction. The work consists of 20 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Twenty Stanzas Dealing with the Highest Object. In this *saṃsāra*, that the self is unique and separate from *karman* (*advaita*) and also the seed of the tree of liberation is not realized. This self-realization is characterized by infinite-quaternity (*anantacatuṣṭhaya*) and is above all worldly botherations. This state of isolation is an abode of infinite

knowledge; therein one's perfect independence (*ekākitā*) is realized; and therein the self is realized (*so'ham*), eschewing passions and possessions. The body may be weak, the times may be bad--still nothing should come in the way of concentrating one's mind on that pure sentient spirit, leaving aside foreign adjuncts and outward attachments. If the Teacher's words burn bright, giving joy, in one's heart, all other considerations are subservient. When the *karmans* are realized to be separate from the self, even the ideas of happiness and misery disappear. When the mind is firm, all other distractions lose their effect; the pure sentient self is realized; there is no room for any attachment or desire; and it is a state which words cannot adequately describe."

58.225 PADMANANDIN, *Śarīrāṣṭaka*

PDV pp. 261-263. The summary is on pp. 9-10 of the Introduction. The work consists of 8 verses.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye and H. L. Jain

"Eight Stanzas on Body. The human body is a hut, full of dirt and perishable by nature: a sensible person would never be over-attached to it and try to make it pure by water and sandal paste. It is not fit for enjoyment; but it should be yoked to the practice of penances and used as a boat to cross this worldly current. It should treasure the correct instructions of the Teacher. Contact with this body is the veritable worldly life; so one should not go on nourishing it and be attached to it."

The last two works in PDV concern respectively bathing and *brahmacarya*, i.e., the proper approach to sexuality.

59 NARACANDRA UPĀDHYĀYA (1175)

According to NCC 9, p. 353, Naracandra Upādhyāya was a

"pupil of Siṃhasūri and grand pupil of Uddyotanasūri of Kāśadrahagaccha." The same page states that he completed a (nonphilosophical) work "in 1167 A.D. during the reign of Kumārapāla." On the other hand, Velankar at JRK p. 275, while citing his teacher and grand-teacher as the same as above, says he composed a work called *Praśnaśataka* in *saṃvat* 1324, i.e., 1267 A.D.

59.226 NARACANDRA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Jñānacaturviṃśatikā*

NCC 9, p. 253 says this work is edited by Aryendra Sarma from Hyderabad 1956. According to JRK p. 147 the author was a pupil of Siṃhasūri of the Kāsadraha Gaccha.

59.227 NARACANDRA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Praśnaśataka/Avacūri*

As noted above, Velankar at JRK p. 275 dates this work to 1267, cites manuscript locations.

60 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI or CANDRASENA (SŪRI) (1178)

NCC 6, p. 373: "A pupil of Maladhārin Hemacandra of Harṣapurīyagaccha and preceptor of Devabhadrasūri (author of Commentary *Vṛtti* on *Laghusaṅgrahaṇī*). Also known as Pārśvadeva Gaṇi. He is said to be a pupil of of Pradyumna Sūri (Johrapurkar p. 86). He was also a pupil of Maladhārin Hemacandra, and succeeded him on the seat. JRK p. 390 says he was (also?) a pupil of Śīlabhadra of the Candra Kula. Velankar 1930, under #1484, says: "In his very able Introduction to Dalal's Catalogue, Pandit Lalchand gives many of our author's dated works on p. 21. According to the information collected by him, the author's earlier name was Prāśvadevagaṇi. He composed his Jitakalpacūrṇivyākhyā in *samvāt* 1227; cf. Peterson, Reports, V. Extracts, p. 128. He made a *tīrthoddhāra* in the Vimalavasahi temple on Mount Abu in *saṃvat* 1206."

Sagarmal Jaina (in the Introduction to Vinayasagara) says

that Śricandra Sūri was present when in 1204 *vikrama* era, the Minister Prithvipala had liberated Vimala vasahī, Abu", presumably referring to the same trip mentioned above. He mentions several of this author's works written during the period 1173-1228 *vīra saṃvat*.

60.228 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Vivaraṇa* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Anekāntajayapātakavṛtti*

See H. R. Kapadia, ed., in GOS volumes. 88 and 105 (891.08 G118).

60.229 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Dharmabindu*[213]

60.230 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, Commentary on Abhayadeva's *Āgamastottarī*

Edited Ahmedabad (?).

60.231 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, Commentary on Śivaśarman's *Bandhaśataka*

Edited (B162.5.S58).

60.232 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

Cf. Jinaratnakosa 45.

60.233 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Candrasena's *Utpādādisiddha/Svopajñavṛtti*[214]

NCC 6, p. 373 says it was "composed in 1151 A.D.". See also JRK p. 46.

60.234 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Ṭippaṇa* on Hemacandra's *Āvaśyakavṛttivyākhyā*

NCC II, 191 cites Peterson 3,. Introduction, p. 14, which says it was written in *saṃvat* 1232. For the commentary on the

Caityavandanā section see NCC 7, p. 83. See also JRK p. 38.

60.235 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Kṣetrasamāsa*

NCC V, 160.

60.236 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Durgapadavyākhyā* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Nandīsūtravivaraṇa* [215]

Wiles says it has "3,300 *granthas*."

60.237 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Saṃgrahaṇīratna* or *Trailokyadīpikā*

NCC 6, 373. According to JRK p. 409 it deals with the geography of the world. It has 274 *gāthās* divided into seven chapters. JRK p. 409-410 gives many manuscript citations.[216]

"The object of the work is to present an account of the worlds of gods. Nārakas or the beings of the hell, men and beasts, referring to this span of life, habitation and corporeal formation are described. In the case of the man and beast, the account of the habitation is omitted. The work is stated to be an abstract of the *Saṃgrahaṇī* by Jinabhadragaṇi which was swollen into a huge bulk of *gaṭhās* of the commentaries and other interpolated *gāthās*."[217]

60.238 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Laghusaṃgraha*

Edited twice.

60.239 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Municandra Sūri's *Upadeśapada-Sukhasambodhanī*[218]

60.240 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Nirayāvaliyāsūtra*[219]

60.241 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Caityavandanāsūtra*

Manuscripts cited at JRK p. 126, including Jesalmere No. 943.

60.242 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Śrāddhapratikramaṇasūtra*

Composed in *saṃvat* 1222 (=1166), says Velankar at JRK p. 390. He gives *saṃvat* 1299 (=1242 A.D.) as the date of one manuscript.

60.243 (ŚRĪ)CANDRA SŪRI, *Laghupravacanasāroddhāra*

JRK p. 335 says that it contains 115 *gāthās*, and that a manuscript exists in a private library in Baroda.

61 HEMACANDRA (KALIKĀLASARVAJÑA) (1180)

A. B. Dhruva provides an exhaustive account of the life of this very important and influential philosopher. Noting that, as is typical with such persons, a great many stories have cropped up about Hemacandra, he tries to put forward "a few indisputable facts": "Hemacandra was born in 1134 *vikrama saṃvat*, that is, 1078 A.C. at Dandhukā in a family belonging to Moḍha Vāia caste. His birth-name was Caṅgadeva or Cāṃgadeva, his father's Cacca, Cāca or Cāciga, and his mother's Pāhinī."[220] He recounts some stories about the young Caṅgadeva's promise and eventual entry into the monastic order, where he received a new name, "Somacandra". The young man "became a great scholar. a few years later in recognition of his profound scholarship, his old *ācārya* gave him the *mantra* and title of Sāri, with a change of his name from Somacandra to Hemacandra."[221]

"When Hemacandra visited Aṇahillapura, the capital of Gojara, he was introduced to Siddharāja. Siddharāja, who had seen a work on grammar composed by Bhoja, King of Mālava, was anxious to see a similar work produced in Gujarat. When he consulted his literary advisers, all eyes fell on Hemacandra. Hemacandra undertook to prepare the work. When completed, the new grammar was carried with great *éclat* in a procession on the back of an elephant, and copies of it were sent to

different provinces of India. The work, which was named Siddhahemacandraśabdānuśāsana after the combined names of the patron and the author, consists of *sūtras*, with such appendices as belonged to Pāṇini's grammar...together with *vṛttis*, long and short, by Hemacandra himself. During Siddharāja's reign, Hemacandra also composed two other works, *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* and *Anekārthasaṃgraha* on the lines of similar sections in the famous *Kośa* of Amarasiṃha, the Buddhist lexicographer whose work was read then as now by Brāhmaṇas as well as Buddhists."[222]

"While Hemacandra's influence on Siddharāja, 'a latitudinarian in religious views,' was considerable, that on Kumārapāla" (Siddharāja's successor) "was immense. Under his influence Kumārapāla not only gave up meat-eating, but promulgated the principles of *ahiṃsā* throughout his kingdom, visited Jaina temples and celebrated Jaina festivals."[223]

For a more recent and more extensive, indeed exhaustive, account of Hemacandra's life see Olle Qvarnström (tr.), *The Yogaśāstra of Hemacandra: A Twelfth-Century Handbook of Śvetāmbara Jainism* (Harvard Oriental Series 60, Cambirdge, Mass, London 2002), pp. 1-5.

Kristi Wiley[224] reports: "Hemacandra (1089-1172 C. E.). Śvetāmbara mendicant leader and consolidator of Jainaliterature and philosophy, whose epithet was "Omniscient One of the Kāli Yuga". He was born into a Jainamerchant family in Dhandhukā, a village near Ahmedabad, Gujarat, and was named Caṅgadeva. He was given to a Śvetāmbhara *ācārya* named Devacandra and was initiated as Muni Somacandra while still a young boy. After mastering the various traditional branches of Indian learning, he was appointed *ācārya* in 1108 and was given the name Hemacandra."

"Jayasiṃha Siddharāja, a king in the Caulukya dynasty who ruled Gujarat from his capital in Patan from 1092-1141, appointed him as a court scholar and historian. He commissioned Hemacandra to write a history of the dynasty

and a Sanskrit grammar called *Siddhahaima*, which is still used by Śvetāmbara mendicants today. When dissension arose in the royal family, it is reported that Hemacandra hid the king's nephew Kumārapāla under a pile of manuscripts as he was fleeing for his life. After Siddharāja's death, Kumārapāla returned to Patan and Hemacandra validated his claim to the throne. Hemacandra persuaded the king to abstain from meat and alcohol and to issue edicts banning the killing of animals in his kingdom."

"Hemacandra's most important works are *Triṣāṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita* ("The Lives of Sixty-Three Illustrious persons"), the largest surviving example of the Jaina literary genre called Universal History, and *Yogaśāstra*, in which various aspects of yoga are discussed, providing a summary of his views on Jainism."

Hemacandra wrote a great many works, it is said "three crores and a half verses", including besides grammars lexicons (*kośa*), poetry (*kāvya*), prosody (*anuśāsana*), as well as biographies of great Jaina monks.

This Hemacandra is not to be confused with Maladhārin Hemacandra, who lived a half a century earlier and whose works were identified previously. There probably remain some confusion about which Hemacandra was the author of precisely which of the works cited there.

61.244 HEMACANDRA, *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā*

Our "E" is the edition in Dhruva. The "T", by F. W. Thomas, is Flower-Spray. The summary is by the Editor. The first three *sūtras* are invocatory. The attempt of Thomas to give a word-for-word rendition of each *sūtra* proves practically unintelligible: we have given instead (for the most part) the accounts provided by Dhruva in E.

4 (E10; T19) "Things are of themselves...capable of co-ordination with things of their own class, and differentiation from things of a different class; their nature is not to be explained by assuming realities (universal and particular) other than the things themselves. Those fools err who declare that the two, universal and particular, are distinct realities, since they are not such." (E, pp. lxxii-lxxiv)

5 (E13; T22) "All things including *dīpa* (light) and *ākāśa* (space) (generally believed to be non-eternal (*anitya*) and eternal (*nitya)* respectively are subject to the law of *syādvāda*--that is to say, a light which is regarded as an exemplar of non-eternal things is also eternal, and space which is regarded as a type of eternal things is also non-eternal. All reality, according to Jainas, is both eternal and non-eternal, one might almost say, at once, although from different points of view, so that there is no logical contradiction."(E, pp. lxxxiv-lxxxv)

6 (E21; T29) "(1) There is some maker of the world; (2) He is one; (3) He is everywhere; (3a) He knows everything; (4) He is self-dependent; (5) He is eternal." (E, p. 55)

7 (E31; T36) "We never perceive three things, one binding the other two, like cement binding the stones. Inherence *samavāya*, it is said, is one, eternal and all-pervasive. If so, the moment one thing perished, its inherence would also perish, and with it all things in the world to which it belonged!" (E, p. xcii)

8 (E34; T40) "1. *Sattā* (the highest *sāmānya* or universal)--which is supposed to reside not in all that exists...but in certain reals only, viz., *dravya* (substances), *guṇa* (qualities) and *karman* (motions), the remaining (Vaiśeṣika categories) being denied the right.

8.2. "*Caitanya* (consciousness), which one would expect to be regarded as the very essence of self, is (for Vaiśeṣika) something different from the self (*ātman*). But in the case of the other varieties of *pramā* (knowledge), so far as the adventitious character of cognition is concerned, the position is the same, viz., one *jñāna* (awareness) through the working of the internal organ (*manas*) causes another awareness...to come

into a self.

8.3. "Liberation of a self is not a positive state of *saṃvit* (consciousness) and *ānanda* (joy), but a negative condition in which there is no consciousness and no joy. (E, p. xciii)

9 (E48; T52) "The doctrine next examined is that of the *vibhutva* [omnipresence] of the self--that a self (*ātman*) is everywhere--a doctrine which on the face of it, say the Jains, is contrary to our experience. For, all are agreed that a thing must be where its quality is found, e.g., *ghaṭa* (a pot) exists where its form exists and not elsewhere. (E, p. xcvi)

10 (E54-55; T57) "That in this world, where men are naturally inclined towards disputes and are anxious to babble out their so-called wisdom, the sage of the heretics should injure the hearts of others by preaching to them false doctrines is indeed a singular mark of his dispassionateness! (Dhruva's translation, E118)

11 (E61; T63) "*Hiṃsā* (killing), even though it may be enjoined by the Vedas, cannot produce *dharma* (religious merit). A general rule such as 'No living being should be killed (injured)' can have no exception in any other sphere. The idea of the heretics is like the desire to get sovereignty for one's self by performing the ceremony of killing one's own son. (Dhruva's translation, E126).

12 (E73; T73) "Hemacandra says that the doctrine of the self-revelation of *jñāna* is a perfectly sound proposition and yet some weak-kneed philosophers have succumbed to the criticism leveled against it by their opponents, which they need not have done. (E, p. ciii)

13 (E77; T78) "If *māyā* is, there arises the dualism of Brahman and *māyā*. If *māyā* is not, how could the manifold world be explained? To say that there is *māyā* (something that is not real) and that it can do something is equivalent to saying that a woman is barren and that she is a mother! (Dhruva's translation, E144)

14 (E84; T84) "Things (*vācya*), though many, are also one; though one, they are also many. So are the words denoting them (*vācaka*) both one and many. Those who are not 'yours', i.e. the heretics, in considering things and words to be of a different nature from what is mentioned above, are mistaken. (Dhruva's translation, E153)

15 (E94; T93) "Here are a few of the innumerable absurd propositions maintained by the Sāṃkhyas: (1) That *cit (puruṣa)* does not function in the cognition of the objective world. (2) That *buddhi* is *jaḍa*, i.e. an unconscious principle. (3) That *ākāśa*, etc. spring from the *tanmātras*, i.e. the essences of *śabda* etc. (4) That *bandha* and *mokṣa* do not belong to *puruṣa*. (Dhruva's translation, E157)

16 (E101; T100) "The relation of cause and effect cannot be one of simultaneity; nor can an effect come into existence after the cause is dead. Monism cannot account for knowledge being the knowledge *of* things. Thus, the jugglery of Sugata (Buddha) has been torn to pieces. (Dhruva's translation, p. 182)

17 (E115; T112) "An obvious objection which is taken to the doctrine (of *śūnyavāda)* is that it leaves no ground even for itself to stand upon, its only logical position being dead silence. (E, p. cxvii)

18 (E122; T119) "Greatly audacious is that opponent of yours who desires to hold (the doctrine of) *kṣaṇabhaṅga* (the momentary perishing of everything), while remaining unmindful of the bad consequences which would thereby stare him in the face, viz., (that) (1) what is done passing away into nothingness, leaving no consequence behind, (2) experiencing the results of acts for which one has not been responsible, (3) impossibility of life hereafter, (4) impossibility of emancipation from *saṃsāra*, (5) impossibility of memory. (Dhruva's translation, p. 212)

19 (E127; T122) "The *vāsanā* (psychic impression, trace) and that *kṣaṇasaṃtati* (series of *jñānas* or ideas [that inform the person]) do not fit in, whether they are supposed to be identical or distinct or neither. Therefore, the opponents should

rest upon your words, on the analogy of the little birds who fly away from the mast of a ship, yet, unable to see land, return to the same. (Dhruva's translation, E219)

20 (E130; T126) "The two principles of the Cārvāka (here, *nāstikas*) which are criticized are:

(1) That *pratyakṣa* (perception) is the only *pramāṇa*; not even *anumāna* (inference).

(2) That there is no soul beyond the physical body, and consequently, there is no moral responsibility and no life after death (*bhūtacidvāda*). (E, p. cxix)

21 (E133-134; T129) "(Hemacandra) asserts here the Jaina doctrine of Reality as possessed of *utpāda* (origination), *vyaya* (decay) and *dhrauvya* (persistence) as against those who, obsessed by the phenomena of the first two, overlook the third. (E, p. cxx)

22 (E136; T132) "Reality is possessed of innumerable characters; it is not possible to explain it in any other way. So, your proofs are like roars of a lion which frighten away antelopes, namely, heretics. (Dhruva's translation, p. 235)

23 (E138; T134) "When integrated, Reality is without characters; when differentiated, it is without a substance. You have fully seen the truth of Seven Modes which is expressed according to different points of view--a truth which is known by supremely wise men only. (Dhruva's translation, p. 239)

24 (E148; T142) "The author now explains how the synthesis of opposites recommended in the previous stanza does not involve any contradiction, inasmuch as the opposites are conditioned by *upādhis* and are relative to them. (E, p. cxxi)

25 (E151; T145) "The *saptabhaṅgī*, be it remembered, gives only the forms of the propositions. The principle has to be applied to actual problems of philosophy on which various schoolmen stand divided owing to their viewpoints being partial. The problems are: (1) permanence versus change; (2) universal versus particular; (3) expressible versus inexpressible, i.e., positivism versus transcendentalism; (4) being versus non-being, real versus unreal. (E, p. cxxi)

26 (E153; T147) "Of these the author takes up the first, viz., permanence versus change or the eternal versus the transitory, and shows how the arguments of the two sides destroy each other..." (E, p. cxxi), "...in the same way as the enemies of a kind may destroy themselves by mutual warfare and thereby serve to bring about his undisputed sovereignty. (E, p. 259)

27 (E155; T149) "Absolutists cannot solve the problem of *sukha-duḥkha* (pleasure-pain), *puṇya-pāpa* (merit-demerit), and *bandha-mokṣa* (bondage-liberation). (E, p. cxxi)

28 (E159; T152) "The author next refers to the Jaina philosophy of *durnaya* (wrong perspectives), *naya* (perspectives) and *pramāṇa*. (E, pp. cxxi-cxxii)

29 (E169; T161) "The souls are divisible into six kinds, but their number is endless. (E, p. cxxiii)

30 (E172; T164) "...(T) Jaina philosophy emerges as the whole truth from the mutual conflicts of the several schools." (E, p. cxxiii).

61.245 HEMACANDRA, *Ayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā*

This is the other, the first part, of the hymn of which the previous entry is the second. This part "contains an easy exposition of the doctrines of Jainism". Cf. JRK p. 15, who says. "It is published in *Kāvyamālā* VII. p. 104, and also in the RHS (second) edition of the *Syādvādamañjarī*, Bombay 1935."

See also Kapadia 18, p. 195, who calls it "a small poem in 32 verses in Sanskrit establishing the superiority of Jainism over other systems of philosophy".

61.246 HEMACANDRA, *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*

The work has been edited and translated by Satkari Mookerjee, Prachya Bharati Series II, Varanasi 1970; this is our "E" and "T". The summary borrows at times from T, with occasional stylistic emendations due to the General Editor.

Summary by Esther A. Solomon

(E1; T1) After paying homage to the *arahata*, Hemacandra gives expression in two verses. to his aim in writing a commentary on aphorisms of Jaina *siddhānta* composed by himself, the aim being to develop the seed of enlightenment of the intelligent ones by means of repeated exercise over the ultimate truth.

The author explains that sciences like grammar, logic, etc. are without any definite beginning in time, but they appear to be ever new according as they are presented in an abridged and enlarged form and as such as said to be the work of this or that person. He refers to the *Tattvārthasūtra* composed by (Umāsvāti), the foremost vācaka). He further says that he did not write a *prakaraṇa* but chose instead to be a *sūtra*-writer, for each has its own taste and there is no public or royal command to put a restraint on the exercise of one's will.

Hemacandra, in his role of a commentator, says that the Ācārya composed this *śāstra* in five chapters (*adhyāya*), each consisting of a group of *āhnikas* (daily lessons or chapters), the latter consisting of a number of discourses (*prakaraṇa*), each being made up of a group of aphorisms (*sūtra*) consisting of a number of inflected words (*pada*) which in their turn consist of a number of phonemes (*varṇa*).

BOOK ONE

CHAPTER ONE

(E1-2; T2-4) (*Sūtra*) 1. Now a critique of the *pramāṇas*.

The term "now" (*atha*) signifies commencement. Or it signifies sequence--the *pramāṇa* is being discussed subsequent to the treatment of grammar (*śabda*), poetics (*kāvya*) and prosody (*chandas*), thus suggesting that this work is the composition of the same author as that on grammar, etc.

Moreover, the word "*atha*", by virtue of just its phonetic value, being apprehended serves to promote well-being and avert all types of hitches, both for the author and the hearer.

The word "*pramāṇa*" by its very etymology signifies the most effective instrument of the determination of the true nature of a thing through the thorough exclusion of doubt, error and indecision. *Mīmāṃsā* (critique) of the *pramāṇas* consists in complete consideration by the method of enumeration (*uddeśa*), definition (*lakṣaṇa*), and examination (*parīkṣā*)--the threefold procedure adopted in a scientific work. The term "*mīmāṃsā*" means respectful rational reflection. Therefore, not only is there the consideration of the *pramāṇas*, but also of the viewpoints (*naya*) which are parts of the instruments, their way being cleared by means of the exclusions of false perspectives, and of liberation along with its means and its contrary, for liberation is the foremost among the values to be desired by men. It is thus that a *vicāra* becomes respectful (*pūjita*). An inquiry into the *pramāṇas* alone would degenerate into a mere polemic since it would inevitably be involved in the refutation of rival theories, and the introductory aphorism should then have been worded as "Now, the examination of the *pramāṇa*".

(E2-3; T4-9) The general definition of *pramāṇa* is as follows:

2. A *pramāṇa* is the right determining cognition of an object.

A "determining (*nirṇaya*) cognition" is one [which is] devoid of the characteristics of doubt or non-ascertainment and is a construction-free (*avikalpa*) awareness. The term "determining cognition" negates the ascription of being a *pramāṇa* to sense-object contact, as it (sense-object contact) is not cognition, and of doubt, etc., even though they are cognitions.

An object (*artha*) is what is attained or aimed at, and it is what is to be accepted, avoided or ignored. What is to be

ignored cannot be subsumed under what is to be avoided. As a matter of fact, the category of the ignorable is of greater importance than that of what is to be accepted or what is to be avoided, for *yogins* are also ordinary people like us. The term *artha* serves to exclude self-cognition, for though it is a fact, it is not an exclusive characteristic, being present in doubt, etc. as well.

The term "right" (*saṃyak*) (in *sūtra* 2) means what is not contrary, and is an indeclinable or a derivative of *saṃ* + *añc*. It is an adjective modifying "definitive cognition", for it alone (and not "object") can be "right" or "not right". Thus error (*viparyaya*) is excluded, and the definition of *pramāṇa* in general is free from the faults of over-extension (*ativyāpti*), under-extension (*avyāpti*), and impossibility (*asambhava*).

Objection: "Determining cognition of its own self" has, like "determining cognition of an object", been included in the definition of *pramāṇa* by the old masters, and *pramāṇa* has been said to be revelatory of itself and another.[10] It is not possible that the cognition of a content can occur to a subject who does not intuit the cognition itself. It cannot be supposed that this is done by a second cognition, for this would lead to infinite regress (*anavasthā*) or mutual dependence. Therefore the element of "self-cognition" should be included in the definition of *pramāṇa*. Cognition does not become non-cognition by becoming a content of cognition, for it would be apprehended as "cognition", just as "knower" is apprehended as "knower". Nor is there any logical flaw in cognition being cognizable, for it is "cognition" with reference to itself and "cognizable" with reference to its content, as one and the same person can be both son and father with reference to his own father and son.

The fact of self-cognition in the case of cognition is established by direct experience, as also by inference, viz.: cognition reveals its content only while revealing itself, because it is revelatory, like a light. It may be contended that the rule propounded does not hold good in the case of the sense-organs eye, etc. (which though revelatory are not self-revealed). But this is not true. There is no breaking of the rule since it is (not physical organs but) their spiritual counterparts (*bhāvendriya*) which are revelatory and they are certainly self-revealed. Therefore "determining cognition of itself" is covered by our definition of *pramāṇa*.

(E4; T9-10) Answer:

3. Determining cognition of itself, though (always) present, is not the defining characteristic (of "*pramāṇa*") as it overlaps cases of what are not *pramāṇas*, viz., doubt, etc.

Self-cognition is common to valid cognition as well as doubt, error, etc. There is not a single instance of cognition which is not *ipso facto* self-cognized. Therefore "self-cognition" has not been put forth as a defining characteristic. The old master, however, included this element in the definition of *pramāṇa* with a view to its examination.

(Objection:) The definition should be "definitive cognition of an object that is (previously) uncognized", for a *pramāṇa*'s cognizing an object already cognized would be redundant, and *dhāravāhijñānas* (a series of repeating cognitions of the same object) would have to be recognized as (an added, separate class of) valid cognitions.

(E5; T10-11) In answer to this, the author says:

4. (Determining cognition) apprehending a content previously cognized does not lack the status of *pramāṇa*, exactly as the (determining cognition) which apprehends what is to be apprehended in the future.

If the repudiation of the cognition of the cognized object has reference to the mode, even the series of repeating cognitions cannot be said to be cognizing what is already cognized, since modes are momentary in duration, and this qualification (that it is a definitive cognition of an uncognized object) is not necessary, for no two cognitions could have the same object. If it has reference to a substance (*dravya*), a

substance being eternal is the self-same unity, and there is no variation in it in either state--the one cognized and the one to be cognized, and hence again the qualification would serve no purpose, as the distinguishing character can be pointed out in the cognition of an object to be known hereafter on the basis of which it could be regarded as a *pramāṇa*, whereas the cognition of a previously cognized content could not be regarded as such. Furthermore, *avagraha, ūha*, etc. are recognized as instances of valid awareness, though each succeeding cognition has for its content what has been cognized by the earlier one. And recollection (*smṛti*), recognized as a *pramāṇa* is essentially the cognition of an already cognized object.

(E5; T11-12)The definitions of doubt, indecision and error which have been excluded from the purview of "*pramāṇa*" are as follows:

5. Doubt is the cognition which refers to both the extremes with reference to an object which is not possessed of such a dual character.

E.g., "Is it a post or a human being?" But "the self is both eternal and non-eternal" is not doubt, as the self has this dual character.

(E5-6; T12) 6. A cognition which does not take note of a specific characteristic is called "indecision" ([or "non-ascertainment",] *anadhyavasāya*). E.g., "what may it be?", the indeterminate intuition arising at the first moment of sense-object contact, which is regarded by the Buddhists as perceptual awareness, is nothing but indecision.

(E6; T12-13) 7. Error (*viparyaya*) is a cognition which definitely grasps a thing as what it is not.

E.g., the cognition of one moon as two (e.g. owing to the infection of the eye).

How is the validity of an awareness determined--by itself or by another? There are difficulties in either view. The answer is:

(E6-7; T13-17) 8. Determination of validity is by itself or by another.

Validity is determined by the cognition itself in some cases, as for example in the habitual cognition of one's own palm, or the direct perception of results in respect of bathing or drinking issuing respectively in immersion and alleviation of thirst. Here no verification is sought by a rational mind. In the case of inference, validity is always self-determined, for doubt is not possible when the conclusion is known to follow from a *hetu* necessarily concomitant with the *sādhya*.

At times, the validity of an awareness is determined intrinsically. As an example, in the case of perceptual cognition that is not confirmed by (immediately) repeated experience, validity is determined by a subsequent confirmatory cognition of the same object, or by the cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or by the cognition of an object invariably concomitant with the object of the cognition in question. As regards the latter, their validity is self-determined, and so there is no scope for the charge of infinite regress.

As regards verbal knowledge, its validity can be determined only by verification and the like where the content of the verbal cognition is capable of being directly perceived, or in other cases where verification is not possible on the ground of its being delivered by a trustworthy person on the analogy his other utterances regarding perceivable facts such the eclipse of planets, loss of an article, secret contents of a closed fist, the authenticity of which have been verified.

There is refutation here of the definition of *pramāṇa* given by the Naiyāyikas, viz., "a *pramāṇa* is that which is the cause of the cognition of an object", and of the definition in the *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña, *viz.*, "that which is the means of right apprehension is (called) a *pramāṇa*". The main emphasis in these refutations is that cognition alone can be the most efficient condition and so it is the *pramāṇa*, and not a sense-organ or its contact with the object.

Then follows the refutation of the Buddhist definition: "It is non-discrepant awareness that is *pramāṇa*" (*Pramāṇavārttika*

II.1). If the awareness referred to is construction-free, it is not capable of giving rise to a pragmatic consequence. The Buddhist defense involves a roundabout procedure, and is like decoration with borrowed ornaments. The Buddhist must accept that it is construction-filled knowledge that is *pramāṇa*.

(E8; T17-18) 9. There are two kinds of *pramāṇa*.

"Two" refutes the views of other schools of philosophy which recognize a lesser or greater number. (According to Hemacandra the Vaiśeṣikas admit perception, inference and verbal testimony.) This twofold classification [of ours] is not the same as that of the Buddhists.

(E8; T18) 10. Direct (perceptual) (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (non-perceptual) (*parokṣa*).

The word "*akṣa*" is derived from *aś* or *akṣ*, to pervade, and means the individual self (*jīva*), which knows all substance, space, time and modes. "*Akṣa*" can also denote a sense-orgqn, since it also pervades (apprehends) its object. The prefix "*prati*" means resident or dependent. Thus, "*pratyakṣa*" means what is resident in the individual self. Also, the cognition which emerges in dependence on the sense-organ is called perceptual cognition. "*Parokṣa*" is that which lies beyond the province of the senses, or that which is left untouched by another (sense-organ and the like). The conjunction "and" is intended to stress the equal competence of both in their respective fields, and to refute the view of those who regard perception as the senior-most of the *pramāṇas*. Perception may precede or even follow other *pramāṇas*.

(E8-10; T19-22) 11. That there are *pramāṇas* other than perception is proved by the fact that there is a clear distinction (between valid and invalid awarenesses).

There is awareness of other men's thoughts and negation (of what transcends sense-perception). These would not be possible for the Cārvāka merely on the basis of perceptual awareness, which has its jurisdiction only over what is present to the senses.

Further, the validity of even perceptual cognition can be established only on the strength of unfailing correspondence with fact. The validity of non-perceptual cognition arising from verbal testimony or from a logical ground can be similarly ascertained, and so non-perceptual cognition should be accepted as a *pramāṇa*.

The Buddhists admit non-perceptual knowledge but regard it as only of the nature of inference. This is not a tenable position. Verbal testimony and others are also *pramāṇas*. Of course, sense-perception, mental perception, self-awareness (*ātmasaṃvedana*) and transcendent intuition of *yogins* are all subsumed under *pratyakṣa*, and recollection (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), inductive reasoning (*ūha*), inference (*anumāna*) and verbal testimony are subsumed under *parokṣa*. Comparison (*upamāna*) (of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā) and presumption (*arthāpatti*) (of the Mīmāṃsā school) fall under inference.

Non-awareness (*abhāva*) is not a *pramāṇa* at all, as it has no corresponding object.

(E10-11; T22-24) 12. Since things partake of the nature of being and nonbeing, negation cannot have its own content.

If things were of the nature of being alone, all things would have all possible characteristics. And if things were of the nature of nonbeing alone, they would be devoid of all character. In fact, they are constituted of both being and nonbeing. They have being in respect of their own nature, and nonbeing in respect of the nature of another. Perceptual cognition determines by way of affirmation and negation of its content, e.g., "this is a surface of the ground and not a jar". So also the non-perceptual instruments. So there is no additional object of the nature of pure nonbeing in respect of which non-awareness could function. Further, this so-called non-awareness is but a fiction, as it is of the nature of the negation of the absences of five positive instruments. So it is non-awareness, which could not be knowledge in any case (since knowledge is

a kind of awareness).

(E11; T24-25) 13. Perception is lucid (*viśada*).

What is this lucidity? It cannot signify apprehension of its own content, for that is not lacking in non-perceptual awareness. Nor can it mean being manifest (*sphuṭa*); since this is a common characteristic of all cognitions, as they are self-intuited. In view of this objection, the author explains:

(E11; T25) 14. Lucidity consists in either its independence of another *pramāṇa*, or in the apprehension of its content as "this" (i.e.., as referring to a particular existent).

Keeping in mind the twofold principle of perception as principal (*mukhya*) and recognitive (*sāṃvyāvahāriķa*), the author give the definition of "principal" perception:

(E12; T26-29) 15. The manifestation of the innate nature of a conscious self, emerging on the total cessation of all obstructive veils, is that principal known as "unique" [i.e., "omniscience"].

The self has consciousness as its essence and is consequently luminous by its very nature. The manifestation of the essential luminous nature of the self is principal perception. It is the principal of all cognitions, just as the face (*mukha*) is of the principal part of the body. It is characterized as "unique" in scriptures, since it is independent of external factors like the sense-organs, is cognizant of all objects, and thus has noting in common with other kinds of cognition. The manifestation of the luminosity of the self occurs on the disappearance of the obscuring veils by virtue of the total destruction of all the destructive *karmans* that serve to cover innate knowledge. This can be achieved by acquiring the "triple jewel" (knowledge, faith and conduct) by prolonged, unremitting and reverent practice, and by the power of unflagging meditation without change of content as laid down in the scripture.

The self-luminous nature of the self can be established by virtue of the fact that it is not susceptible to doubt, that it is a knower, and that it is the agent of the act of knowing (and so

cannot be the object of the act of knowing).

The self, though luminous by nature, can be obscured by knowledge-obscuring *karman* and the like, as the sun and the moon are obscured by a veil of dust, by fog, by a patch of cloud and so on. And this obscuration is not permanent, for it can be removed by the prescribed practice of meditation and contemplation, exactly as the obscuration of the sun, etc. is removed by a powerful blast of wind. Just as the dross found in the ore of gold, though as old as the gold, can be removed by proper chemical treatment, so the removal of beginningless knowledge-obscuring *karmans* is possible by the repeated practice of the triple jewel which is their antidote.

The self, though it is amorphous, can still be obscured, for the power of consciousness, though incorporeal, is not infrequently found to be obscured by the consumption of spirits, intoxicating drugs, and (fermented) grains.

Question: Does the self undergo any modification on account of the obscuring *karmans* and their opposites? Both rainfall and sunshine produce no effect on the sky, while they produce an effect on leather. If the self is like leather, it should be non-eternal (and perishable), and if it is like the sky (space), there should be no change whatsoever in it.

Answer: This objection would hold if the self were recognized as eternally unchanging (*kuṭasthanitya*). But according to the Jains the self is *pariṇāminitya*), an eternal entity persisting through the continuum of modes, the cessation of each preceding mode being synchronous with the origination of the succeeding one. The exercise of causal efficiency would be untenable in the view that things are absolutely permanent and unchanging, or that they are absolutely momentary--the respective views of the Vedāntins and the Buddhists.

Objection: There is no proof for the existence of principal perception, or the possessor of it. Sensuous perception, inference, and even authoritative scriptural texts do not vouchsafe for its reality. There are of course scriptural

statements like "Though He is without hands and feet He moves fast and catches hold of things. He sees though without eyes and hears though without ears. He knows the whole universe and there is none to know Him. Him the seers declare to be the Supreme Great Person" (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.19)--but the statement is meant to be an exhortation in respect of an injunction and has no independent validity of its own.

(E13-16; T29-33) 16. Answer: The proof of it follows from the proof of the necessity of the final consummation of knowledge and the like.

The progressive development or the realization of the degrees of excellence of knowledge must reach consummation somewhere, since this is true of all progressions, as seen in the progression of magnitude. This is the proof of omniscience. "And the like" (in the *sūtra*) stands for the following proofs: objects which are subtle, intercepted by barriers, and remote are perceived by some person since they are knowable. Moreover, verification of astronomical knowledge cannot be accounted for except by recognizing omniscience or *mukhyapratyakṣa*.

The opponent (Mīmāṃsaka, who does not recognize omniscience as a reality,) too must admit that knowledge of the past and other things is possible in the case of some person when he (Śabara) affirms "The Vedic injunction makes known past, present, future, subtle, intercepted, distant and suchlike objects of which the sense-organs are not capable (of cognition)" (*Śabarabhāṣya* I.1.2). If there were no such person capable of knowing all things of all the three times, for whose sake would the Veda assert truths which hold good for all the three times? Thus is proved the possibility of pure super-sensuous transcendent perception (*kevalapratyakṣa*).

Moreover, the very scriptures, whose theory of non-absolutism (*syādvāda*) is verified by perception and the like, furnish proof of the existence of a person cognizant of super-sensible reality. The scripture affirms the omniscience of the

arahant.

Though empirical sense-perception cannot apprehend the existence of super-sensuous perception, the intuition of ascetics (*yogin*) born of the force of meditation is as cognizant of itself as it is of external objects. And thus omniscience is also proved by the evidence of perception.

The author pours forth his ire on Kumārila, who has tried to refute the concept of omniscience, exhorts the supreme excellence of omniscience, and exhorts the supreme excellence in all respects of the perfect selves, censuring the brahmanical deities, Brahmā and the like, whose account of vanity, sexual love, etc. are recorded in the Vedas, *smṛtis*, *purāṇas* and *itihāsas*.

(E16-17; T33-36) 17. And (the possibility of super-sensuous knowledge can be established) also by the lack of contrary proofs.

Perception cannot furnish any contradiction to transcendent knowledge, for it apprehends only what is present. Nor can it do so negatively when it ceases to operate, for this negative evidence would not be effective without the direct perception of the whole race of mankind of all times and climes, and the admission of such possibility would only confirm the Jaina position. How can the opponent advance lack of perception as a proof contradictory of an omniscient person when he does not admit its validity when proving the superiority of Jaimini and others on the ground of their excellence of knowledge?

Nor can inference be accepted as contradictory proof in respect of an omniscient person, as inference is not possible without the knowledge of the subject (the *pakṣa*, viz., the omniscient person). The contradicting inference might be put in the following form: "The person under dispute is not omniscient, since he is a speaker, just like the man in the street." This would be an unsound argument involving some fallacy whatever the interpretation put on "speaker".

Nor can a scriptural text be cited as invalidating proof. Actually, scripture not owing its existence to any author does not exist. Even if the Vedas be regarded as uncreated, still there would be no difficulty since there is no text found to contradict the existence of an omniscient person. As regards the scripture which owes its origin to an omniscient person, how can it be supposed to contradict the possibility of omniscience?

(E17; T36-37) (Pure intuition is not the only kind of principal or transcendent perception (*mukhyapratyakṣa*); there are other varieties.)

18. And owing to the lesser or greater degree of that (cessation of obstructive veils) there are extrasensory awareness and telepathy (intuition of the modes of other minds).

Omniscience occurs when there is the complete cessation of all the obstructive veils. But when there is variation in the degree of this cessation, that is to say in the subsidence-cum-destruction of these veils, there occur two varieties of the principal super-sensuous perception or intuition, viz. extrasensory awareness (*avadhi*) and *manaḥparyāya*. The word "*avadhi*" means limit, so *avadhi* is super-sensuous intuition limited to objects having shape and color (*rūpa*). It is of two kinds: congenital (*bhavapratyaya*) and acquired by virtue (*guṇapratyaya*). Of these, the first belongs to the inhabitants of heaven and hell; the second is possible for men and lower creatures.

The modes of the mind-substance are the different modifications in accordance with thinking. And the intuition of these modifications is called *manaḥparyāya*. It may be stated that the cognition of the external object of thought is necessarily inferential in character, derived as it is by necessary implication from the cognition of thoughts which are impossible without objects.

(E17-18; T37) What is the difference between extrasensory awareness (*avadhi*) and *manaḥparyāya?*

19. The difference between the two is due to the difference of purity, scope, possessor (subject) and object.

Manaḥpryāya is purer than *avadhi*. The person having *avadhi* cognizes the mind-substances, but the one having *manaḥparyāya* knows the self-same objects in a purer (or more lucid) form.

The scope of extrasensory awareness varies from an infinitesimal part of an *aṅgula* (about three-fourths of an inch) up to all the inhabited worlds. But the scope of *manaḥparyāya* is confined to the sphere inhabited by human beings.

Extrasensory awareness is possible for living beings in all the four states (hell, heaven, human beings, lower creatures) in the three stages of spiritual progress, viz., restrained, unrestrained, restrained-cum-unrestrained. But *manaḥparyāya* is possible only for a human being possessed of self-restraint and of exalted conduct, occupying any one of the states of spiritual perfection (*guṇasthāna*) ranging from the sixth to the twelfth, and even there it is possible only for those whose spiritual progress is on the increase, and even for those possessed of spiritual powers, and even there only for a few and not all.

The jurisdiction of extrasensory awarenessi is limited to objects having shape and color, and there too not covering all their modes, but that of *manaḥparyāya* to the minutest (*ananta*) parts (of the nature of mind).

(E18; T38-39) 20. Right definitive cognition caused by a sense and the mind is called empirical perception. It is of the nature of indistinct awareness (*avagraha*), speculation (*īhā*), determinative awareness and retention (*dhāraṇā*).

The phrase "of the nature of" is meant to show that determinate perception and the rest do not absolutely differ from one another, but the antecedent variety only develops into the subsequent one, and thus all share the same essential nature. The term "empirical" means that this perception leads to *saṃvyavahāra* (proper or right activity, positive or negative). "Caused by a sense and the mind" is to be understood in both

a distributive and a collective sense. It is said to be "caused by the sense" when the sense plays a major role and the mind exerts influence in its generation. And it is said to be "causes by the mind" when it is generated by the mind alone endowed with a particular kind of purity.

Objection: Why is self-awareness not enumerated as (another) variety of perception?

Answer: Self-cognition relating to sense-perception is included in sense-perception; the self-cognition of the perception of pleasure, etc. brought about by the mind is subsumed under mental perception, and the self-cognition of yogic perception under yogic perception. The self-cognition of recollection, etc. is nothing but mental perception. Thus there is no additional variety of perception called "self-cognition".

(E19-20; T39-43) 21. The senses are touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing having respectively for their characteristics the capacity of apprehending touch, taste, odor, colored shapes and sounds.

Each of these is twofold: substance (*dravya*) and function (*bhava*).

"Senses" (*indriya*) are so-called because they have been produced by *indra*, i.e., *karman*, since the senses are brought about by the manifestation of name-*karman* as their condition. Or they are so-called because they are the distinguishing marks (*liṅga*) of the self who is designated "*indra*". The senses serve as the organs of perception of objects for a self stained with *karman* and so unable to perceive things by itself.

Objection: If the senses are marks (*liṅga*) then the cognition of an object by the self, being by means of a mark, should be inferential, and inference cannot arise without the knowledge of the mark. If the mark were to be known by another inference, this would result in infinite regress.

Answer: The objection is baseless, since the senses *qua* spiritual functions are intuited by themselves. Or the senses are the marks of the self (and not of the object), and as such are

proof of the existence of the self. It is universally seen that an instrument, e.g., the carpenter's axe, is operated by an agent, and the sense is an instrument.

The senses are twofold--substance and function. The sense *qua* substance is caused by the rise or manifestation of the corresponding name-*karman*. The senses *qua* functions are brought about by the subsidence-cum-destruction of the obscuring *karman* and obstructive *karman* frustrating the relevant capacity.

The place of honor in the order of enumeration has been given to the sense of touch, since it is universally present in all living beings subject to transmigration and it pervades the whole body. And the respective positions in the order of enumeration of the senses are due to their incidence in progressively decreasing number of embodied beings.

There follows an enumeration of living beings with one sense (touch), with two senses (touch and taste), with three senses (plus smell), with four senses (plus sight) and with all five senses.

Only the conditions of specific cognitions are treated under the head of "senses" in the present context. If the rank of *indriya* is accorded to the organs of speech, etc. on the ground of their being instruments of particular varieties of physical actions the number of senses would have to be extended indefinitely since no limit can be set to different kinds of action.

These sense-organs can be regarded as mutually identical when viewed from the standpoint of substantial unity, and as numerically different from one another when viewed from the standpoint of modes. If their identity were absolute, any one sense-organ could serve the purpose of all of them, and the perfection or deficiency of one would affect the rest. If on the other hand they were absolutely different, they could not co-operate in the generation of a synthetic judgment like "I see what I touch", as is well-known. The same line of argument dismisses the belief in the absolute difference and the absolute

identity of the sense and the self.

As regards the relation of the senses *qua* substance among themselves, as also the material atoms from which they are produced, it is of the nature of identity (from the viewpoint of substance) and difference (from the viewpoint of modes) in conformity with the theory of non-absolutism.

The dual relation of identity-cum-difference exists among the objects of the senses, touch and the rest *qua* substances and modes. The object of sense is neither pure substance nor pure mode, and this is corroborated by the fact that "*sparśa*" ("touch") and the like signify both object and act.

(E21; T44) 22. The sense *qua* substance is material (*pudgala*) (atoms) as possessed of definite shape.

The word "definite" relates to both internal and external shape, "shape" meaning particular structural arrangement. The atoms having a specific structural arrangement are the sense *qua* substance. The atoms are called "*pudgala*" because they are characterized by *pūraṇa* (accretion) and *galana* (decomposition), and they are possessed of the qualities of touch, taste, odor and color. For example, in the case of the auditory organ, the external combination of the atoms in the shape of an elipse (*karṇaśaṣkulī*), and the internal combination in the globular shape of a *kadambaka* flower, are both in their entirety the sense *qua* substance. And so on in the case of the other organs. These are called "*dravya*" as they are of the form of material substance. The term "*dravya*" may also connote inferiority--an inferior sense-organ. The *dravyendriya* is inferior because, even when it is operating and the whole set of auxiliary conditions such as light, etc. is present, cognition of touch, etc. does not result without the functioning sense (*bhāvendriya*)

(E21; T44-46) 23. The functioning sense (*bhāvendriya*) is of two kinds--attainment (*labdhi*) and conscious undertaking of activity of the cognitive faculties.

Attainment consists in a particular substance-cum-

destruction of *karman* which obscures knowledge. Conscious undertaking of activity is a particular modification of the self due to attainment owing to the presence of which the self is directed to the substantial sense-organ roused to activity. The term "*bhāva*" has the sense of actual pre-eminence. Just as the person who is actually, and not merely metaphorically, possessed of the attribute of sovereignty (over gods) is called a real functioning sovereign (*bhāvendra*), so also the changed state of the self is called the real functioning sense when it is actually and not metaphorically possessed of the attributes of being a sign of this self and the like.

Of these two functioning senses, attainment generates the capacity of the self to apprehend a relevant content and thus exercises the role of a functioning sense. The competence of the self to apprehend its content is called "*labdhi*", for the said apprehension is not produced in a substance which is not competent for the same, e.g., space. The sense *qua* conscious activity is of the nature of an activity in respect of the cognition of an object. The sensing of touch and the like by the tactile sense and the like cannot reveal its object unless monitored by or appropriated by the conscious activity of the self, otherwise the emergence of such cognition in deep sleep also could not be ruled out.

Objection: The conscious activity of the self employed in the apprehension of a relevant object is rather the result and as such cannot be regarded as an organ which is of the nature of an instrumental cause.

Answer: Certain attributes of the cause pass on to the effect. For example, fire has the attribute of illumination, and so does the light of a lamp which is its effect. Moreover, it is not that the conscious activity is an organ in the same capacity in which it is the result. It is an organ in its capacity as the most efficient instrument, and the result in the capacity of an act. Light, for example, the most efficient instrument as an illuminator, is an effect as the act of illumination, and an agent

on account of its independent status. And all this can be justified from the position of non-absolutism.

(E22; T46-47) 24. The mind is the instrument of apprehension of all contents.

The internal organ (*manas*) is also called *anindriya* (non-sense) or *no-indriya* (quasi-sense). The term "*pramāṇa*" ensures that the definition not apply to the self, which is only the agent. As can be seen from *Tattvārthasūtra* II.22 and I.276, whatever is the content of sensuous and non-sensuous cognition is the content of mind.

The mind is also, like the five senses, twofold--substantial and functioning. Substantial mind is nothing but substantive matter transformed into mind-substance. The mind *qua* functioning is the attainment consisting in the subsidence-cum-destruction of the relevant obscuring *karman*, and the specific undertaking of activity of the self prone to the apprehension of an object.

It may be argued that the sense and the mind are not the only conditions of sensuous perception, for in the case of visual cognition, for instance, the object and light are also conditions. The answer to this is

(E22-24; T47-51) 25. The object and light are not conditions of awareness, because there is lack of negative concomitance between the two.

The external object and light are not the direct cause of visual cognition, though it not denied that they are remote conditions, inasmuch as they are helpful in the subsidence-cum-destruction of the knowledge-obscuring *karman* and as aids to the eye. But negative concomitance is not observed so as to ensure their causality. For example, cognition of water occurs in a mirage in the desert in spite of the absence of water, and a cat can see objects even in the absence of light in a place steeped in a thick pall of darkness. And how could past or future objects have causal efficiency in respect of the knowledge of them by *yogins*?

The capacity for illumination possessed by the illuminator cannot be said to be derived from the object to be illuminated, for we do not find this in the case of light illuminating a jar, etc. The Naiyāyika who believes sensuous awareness to be generated by an object cannot accept that knowledge possessed by God, which he regards as eternal, is generated by an object. Moreover, if knowledge is believed to be generated by its object, recognition and recollection would have to be rejected as *pramāṇas*.

In the Buddhist view, an existent is absolutely momentary, and is the generator of its cognition. But in this theory, the cognition and its content, which are supposed to be related as effect to cause, cannot possibly be related as cognizer and cognized on account of their being separated by an interval of time. It may be argued that the relation of cognized-cognizer is not something different from the relation of causality. As Dharmakīrti says, "the character of being something cognized is nothing but the causal efficiency of the object to imprint its likeness on the cognition concerned" (*Pramāṇavārttika* 3.247). But in that case the knowledge of an omniscient could not have as its content a thing present at that time, as it would not be generated by it. Moreover, how could a cognition then be its own cognizer, ungenerated as it is by itself? Hence the cognition and the object owe their existence to their own causes and stand in the relation of illuminator and illuminated. Thus the object and light are not the causal conditions of perceptual cognition.

Objection: If a cognition is not caused by its object, what would determine the relation of cognition and cognized?

Answer: That a cognition reveals a particular content is due to its specific competency characterized by the destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant obscuring *karman*. This competency will have to be accepted even in the theory of causality, as otherwise there would be no explanation as to why a particular cognition is generated by a particular object though an infinite

number of objects are presented there. Dharmakīrti's explanation on the basis of structural similarity is not tenable, for there can be no similarity between a corporeal (having spatial dimension) object and knowledge, which is incorporeal. This structural likeness is nothing else than the transformation of consciousness as such into the cognition of a particular object.

Causality and structural similarity cannot jointly or individually be the condition(s) of the cognition of an object, for in the latter alternative, the parts of a jar in the first moment of their origin should be cognizant of the whole jar in the last moment, or the moon's reflection in water should be cognition of moon in the sky. If both collectively determine the cognition of an object, then the jar in the subsequent moment should be cognizant of the jar in the previous moment. Therefore we do not find anything other than competency that could be a causal condition of cognition.

(E24; T51-52) 26. Determinate perception (*avagraha*) is the definitive right cognition of an object which follows in the wake of initial apprehension on there being the contact of the sense-organ with the object.

A sense-organ is twofold, the material organ and the (psychical) function. The object is a composite of substance and mode. The contact between them is a relation by the situation of the object--neither too far, etc. "Indeterminate intuition" is the cognition of an object which does not comprehend its specific characteristics (*viśeṣa*) and takes place (immediately) on sense-object contact. This indeterminate intuition is transformed into determinate perception. So determinate perception should not be confused with indeterminate intuition.

This determinate perception is not a mental construction, since it depends for its existence on the presence of the sense-organ and is not liable to be corrected by discursive thought (*pratisaṃkhyāna*).

(E24-25; T52-53) 27. Speculation (*īhā*) is inquisitive

pursuit (of the knowledge) of specific details of the perceived object.

On the determinate perception of an object, e.g., a sound, there arises a doubt whether the sound is that of a conch or a horn, and the mind is driven to consider the points of agreement and difference, e.g., "it is perceived as sweet and agreeable, which are qualities belonging to the sound of a conch, and not as harsh and shrill as the sound of a horn is known to be." This mental exercise is called speculation. It may be noted that doubt invariably crops up in the interval between determinate perception and speculation, even in cases of habitual perception, but its existence is not noticed owing to the rapidity of succession.

Question: What is the difference between reasoning (*ūha*)--a nonperceptual *pramāṇa*--and *īhā*?

Answer: *Ūha* is an instrument competent for the apprehension of pervasion (*vyāpti*) between *hetu* and *sādhya*, and has reference to all the three times--past, present and future. Logicians affirm that while comprehending pervasion the knower becomes like a *yogin*! But speculation (*ihā*) concerns things in the present time, and is a species of perceptual cognition.

Though speculation is said to be exercise, it pertains to the conscious self and so is of the nature of cognition, and it stands to reason that it is considered as a species of perceptual cognition. Its validity should not be doubted, as it is certainly a definitive cognition in regard to its own object.

(E25; T54) 28. Determinative awareness is the determination of the specific characteristic which was the object of speculation.

E.g., "The sound must be of a conch and not of a horn."

(E25-26; T54-56) 29. Retention (*dhāraṇā*) is the cause of memory.

"Cause" signifies the causal stuff which is capable of being transformed into (its effect) memory which consists in the

recollection of something past. It is nothing but the mental trace (*saṃskāra*). Retention is thus the continued existence of a cognition for an indefinite length of time. On the other hand, determinate perception, speculation and perceptual judgment can exist from mathematical instant to a *muhūrta* (48 minutes) minus one instant.

That a latent mental trace is cognitional in character can be deduced from the fact that it is a species of perceptual cognition. If it were not cognitional in character it could not produce recollection, which is a species of cognition, and it could not be an attribute of the self. The Vaiśeṣika view that a trace is different from cognition and even from so-called psychic reasoning (*bhāvanā*) cannot be accepted.

Objection: The old (Jain) masters have taught that persistence of awareness (*avicyuti*) is also a case of retention. (Cf. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* 180).

Answer: True, but this (*avicyuti*) is included within the field of determinative awareness and so has not been separately mentioned. Perceptual judgment when protracted for a length of time is titled "retention" *qua* freedom from lapse. Or, as freedom from lapse is also a cause of memory, it has been included under retention (as defined here). For mere perceptual judgment bereft of absence of lapse and not subjected to attentive reflection cannot give rise to recollection. Thus this *sūtra* (29) includes both absence of lapse and mental trace as causes of recollection.

Although recollection itself has been recognized as a species of retention in authoritative texts, it has not been mentioned in the above *sūtra* as it is an instance of non-perceptual awareness.

It may be noted that there is somehow a thread of unity which runs through the different stages of perceptual cognition in spite of their succession.

(E26; T56-57) Refutation of the interpretation of *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.4 (giving the definition of the *pramāṇa*

constituting perceptual awareness (*pratyakṣa*) put forth by Trilocana and Vācaspati Miśra: They take "*yataḥ*" as understood, and thus interpret the *sūtra* as meaning "That due to which the unerring, unnameable and decisive definitive cognition produced by sense-object contact arises is *pratyakṣa*". Thus the *pramāṇa* could be of the nature of cognition or different from it. This cognition could be unnameable (*avyapadeśya*) or decisive (*vyavasāyātmaka*). The instruments of both such perceptual cognitions are to be regarded as valid.

But this is not justifiable, as can be seen from the very fact that they have to resort to the strategy of supplying an ellipse. Moreover, how can sense-object contact and the like, which are not of the nature of awareness, function as the most efficient instruments for the determination of an object? Cognition of an object does not arise in spite of there being sense-object contact, but arises only when there is consciousness. An instrument is that which is the most efficient condition and immediately produces the effect.

Moreover, sense-object contact, being of the nature of a relation, is not invariably present in all cases of sensory perception. The organ of sight acts from a distance, and even on objects intercepted by such transparent media as glass and the like.

(E26-27; T57-58) Refutation of the Buddhist definition of *pratyakṣa*: The Buddhists define perceptual cognition as non-erroneous and free from conceptual construction, conceptual construction being that cognition the content of which is liable to be associated with verbal expression. (Cf. *Nyāyabindu* I. 4-6.)

But this definition is irrational as it has no bearing on practical activity. If practical activity is supposed to be conditioned by construction-filled perception, which occurs subsequently to construction-free perception, then it is in the fitness of things that the credit of validity be given to construction-filled rather than construction-free awareness. The postulation of construction-free perception, which is as

ineffective as Śikhanandin[1], is a superfluity.

(E27-28; T58-60) Criticism of the Mīmāṃsā definition of perceptual cognition: The Mīmāṃsakas, while eliminating those sources of knowledge which are not the *pramāṇa* of *dharma*, set forth the definition of perceptual cognition by way of reiteration of a known fact. The cognition which arises in a person on the *satsamprayoga* of sense-organs is perceptual, and being the apprehension of an object existing at the present moment it is not a competent source of knowledge (of *dharma*). (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I.1.4.)

This definition is too wide, as it could apply to doubt and illusion also which occur due to sense-perception. If the term "*satsamprayoge*" be interpreted as "there being contact with an actually existent thing", it would lead to the exclusion of cases of hallucination alone (which are not founded on reality and come about independently of an objective datum) but not to the exclusion of doubt and illusion (which are based on real data). If "*satsamprayoge*" is interpreted as "*sati samprayoge*", "on there being the contact as an antecedent event", and the prefix "*sam*" (genuine) deemed competent to exclude doubt and illusion (cf. Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* 4. 38-39), even then the definition is not faultless. The authenticity of contact is something super-sensuous, and the effect, viz. perceptual cognition, cannot serve as a reason to prove it unless it is qualified, but as the definition stands there is no such qualifying epithet. "*Satsamprayoga*" should rather be interpreted as "*satā samprayoge*" (on contact with an actually present object) to exclude objectless perception. The construction with "*sati*" is superfluous, as the purpose is served by the locative case-

[1]A princess called Ambā was spurned by Bhīṣma in a *svayaṃvara*. She became a male by performing penance and was known as Śikhanandin. But her past always made her a butt of ridicule. In the Mahābhārata war, Ārjuna kept Śikhanandin in front of him and killed Bhīṣma. This Śikhanandin was later killed by Aśvatthaman.

ending of "*samprayoge*".

Śabara's attempt (see *Śabarabhāṣya* I.1.5) to make the definition faultless by the transposition of "*tat*" and "*sat*" also fails to expel the contingency of its extension to doubt, as in doubt the sense is certainly in contact with one of the objects concerned. Moreover, the definition would be too narrow as it would not apply to visual perception, for in it the organ of sight does not come into actual contact with the object.

(E28; T60-61) Criticism of the Sāṃkhya definition of perception: The older exponents of Sāṃkhya define perceptual cognition as a modification (*vṛtti*) of the sense-organ of hearing or the like and as indeterminate. But the sense-organs are devoid of consciousness, hence their modification also should be such, and so could not serve as a *pramāṇa*. Instead of bringing in its association with the conscious self, the status of *pramāṇa* should rather be accorded to the conscious self itself. And there is no evidence in respect of the cognition's being indeterminate.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines perception as decisive cognition of the object in front (*prativiṣaya*). But this could apply to inference also, which too refers to an object in front, e.g., "This hill is possessed of fire".

Thus it follows from the examination of the definitions put forth by philosophers of other schools that the only faultless definition of valid perceptual cognition is that it is lucid.

(E28-29; T61-63)[11] 30. The content of a *pramāṇa* is an actual entity which is of the nature of substance-cum-mode.

Though the subject-matter under consideration is *pratyakṣa*, yet the general term "*pramāṇa*" is used as there is no difference in respect of their contents among the several *pramāṇas*. The content of any of the types of knowledge is a real entity which is of the nature of substance-cum-mode (*dravyaparyāya*). The term "*dravya*", derived from *dru*, to go, means that which runs through all the modes, and signifies persistence. *Dravya* thus comes to be the vertical universal

which is revealed by the cognition of identity through the antecedent and subsequent states of a thing. "*Paryāya*" etymologically denotes the state which has the characteristic of origination and cessation (in succession). An actual entity is what is truly existent as an objective fact. As Vācakamukhya (i.e., Umāsvāti) says: "Real (existent) is that which is endowed with origin, cessation and persistence" (*Tattvārthasūtra* 5.29).

The interpretation of "substance-cum-mode" in the definition serves to reject the conception of an object of knowledge as exclusively substance or exclusively mode (as upheld respectively by the Sāṃkhya and the Buddhist schools). The term "nature" is intended to refute the view of the adherents of Kaṇāda (the author of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*) and Akṣapāda (the author of the *Nyāyasūtra*) that substance and mode are absolutely different from one another. (See Siddhasena Divākara, *Sanmatitarka* 3.49).

(29-33; T63-73) 31-32. Because of the capacity for the effective generation of practical consequences of efficient action, an actual entity has that (substance-cum-mode) for its characteristic.

The capacity for the production of practical consequences like acceptance, avoidance and the like is possible only in an actual entity which is by nature a complex of substance-cum-mode. Every person who engages in the pursuit of a *pramāṇa* invariably does so being impelled by the desire for the acquisition of a practical consequence, hoping that he will be able to find the object capable of yielding the desired consequence with the aid of such knowledge. If the object is not such, the examination of it on his part would be in vain. (See Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika* I. 215). And only an actual entity which is of the nature of substance-cum-mode could have this causal efficacy.

A real which is of the nature of just substance could not be possessed of this causal efficacy. Being of static identity, not admitting either lapse or growth, it could not exercise any causal efficacy either in succession or in non-succession. An entity which is of the nature of just substance will execute even at the time of its first causal operation all the operations which are (as a matter of fact) due in other times, as being fully endowed with the relevant capacity there is no reason for it to brook any delay. On the contrary, a thing which waits for a lapse of time should be regarded as incapable. It cannot be said that it gives rise to the relevant consequence when it becomes associated with the set of auxiliary conditions required, for that which stands in need of others is incapable. (See Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* III.1.8).

It may be argued that the cause does not stand in need of the auxiliaries, but the effect does not come into being in the absence of these auxiliaries. If it is really capable why should it indifferently wait, helplessly looking forward to the emergence of the auxiliaries, instead of producing the effect immediately without any delay? Moreover, do the auxiliaries render any service to the basic substance, and if so is this service identical with it or different? If it is identical it would only mean that it is the basal substance that is produced--which would, for the opponent, be like investing money for profit and eventually losing even the capital. If the service rendered is different from the basal substance, how would it relate to it? The relation between the service and the receiver of it could not be contact, since that is possible only between two substances. Nor can it be inherence, since that is equally present everywhere, and so it is not logically justifiable that it should function as a relation between determinate terms, otherwise these terms would have to be admitted as rendering some service to it, and the dilemma of the identity or difference of the service would crop up. Therefore, an entity absolutely eternal is not capable of exercising causal efficiency in succession.

Nor can it do so in non-succession (i.e., simultaneously). It is not attested by experience that the self-same thing simultaneously discharges all the functions that are due to

occur in all the divisions of time. If it were to do so, what would it do in the second moment? If it does nothing it would forfeit its claim to reality, being devoid of causal efficacy which is the criterion of reality. Thus, an absolutely unchanging substance would be a nonentity.

An entity, again, supposed to be of the nature of absolute mode is not capable of causal efficacy in succession as, it being absolutely perishable, spatial and temporal succession are not possible for it. Nor is succession possible of preceding and succeeding moments in the role of a continuum, since a continuum is an unreal mental construction.

The other alternative of the exercise of causal efficacy in non-succession is equally untenable in the case of a momentary entity. If the self-same point-instant and others produce these diverse results by a self-identical nature, the effects should all be identical. If it is said that what plays the role of a material cause in one context plays also the role of an auxiliary cause in another and thus diversity of nature can be admitted, then there would be nothing repugnant in the supposition that an eternal and uniform entity also executes diverse effects in succession without undergoing change of nature and without givine rise to the contingency of the effects' being identical in nature. The absence of this productive activity entails the absence of reality in an absolutely momentary mode. Thus reality cannot be of the nature of pure mode.

The followers of Kaṇāda (i.e., the Vaiśeṣikas) admit the reality of both substances and modes. Earth, etc. are substances, being the substrates of qualities, etc., whereas qualities, etc. are the modes being supported therein. Of the latter, some are transitory, some endure as long as the substance does, and some are eternal. Further, these thinkers regard the substrate and attribute as absolutely different from one another. But this cannot be accepted as true. For instance, if existence be absolutely different from substance, the substance would itself be nonexistent only. And what is

nonexistent could not become existent by its relation with existence. Further, if things be intrinsically existent, the inherence of existence in them would be a superfluity. If it be argued that a thing is neither existent nor nonexistent before coming into relation with existence, but becomes existent after coming into relation with existence, this is a meaningless verbalism, for there can be nothing that is neither existent nor nonexistent. Moreover, the triad, viz. entity, existence and the relation between them, is never experienced. This relation could not be of the nature of identity between entity and existence, nor could it be contact (which is possible only between substances), as this is not acceptable to the followers of Kaṇāda. Inherence is not believed to be dependent upon the things related, and if such an independent thing can serve as a relation, everything could come into relation with every other thing, or no entity could be in relation with any other entity. This objection would hold good in all cases where the relation of inherence is admitted by them. Thus no relation is possible between two absolutely different things, and Kaṇāda's concept of reality cannot be upheld.

Objection: Even if a real were supposed to consist of both substance and mode, this position could not be upheld, for the exponents of *syādvāda* regard substance and mode to be somehow both identical and different--which stand is vitiated by contradiction and other defects.

Answer: There is no possibility of contradiction in a thing which is cognized as such. Two things could be contradictories of each other if in the presence of one, the other is never found. But in what is perceived there can be no contradiction. The Buddhists do not admit any contradiction between blue and non-blue in the cognition of a variegated canvas. And the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits the reality of variegated color (*citrarūpa*). When a single piece of linen is found to possess the apparently opposite attributes--moving/nonmoving, red/non-red, covered/uncovered--there is no scope for the suspicion of

contradiction in the present context, where experience is sure evidence. (Other arguments are also answered.)

Thus, the conception of reality as synthesis of substance and mode is not incompatible with what is experienced and what is acceptable.

Objection:[12] How can even a real entity consisting of substance and mode exercise causal efficacy? The exercise of causal efficacy which is concomitant with succession and non-succession is incompatible with a real entity's being of a dual nature, in the same manner as it has been thought to be incompatible with pure substance or pure mode (see the preceding arguments).

The answer to this objection is:

(E33; T73-74) 33. The tenability of causal activity by (a real object of the nature of substance-cum-mode) is warranted by its being susceptible to modification characterized by continuity and surrender and the appropriation of antecedent and consequent shapes (*ākāra*).

A real is not of the nature of substance nor of mode, nor of a combination of both, so that the defects pertaining to these positions could not be overruled. It is a *sui generis* multiform entity of the nature of continuity, origination and cessation. Thus it does its causal activity simultaneously or successively according as the relevant auxiliary conditions present themselves; it appropriates the chain of services rendered by the auxiliary conditions and undergoes self-development according as it puts aside and accepts the services becoming both different and identical. It does not run away being frightened by the charges leveled against both the alternatives.

It is therefore established that an actual object consisting of substance and mode is the content of a *pramāṇa*.

(E33-34; T74-75) 34. The result (of a *pramāṇa*) is the illumination of the object.

Illumination of the object signifies its apprehension.

Question: But if so would not the instrument (which is said

to be of the nature of knowledge) be itself the result? But a nonexistent cannot be an instrument, nor can a (previous) existent be the result.

Answer: True, this drawback is present in respect of origination, though not in respect of determination. (The relation of determination as meant here does not presuppose numerical difference, but it presupposes difference of function:)

(E34; T75-76) 35. Its activity concerns the object.

The operation of cognition having reference to the object is the resultant.

(E34; T76) 36. The activity as related to the subject is the *pramāṇa*.

The cognition insofar as it takes note of the activity of the agent (i.e., subject) is the *pramāṇa*. It is so because

(E34; T76) 37. The illumination of the object is realized immediately upon the occurrence of that.

"Upon the occurrence of that" means on there being the activity in the of awareness which has been stated to be an *pramāṇa*. "Realization of the illumination of the object" means the determination of it as the result. The instrument and the result stand in the relation of identity inasmuch as they belong to the self-same cognition. Their difference is in respect of the relation of determination and determinatum. Thus the theory of non-absolutism holds good here. The immediate result is referred to here.

The author now states an alternative result as immediate:

(E34; T76) 38. Or, the cessation of ignorance (is the result).

As has been said: "The immediate effect of a *pramāṇa* is the removal of ignorance; that of pure transcendent knowledge (, omniscience, *kevalajñāna*) is bliss and unconcern (for everything else); that of the rest is the notion of acceptance and avoidance (*Nyāyāvatāra* 28).

The author now state the remote (result):

(E34-35; T77) 39. Or, of determinate perception and the

rest, which have the characteristic of occurring successively, each antecedent member is the *pramāṇa* and each succeeding member is the result.

Of indistinct awareness (*avagraha*), speculation (*īhā*), memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), inductive reasoning (*ūha*) and inference (*anumāna*) which occur in the order of immediate succession, each presentation is the cognitive instrument and each succeeding one is the result. The self possessed of determinate perception as its evolved state is transformed into the state of speculation, so determinate perception functions as instrument in relation to its result in the shape of speculation. And so on.

Now, the author states another result:

(E35; T77) 40. Or, the judgments, conceptions, notions of avoidance and the rest (are the result).

The judgments of avoidance, acceptance and indifference are the results of a *pramāṇa*. The many results are put forth to show that there is no difference (in this respect) among them, and the question of what is a result depends on the point of view.

Now the author, with a view to examine the absolutist view, states:

(E35; T78-79) 41. It (the result) is both different and non-different from the *pramāṇa*.

A *pramāṇa*, being of the nature of an instrument, and the result, being of the nature of an effect, are different from each other. If the relation were of absolute non-difference, they would not be conventionally spoken of as different and so there would be either exclusively a cognitive instrument or exclusively a result. Similarly, a cognitive instrument and its result should be regarded as non-different inasmuch as the self-same self which changes into a cognitive instrument transforms itself into the result. If the two modes were absolutely different, their relation as instrument to result would be as absurd, even in the same subject (knower), as it is between two such modes occurring in two different subjects (where A's cognitive instrument is functioning, B's cannot have the expected cognition). Therefore the result is somewhat different-and-non-different from the cognitive instrument.

(E35-36; T79-81) 42. The knower (*pramātṛ*) is the self which illumines its own self and another and is liable to change.

The self has the nature of illumining its own self as well as an object other than a self, e.g., "I know the jar". There is no contradiction between revealing oneself and revealing another, for we find this characteristic in light as well. Thus the theories that cognition reveals only its own self, and that it reveals only the object, stand refuted.

The expression "liable to change" in the definition is significant. If the self were an unchanging constant phenomenon, changes like joy, grief, pleasure, pain, etc. which are liable to origination and cessation would not be possible. On the other hand, if the self were absolutely perishable the faults of loss of earned merit, demerit and acquisition of unearned deserts would be unavoidable, and memory, recognition, etc. would not be possible. But all this is properly justifiable in the dynamic self having the characteristics of origination, cessation and persistence. (Quotes verses 223-227 of a text identified in "E" as "Tattv Saṃ Kā").

This line of argument serves to refute the theories which regard the self as absolutely unchanging or absolutely perishable. The Buddhist theory of no self is also dismissed.

BOOK ONE, CHAPTER TWO

(E37; T82-83) Now the author gives the definition of indirect (non-perceptual) *pramāṇas*.

1. The indirect (*pramāṇa*) is what lacks lucidity.

2. Its varieties are: recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference and verbal testimony.

The cognitions are comprehended under the definition of

"indirect *pramāṇa*", and so cannot be regarded as distinct from it. The Buddhists also have similarly subsumed sensory awareness (*indriyajñāna*), mental awareness (*mānasajñāna*), self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) and yogic awareness (*yogijñāna*) under "perceptual *pramāṇas*".

(E37-38; T83-85) 3. Recollection (*smṛti*) is (cognition) caused by the rousing of a trace (*vāsanā*) and refers to its content as "that".

A trace, though it may have persisted for a length of time, does not become the cause of memory unless it is roused by the requisite conditions such as the subsidence-cum-destruction of the obscuring veil, observance of a similar object and the like. Cognitions which deliver their content as "that jar", "that cloth", etc. are cases of recollection.

It is a *pramāṇa* as it is not found to be discrepant, as is attested by such successful activities as searching for things kept by one's own self.

Objection: How can recollection be a *pramāṇa* when the object apprehended is absent, so lacking an objective basis.

Answer: It certainly has a content that has been experienced in the past. If illumination of the relevant object be the criterion of validity it is equally present in memory also. And lack of discrepancy in the case of other instrumens also does not consist in their being generated by an object. Light, which is caused by its own causal factors, reveals the objects jar and the like, though it is not generated by them. So also, a cognition reveals its object when brought about by the required conditions, viz., a sense-organ and mind accompanied by the subsidence-cum-cessation of the obscuring veil. It is not true that nothing is an object which is not the cause of its cognition. There is no dispute about the validity of the mystic's intuition of past and future objects, though it is not generated by them. Moreover, if recollection is not recognized as a *pramāṇa* inference would not be possible, for it is accepted by all logicians that inference is brought about by the apprehension

of the *hetu* and the recollection of its necessary concomitance with the *sādhya*. Therefore, recollection must be accepted as a *pramāṇa*, for otherwise the validity of inference could not be accounted for.

(E38-41; T85-90) 4. Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) is the synthetic judgment born of seeing (perception) and recollection as typified by such form as "this is that only" (judgment of identity), "this is like that" (judgment of similarity), "this is dissimilar to that" (judgment of dissimilarity), "this is different from that" (judgment of difference), and the like.

"And the like" refers to cases where having heard the description of a bird or animal or a man, one identifies them on seeing an object satisfying that description, e.g., "this object is certainly what is denoted by the word 'camel'." This synthetic judgment is to be accepted as a case of recognition since it is derived from perceptual awareness and recollection.

Those philosophers who acknowledge a judgment of similarity to be a separate instrument called "comparison" (*upamāna*) would have to regard judgments of dissimilarity and the rest as separate instruments. (Cf. Akalaṅka, *Laghīyastraya* III.10.12.)

If by some exegetical strategy they say that "similarity" in the definition of comparison is meant to cover dissimilarity, then the author of the *sūtra* should be regarded as unskilled, since his *sūtra* is found to be lacking in the essential characteristics of a *sūtra*.

The Buddhists say that they do not find recognition, which is taken here to be a separate *pramāṇa*, to be anything different from recollection, indicated "that", and perception, indicated by "this". But this is not a sound argument. The object apprehended by recognition cannot be comprehended by recollection and perception combined. The province of recognition is the substance which stands out as the identity persisting in antecedent and subsequent modes, and this certainly cannot be the object of recollection or perception. It

is not justifiable to deny what is experienced, as this would lead to absurd consequences.

There are some (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) who maintain that recognition is nothing but perception. But they are not correct, for the province of perception is limited to what is actually present and amenable to the senses. The identity of a past and a present datum cannot fall within the scope of perception even when the sense-organ is aided by memory. A sense-organ which is confined to its own sphere cannot be supposed to proceed to another object, though it be aided by a hundred auxiliary factors. (See Vidyānanda, *Tattvārthasūtra-Ślokavārttika* on II, 114.) Nor can it tenably be maintained that a sense-organ aided by an unseen potency (*adṛṣṭa*) can apprehend this identity. On the contrary, it would be appropriate to say that the cognition of the identity is on the part of the self aided by the unseen potency. It is seen that a self strengthened by the knowledge of some secret information acquired in a dream comes to have a distinct kind of awareness even in regard to an object which is beyond its ken.

Therefore recognition, which has an object distinct from that of perception, is different from the latter and falls within the category of indirect non-perceptual cognitive instrument.

Recognition cannot be said to be lacking in validity since absence of discrepancy (the criterion of validity) is present in it. An occasional occurrence of discrepancy (e.g., in the case of a flame which is different every moment and yet is regarded as the very same) is not sufficient to condemn it to invalidity. For this would apply to perception also. Recognition must necessarily be recognized as a *pramāṇa*, since the sense of identity can have its lease on life only if there is recognition to validate it, and it is this sense of identity that is at the root of all secular and spiritual activities.

(E41-42; T90-93) 5. Inductive reasoning (*ūha*) is the knowledge of pervasion (*vyāpti*) brought about by observation and non-observation.

"Observation" (*upalambha*) here stands for valid cognition as such and not for perceptual cognition alone, for the *hetu* may be an object of inference also, and there is no incompatibility in the fact of pervasion between two terms known by inference any more than between two terms known by perception. Knowledge of pervasion is a specific type of definitive cognition and is known as "inductive reasoning" (*ūha*).

It cannot be maintained that awareness of pervasion is derived from perception, since perception cannot perform all the operations involved in the awareness "whatever is a case of smoke is invariably the product of fire in all phases and times and not to anything else". Nor is inference competent to yield such knowledge, for on the occasion of the awareness of pervasion the knower becomes as omniscient as a *yogin*. Even if it be competent, which of the inferences, the present one or another, is cognizant of the pervasion? But, accepting this, there would be the fault of mutual dependence or infinite regress, for the inference would itself be dependent on pervasion.

Objection: Construction-free perception, being non-discursive, may be incompetent to provide awareness of pervasion, but construction-filled reflection which follows in its wake could certainly be cognizant of it.

Answer: No, for reflection has for its contents the same data as are apprehended in construction-free perception. If reflective thought had a different objective datum independently of construction-free perception, could it be considered a *pramāṇa* or not? If it be considered to be so, an additional *pramāṇa* over and above perception and inference would have to be tolerated. If it be considered to be invalid, expecting knowledge of pervasion from it would be like expecting a child from an impotent person. This also sets at nought the Buddhist stand, viz., "The relations of pervasion and causality are known from the non-observation (of the determinate concomitant and the effect) following upon the

non-observation (of the determinant concomitant and the cause)." Non-observation of the determinate concomitant and of the effect is a case of perception, and non-observation is the determinant concomitant of the cause being a logical ground (*liṅga*), the knowledge resulting from it would be nothing but inference. And we have already stated the objections against the competency of perception and inference for the apprehension of pervasion.

The Vaiśeṣikas hold that knowledge of pervasion is derived from reflective thought which works by elimination and assimilation and is the effect of perceptual cognition. If this reflective thought falls under perception or inference, the above-mentioned difficulties would be there. If it be different from these, it would amount to admitting an additional *pramāṇa*. It will not be proper to say that this reflection of pervasion is but the result of perceptual cognition, and so the question of its being a *pramāṇa* does not arise. For though a result, it is a condition of a subsequent result in the shape of inference, and so certainly an instrument regarding inference.

The Yaugas (Naiyāyikas) on the other hand hold that the apprehension of pervasion results from perception aided by *tarka*. But would it not be proper to give credit to *tarka* alone for the apprehension of pervasion, rather than do injustice to *tarka* and expose perception to the charge of ingratitude? *Tarka* is not regarded as a *pramāṇa* by the exponents of the Nyāya school, but there is no valid reason why it should not be given this status when it fulfils the criteria of such an instrument. Even lack of discrepancy (between knowledge and its object) is not wanting, and it has a distinctive object, vis., pervasion, of its own.

Therefore, inductive reasoning (*ūha*) is a separate *pramāṇa* yielding knowledge of pervasion which is not apprehended by any other *pramāṇa*.

Now the author defines pervasion

(E42-43; T93-96) 6. Pervasion consists (1) in the occurrence necessarily (*bhāva eva*) of the *sādhya* in the occurrence of the *hetu*, or (2) the occurrence of the *hetu* only there (where the *sādhya* occurs).

Pervasion (*vyāpti*) is the property of both the terms--that which determines its occurrences and that of which the occurrence is determined: hence the definition as given above.

The significance of the restrictive qualification *eva* ("necessarily, only") is explained. In (1) it is to be construed with "occurrence" and not with "pervasion", and in (2) with "there" and not with pervasion, since such other constructions would involve many faults. The determinant "necessarily" occurs when the determinant (e.g, fire) is there and determinate (smoke) exists only where the determinant occurs.

The characterization of the *hetu* and *sādhya* terms as "determinate" and "determinant" respectively is deliberately done in order to guard against the possibility of the relation of pervasion being understood in a uniform manner on the ground that it is the common attribute of both the term.

(E43; T97) 7. Inference (*anumāna*) is the knowledge of the *sādhya* on the strength of the *hetu*.

Knowledge of the *sādhya*, which is of the nature of right definitive cognition of an object, and which arises from a *hetu* either perceived or expressly stated, is called inference; it is a cognition which takes place subsequent to the apprehension of the *hetu* and recollection of the necessary relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*.

(E43; T97) 8. It is of two kinds--for one's self (*svārtha*) and for another (*parārtha*).

Svārtha anumāna is what is meant to remove one's own misconception, and *parārtha anumāna* is competent to remove the misconception of another person.

(E43-45; T97-103) 9. Inference for oneself is the knowledge of the *sādhya* from the *hetu* ascertained by one's own self as having the sole characteristic of necessary concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with the *sādhya*.

"Necessary concomitance with the *sādhya*" means the impossibility of the *hetu* apart from the *sādhya*. The *hetu* is also called the "mark" (*liṅga*) and the *sādhya* the *liṅgin* ("that of which the former is the mark"). The *hetu* brings about the knowledge of the unperceived *sādhya* not by its very presence but by being definitely apprehended and at the same time known as having the relation of pervasion with the *sādhya*.

The Buddhists, in order to avoid the fallacies of unprovedness, contradiction and inconclusive, insist on the triple characteristic of the *hetu*, viz., (1) subsistence necessarily in the *pakṣa*, (2) subsistence in the *sapakṣa* alone, (3) nonexistence necessarily in the *vipakṣa*. But the contention is not sound. Knowledge of the necessity of pervasion alone is capable of preventing the three fallacies (mentioned). "Necessary concomitance" means the impossibility of the *hetu* without the *sādhya*, or the incompatibility of the *hetu* with the contradictory of the *sādhya*, and this cannot be found in a fallacious *hetu*. On the other hand, a reason found to lack cogency in spite of this triple characteristic if the condition of pervasion is not present in it. The inference "A must be dark in complexion, like other sons of Maitra, since he is a son of Maitra" is an instance in point. It may be argued that the reason is not cogent here because it is lacking in the criterion, viz., necessity of absence in the *vipakṣa*. But in that case "necessity of absence in the *vipakṣa*" should be reckoned as the only characteristic of a valid *hetu*, as it is alone of the nature of necessary concomitance. The presence of this condition alone, irrespective of the other two characteristics, is found to ensure the full cogency of the *hetu*. For example, "The admission of it is necessary for the Monist also, as the proof of the desired conclusion and refutation of the undesired position would otherwise be impossible." Here the *hetu* is found to be conclusive only on the ground of the presence of pervasion (proved by the necessity of the incompatibility with the contradictory of the *sādhya*.

Thus pervasion alone should be regarded as the principal characteristic of a valid *hetu*. The triple characteristic, moreover, is not a necessary universal feature of a valid *hetu*. For example, in the most predominant argument of the Buddhists, "existent" does not occur in a *sapakṣa*--there is nothing outside "all" which can serve as a *sapakṣa*-- and yet the reason is accepted as valid by the Buddhists.

The above also serves to reject the fivefold characterization of a *hetu* as stated in the Nyāya school, since it is nothing but an elaboration of pervasion. The five characteristics stated by the Nyāya school are the above mentioned (1)-(3) plus (4) absence of contradiction by a stronger *pramāṇa*, and (5) absence of a countervailing *hetu*. These last two also can be included within the scope of pervasion.

Thus it is established that a *hetu* having the sole characteristic of being necessarily concomitant with the *sādhya* is a valid reason capable of being conclusive.

(E46; T103-105) 10. Necessary concomitance consists in the complete necessity of synchronous and successive occurrences of simultaneous and successive things (respectively).

"Synchronous" things are those which are the co-effects of the same act or causal factors, e.g., the color and taste of a fruit, or those which stand in the relation of determinant and determinate, such as genus and species, e.g., tree and *śiṃśapā*. "Successive" events are those which occur in succession, e.g., the appearances of the constellations *kṛttikā* and *śakaṭa*, or which are related as cause and effect, e.g., fire and smoke. The synchronous necessity of synchronous events, and the successive necessity of successive events, is what is meant by "necessary concomitance."

But by what *pramāṇa* can this concomitance be known? Not by perception (as it pertains only to objects in the vicinity of the senses), nor by the mind (for it operates only in the sphere of the objects apprehended by the senses, otherwise there would not be blind or deaf persons). If yogic awareness

(*yogipratyakṣa*) were to be posited as the *pramāṇa* for the knowledge of pervasion, then there would be no necessity for inference at all (for knowledge of the *sādhya* could be had by the former itself). Inference also is of no avail in this respect, for this would lead to the fault of infinite regress or mutual dependence. Keeping this in mind, the author says:

(E46; T105) 11. The knowledge of it (i.e., pervasion) is acquired by means of inductive reasoning (*ūha*).

Now the author gives the classification of the kinds of reasons (*sādhana*):

(E46-50; T105-114) 12. The reason is of five kinds: (1) essential nature (*svabhāva*), (2) cause (*kāraṇa*), (3) effect (*kārya*), (4) inhering in the same thing (as the *sādhya*) (*ekārthasamavāyin*), and (5) contradictoriness (*virodha*).

The first four are reasons for a positive conclusion, while the last one, viz., contradictoriness, is a reason for a negative one.

(1) Essential nature. For example: Word is impermanent, because it is a product, or because it is audible.

Objection: Audibility is an uncommon attribute. How can pervasion between it and impermanence be established?

Answer: It is established by the proof of sublation of the contradictory possibility. The case is exactly on a par with "existence", which is advanced as a reason for establishing impermanence by the Buddhists. (Arguments are advanced to show that audibility, though an uncommon attribute, is a legitimate reason for proving impermanence.)

The impossibility or untenability of the *hetu* without the *sādhya* (*anyathānupapatti*) is the sole condition that can be regarded as the only characteristic of a (good) reason (*hetu*). It is not even necessary that the *hetu* should be an attribute of the *pakṣa*), as we see in the case of the inference of the emergence of the *śakaṭa* constellation from the emergence of the *kṛttikā* constellation. Thus, "audibility", though an uncommon attribute, serves as a ground of inference of impermanence, as

it is necessarily concomitant with it. A substance will not thereby be proved to be impermanent, for it is the impermanence of the modes only that is sought to be established.

Objection: If the attribute of "being a product" and "impermanence" are essentially identical, the *sādhya* should be a proved fact like the *hetu*, or the *hetu* should be one that is not yet proved, like the *sādhya*.

Answer: True. But the inference is employed in order to remove a delusion. It has ben said: "For a person who does not realize that what has a beginning has an end, the self-same entity used as *hetu* and *sādhya* is not liable to objection."

(2) Cause. For example: Fire serves are the reason for proving smoke, when there is doubt in respect of the latter as to whether it is a volume of vapor or an assemblage of mosquitoes. Or, upsurge of a special variety serves as the reason for impending rainfall.

It is strange how this matter of common knowledge escapes the notice of the Buddhist Logician, who claims to be a minute observer. For the effect which is yet to come, no source of knowledge other than inference can be imagined. It goes without saying that only a competent adequate cause can serve as the ground for the inference of the effect, for this relation of cause to effect is with reference to each other. As a matter of fact, the Buddhist Logician also endorses the position that the cause can survive as a *hetu* when he recognizes the inherence of color from the presence of taste based upon the inference of the self-same set of causal conditions. (See Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika* I.10.)

(3) Effect as reason is illustrated by the appearance of a particular type of flood serving as the reason for inferrng rainfall, by smoke serving as the *hetu* for fire, and vital functions for consciousness. The said flood, smoke and vital functions can very well be determined to be the effects of rainfall, fire and consciousness respectively (without which they

are impossible). (See Jayanta Bhāṭṭa, *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 130; *Pramāṇavārttika* I. 35ff.)

Moreover, concomitance in agreement is not a characteristic of a (good) *hetu* since its default does not entail a fallacy. A *hetu* which exists in a *vipakṣa* only is fallacious and is known as contradictory. What exists in both the *vipakṣa* and the *sapakṣa* is known as inconclusive. As regards the *hetu* speaker-hood, advanced to prove omniscience ("X is omniscient, because X is a speaker"), it is regarded as fallacious due to the lack of negative concomitance (not all non-omniscients are non-speakers), and not due to doubt regarding its positive concomitance (all omniscients may well be speakers). Thus the Buddhist logician too has affirmed the two types of fallacy to be due exclusively to the lack of negative concomitance...Even an uncommon attribute cannot be regarded as inconclusive if it can be ascertained to cease to exist in the absence of the *sādhya*. If positive concomitance were regarded as a characteristic of a valid *hetu*, just as negative concomitance is, then it could not have both existence and nonexistence in the *sapakṣa*, just as it cannot have both existence and nonexistence in the *vipakṣa*.

Thus it is established that a valid *hetu* has incompatibility with the contradictory of the *sādhya* (not being possible or justifiable otherwise than by virtue of the *sādhya*) as its sole characteristic.

(4) Inherence in the same thing (as the *sādhya*) is illustrated by an attribute which subsists along the the *sādhya* in the same locus whether perceived or unperceived. Such co-inherence in the same locus is found in the case of color and taste of one and the same fruit and the like, of the emergence of *śakaṭa* and *kṛttikā*, of moon-rise and sea-tide, of rainfall and the commotion of ants carrying their larvae, of combustion of the betel-creeper and the withering of its leaves. Of these, taste is the co-inherent of color, or color is that of taste. The relation in question cannot be that of causality, subsisting as it does between synchronous phenomena.

It may be argued that this is a case of causality, and the object of inference is a cause productive of two synchronous effects. But this is not true, for in that case the effect will not be inferred. As for the appearance of *śakaṭa* and that of *kṛttikā* and the like, the relative position of the terms as *hetu* and *sādhya* should be understood in conformity with the nature of their invariable concomitance (or one not being possible without the other). Thus, for example, the rise of *kṛttikā* is the ground of the inference of the *śakaṭa*, but not vice versa. This principle holds good in the case of other *hetus* as well.

Objection: Why should not the attributes *being a product* and *being impermanent* be regarded as a case of inherence in the same thing?

Answer: This is not possible, as the two attributes are one and the same. It has been said: "The same existence relative to a beginning and an end is viewed as the attribute of *being a product* and *being impermanent*. The selfsame thing serves as the *hetu* and *sādhya*, and so it is not a case of two attributes in one substance.

(5) Contradictoriness. The foregoing four reasons, essential nature etc., are for instruments invoked to prove a positive conclusion, whereas the "contradictory" type of reason in an instrument for establishing a negative conclusion. It establishes the negation of the other by its presence, for otherwise the relation of opposition between the two would not be established.

The implication of the word "and" (in *sūtra* 12) is: Since essential nature, cause, effect and co-inherence (as the grounds of inference) lead to the establishment of their respective *sādhyas* by virtue of their being otherwise impossible, it follows that they cannot possibly come into being in the absence of the *sādhyas* concerned, and so the non-cognition of these (essential nature, etc.) is a valid ground for the establishment of the relevant absence.

Illustrations: Of non-cognition of essential nature: "The jar is not here, since it is not perceived though amenable to perception."

Of non-cognition of the cause: "There is no smoke here, as there is no fire."

Of non-cognition of effect: "The causes of smoke with their powers unobstructed are not present here, since there is absence of smoke."

Of non-cognition of co-inherence: "A *śiṃśapā* tree is not here, as there is no tree here."

As regards contradiction, it is what is opposed to (a) what is to be negated, or to the (b) cause, (c) effect or (d) co-inherent thereof, or (e) is the effect of what is opposed to these.

Thus the inferential forms on the basis of the contradictory are of various kinds. (It may be noted that the fundamental ground of inference of negation is nothing but the relation of contradictoriness.)

Now the author gives the definition of a *sādhya*:

(50-51; T115-116) 13. The *sādhya* or *pakṣa* is what is intended to be proved, is unproved, and is not capable of being sublated.

A *sādhya* may be what is desired to be proved, though it may not be expressed. Thus, for instance, in the Sāṃkhya argument "The visual organ and the like are subservient to another, since they are composite bodies like a bed, articles of food and such other subservient things". "Subservient to another" means subservient to the self (and this is the *sādhya*). But in the Vaiśeṣika argument "Earth and the like have for their antecedent an intelligent agent, as they are produces", the *sādhya* is understood to be *having for its antecedent an unembodied omniscient being.*

The expression "intended to be proved" removes the possibility of what is not intended by the arguer to be proved being regarded as a *sādhya*, e.g., "sound is eternal" in the case of the Vaiśeṣika, or "sound is a quality of ether" (because

though this latter is acceptable to the Vaiśeṣika it is not intended to be proved and so is irrelevant to the discussion). The term "unproved" (in the *sūtra*) shows that the *sādhya* is always something which is the content of indecision, doubt or erroneous judgment and not something already proved as, e.g., "sound is audible". The expression "not capable of being sublated" means that the *sādhya* cannot be what is contradicted by perception or other instruments.

(E51; T116-117) 14. Sublation (*bādha*) is constituted by perceptual cognition, inference, scriptural evidence, popular opinion, one's own statement and (linguistic) convention.

Perceptual cognition, etc. can serve to contradict by presenting facts which are opposed to what is meant to be proved.

Cases of sublation by perception: "Fire is not hot", "Sound is not audible".

A case of sublation by inference: "Sound is eternal". (This is contradicted by an inference having *being a product* as its logical ground.

A case of sublation by scriptural evidence: "A pious act result in unhappiness in the next world". (All scriptures assert that a pious act result in happiness in the next world.)

A case of sublation by popular opinion: "Human skulls are ceremonially clean."

A case of contradiction by one's own statement: "My mother is barren."

A case of contradiction by (linguistic) convention: "*Śaśin* is not *candra*", i.e., "the rabbit-bearing luminary is not the moon".

The author now eliminates the doubt whether the *sādhya* consists in an attribute or a synthetic whole composed of the attribute and the substantive which is its possessor.

(E51; T117) 15. The *sādhya* is a substantive (*dharmin*) qualified by an attribute sought to be proved; but in some cases, an attribute (*dharma*) alone is the *sādhya*.

"But in some cases" refers to the time of the comprehension

of the pervasion, when the term "*sādhya*" signifies an attribute. For one cannot comprehend in all cases of the observation of smoke the universal proposition that the hill possesses fire, since this is in direct conflict with what is known. (That is to say, the necessary concomitance of smoke can be comprehended with fire as such, and the occurrence of the latter on a hill is only accidental; there can be no universal relation with the subject, which may be variable.)

(E52; T118) 16. A property-possessor (*dharmin*) is what is established by a *pramāṇa*.

E.g., "This place is possessed of fire". Here the place is established by perception. This assertion refutes the Buddhist stand that all this assertion of *hetu* and *sādhya* is due to conceptual constructions which is based on our cognitions and does not require existence or nonexistence in the external world. It is not possible that a conceptual construction unrelated to an object which is either inside or outside can establish a property-possessor. And if the property-possessor is unreal, the reality of *hetu* and *sādhya*, which have the property-possessor for their support, cannot be logically tenable. Thus conceptual construction cannot be said to establish reality even remotely. So, the mountain or the like can assume the character of property-possessor only when it becomes the content of conceptual or non-conceptual cognition and is determined thereby. Therefore, what is established by an accredited cognitive organ should be accepted as the property-possessor.

Now the author states an exception.

(E52-53; T118-120) 17. It is also established by conceptual awareness (*buddhi*).

"Also" shows that there may be a subject which is established by a *pramāṇa* as well as one established by conceptual awareness. With regard to the subject established by conceptual awareness, the predicate to be proved, e.g., existence or nonexistence, is established on the strength of a *pramāṇa*. For example, "There exists an omniscient person"; A

sixth element is not in existence."

Objection: How can existence or nonexistence be established as a predicate in respect of a subject which is not directly cognized to exist, especially when the predicate cannot be a legitimate object of inference in view of the fallacies of nonexistent, contradictory or inconclusive reason involving a *hetu* that is positive, negative or both in character. (See Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika* I, 192-193, according to Mookerjee.)

Answer: It is not so. Only a positive subject is comprehended by mental intuition. And even though its existence is envisaged, inference is certainly fruitful in compelling recognition of the truth by a person who out of perversity refuses to accept the truth though he realizes it. It should not be feared that there would be absurd over-extension as mental intuition may lead to the establishment of such fictions as a donkey's horn. This sort of mental intuition is not intuition proper, but is rather its (mere) semblance (*ābhāsa*), since the existence of its object is set aside by the contradictory notion involved.

It may be questioned as to how a (nonexistent) sixth element can be made a logical subject. The answer to this is that when the subject is stated in the argument, the notion of contradiction does not arise and hence the probability of its existence is logically tenable (i.e., it is presumed to exist). But by analogy the existence of an omniscient being cannot be doubted on the ground of the absence of proofs to support it. As a matter of fact, the existence of such a being is determined as decisively as that of pleasure, etc. on account of the well-determined realization of the impossibility of any contradicting evidence.

The subject established by both (*pramāṇa* and conceptual awareness) is illustrated by such a proposition as "Sound (as a class) is perishable". Here all the individual sounds of infinite time and space cannot be cognized through perception by

persons of narrow vision, and hence the subject (the class of sounds) is one that is established by both empirical perception and conceptual knowledge, and the predicate "perishable" is established in respect of it.

A question may be asked as to why example (*dṛṣṭānta*), though traditionally regarded as a necessary factor of inference, is not mentioned and only the thesis and the reason are mentioned. The answer is this:

(E53; T121-122) 18-19. The example is not a factor of inference, because it (inference) is realized by means of the *hetu* alone.

Inference, which consists in the knowledge of the thesis, is realized by means of knowledge of the reason, which is incompatible with knowledge of the opposite of the *sādhya*, and so the example is not regarded as a factor in inference.

The example cannot be said to be useful for the knowledge of the *sādhya*, for the latter is obtained from the *hetu* having the three features mentioned earlier. Nor is it useful for the apprehension of pervasion, for this is attained by the proof of the contradiction of the opposite possibility. Moreover, how can the example, which is an individual case, be helpful in knowledge of pervasion, which is necessarily universal in reference? One would have to go on searching for examples one after the other in order to understand the extension of this concomitance to other individual cases, and this would lead to an infinite regress. Nor, again, is the example useful for the recollection of the pervasion, because this recollection is possible on the apprehension of the *hetu* by the person who has apprehended it. If the person has not previously apprehended this relation, the example would not at all help him to remember, as recollection is necessarily preceded by apprehension.

The author now defines "example".

(E53-54; T122) 20. The example is the locus of the apprehension of pervasion.

It may be noted that "apprehension" signifies here the communication to another person of the truth of the pervasion which the example drives home for the other person by serving as the locus or objective substratum of such communication.

"Example" is appropriately defined here, for it is allowed by way of exception, out of deference to a pupil (of slow understanding) in an inferential argument (meant for the conviction of another). And even in the field of inference for oneself, a person may be helped to arrive at knowledge of pervasion from the observation of external concomitance in the case of the example.

(E54; T122-123) 21. It (the example) is of two kinds according as it is based on similarity or dissimilarity.

That is to say, on concomitance in presence or concomitance in absence.

(E54; T123) 22. The example based on similarity is an individual possessed of the *sādhya* logically entailed by the possession of the *hetu*.

The possession of the *sādhya* here is logically brought about by the nature of the *hetu*, and not by something accidental, as in the maxim "the fall of a palm-fruit and death of a crow". For example, a jar serves as an example in relation to sound of which perishability is to be proved on the ground of its being a product.

(E24; T123) 23. The example based on dissimilarity is an individual which is associated with the absence of the *hetu* entailed as a necessary consequence by the absence of the *sādhya*.

Thus space serves as such an example in relation to sound which is sought to be proved perishable on the ground of its being a product.

BOOK TWO, CHAPTER ONE

(E55; T124) 1. Inference for another is produced from the statement of a reason having the properties mentioned

previously.

That is to say, it is knowledge of the *sādhya* derived from the communication offered by another person.

Question: Inference for another is said to consist in verbal assertion. How does this agree with the definition?

The answer to this is:

(E55; T124-125) 2. A statement (*vacana*) is called "inference" metaphorically.

A statement, being nonconscious, cannot be the cause having knowledge as its result, and so cannot be a *pramāṇa* in its own right without resorting to a metaphor. It is called "inference" by transferred epithet, being the cause of inference proper. The nature of the effect is ascribed to the cause. Recollection of the *hetu* arises from its statement, and this recollection gives rise to inference, and so the statement of the *hetu* (i.e., of the reason) is the indirect cause of the inference, and the character of the effect is superimposed upon the cause, viz., the statement, which is thus called inference.

Or, it may be understood as a case of the superimposition of the character of the cause, viz. inference, on the effect, viz., the statement, which is the result of the inference arrived at by the arguer.

All the conditions required for transference of epithet or secondary (metaphorical) usage as fulfilled here.

(E55; T125-126) 3. It (inference for another) is twofold.

(E56; T126) 4. The difference is due to (the consideration of) the possibility (of the *hetu*) on the occurrence of the *sādhya* (i.e., the consideration of) the impossibility (of the *hetu* in the absence of the *sādhya*).

For example, the hill is possessed of fire, because the possibility of its being possessed of smoke is intelligible only on that condition. Or, the fact of its possession of smoke would be impossible in the absence of fire there. The difference between the two is just formal.

(E56; T126-128) 5-6. The difference between these two is

not in respect of ultimate intent. For that reason, the statement of both is not necessary.

There is difference between the (two) verbal propositions (cited in the commentary on (4)) so far as they express different primary meanings, but their ultimate intent, or the logical content intended by them, is identical. When agreement in presence is stated, agreement in absence is implied and vice versa. Both these propositions have the same ultimate intent, viz., the pervasion of the *hetu* by the *sādhya*. Difference of ultimate intent need not be necessarily present where there is difference of primary meaning. For example, the statements "Devadatta is stout but does not take his meals in the daytime" and "Devadatta is stout and takes his meals at night" have different expressed meanings, but the very same intent or logical meaning.

Since there is no difference in ultimate intent, the simultaneous employment of the two propositions stating positive and negative concomitance respectively is not warranted, as they both ultimately want to convey the pervasion of the *hetu* by the *sādhya*. (See *Nyāyāvatāra* 17)

It may be urged that arguing on these lines the statement of the thesis (as a member of the argument) should be dispensed with on the ground of superfluity, for a person does not come to understand the conclusion from the thesis alone, as otherwise there would be no divergence of views. In answer to this contention, the author says:

(E57; T128-130) 7. But the thesis (*pratijñā*) is intended for demonstrating the content (of the inference).

"The content" is that with reference to which the *hetu* with its positive and negative concomitance is sought for establishing the relevant *sādhya*. The demonstration of it means the communication to another person and it is for this purpose that the thesis is to be stated.

When a sane person makes a statement for the enlightenment of another person, he should take care to

communicate only that which the person intended to be enlightened desires to know. It is only thus that he can succeed; otherwise attention would not be paid to his statement. When a person desires to now how sound is impermanent and another person states to convince him by saying something like "because it is a product", or "because its being a product would be impossible if it were otherwise", but he does not care to state the subject in some such proposition as "Sound is perishable", his assertion would fall flat for the person addressed, who would take it to be an irrelevant statement and would not pay attention.

It might be contended that "whatever is a product is perishable, e.g., a jar; sound is a product" is a perfect argument which by implication will lead to the conclusion "sound is perishable", and so will receive due attention. But that is not so, as this contention involves mutual dependence. There would arise awareness of the object from the argument if attention is paid to it, and attention would be paid if there were such awareness of it. Nor would the council of umpires and the opponent regard the proponent as having authority and as such endeavor to bring out the logical relation of the premisses stated by him, for otherwise without demanding that the reason be stated, etc., they would accept the truth of his contention. But when the contemplated conclusion "sound is perishable" is put forth as the thesis, in anticipation of the query for the logical ground of this statement, some such statement as "the fact of its being a product is logically possible only on the condition of its being perishable" properly presents itself as the answer. This is the logical justification of the thesis for the purpose of demonstrating the subject.

It may still be urged that even then the statement again of a fact derived by implication by means of explicit language contitutes tautology and purposeless elaboration. The author's answer is:

(57-58; T130-131) 8. Though (the conclusion is) known by

implication, (the advance statement of) it (as thesis) has justification in order to set aside a possible doubt about the locus of the attribute to be proved, just as is the case with the assertion of the *hetu*(-property) in the *pakṣa*.

When the *hetu* is stated to be necessarily concomitant with the *sādhya*, the locus of such a *hetu* is known generally, yet it is felt necessary that the second member (of the inference), e.g., "sound is a product" should be expressly stated for demonstrating the factual relation of the *hetu* with a definite subject. Similarly, the statement "sound is perishable" is necessary to generate knowledge of the factual relation of the *sādhya* with a definite subject.

There are different views regarding the constitution of a (properly-formed) argument. According to Sāṃkhya it consists of three members--thesis (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*) and example (*udāharaṇa*). The Mīmāṃsakas admit one more, viz. application, and the Naiyāyikas still another, viz., conclusion. What then is the proper form of the argument?

(E58; T131-132) 9. This much constitutes an argument adequate for a knowledgeable person.

"This much" means the thesis and also the *hetu* endowed with positive and negative concomitance. The argument consists of neither more, as the Sāṃkhyas maintain, nor less (--just the reason--) as the Buddhists hold (see *Pramāṇavārttika* I, 38).

But, the main purpose is that one should enlighten others by whatever method is found to be convenient. So, how can it be said that an argument is "this much" for a knowledgeable person? Answering such an objection, the author endorses another form of the argument (out of concession):

(E58; T132) 10. In deference to the caliber of) the person to be enlightened, the argument may have five members also, viz., thesis, reason, example, application and conclusion.

"The person to be enlightened" means a pupil, and "deference to him" means obligation to the pledge of his

enlightenment. In pursuance of such an obligation, the five propositions beginning with thesis ought to be affirmed. These propositions are designated by the names of members. (See *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.32.) "Also" is significant and shows that each of the five members should be supplemented by a corroborative statement out of deference to the pupil's requirements. As Bhadrabāhu has said, "(The argument) is said to consist of five members, or of ten members in the alternative. We denounce neither". (*Daśavaikālikaniryukti* 50)

(E58-59; T132) 11. The "thesis" (*pratijñā*) is the statement of what is to be proved.

"What is to be proved" means the subject with the predicate attribute contemplated to be established. "Thesis" can be illustrated by "this locality is possessed of fire".

(E59; T132-133) 12. The "reason" (*hetu*) is the statement of a proof ending in an inflection (*vibhakti*) unfolding the character of the *hetu*.

The "inflection unfolding the character of the *hetu*" is either the fifth or the third case-ending (in Sanskrit). This serves to rebut the contention that the a word with the first (nominative) case-ending, e.g., *dhūmaḥ*, could designate the reason. This statement of the reason is twofold according as the concomitance is shown affirmatively or negatively. The reason is illustrated by "because smoke is possible only thus (i.e., if fire, with which it is concomitant, is present). "

(E59; T133) 13. The *udāharaṇa* is the statement of an example (*dṛṣṭānta*).

It is twofold, according as the example is put forth by way of similarity or dissimilarity. E.g., "whatever is possessed of smoke is possessed of fire, as for example, a kitchen", or "whatever is possessed of the absence of fire is possessed of the absence of smoke, as for example, a lake".

(E59; T133-134) 14. The application is the proposition bringing the *hetu* into connection with the subject (*dharmin*) (of the inference).

E.g., "it is possessed of smoke".

(E59-60; T134-135) 15. The conclusion is (the predication) of the *sādhya* (as an attribute of the subject (of the inference).

E.g., "Therefore it is possessed of fire."

These five members are parts of one (self-contained) proposition, each member constituting a quota of meaning which stands in necessary relation with what is conveyed by the other members. The five corroborative statements referred to in II.1.10 relate to these members respectively and serve to remove any defects suspected or erroneously superimposed in respect of these. It follows that in pursuance of the requirement of the pupil, an argument consisting of ten members[1] may be employed.

The topics defined in this treatise are to be understood and used in terms of their respective definitions. In default of any constituent element of these definitions, they are regarded as sham semblances (or fallacies, *ābhāsa*). For example, an account of the lack of the characteristics of valid cognition in general, doubt, error and indecision are called sham semblances of valid cognition. So also in the case of doubt, etc., and memory and the like. Similarly, when a *hetu* is lacking in its essential characteristic, it is a sham semblance of the same, i.e., a fallacy. Since the determinate number and the characteristic individual fallacies are particularly difficult to grasp, the author gives a list of these fallacies with a view to defining them.

(E60; T135-136) 16. The fallacies of the reason

[1]The ten memers are (1) thesis (*pratijñā*), (2) limitation of the thesis (*pratijñāvibhakti*), (3) reason (*hetu*), (4) limitation of the reason (*hetuvibhakti*), (5) counterexample (*vipakṣa*), (6) denial of the counterexample (*vipakṣapratiṣedha*), (7) example (*dṛṣṭānta*), (8) doubt (of the validity of the example) (*ākāṅkṣā*), (9) dispelling of the doubt (*ākāṅkṣāpratiṣedha*), (10) conclusion (*nigamana*). (See *Daśavaikālika-niryukti* 137.).

(*hetvābhāsa*) are three: viz., unproved, contradictory, and inconclusive.

The author explains that the defects actually belong to *hetu* terms (and not to reasons) because they do not occur if the reasons are valid; still, these defects are transferred by extension of meaning to the reasons which are but statements of *hetus*, and they have been designated by previous writers as defects of reason. The author too, not wanting to make a break with tradition, designates them as fallacies of the reason.

The mention of "three" is meant to exclude any other possible number, and thus the so-called fallacies, viz., mistimed (*kālātīta*) and counterbalanced (*prakaraṇsama*), are excluded from the category called "fallacy of the reason": Of these , the mistimed is subsumed under defects of the thesis (*pakṣadoṣa*), e.g., "The mass of fire is unwarm, since it is a product, just like a jar". (This is contradicted by perception.) As regards counterbalanced reason, it is not possible at all. There is no possibility whatever of another inference so long as an inference as defined before stands employed or unrefuted. Suppose one says: "sound is impermanent, being either a subject or an example". But this is highly inappropriate. Who, unless he be beside himself, could make such incoherent statements in a council consisting of four (--the president, the umpire, the proponent and the opponent).

(E60-61; T136-137) 17. The unproved *hetu* arises from lack of proof or doubt of its existence, according as the reason assigned is found to be nonexistent and lacking in necessary concomitance, or lacking in definite proof of its existence as well as necessary concomitance.

The fallacy "unproved *hetu*" arises when the reason is found to be nonexistent and to lack in necessary concomitance, that is to say, when the reason is nonexistent by nature, e.g., "sound is perishable, since it is visible." The reason is unproved not because it is not an attribute of the subject, but because it lacks necessary concomitance which is the sole characteristic of a

valid *hetu*. It has been shown above that it is not necessary that the *hetu* must exist in the subject, provided that the characteristic of necessary concomitance is there. So also, even when the existence of a *hetu* is subject to doubt and is lacking in necessary concomitance, it is a case of the fallacy of unproved *hetu*, that is to say doubted-cum-nonexistent; as for instance when a rising column of smoke doubted to be a stream of vapor is adduced to establish fire.

(E61; T137-138) 18. The different varieties of this fallacy arise from the different of the proponent, opponent and both.

Unproved from the point of view of the proponent: "Sound is liable to change, since it has origination". The reason is unproved when the Sāṃkhya is the opponent, inasmuch as he does not admit the truth of origination (for him, origination and cessation are only cases of manifestation and non-manifestation).

Unproved from the point of view of the opponent. A Jaina says: "Trees are animate beings, since they die if stripped of the whole of their bark." The reason "death", which connotes interception of life, sense-organ and consciousness is not accepted (unproved) to exist in trees for a Buddhist, who is the opponent here.

Unproved from both points of view: "Sound is perishable, since it is visible."

The doubted-cum-unproved variety is similarly three-fold on the basis of the difference of proponent, opponent and both.

But what about other varieties like unproved in respect of the substantive (*viśeṣyāsiddha*), etc. The author observes:

(E61-62; T138-140) 19. The so-called fallacies "unproved in respect of the substantive" and the like are included in these (above) only.

"In these (above) only" means in the varieties "unproved in respect of the proponent, opponent and both."

Unproved in respect of the qualified (*viśeṣyāsiddha*): "Sound is perishable, since while possessing a universal it has

visibility."

Unproved in respect of qualifier (*viśeṣaṇāsiddha*): "Sound is perishable, since being possessed of visibility it possesses a universal."

Unproved in respect of a part (of the subject) (*bhāgāsiddha*): "Sound is perishable because it is the product of effort". (There are cases of sound, such as thunder, which are not the products of a volitional effort, so the reason is true only of a part of the subject.

Unproved in respect of the locus (*āśrayāsiddha*): "Primordial matter is existent, since it evolves as the whole world" (--the existence of such a principle which evolves into the world is not admitted by philosophers other than the Sāṃkhya).

Unproved because of a superfluous substance (*vyarthaviśeṣaṇāsiddha*): "Sound is perishable, since being possessed of a universal it is produced."

Unproved because of a doubtful substantive (*sandigdhaviśeṣyāsiddha*): "Kapila is still subject to attachment, etc., because being devoid of the knowledge of ultimate reality he is a human being."

These varieties of unproved reason are cases of a reason unproved from the point of view of the proponent, opponent or both according as the reason happens to be unproved according to the views of the one or the other.

(E62: T140-143) 20. The contradictory is a reason which is necessarily of the opposite concomitance and is thus possible in the absence (of the *sādhya*) as a matter of necessity.

For example, "Sound is eternal, because it is a product". (The *hetu* "being a product" is concomitant with the opposite of the *sādhya*, viz. "eternal".)

Or, "earth and the like have an intelligent agent as their cause, since they are products." (Here the reason advanced by the Naiyāyikas, viz., "being a product", proves the very opposite of the intended *sādhya*, viz., the fact of being created by an unembodied omniscient agent, because all intelligent agents are found to be embodied persons.)

The other varieties of the contradictory as recognized by other logicians are comprehended here. Thus there are four varieties when a positive example is available:

(i) When the reason pervades the subject and the *sapakṣa*, e.g., "sound is eternal, because it is a product'".

(ii) When the reason pervades the subject and part of the *vipakṣa*, e.g., "sound is eternal, because being possessed of a universal it is cognizable by an eternal sense-organ possessed by beings like us". (Perishable entities such as a jar have the *hetu*-property, but not things like dyads which are not cognizable by the sense-organs).

(iii) When a reason exists in a part of the subject, but in the whole of the *vipakṣa*, e.g., "Earth is eternal, since it is a product. (Atoms of earth are not products.)

(iv) When the reason exists only in a part of the subject and of the *vipakṣa*, e.g., "Sound is eternal, since it is a consequence of effort." (All sounds are not the result of conscious effort, e.g., the sound of thunder, and all perishable things are not products of effort, e.g., a lightning-flash.)

There are four varieties of the contradictory in the absence of the *sapakṣa*:

(i) A reason which occurs in the whole of the subject and the *vipakṣa*, e.g. "sound is a specific quality of space, since it is knowable."

(ii) A reason which belongs to the whole of the subject but to a part of the *vipakṣa*, e.g., "Sound is a specific quality of space, since it is cognizable by an external sense-organ." (The *vipakṣa* "size of space" is not cognizable by an external sense-organ.)

(iii) A reason which exists only in a part of the subject and the whole of the *vipakṣa*, viz., "Sound is a specific quality of space, since it is not composed of letters."

(iv) A reason which exists only in a part of the subject and

of the *vipakṣa*, e.g., "Sound is a specific quality of space, because it is a consequence of effort."

In four cases (out of these eight) the contradictory is the exclusive fallacy. In the other four, where the reason exists in a part of the subject, there is a combination of both the fallacies called "nonexistent" and "contradictory".

(E63; T143-145) 21. The equivocal (*anaikāntika*) reason is one which is possible even in the absence of the *sādhya* and occurs when the necessary concomitance is either nonexistent or subject to doubt.

For instance, "sound is perishable, because it is knowable" (--knowability exists even in eternal things like *ākāśa*). Or, "X is non-omniscient, since he is a speaker" (--The concomitance between speaker-hood and non-omniscience is doubtful.)

The other varieties of the inconclusive reason which have been put forth by some logicians are covered by the definition of "inconclusive" given here. For instance, (i) Where the reason pervades the three terms (*pakṣa, sapakṣa, vipakṣa*), as "sound is perishable, because it is knowable". (ii) Where the reason pervades the *pakṣa* and the *sapakṣa* and belongs to a part of the *vipakṣa*, e.g., "it is a cow, since it is possessed of horns." (iii) Where the reason pervades the *pakṣa* and the *vipakṣa* and belongs to a part of the *sapakṣa*, e.g., "it is not a cow, since it is possessed of horns." (iv) Where the reason is that which exists in the whole of the *pakṣa* and in a part only of the *sapakṣa* and of the *vipakṣa*, e.g., "sound is perishable, since it is perceivable". (Sound as a class is perceivable, but a part of the *sapakṣa*, viz., dyads, are not perceivable, and a part of the *vipakṣa*, viz., eternal entities such as universal properties, are perceivable, but space, etc. which being eternal are a part of the *vipakṣa* are not perceivable.) (v) Where the reason is that which exists in only a part of the *pakṣa* and in the whole of the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, e.g., "*ākāśa*, time, spatial direction, self and mind are not substances, since they are devoid of specific qualities which are momentary." (Self and *ākāśa* are possessed of, i.e. not devoid

of, momentary specific qualities). (vi) Where the reason is that which exists in a part of the *pakṣa* and the *vipakṣa* but in the whole of the *sapakṣa*, viz., "space, time and mind are not substances, since they are devoid of limited dimensions". (Mind is not devoid of limited dimension, since it is atomic according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and self, a part of the *vipakṣa*, is devoid of limited dimension but not earth, water, etc. The whole of the *sapakṣa*, non-substances (like quality, motion, etc.) is devoid of limited dimension.) (vii) Where the reason is something which exists in the whole of the *vipakṣa* but in only a part of the *pakṣa* and the *sapakṣa*, e.g., "space, time and mind are substances, since they are devoid of limited dimension". (The mind is not devoid of limited dimension; only a part of the *sapakṣa*, viz., space and time, is devoid of limited dimension, but not the other part.) (viii) Where the reason is that which exists in only a part of the subject of the *sapakṣa* and of the *vipakṣa*, e.g., "Earth is perishable, since it is an object of perception." (Only non-atomic earth has the *hetu*-property (viz., being an object of perception), and so also a part of the *sapakṣa* (viz., non-atomic water, etc.) and a part of the *vipakṣa* (viz., universal properties), for *ākāśa*, spatial dimension, etc. are not objects of perception.)

The author now states the fallacies of the example:

(E63; T145) 22. Sham examples (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) are eight in each class according as each is based on similarity or dissimilarity.

The author now illustrates and classifies these:

(E63; T146) 23. When sound is sought to be proved to be eternal on the ground of lack of limited magnitude, motions, atoms and jars (would be sham examples) being destitute of the *sādhya*, the *hetu*, and both respectively.

(E64; T146-147) 24. In respect (of dissimilarity), atoms, actions and *ākāśa* are sham examples, not being devoid of the *sādhya*, the *hetu*, and both respectively.

In the argument "sound is eternal, since it is devoid of

limited magnitude, unlike atoms, motions, and *ākāśa*", an atom is not devoid of the *sādhya* (eternality), motions are not devoid of the *hetu* (they are of limited magnitude), *ākāśa* is not devoid of both (eternality and being of limited magnitude, since it is eternal). These are examples based on dissimilarity and are expected to serve as examples of negative concomitance, viz., whatever is not eternal is not devoid of limited magnitude, but are not examples of such.

So also

(E64; T147-148) 25. When "attachment" is sought to be established on the ground of "speech", and "mortality" and "limitation of knowledge" are sought to be established on the ground of "attachment", the man in the street, etc. will be examples of doubtful pervasion in presence and in absence in respect of the *sādhya*, the *hetu*, and both (respectively).

Three types of sham examples are possible in each case according as the presence of the *sādhya*, the *hetu* and both is subject to doubt, or the absence of the *sādhya*, the *hetu*, or both are subject to doubt. To take but one example of each doubtful agreement in presence and in absence, "X is subject to mortality, since he is possessed of attachment, like the man in the street". (It is doubtful whether the man in the street is possessed of attachment.) "X is subject to attachment, since he makes a speech, unlike the man in the street (who happens to be mute)". (It is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of the *sādhya* "subject to attachment".)

In all these cases, the presence or absence of attachment, and presence or absence of limited knowledge in the man in the street, is a matter of doubt because of the inaccessibility of the mind of another person.

(E64-65; T148-149) 26. The two cases of reversed pervasion in respect of presence and absence.

Reversed positive pervasion, e.g., "whatever is perishable is a product, like a jar" (instead of the valid form "whatever is a product is perishable, like a jar"). Reversed negative

pervasion, e.g., "whatever is not a product is not perishable, like *ākāśa*" (instead of the valid form "whatever is not perishable is not a product, like *ākāśa*").

(E65; T149-151) 27. The other two cases are cases of undemonstrated pervasion in presence and absence.

The omission of the statement of pervasion, positive or negative, is a defect in a formal argument. But the omission of expressions signifying unqualified extension, such as "whatever" (*yat yat*), "all" (*sarva*) and terms such as "necessarily" or exclusively" in the universal proposition that is stated, does not constitute a defect, as positive or negative concomitance is not established in spite of the employment of these expressions unless there is independent proof of that.

Thus there are eight types of sham examples based on similarity: (i) devoid of the *sādhya*, (ii) devoid of the *hetu*, (iii) devoid of both, (iv) with doubtful positive pervasion in respect of the *sādhya*, (v) with doubtful positive pervasion in respect of the *hetu*, (vi) with doubtful positive pervasion in respect of both, (vii) with reversed positive pervasion, and (viii) with undemonstrated positive pervasion.

There are, moreover, eight types of examples based on dissimilarity; an example (i) not lacking in the *sādhya*, (ii) not lacking in the *hetu*, (iii) not lacking in both, (iv) with doubtful absence of the *sādhya*, (v) with doubtful absence of the *hetu*, (vi) with doubtful absence of both, (vii) with reversed negative pervasion, (viii) with undemonstrated negative pervasion.

Objection: Some logicians have mentioned two other types of sham example, viz., (i) lacking in positive pervasion, (ii) lacking in negative pervasion. For instance, "X is subject to passions because he indulges in speech, like an ordinary person, and unlike a piece of stone". Here, in spite of the co-presence of attachment and speech in the positive example (viz., the self) and in spite of their co-absence in the negative example (viz., a piece of stone), it has to be accepted that positive and negative pervasion are lacking in the example, since the

concomitance of the two (speech and passion) is absent as there is no intimate relation (no identity or causality) between the two. Why are these two types not mentioned by the author?

Answer: The aforesaid cases of sham examples are not in any manner different from these two, and hence the number of sham examples is eight in each case, according as the example is put forth as based on similarity or dissimilarity. The sham example cannot in any way show that the *hetu* is not possible without the *sādhya*.

Now, the author gives the definition of refutation (*dūṣaṇa*), which is intimately connected with inference:

(E65; T151) 28. Refutation consists in the exposure of the defects inherent in a proof.

"Proof" (*sādhana*) signifies inference. The defects are those mentioned above, viz., nonexistent, etc. In refutation, or the laying bare of those defects, there is the exposure of defects really present in the opponents' arguments. Whereas

(E66-69; T151-162) 29. False refutation (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*) consists in the urging of nonexistent defects and are called "counterfeit rejoinders" (*jātyuttara*).

They have the appearance of refutation, but really are not. The word "*jāti*" signifies similarity or analogy. Because they resemble proper rejoinders being employed in the place of legitimate replies, they are called "counterfeit rejoinders", that is to say, rejoinders by analogy. They are as it were reflections of the reason, and are employed in opposition to a (legitimate) reason or false reason advanced by the proponent, when the true nature of the defect in the argument does not strike the opponent. And though as a matter of fact there is no limit to such cases of apposition, and hence they are innumerable, yet in consonance with the line of treatment adopted by Akṣapāda (in the *Nyāyasūtras*) they are demonstrated to be of twenty-four types according as the opposition in them is based on similarity and the like.

When the proponent argues: "Sound is non-eternal because

it is a product (or because it is a consequence of effort), like a jar," a tricky opponent may give one of the following counterfeit rejoinders in opposition:

(i) Parity through similarity (*sādharmyasama*): "Sound is eternal, because it is devoid of parts, like space".

(ii) Parity through dissimilarity (*vaidharmyasama*): "Sound is eternal, because it is devoid of parts, unlike the jar".

(iii) Parity through argumentation (*utkarṣasama*): "If sound is held to be non-eternal because it is a product, like the jar, then it should be possessed of limited dimension also, like the jar".

(iv) Parity through subtraction (*apakarṣasama*): "If sound, being a product, is non-eternal like the jar, then like the jar it should be inaudible also, otherwise it could not be non-eternal". (The opponent seeks to subtract the attribute of audibility from sound).

(v) Parity through uncertainty (*varṇyasama*) and (vi) Parity through certainty (*avarṇyasama*): The attribute which is to be established is one which is uncertain, and the opposite of it is one which is established and so certain, and they are the respective attributes of the *sādhya* and the example. When the opponent reverses the attributes he is said to employ these two counterfeit rejoinders. If sound is like the jar, then the attribute of being non-eternal should be as uncertain in a jar as it is in sound (v). If sound is like a jar, then the attribute of being non-eternal should be certain as it is in the case of a jar (vi).

(vii) Parity through contingency (*vikalpasama*): Some products are found to be soft, e.g., a blanket, while some are found to be hard, e.g., an ax. Similarly, some products, such as a jar, will possibly be non-eternal while some products, such as sound, may be eternal.

(viii) Parity through the *sādhya* (*sādhyasama*): If sound is like a jar, it follows that a jar is like sound. But sound has to be proved (to be non-eternal), so a jar also should be one that is subject to proof, and so cannot possibly serve as an example.

(ix) Parity through contact (*prāptisama*): The fact of being produced is the reason, but does it prove the *sādhya* by coming into contact with it or without contact? Now contact is possible between two present things, and not between one that is present and another that is absent, and when both (the *hetu* and the *sādhya*) are equally present, which can possibly be the *hetu* and which the *sādhya*?

(x) Parity through non-contact (*aprāptisama*): If there is no contact, it is impossible that one should be the *hetu* of the other, since otherwise there would be absurd over-extension (anything could be the *hetu* of anything at all).

(xi) Parity through interrogation (*prasaṅgasama*): If the fact of being a product be the *hetu* of impermanence, what is the *hetu* of being a product, and what again is the *hetu* of that *hetu*, and so on indefinitely.

(xii) Parity through counter-instance (*pratidṛṣṭāntasama*): Suppose one argues "Sound is impermanent, since it is a consequence of effort, like a jar." The opponent may give the (counterfeit) rejoinder "As a jar, which is a consequence of effort, is found to be impermanent, so *ākāśa*, cited as a counter-instance, though permanent, is found to be the consequence of effort since it is perceived subsequently to the effort of digging a well."

(xiii) Parity through non-generation (*anutpattisama*): Wherein does the property *being produced* exist when the sound itself has not been produced? So, impermanence cannot be established of sound, because of the absence of the *hetu*.

(xiv) Parity through doubt (*saṃśayasama*): Is sound non-eternal by reason of its similarity to the jar on the ground of its being a product? Or is it eternal by reason of its dissimilarity to the jar, or its similarity to space in respect of its being devoid of parts?

(xv) Parity through neutralization (*prakaraṇasama*): "Sound is eternal, since it is audible, like sound".

(xvi) Parity through non-probativeness (*ahetusama*): Does the *hetu* exist before or after or synchronously with the *sādhya*? If it exists before, of what can it be the *probans*, when the *sādhya* does not (yet) exist? If it exists after the *sādhya*, of what can it be the *hetu*, when the *sādhya* no longer exists. If they are simultaneous, then one cannot be *hetu* or *sādhya* with regard to the other, like the left and right horns of a cow.

(xvii) Parity through presumption (*arthāpattisama*): If sound be non-eternal by reason of its similarity to non-eternal things in respect of being produced, it follows by presumption that what bears resemblance to eternal entities should be eternal, and sound has resemblance to such eternal entities as *ākāśa* and the like in respect of being devoid of parts.

(xviii) Parity through non-difference (*aviśeṣaṇasama*): If the attribute of *being a product* be the common property of sound and jar, and if on the basis of this common property the two are regarded as non-different, then all things should be regarded as non-different.

(xix) Parity through logical ground (*utpattisama*): If the non-eternality of sound be justified on the ground of its being a product, then why should not its eternality be justified on the ground of its being devoid of parts?

(xx) Parity through apprehension (*upalabdhisama*): The fact of being the consequence of effort cannot be the ground of the inference of impermanence. That alone is said to be the logical ground (or *hetu*) without which the *sādhya* is not apprehended. But lightning and the like are found to be impermanent though they are not the consequence of effort. And even a sound which is produced by the breaking of a tree and the like due to the impact of a violent storm is equally found to be not an outcome of effort.

(xxi) Parity through non-apprehension (*anupalabdhisama*): Sound is not the product of effort. It undoubtedly exists before it is articulated, though it is not perceived owing to the presence of an obstructive barrier. It is thus on a par with roots, water, etc. which lie underground. Hence, sound is eternal

since it is not the product of effort.

(xxii) Parity through permanence (*nityasama*): Is the character of being permanent which is predicated of sound non-eternal or eternal? If it is non-eternal, then with the cessation of the character of non-eternity, sound should be permanent. If on the other hand, the character of non-permanence be itself eternally present, since the presence of an attribute without a locus is impossible, it follows that sound being the locus of the eternally present non-permanence must be eternally present. Thus, sound is in either way eternal.

(xxiii) Parity through impermanence (*anityasama*): If sound is proved to be impermanent on the ground of some attribute shared in common with the jar which is impermanent, then it must be admitted that all existent things are impermanent, since they certainly share some common attribute with the jar. If, notwithstanding this, the impermanence of other entities is not admitted, then it need not be admitted in the case of sound either.

(xxiv) Parity through effect (*kāryasama*): It is observed that there are two varieties of effort--by one something nonexistent, e.g., a jar, is brought into existence, by the other something already in existence is manifested by the removal of obstruction, as in the case of roots, etc. lying buried underground. Hence, it is obviously a case of doubt whether sound is produced or is made manifest, since the diversity of outcomes of effort is an established fact.

As a matter of fact, the number of counterfeit rejoinders is infinite, yet only twenty-four types have been mentioned to show only unmixed instances. The solution of all types of futile rejoinders lies in examining whether the *hetu* is not possible without the *sādhya* (i.e., is universally concomitant with it). If the *hetu* possesses this essential characteristic of a sound reason, such attempts at throwing doubt in the eyes could not be successful. The necessity of pervasion between being a product and being an outcome of effort with non-eternality is

firmly established, and it cannot be alleged that the non-apprehension is due to the obstruction of some barrier. When, however, the opponent employs such a counterfeit rejoinder, the proponent should put forth a sound refutation and never another counterfeit rejoinder, since this would not be in consonance with the rules of dignified dialectics.

As regards quibble, it is nothing but a variety of counterfeit rejoinder, as it lacks the character of a sound answer. Quibble consists in the refutation of a statement put forth by the proponent by ascribing to it a meaning different from what is intended. It is of three types:

(1) Quibble based on verbal ambiguity (*vākchala*). For instance, a person says: "This boy is *navakambala* (possessed of a new blanket), and the opponent tries to refute this statement by rejoining: "How can he have nine blankets, when he has only one". Here he ascribed the meaning of the number nine to "*nava*".

(2) Quibble based upon generalization (*sāmānyachala*). When a statement is made in general terms, which taken literally may extend to unintended cases, and the opponent seeks to refute it by attributing to it the character of a logical reason. For instance, when eulogizing a particular Brahmin, a man casually says: "Learning and proper conduct are quite natural in Brahmins". But a quibbler seeks to refute this on the supposition that Brahmin-hood is made a logical ground and rejoins, "If learning and proper conduct be the properties of Brahmins, they should be equally present even in the uninitiated Brahmin (*vrātya*, lit. "vow-taker") on the ground of his Brahmin-hood."

(3) Quibble based on metaphor (*upacārachala*). For instance, a man says: "The platforms are shouting", and the opponent rejoins "How can inanimate platforms shout? It is the men on the platform who are shouting". This is a case of *upacārachala*, where the metaphorical use of a word is deliberately ignored and the word is taken in its primary sense.

The solution of all three types of quibble is furnished by the scrutiny of the denotative capacity of a word as sanctioned by the usage of adults.[1]

The statement of proof and refutation generally occurs in a legitimate discourse, the author puts forth its definition:

(E70; T162-166) 30. The statement of proof and refutation in the presence of judges and other members of the council with a view to the preservation of truth is called a legitimate discourse (*vāda*).

Both the proponent and the opponent have to make a statement of proof, that is to say, argument meant to establish their respective theses, and of refutation, that is to say, a counter-argument in refutation of the stand of the other side. These arguments and counter-arguments are put forth by the proponent and the opponent in the presence of the judges and other members of the council. Judges, president, proponent and opponent are the four necessary factors on which the discourse rests and is known as controversy (*kathā*). The judges should be equally conversant with the philosophical conventions of their own school and that of others, men of high pedigree, acceptable to both the parties, tolerant by nature, of long acquaintance with the ways of legitimate discourse and as impartial as a weighing balance. The president should be a man of authority, competent to enforce the observance of social duties, free from partiality and equally considerate to both the parties. These four factors are absolutely necessary in a debate for the maintenance of order, for the preservation of truth and for preventing the masses from being carried away by vociferous sophistical arguments. Truth signifies the determination or conviction of truth which is uppermost in the minds of persons known for their rectitude, and this has to be preserved against the attacks of sophistry directed by a set of

[1]The explanation of *jāyuttaras* and *chalas* is the same as in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyakalikā* pp, 16-21.

people misguided by vicious training.

Objection: The preservation of truth is the objective of sophistry and wrangling (*vitaṇḍā*), as stated in *Nyāyasūtra* IV.2.5: "Disputation and wrangling are resorted to for the purpose of preserving the conviction of truth just as a hedge of thorny brambles is set up for the preservation of sprouts."

Answer: Even a legitimate discourse which is held to be subject to ways of losing an argument (*nigrahasthāna*) is equally directed to the preservation of truth. The very definition of legitimate discourse, viz., "A legitimate discourse consists in the propounding of a thesis and a counter-thesis, each supported by an argument consisting of five members, not standing in opposition to the established and in which the establishment of the thesis and the refutation of the counter-thesis are sought to be achieve by means of the recognized *pramāṇas* and legitimate inductive reasoning" (*Nyāyasūtra* I.2.1), implies that there is scope for the ways of losing an argument called "incomplete" (*nyūna*), "redundant" (*adhika*), "acceptance of a thesis not in accordance with one's doctrine" (*apasiddhānta*), and the five fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*) and such. Hence, legitimate discourse alone is competent to defend the accepted truth, and disputation and wangling are not approved forms of debate.

Nyāyasūtra (I.2.2-3) defines disputation and wrangling as distinct types of debate, but this is not proper. Wrangling, which does not seek to establish a counter-thesis but only tries to refute the position of the opponent by means of just any argument that comes in handy, cannot be regarded as a legitimate variety of debate. Disputation which aims at establishing one's own position and refutation of the opponent's cannot be regarded as a type of debate distinct from legitimate discourse.

It may be urged that disputation is distinct from legitimate discourse in view of the frequent employment of casuistry, counterfeit rejoinder and ways of losing an argument in the

former. But this is not a proper contention, as the employment of casuistry and counterfeit rejoinders, which are only simulations of refutation, is to be ruled out in a debate, and ways of losing an argument are not in any way incompatible with a legitimate discourse. As to personal interests such as gain, honor, reputation, they automatically follow on the achievement of the main purpose, viz., preservation of the conviction of truth, and thus cannot be prevented from serving as incentives even in a legitimate discourse, as they are natural to man.

It may be contended that casuistry and counterfeit rejoinders are banned from a legitimate discourse, whereas they are permitted in disputation in order to defeat the opponent who indulges in these and so is likely to carry the audience with him and mislead it (see *Nyāyamañjarī* p. 11). But this is not true as it is not a legitimate procedure, and refutation of the opponent, wealth, fame cannot be achieved by unfair arguments and means. Even supposing that a debater is compelled to emply an unfair argument even in a legitimate discourse keeping in view the peculiar circumstances of exceptional gravity, that alone will not make it assume the character of a distinct type of debate. Thus a legitimate discourse is the only form of debate.

A legitimate discourse is terminated by victory or defeat.

(E71-72; T167) 31.Victory consists in the proving of one's position. This is achieved by repudiation of the charges brought against the *hetu* put forth in support of one's own stand, and by the demonstration of defects in the *hetu* employed to support the opponent's position. A debater can defeat his opponent even without adducing a *hetu* in support of his position, if he proves that the *hetu* employed by the opponent is contradictory, for exposing the contradictoriness of the opponent's *hetu* is tantamount to the statement of a reason in support of one's own thesis.

(E72; T167) 32. Defeat consists in the failure to establish

(one's position).

This may be due to the statement of a false reason, or to the inability to repudiate the charges advanced by the opponent against one's own reasoning in spite of its being legitimate.

What then is a "way of losing an argument" (*nigrahasthāna*) in which a debate culminates?

(E72; T167-168) 33. That (i.e., defeat) is the losing of the argument by the proponent or the opponent.

Defeat itself is the losing of an argument and not execution, imprisonment or the like. Or, that defeat itself, consisting in the failure to prove one's thesis, is figuratively called a "way of losing the argument", since it is the cause of that. Losing the argument cannot be anything different, as propounded by others--"the ground for defeat is misunderstanding or default of understanding" (*Nyāyasūtra* I.2.19).

(E72-79; T168-189) 34. Mere misunderstanding and default of understanding does not constitute a way of losing (a debate).

Misunderstanding consists in regarding false proof as legitimate and a false refutation as a legitimate one. Default of understanding consists in the failure to accomplish the refutation of the argument employed by the opponent, and the failure to accomplish the repudiation of the objection raised by the opponent against one's own argument. These as such are not the cause of defeat. On the contrary, the failure to prove one's own position alone is the cause of defeat.

From the repudiation of misunderstanding and default of understanding as the grounds for ways of losing the argument it follows that the variety of the same are also to be rejected as such.

Hemacandra gives a list of the twenty-two ways of losing an argument as found in *Nyāyasūtra* V.2.1, and even quotes where necessary the definitions of the respective ways as given there, citing the explanations of Vātsyāyana (the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*) and of Uddyotakara, the Vārttikakāra also in the

case of the abandonment of the thesis (*pratijñāhāni*), and then criticizes them. He has attempted to show that the name does not reflect the nature of the "way", or that many ways with minor differences can be bracketed, or are merely formal and even unjustified, and can constitute a ground of defeat only when the opponent is able to prove his position. Only when a debater exposes the fallacy of contradictory reason in the opponent's argument, it is not necessary for him to put forth a reason in support of his own position, for his position stands proved by the exposure of the defeat of the contradictory reason in the opponent's argument.[1]

Now the author scrutinizes and rejects (the ground of) defeat as propounded b the Buddhists.

(E80-82; T189-197) 35. Nor are again the statement of what is other than essential factors or conditions of inference, and the exposure of what is not a defect (the legitimate ground of defeat).

Or (alternatively),

Nor are again the non-statement (*avacana*) of the essential conditions of inference (*sādhanāṅga*) and the non-exposure (*anudbhāvana*) of defeat (the legitimate grounds of defeat).(See Dharmakīrti, *Vādanyāya* 1.)

Defeat is constituted by the failure to establish one's own thesis, and not by the statement of what is other than the essential factor of inference, nor by the exposure of what is not a defect. Even the advocate of the five-membered inference may thus contend that the Buddhist debater is to be judged vanquished for non-statement of the five-membered inference which is an essential condition of proof. He can very well justify the necessity of each and every member of an inference, or contrarily assert that there is unnecessary repetition in even the

[1]The treatment here and in the case of the *nigrahasthānas* recognized by Dharmakīrti is *verbatim* the same as in Prabhācandra's *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* pp. 200-203.

argument as recognized by the Buddhist. There is no reason why offence should be taken even if a person dances after having established his conclusion, leave alone saying something regarded as superfluous; he cannot be subject to defeat on this account if he has succeeded in establishing his conclusion. On the other hand, he will be considered defeated by the successful establishment of the opponent's thesis, and the pressing home of the fault of superfluous expression will be redundant. There can be no verdict of victory on the basis of such superfluity unless the thesis of the opponent has been established.

It has been contended that victory and defeat do not depend on the proof of one's position or the failure of such proof, but they depend on the knowledge and want of knowledge of a sound reason. Thus when it is possible to deduce the conclusion either from the statement of pervasion or from the statement of negative concomitance, but yet the opponent makes both such statements and the opponent exposes this fault of the statement of an unessential factor on the part of the proponent in a council, the latter stands defeated because his ignorance of what is a sound reason is proved.

But this contention cannot stand when subjected to critical examination. If the proponent has put forth a sound argument, he cannot be charged with ignorance of a sound reason when what he lacked was knowledge of the requisite number of such reasons. On the other hand, if the proponent has put forth an unsound argument, the opponent's knowledge of a refuting argument is not established, since he does not expose the fallacy in the reason advanced by the proponent, but only points out a redundant statement.

Thus it may be said that victory accrues from the establishment of one's own position, and defeat from the failure to establish it. No interpretation of *asadbhāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana* as put forth by the Buddhists is justified as resulting in the defeat of the proponent or the opponent (when he exposes what is not actually a fault or fails to expose a fault)

unless the respective counter-thesis or thesis has been proved.

The above-mentioned debate resting on four factors is sometimes carried on through the medium of epistles (*patra*). Hence its definition should be stated, otherwise such a medium of debate with its nature not known could not be conducive to victory, and it would not be possible to penetrate into the contents of such an epistle sent by the opponent. With this object in view the author propounds the following:

(Here the text breaks off...)

61.247 HEMACANDRA, *Yogaśāstra or Adhyātmopaniṣad/Svopajñavṛtti*

This popular handbook has been edited a number of times and the verses (at least) translated into English at least twice. The summary which follows is provided on pp. viii-xi of our "ET" by A. S. Gopani, who translates the verses of the work, with Surendra Bothra's edition, in *The Yoga Shastra of Hemchandracharya (A 12th Century Guide to Jaina Yoga)*, Mevanagar, Barmer Dist., 1989. More recently (in 2002) the work has been translated by Olle Qvarnström in *The Yogaāstra of Hemacandra: a Twelfth Century Handbook of Śvetāmbara Jainism* (Harvard University: Cambridge, Mass., 2002) from whose Introduction we have selected a few paragraphs of summary (op. cit., pp. 10-13).

A. K. Chatterjee[225] writes: "The *Yogaśāstra* is another great work of Hemacandra, which, according to his own statement, he wrote for his royal disciple Kumārapāla...There is an extensive *vṛtti* on this by Hemacandra, where we have several popular stories, quite a number of which are also given by Hemacandra in his *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra*", which he had composed previously."

Summary by Olle Qvarnström

"The first three chapters of the *Yogaśāstra* constitute,

according to Hemacandra, a summary (*saṃkṣepa*) of the three jewels (*ratnatraya*), also designated *yoga* and thus elucidating the second title given to the work: *Yogopaniṣad*. It begins with a set of benedictory verses (*maṅgala*) addressed to the last Jina or Tīrthaṅkara, Mahāvīra, who as an embodiment and communicator of the eternal Jaina teaching forms the object of right belief (*saṃyagdarśana*). Then follows a brief definition of each of the three jewels. The rest of the three initial chapters, though attempting to cover all three jewels or both main aspect(s) of Jainism, are in substance devoted to a description of the jewel of correct conduct (*saṃyakcāritra*), especially the corpus of rules regulating the daily life of the lay disciple. The proper conduct of the mendicant (*yatyācārya*) is summarized in the form of five great vows (*mahāvrata*)--non-violence (*ahiṃsā*), truthfulness (*satya*), non-stealing (*asteya*), continence (*brahmacarya*) and propertyless-ness (*aparigraha*)--of which the first is the paramount and all-inclusive ethical principle. These vows should be cultivated in thought, word and action, and fostered, either through five exercises (*bhāvanā*) or through five kinds of care and three kinds of restraint. The proper conduct of the seeker disciple (*śrāvakācāra*) is modeled on that of the mendicant, but differ as to the degree to which the vows are to be implemented, and the extent to which other rules are to be followed. The lay vows are therefore viewed as lesser or minor and thus designated *anuvratas*. A distinction is further made between the moral(s) of the householder (*gṛhastha*) or lay person (*śrāvaka*) and that of the exceptional layman (*mahāśrāvaka*), such as king Kumārapāla. The lay disciple, whether exceptional or not, should reinforce the five vows by means of the three virtues (*guṇa*) and the four educational vows (*śikṣāvrata*), including instructions on food, meditation and fasting, avoiding the different infractions (*aticāra*), particularly those related to prohibited occupations. The exceptional disciple should furthermore follow a daily routine (*dinacaryā*) and at the end

of his life ideally observe the ritual of voluntary death (*saṃlekhanā*). A life dominated by this 'jewel of correct conduct' (*saṃyakcāritra*) or the moral aspect of the double *dharma* (*dvidharma*), which by Hemacandra is equated with the first two limbs (*aṅga*) of the eightfold path, leads to temporal happiness (*sukha*), rebirth in heaven (*svarga*) and for the *mahāśrāvaka* to liberation within eight lifetimes."

"The other main aspect of the Jaina teaching, the jewel of correct knowledge (*saṃyagjñāna*) or the cognitive aspect of the double *dharma*, is the prime concern of the fourth chapter of the *Yogaśāstra*. Contrary to the description of the three jewels (*ratnatraya*) offered in chapters one to three, the fourth chapter views *dharma*, in the form of the three jewels, not as distinct from the human being who enjoys this teaching (*dharmin*) and who pursues its moral(s) and knowledge, but instead as identical with the human being and her self (*jīva*): the agent (*kartṛ*) and enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*). In order for faith, knowledge and conduct to be 'correct' suffering, their common source, the Self has to be known. Hemacandra, therefore, prescribes how to acquire knowledge of the self. For this the passions (*kaṣāya*) have to be controlled and this is only possible if one controls the senses (*indriya*), for which mental purity (*manaḥśuddhi*) is required. The latter is obtained once attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) are eliminated through equanimity (*samatva*). Equanimity results from non-attachment (*nirmamatva*), which in turn results from contemplation (*bhāvanā*). Equanimity and meditation are mutually interdependent, and to even attempt to practice meditation without equanimity is, according to Hemacandra, nothing but mockery. After this description, Hemacandra urges the adept to cultivate benevolence (*maitrī*), appreciation (*pramoda*), compassion (*kāruṇya*), and tolerance (*mādhyastha*) as a direct means of assisting, with respect to the practice of meditation (*dhyāna*). Meditation is twofold, virtuous (*dharmya*) and pure (*śukla*), and requires for its performance yogic postures (*āsana*) depicted at the end of the fourth chapter."

"The following seven chapters may be viewed as an exegesis of the fourth chapter, particularly of meditation and its prerequisites, thus also covering the remaining limbs of the eightfold path. The fifth chapter describes various forms of breath control (*prāṇāyāma*), classic and Tantric. Breath control in itself leads to physical health (*kāyārogya*) and ability to determine the time of death (*kālajñāna*), but it may also be included as a complementary soteriological tool conforming to the recommendations of Patañjali and others. The major part of the fifth chapter is devoted to various pan-Indian and Śaiva, yogic and divinatory exercises, amalgamated with Jaina doctrine and practice. These are categorized under *prāṇāyāma* since they partly involve knowledge of the breath and its movement in the three arteries (*nāḍī*) and four operational fields (*maṇḍala*). Hemacandra also records divination based on the knowledge of medicine (*āyurveda*), astrology (*jyotiṣa*), necromancy (*svapnaśāstra*), oracle voices (*upaśruti*), animal portents (*śakuna*), questions (*praśna*), mental installment of spells on the body (*aṅganyāsa*), ritual drawings (*yantra*), etc. Most of these activities are related to the settlement of a person's longevity, but they also concern warfare, harvest and offspring, topics supposedly of concern to king Kumārapāla as a private citizen and as the head of State. The chapter concludes with a depiction of how to enter into another's body (*parakāyapraveśa*)."

"The sixth chapter contains a critique of the practice of breath-control, which cultivated exclusively forms an impediment to the attainment of liberation, and a brief description of the practice of *pratyāhāra*, the withdrawal of the senses from their objects, and *dhāraṇā* or concentration. Analogous to *prāṇāyāma*, both of these are defined in accordance with the classical Yoga tradition and advocated as parts of the liberating path. Chapter seven opens with a depiction of the qualifications of a meditator (*dhyātṛ*) followed

by a portrayal of the first of four kinds of meditation categorized as virtuous meditation (*dharmadhyāna*). The other three varieties are outlined in chapters eight, nine and ten respectively, and have as their objects holy words (*pada*), the external characteristics (*rūpa*) and the intrinsic nature (*rūpātīta*) of the Jina, in addition to imagined objects (*piṇḍa*) distinctive of the first variety presented in chapter seven. These four chapters thus express classical Jaina teachings in a hitherto unknown terminology and compositional structure, probably stemming from 'Kashmirian' Śaivism, as well as introducing new forms of meditation of Tantric provenance. The tenth chapter is also devoted to a description of the strictly canonical form of virtuous meditation (*dharmadhyāna*) and its four types. The succeeding eleventh chapter outlines the fourfold white meditation (*śukladhyāna*), its physical and psycho-physical preconditions, as well as the requirement of a Jina being present and knowledge of the Pūrva-scriptures acquired in order to perform this direct means to final liberation (*nirvāṇa*). In the twelfth and last chapter, Hemacandra presents his own religious experience (, self-awareness, *svasaṃvedana*) couched in a nomenclature unknown to the rest of the work. Hemacandra's highly formalized personal narrative gravitates around the practice of meditation as defined by the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra* and the *Tattvārthasūtra* in terms of the cessation (of the activity) of the mind (*cittanirodha*). It thus conforms with the earliest known definition of *yoga* found in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* and systematized in the classical Yoga tradition. The terminology, however, bears witness of the Nāth Siddha tradition, with which the Śvetāmbara Jainas of Gujarat also shared various cult centers. Under the supervision of a teacher (*guru*), and through the cultivation of indifference (*audāsīnya*) and practice (*abhyāsa*), the mind reaches the state of no-mind (*amanaskatva*) and comes to rest as the Self (*jīva*) is realized and Reality (*tattva*) uncovered. In the last verses of the twelfth chapter, forming the closing paragraphs of his handbook on Jainism (*yogaśāstra*) or *Yogopaniṣad*, Hemacandra sums up all the wisdom that he has acquired from the scriptures, his teacher and own personal experience, by addressing the very Self (*jīva*) urging it not to seek happiness and success from outside, but instead to please itself realizing its inner glory and universal sovereignty."

62 MALAYAGIRI (1180?)

On the date of this important commentator cf. P. K. Gode.[226] Gode notes that at least two manuscripts date from the 12th century, viz. 1165 and 1192. He suggests a date for Malayagiri between 1100 and 1175. (However, Wiles says "1180"!)

62.248 MALAYAGIRI, *Ṭīkā* on the *Jīvājīvābhigamasūtra*[227]

62.249 MALAYAGIRI, *Ṭīkā* on Śivaśarman's *Karmaprakṛti*[228]

62.250 MALAYAGIRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Nandīsūtra*[229]

FMW 2, p. 472 note 2 ("A section of the commentary (the refutation of theism) is given by F. C. Schrader, Schrader p. 62 ff." And the same source (p. 544 note 1) "The story of the 'Judgement of Solomon has been translated...together with another Jinistic recension (from Malayagiri's commentary on the *Nandī-sūtra*)."

Jambuvijaya (WZKS 38, 1994, 389-401) identifies more than 75 quotations found in this work.

Satya Ranjan Banerjee[230] comments: "...The commentator (i.e. Malayagiri) explains the object of the author in writing the book as the attainment of the highest bliss, the essential condition of which is the identity of one's self with others. Benevolence by gifts is not lasting and not without its faults. But benevolence by giving people the benefit of the Jinadharma is free from guile and everlasting. Now Jinadharma is of two ds-

-*śrutadharma* and *cāritradharma*. *Śrutadharma* or acquaintance with scriptures leads to *cāritradharma* or excellence of character. So it is to the best interests of humanity to elucidate the nine tenets of Jaina scriptures. Hence the author's undertaking of the work."

62.251 MALAYAGIRI, *Vṛtti* on Candramaharṣi Mahattara's *Pañcasaṃgraha*[231]

62.252 MALAYAGIRI, *Vṛtti* on Candramaharṣi Mahattara's *Saptatīkā*[232]

62.253 MALAYAGIRI, *Ṭīkā* on Jinabhadra Gaṇi's *(Bṛhat)Kṣetrasamāsa*[233]

62.254 MALAYAGIRI, *Ṭīkā* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Dharmasaṃgrahaṇī*[234]

62.255 MALAYAGIRI, Commentary on Jinavallabha's *Ṣaḍaśīti*[235]

62.256 MALAYAGIRI, *Viśeṣāvaśyaka* on Bhadrabāhu's *Āvaśyakasūtra-Niryukti*[236]

A. N. Upadhye comments: "In (this work) he (Malayagiri) differs from Akalaṅka in holding that the use of *syāt* in *naya-vākya* is inadmissible, for the simple reason that *naya* itself constitutes that notion; if *syāt* is used in this context, then it ceases to be *naya-vākya* and becomes *pramāṇavākya* instead."

62.257 MALAYAGIRI, *Vṛtti* on *stabaka* 2 of the *Bhagavatīsūtra*

JRK p. 290, cites two manuscript locations.

62.258 MALAYAGIRI, *Ṭīkā* or *Vṛtti* on the *Rājapraśnīyasūtra*

Wiles, p. 108, says there are about 3500 *granthas* including

the text of the *sūtras*.[237]

62.259 MALAYAGIRI, *Vṛtti* on the *Prajñāpanāsūtra*[238]

The editor of *Prajñāpanā*, signing himself as Muni Ajita-Shekharvijay, has provided a summary of the contents of the *Prajñāpanāsūtras*, presumably understood in the light of Malayagiri's commentary. We provide this here in lieu of a summary of the commentary itself.

There are 36 chapters (called *pada*) in this book.

1.*Prajñāpanāpada*. [1]In this chapter the nature of the five non-living substances (*ajīvadravya*) and the one living substance (*jīvadravya*) is explained with their subdivisions. The five non-living substances are (1) *dharmāstikāya*, (2) *adharmāstikāya*, (3) *ākāśāstikāya*, (4) *kāla* (time) and (5) *pudgalāstikāya*.

The meaning of the expression "*astikāya*" is that aggregate constituted by the conglomeration of indivisible and subtle molecules.

(i) *Dharmāstikāya*: A substance that helps motion or movement of *jīva* and *pudgala*, but is itself inactive, like water for fish. Science has projected the idea of ether which is closely similar to *dharmāstikāya*.

(ii) *Adharmāstikāya:* A substance that helps soul and matter to stay firm like the wall, but is itself inactive.

(iii) *Ākāśāstikāya*: It provides space for *dharmāstikāya* and other substances (viz., it bears them), but is itself inactive. In this, the substances like *dharmāstikāya* are located in (a) *lokākāśa;* and (b) *alokākāśa* is just empty space, infinite in extent.

(iv) *Kāla*. It is a causative substance responsible for

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[1]Where the editor of *Prajñāpāṇā* has given the Prakrit terms we have replaced them with the equivalent Sanskrit terms in keeping with the policiy followed throughout this Volume.

changing phases like old and new and determines the time of occurrences with regulatory precision. It is due to this factor that there are different stages of life like children, you and old age etc. This is not a corporeal being but is of the nature of the present duration.

(v) *Pudgalāstikāya*: All things that are seen in the material world are constituted by this substance. Of them, those endowed with souls are living beings and others are inert entities. Form, taste, smell, touch etc. are synonymous with this factor. Even the voice is constituted of *pudgala*. The nature of this substance is impermanence, viz., not enduring in the same form for all the time. Science states that energy is a transmutation and not destruction. Likewise, Jainism asserts or advocates that depending on various causes, the form, color etc. of *pudgaladravya* gets transformed, but there is no destruction. This in brief is the description of *Paṇṇavaṇā* (the Prakrit version of *Prajñāpanā*) with regard to non-life.

Jīvadravya. In the *Paṇṇavanā* relating to life (or living beings) we have a subtle and profound discussion about the life beginning with emancipated perfected beings and ending with plants which have only a single sense-organ. In the subsequent sections, there is a discussion concerning the twenty -four varieties of living beings.

They are as follows: One of hell; the ten varieties of living beings in the state of infernal existence like *asurakumāradeva*; the five kinds of single sensory forms (*ekendriya*); the three kinds of *vikalendriya* forms; the five sense-endowed animals; the *pañcendriya* one; human form one; intermediate gods (*vyantaradeva*) one; stellar bodies (*jyotiṣadeva*) one; celestial gods (*vaimānikadeva*); all told twenty-four varieties and to this must be added general life and the perfected beings.

2.*Sthānapada*. This chapter explains the places wherein all the living forms abide. The hellish (*naraka*) and *bhuvanapati* gods reside in the nether world. The place of the unisensory (*ekendriya*) beings is everywhere. The *vikalendriya* forms, *pañcendriya* animal forms, human form, intermediate (*vyantara*) and stellar (*jyotiṣa*) form reside in the middle region. The celestial gods (*vaimānikadeva*) and the liberated souls abide in the upper region.

3.*Alpabahutvapada*. Herein, the forms of life are considered in their numerical magnitude (few or many) in twenty-seven species. At the end of the section, there is an explanation of the numerical magnitude in relation to all the living forms. People who are concerned about the population explosion should realize that of all the living form, human beings are numerically much less.

4.*Sthitipada*. The word *sthiti* refers to life-span. In this section, the minimal and maximal span of life of all living beings are dealt with. The minimal life span of the *devas* and *narakas* is ten thousand years; and maximally thirty-three *sāgaropamas*. All the other forms have the minimum life span of less than 48 minutes (*antarmuhūrta*) and the maximum of three *palyopama*. In this section it is also shown how long a form of life can retain the same form and take birtgh. This is known as *kāyasthiti* (endurance of body form).

5.*Viśeṣapada*. The word "*viśeṣa*" means mode. In this section, there is a narration of different states of souls (*bhāvas*) such of those which come into existence due to the fruition of *karman* (*audāyika*) and those caused by destruction (*kṣāyika*) and those due to destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣāyopaśāmika*) etc.

6.*Vyutkrāntipada*. This section discusses topics like till how long birth can unintermittently occur in several states and what is the interval between birth and death. In the human state of existence, the interval between two infants is maximally ten hours and thirty-six minutes. In this section it is also shown how many births and deaths can simultaneously occur. Further, passage of the various states of existence beyond death is also discussed. The human state of existence is such a junction from where one can go to all other states of existence.

7.*Ucchavāsapada*..Here is narrated the time of respiration of living forms in different states of existence. The gods inhale the breath once a fortnight, commensurate with the life span of number of *sāgaropamas*.

8.*Saṃjñāpada*. The word *saṃjñā* means cognitional activity through all the sense-organs including mind like desire, enjoyment and effort which prompt impulses. They are ten in number: (food, (2) fear, (3) sex, (4) tendency for possession, (5) anger, (6) arrogance, (7) deceit, (8) greed, (9) mundane and (10) instinctive. Tree grows and endures as long as it is rooted in the earth. This is facilitated by the operation of *āhāra* - food *saṃjñā*.

9. *Yonipada*. The word *yoni* means the origination or birth of living beings. This place of birth is of many kinds like cold, warm and lukewarm, etc.

10.*Caramapada*. The word *carama* means stretching to the end. In this section is discussed whether this earth, etc., do have an end or not.

11.*Bhāṣāpada*. Herein four kinds of speech, viz., (1) truth, (2) untruth, (3) mixed, (4) transitional are discussed in detail. Besides, how far can the material elements involved in speech go and how long can they endure and till how far they become audible are also discussed.

12.*Śarīrapada*. In this chapter, the five kinds of corporeal aggregates, viz. (1) *audārika* (gross) physical body such as of men and animals, (2) *vaikriya* (subtle) transformable body such as of celestial beings, (3) *āhāraka* (projectable) body the capacity of which is in *pūrvadharas*, (4) the *taijasa* body keeps the body warm and helps in digestion and (5) the *kārmaṇa* body will be responsible to project unusual incidents and to prepare a new physical body in another state of existence.

13.*Pariṇāṃapada*. The topics discussed here are (1) *gati*, (2) *indriya*, (3) *kaṣāya*, (4) *leśyā*, (5) *yoga*, (6) *upayoga*, (7) *jñāna*, (8) *darśana*, (9) *cāritra* and (10) *veda*. These are ten conditions of existence of living beings (*jīva*). (1) *Bandha*,

bondage, (2) *gati*, movement, (3) *ākāra*, form, (4) *vibhāja*, division, (5) *varṇa*, color, (6) *gandha*, smell, (7) *sparśa*, touch, (8) *agurulaghu*, nonheavy-nonlight, (9) *śabda*, sound and (10) *rasa*, taste–these are ten factors of modification of nonliving matter (*ajīva*).

14.*Kaṣāyapada*. *Kaṣa* means the world of transmigration and *aya* means to obtain. *Kaṣāya* therefore is to obtain transmigratory status, or to enhance this status. In this section (1) anger, (2) arrogance, (3) deceit and (4) greed–theses four *kaṣayas*, the reason why they arise and their consequences in terms of *karman-bondage* are explained.

15.*Indriyapada*. There are two subdivisions in this chapter. The first discusses the profound topics concerning five sense-organs, namely tactual, gustatory, olfactory, visual and auditory having for their characteristic and capacity of perceiving touch, taste, odor, color, and sound respectively. Each of these again is of two kinds, physical and psychical. The living beings such as plants having only one sense-organ and that is of touch are known as *ekendriya*. the living beings such as snails having besides touch the sense of taste, are known as *dvīndriya*. The ants, etc., having also smell in addition to these two are called *trīndriya*. The butterfly, moth, etc., having eyes along with the other three are known as *caturindriya* and animals and human beings having in addition to these four, ears, are known as *pañcendriya*.

This chapter is discussed in twelve *dvāras*, gateways. Discussed herein is the time when the sense-organs are ready to function and other topics. All the sense-organs get ready in a subtle manner within 48 minutes of conception. (The) mental sense-organ is that which provides knowledge to the soul through the co-operation of several sense-organs. Although the ears are seen, it is possible for man to be deaf; and although plants do not have ears, they can hear.

16.*Prayogapada*. The word *prayoga* means the activity caused by the relatedness of the soul with mind, speech and

body. In the section herein, four kinds of *prayogas* related to mind, four *prayogas* related to speech and seven *prayogas* related to the body are explained. A narration of many kinds of movements (*gati*) is given which is worthy of our attention.

17.*Leśyāpada*. Peculiar modification in the attitude of the soul brought about by the variously colored condition of the mind, is *leśyā*. There are six *leśyās*–(1) *kṛṣṇa*-black, (3) *nīla*-blue, (3) *kāpota*-gray, (4) *tejas*-red, (5) *padma*-yellow and (6) *śukla*-white. The first three *leśyās* are malicious in the decreasing order, and the other three *leśyās* are increasingly beneficent. It is possible to understand the nature of the *leśyā* by the illustrations of the *jāmbu* tree and six travelers or by the illustration of six robbers. In six sub-sections of this chapter, the nature of the *leśyā* is explained. The first sub-section has seven viewpoints, in the second sub-section the differences between the *leśyās* black, etc., and their relative magnitude are narrated. The third sub-section describes the occasioning of the *leśyā*. The fourth sub-section explains the consequences of the *leśyā*, the color, etc., in fifteen gateways. The fifth sub-section discusses the reciprocal impact of the *leśyās*. The sixth sub-section discusses the *leśyās* of human beings.

18.*Kāyasthitipada*. This section deals with how long the soul can abide in the same *paryāya* and explains twenty-two different *paryāyas*.

19.*Saṃyaktvapada*. (1) Right belief is *saṃyaktva*. (2) Wrong belief is *mithyātva*, and (3) Belief in both reality and non-reality is called *miśra*. This section deals with the problem of what happens to each soul in each of these three divisions.

20.*Antakriyāpada*. The *kriyā* (action) relates to the cessation of *karman* and the final action (*antakriyā*) is the last action of the soul in its efforts to obtain emancipation. There are ten aspects discussed in this section. Only the human being ins eligible for this final endeavor. This section deals with what number of human beings are capable of this final effort simultaneously, hailing from several states of existence, and also souls hailing from which states existence can become Tīrthaṅkaras, Cakravartis, etc.

21.*Avagāhanāsaṃsthānapada*. This section describes in seven ways the five types of bodies, their height, their forms, etc. Considering the original body, the plant (tree) has the largest of all the bodies. There are in the world human beings who are as tall as 500 bow lengths.

22.*Kriyāpada*. Action (*kriyā*) is the causation of *karman* bondage. This is of five kinds: (1) *kayiki* (bodily), (2) *ādhikaraṇikī* (engendered by instruments like weapons), (3) *prādveṣikī* (mental aversion), (4) *pāritāpanikī* (causing injury) and (5) *prāṇātipātakriyā* (killing). This section explains the nature and objects of actions and the karmic bondage that is occasioned by them. In another manner the five types are (1) *ārambhikī* (action involving violence), (2) *pārigrahikī* (motive that is instrumental in the accumulation of possessions), (3) *māyāpratyayakī* (caused by deceit), (4) *apratyākhyānakriyā* (action relating to indulgence) and (5) *mithyādarśinapratyayikī* (caused by delusions).

23.*Karmaprakṛtipada*. The law of cause and effect is the theory of *karmavāda*. It governs the entire phenomena whether physical or psychic. An effect in turn itself becomes the cause and the chain continues. The karmic matter (*karmaprakṛti*) makes its inflow into the soul due to one's action or activity of body, speech and mind. This causes bondage (*bandha*) which is of four kinds: [one's] nature (*prakṛti*), duration (*sthiti*), intensity (*anubhāva*) and quantity (*pradeśa*). The nature and quantity of the *karman* depend upon the degree of passion(s) (*kaṣāya*), attachment and aversion (*rāga* and *dveṣa*) or anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), deceit and greed (*lobha*). The nature of *karman* is eightfold: vision-obscuring (*darśanāvaraṇīya*), knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*), feeling-producing (*vedanīya*), character-veiling (*cāritrāvaraṇīya*), deluding (*mohanīya*), age-determining (*āyu*), status-determining (*gotra*) and power-hindering (*antarāya*). Actions cause transmigration

of souls from one life to another life.

24.*Karmaprakṛtibandhipada.* This chapter narrates the number of *karmans* that bind at the time of a particular *karman*-bondage.

25.*Karmavedapada.* There is in this chapter an account of the number of *karmans* that arise at the time of a particular - *karman*-bondage.

26.*Karmavedabandhapada.* This chapter describes how many and what kinds of *karman* bind at the time when a particular *karman* comes to fruition.

27.*Karmaprakṛtivedapada.* At the time of the arousal of a particular *karman*, how many and what kinds of other *karman* also arise, have been discussed here.

28.*Āhārapada.* There are eleven "gateways" in the first section, explaining *sacit, acit* and *miśra,* consumable items of food for nutrition.

The gods have their hunger quenched merely by visualization of food in the mind. For human beings maximally the desire for food arises in three days. The nature of food and the consequences of eating, etc., are explained in the second section in thirteen ways. Then there is the question of whether the soul subsists on food or not.

29.*Upayogapada. Upayoga* means the faculty of cognition [or cognitive awareness]. It consists of vision and knowledge (*darśana* and *jñāna*) as its constituents. The main line of demarcation between apprehension and comprehension consists in this, that in the former the details are not perceived, while in the latter the details are also known. In the technical language of the Jaina theory of knowledge apprehension is called *nirākāra upayoga* and comprehension is termed as *sākāra upayoga.* The comprehension emerging through the media of the senses and the mind is *matijñāna*, the comprehension acquired by reading or hearing the scriptures is *śrutajñāna*, the transcendental perception of material objects is extrasensory awareness, the transcendental perception of thoughts of others

is *manaḥparyāyajñāna* and the faculty of omniscience, i.e., perfect perception, is *kevalajñāna.*

Besides, there are three types of ignorance (*ajñāna*), viz., immediate (*mati*), ignorance about scripture (*śruta*) and that based on deception (*vibhaṅgājñāna*). The four types of apprehension are (1) visual, (2) nonvisual, (3) extrasensory and (4) omniscient. The term (1) *jñāna-upayoga* specifies cognitive awareness with form, (2) *darśana-upayoga* means cognitive awareness without form. In short, the object of both *jñāna* and *darśana* is a complex universal-cum-particular.

30.*Paśyattāpada. Paśyattāpada* connotes prolonged vision and clear vision which provides knowledge relating to three phases of time. In the twelve *upayogas* with the exception of *mati*-knowledge, *mati*-ignorance and non-visual perception, the others are classified under *paśyattā*. The *Prajñāpana Sūtra* gives the divisions and sub-divisions but does not clarify the meaning of *paśyattā* and its difference from *upayoga*. The learned commentator Śrī Malayagiri demarcated the line of distinction between them. It is very clear and definite and unanimous too.

31.*Saṃjñipada. Saṃjñi* is a living being characterized by the possession of special memory of the mental faculty. All the living beings devoid of the five sense-organs are *asaṃjñi.*

32.Saṃyamapada. Saṃyama is proclivity towards pure character observing righteous conduct and envisages retreat from perverted attitude. The worldly souls are divided into three categories, viz., (1) *saṃyami* (following completely pure character), (2) *deśasaṃyami* (partially pure character) and (3) *asaṃyami* (possessing impure character). The emancipated soul is different from all these three. the animals, birds and aquatic creatures are endowed with only marginal capacity of observing *saṃyama*, but it is only the human soul that merits complete *saṃyama.*

33.*Avadhipada.* Extrasensory awareness is the power of the mind to know objects with form beyond sensory apprehension. It is discussed in seven aspects. For the *devas* and *nārakas* this

knowledge is congenital, but for human beings and animals it is attained only after the enlightenment of the attributes of the self. This extrasensory awareness can be of many marvellous kinds. It is for this knowledge that this study needs to be undertaken.

34.*Pravicāraṇapada*. *Pravicāraṇa* means experiencing an object like sound, etc., through an appropriate application of the five sense-organs. At first, there is the question of food, refraining, etc. Then there is the discussion whether or not the soul will be the food that it has itself consumed. later, there is an account of the experience of the celestial beings who have different stages of experiencing conjugal happiness (1) like the enjoyment derived by human beings in their conjugal relationship, (2) happiness derived by touch, (3) happiness experienced just by seeing, (4) happiness derived by only hearing sounds of women, and (5) happiness derived by just thinking of them. In higher forms in gradation of fulfilment of cravings, the efforts are increasingly less and happiness obtained is increasingly more. Relative to the happiness that results from satisfying the desire for objects of sense, the happiness that is caused by the absence of desire for sensory objects is greater.

35.*Vedanāpada*. Topics relating to hot and cold and feelings pertaining to body and mind are discussed here. Even plants have feelings. Because of the absence of mind in them, their feelings remain unmanifested.

36.*Samudghātapada*. The utmost endeavor of the soul to endure or to manifest feelings, etc. is called *samudghāta*. Seven categories are distinguished: Enduring agonizing feelings is *vedanā samudghāta*. Manifestation of severe anger is called *kaṣāyasamudghāta*. At the time of death there is loss of consciousness for a moment, then a struggle for life and death ensues, but there are several such manifestations and such a state is called *maraṇanasamudghāta*. In a soul possessing subtle power (*vaikriyalabdhi*) striving to make a subtle body (*vaikriya samudghāta*) results. A soul possessing projectible capacity operates while endeavoring for a projectible body (*āhāraka samudghāta*). The soul having acquired *tejoleśyā-labdhi* while motivated with a malice to destroy by fire (*tejas samudghāta*) appears. The seventh category is the process of equalizing the residual four *karmans*, viz., *vedanīya, nāman, gotra* and *āyus* adopted by the omniscient soul, which is called *kevalin samudghāta*.

62.260 MALAYAGIRI, *Vṛtti* on Jinabhadragaṇi's (?Jinavallabha Suṛi/s) *Bṛhatsaṃgrahaṇī*[239]

It has 5,000 *ślokas*.

62.261 MALAYAGIRI, *Ṭīkā* on Cirantana's *Devendranarakendraprakaraṇa*

This is mentioned by Malayagiri in his commentary on *gaṭhā* 263 of Jinabhadra's *Bṛhatsaṃgrahaṇī*. No manuscripts of it are so far known.

62.262 MALAYAGIRI, *Ṭīkā* on Gargarṣi's *Karmagrantha*

JRK, at pp. 69 and 72, has manuscript citations.

63 PADMAPRABHA MALADHĀRIDEVA (1180)

Two learned scholars have written articles concerning the identity and age of this author. A. N. Upadhye (in the Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Congress, Volume 8, 1935, pp. 425-437) spends most of his article reviewing the references to other Jaina writers that are referred to by this author his only extant work, the *Niyamasāra-Tātparyavṛtti*. Upadhye (p. 425) asserts that this is the only known commentary on the *Niyamasāra*, and spends most of his article identifying the numerous works that its author quotes. He also speculates on this author's date, coming up with a period between 1175-1225, which later he revises in the light of the discoveries by P.

B. Desai, the other learned scholar (in Indian Historical Quarterly 28, 1952, pp. 182-185). Desai points out that an inscription in Kannada on "a pillar set up at the southern entrance into the village of Pātaśivam, Madaksira *taluk*, Anantapur District, Madras State" describes our author in glowing terms as the disciple of Vīranandi Siddhāntacakravarti and specifies the precise time of Padmaprabha's death: "It was *śaka* 1107, Viśvāsa Phalguṇa, 4. Bharaṇī, Monday, end of the first *nāḍī* after midnight", which date "corresponds to A.D. 1185, February 24, Monday." (p. 184). He suggests that "Padmaprabha Maladhārin deserves to be reckoned among the eminent teachers of the Jaina Law not only on account of his scholarship and poetic genius as judged from his commentary, but also for his other sterling virtues as revealed by the epigraph."

63.263 PADMAPRABHA MALADHĀRIDEVA, *Tātparyavṛtti* on Kundakunda's *Niyamasāra.*

A. N. Upadhye (in the 1935 article cited above) has provided an assessment of this commentary, a selection from which we quote:

"Padmaprabha has written this commentary for the final beatitude of Bhavyas and for the purification of his spirit...he does not give the topical analysis of the sections, but goes on propounding the contents of the *gāthās* often times in a pretty heavy style beyond the limitations of the original text. Usually first he sets forth the contents of the *gāthās*, but it is rarely that he literally follows the text. Then he winds off the explanation of the *gāthā* by some verses (at times only one verse) which are either quotations from earlier authors or composed by himself; in case they are quotations, he adds...his own compositions closely following, but very often amplifying, the contents of the quotations...It is these verses, which are spiritually refreshing, that attract and have a charming effect on the reader. Liberation (*mukti*) is compared with a beautiful lady; and this

is a pet simile of Padmaprabha at times expressed in full details: thus he serves ascetic preparations in romantic dishes. It is not in vain that Padmaprabha has tried to follow the footsteps of Amṛtacandra; he has some poetic genius which flashes forth into melodious verses some of which are spiritual lullabies; and he will be remembered, but second to his model Amṛtacandra, as a spiritual poet. After a close study of the whole commentary, Padmaprabha does not impress us as a helpful commentator, but he attracts us as a poet more charmed by and charming others than by sense. His mission as a commentator has been only an excuse for the expression of his poetic talents." (pp. 427-428)

Velankar at JRK p. 213 provides the names of authors mentioned in this work.

64 SIDDHASENA SŪRI (1191)

JRK p. 272 says "pupil of Devabhadra of the Candra Gaccha", the author of *Prabandhacaritra* and other works".

His work is edited with Gujarati and Hindi commentaries from Indore, 2000. Also cf. Peterson IV, pp. cxxx-cxxxi, who says on of his works was written in *saṃvat* 1242 (=1185), also reported by Velankar, BBRAS 1930, 1640-41.

Sagaramal Jainain Vinayasagara says: "He belongs to the Candragacchiya tradition of Ācārya Abhayadeva Sūri, and has indicated his lineage thus: Abhayadeva Sūri, Dhaneśvara Suri, Ajitsingh Sūri., Vardhamāna Sūri, Devacandra Sūri, Candrapabha Sūri, Bhadreśvarāsūri, Ajitsiṅgha Sūri, Devaprabha Sūri and Siddhasena Sūri." He ascribes three works (other than our #264) to this Siddhasena Sūri, viz., *Padmaprabhacaritra, Samacārī,* and a *stuti.*

64.264 SIDDHASENA SŪRI, *Tattvajñānavikāśinī* on Nemicandra Suri's *Pravacanasāroddhāra*[240]

Velankar, JRK pp. 271-272, says it was composed in 1185.

Sagarmala Jainain Vinayasagara spends several paragraphs reviewing evidence about the time of this work, arriving at the conclusion that it should have been written "around 1225 VS", where "VS" = *viraśaiva*, meaning that the date should fall around 1158 CE. He also characterizes the commentary as follows:

"This commentary, known as the *Tattvajñānavikāsini*, reveals the scholarship of the commentator. He has referred to some 100 works and more than 400 references to them in this work....The commentator has not just put forth his own explanation, but wherever required he has discussed the doubts that may be raised by opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*) and then provided a fitting solution to it. Wherever he found [that] there may be another point of view in the explanation, he gives the difference of opinion as well. Wherever he found a possible contextual error in the original text, he tried to give a possible correction as well. Thus this commentary is of great importance in the study of the work."

65. ĀSAḌA (1192)

NCC 2, p. 230 describes this author as "son of Ānaladevī or Arṇīlatā and Kaṭukarāja of Bhilamāla family; pupil of Abhayadevasūri; had the title 'Kavibhāśṛṅgara'; elder brother of Jāsaḍa and father of Ājaḍa (Bālasarasvatī) and Jaitrasiṃha (a minister) by the second wife and Arisiṃha by the first wife. Wrote his *Vivekamañjarī* in 1192 A.D." His teacher Abhayadevasūri cannot have been the one who lived in 1070. NCC 2, p. 277 calls Āsaḍa's teacher "pupil of Bhadreśvara Sūri", whereas Abhayadevasuri's teachers' names are different.

Velankar, JRK pp. 46-47, says the work "contains 125 Gāthās and was composed at the advice of Abhayadevasūri, successor of Bhadreśvara, successor of Devendrasūri of the Candra Gaccha."

Peterson III, pp. 39-40 draws the following information

from the commentary by Bālacandra, the commentator on the following work. "The poet Āsaḍa, called Kaviśābhāśṛṅgara, was one of the disciples of that Abhayadevāsūri who succeeded Śrī Bhadreśvarasūri, who succeeded Devendra. This Bhadreśvarasūri would appear to have written a *remedium amoris* of a religious kind, as he is called a 'cage for the protection of those who fly in terror from the darts of love', and to have been celebrated as the founder of a great temple of Mahāvīra in Gujarat. At the end of his commentary, p. 101, Bālacandra gives some very interesting details about the book. Katukarāja of the Śrī Bhillalāma race and Analadevī his wife had two sons Āsaḍa and Jāsaḍa. Āsaḍa lit up again the lamp of Kālidāsa's fame with the oil of his commentary on that writer's *Meghadūta*. Thus was for him the title of Kavisabhāśṛṅgāra. He was the author also of several *jinastotras* and *jinastutis* that were so many incantations to deaden the poison of the snake called works. And in his book *Upadeśakandalī* he furnished for all travelers in the way of salvation a stock of 'provisions for the road' (*viaticum*) that could never give out."

"Āsaḍa, like Śiva (as if some such justification were thought desirable) had two wives, Pṛthivīdevī and Jaitalladevī. By the latter he had two sons, the elder called Rājada and the younger called Jaitrasiṃha. By Pṛthivīdevī he had one son Arisiṃha, who is described by an epithet *gurugiripariṇāyakarmā* which appears to contain, along with the sense in which it is applicable to *gaja* in the same line, some reference to his marriage."

"Āsaḍa's son Rājaḍa, straight as the stalk of a young plantain tree, and known already for his learning as the young Sarasvatī, went to the heavenly city, and our book is the poet father's In Memoriam, the themes being taken from the very words with which the teacher Abhayadeva sought to win him from his grief."

65.265 ĀSAḌA, *Vivekamañjarī*[241]

Velankar, JRK p. 359, says it is "in 144 *gāthās* composed by Āsaḍa in *saṃvat* 1248" (=1191) and gives copious manuscripts. citations. Kapadia 18: "Āsaḍa composed *Vivekamañjarī* after the death of his son Rājaḍa (known as Bālasarasvatī)."

65.266 ĀSAḌA *Upadeśakandalī* and Commentary

JRK, p. 46 says "It contains 125 *gāthās* and was composed at the advice of Abhayadevasūri, successor of Bhadreśvara, successor of Devendrasūri of the Candra Gaccha".

Peterson V, Appendix pp. 42-50 contains the whole text of 27 stanzas.

66.267 SOMAPRABHA (1200), *Sindūraprakara*

NCC 4, p. 208 says this author was a "pupil of Vijayasiṃhasūri. NCC 7, p 263 says "disciple of Vijayasiṃhabhaṭṭa". Muniraja Jinavijaya, in his Introduction to Gaekwad's Oriental Series 14, 1920, gives the following account (in which he fails to mention Vijayasiṃha, although he names no other teacher). "He composed the present work in *saṃvat* 1241 (or A.D.1195), i.e., only 11 years after the death of King Kumārapāla. From this it is evident that he was a contemporary of King Kumārapāla and his preceptor Hemachandra. He composed (the *Kumārapālapratibodha*) while dwelling in the residence of the poet Siddhapāla, sone of the poet-king Shree Shreepāla, of Prāgvat (Porwad) community, for the benefit of Harischandra and Shreedevi, son and author respectively of Shet Abhayakumāra, son of Nemināga; and it was heard from the beginning to the end by the three learned disciples of Hemachandra himself, by name, Mahendramuni, Vardhamāna and Guṇichandra. Abhayakumāra was, as is mentioned in this very work, the head of the charitable departments, like alms-houses, etc., opened for the maintenance of helpless and disabled persons (*vide* pp. 219 to 229). The poet-king Śrī

Śrīpāla was one of the best poets of Gujara and a greatly honored and accepted brother of Siddharāja Jayasiṃhadeva. His son, Siddhapāla, also, was a poet of the first rank and a beloved and bosom friend of King Kumārapāla...The poet Śrīpāla was a disciple of Devasūri, the most illustrious in the lineage of preceptors of Somaprabhācārya...The preceptors of Somaprabhācārya and other sages generally made their stay under the roof of the family house of this poet in Anahilpur. His other great work, by name *Sumatināthacārita*, was also composed by Somaprabhācārya while dwelling in this very house." In the next paragraph the writer gives the genealogical tree of the Somaprabha.

67.268 JINATILAKA UPĀDHYĀYA (1200), *Ṭīkā* on Jinadattasūri's *Sandehadolāvalī*

JRK, p. 413, says this work was composed in *saṃvat* 1257; cites a manuscript held in Jaipur.

68 MAYILLA DHĀVALA (1200?)

Velankar, JRK p. 203, dates this author at *saṃvat* 990 (=933 A.D.). If he is right, the entry below is misplaced in the present Volume, and belongs in Volume 10 of this Encyclopedia. However, it is too late to put it there, so we put it here! Velanekar comments: "It wholly embodies Dayasena's *Nayacakra*, which however, is not separately known to exist".

68.269. MAYILLA DHĀVALA, (*Dravyasvabhāvaprakāśaka*)

Summary by Kailash Chandra Shastri, translated by Ratna Lahiri

"E" references are to the edition by Kailash Chandra Shastri, Moortidevi Jaina Granthamala: Prakrit Series No. 12 (second

edition), New Delhi 1999.

1. Section on Quality (*guṇa*)

11 (E6) Those coexistent with substances are their qualities. They are either general or specific.

11-14 (E6) Ten types of qualities are general: existence, entity, substance, object of knowledge, size, situation, sentience, insentience, form and non-form. Sixteen specific characteristics may or may not be general or specific depending on whether the substances are of the same or a different kind.

2. Section on Modes (*paryāya*).

17-18 (E9-11) Changes (*vikāra*) in qualities are known as modes, which are in turn of two types, natural (*svabhāva*) and nonnatural (*vibhāva*). Only a self and karmic matter have nonnatural modes.

20 (E20-23) Natural modes are those that remain static in their own natural state in the world. The infinite possible quantifications of a substance and their increases and decreases results are these natural modes. The four types of awareness (*jñāna*) such as perceptual, as well as the three *ajñānas*, are the nonnatural modes.

25 (E13-14) The qualities that are bereft of *dravyakarman* (actions of the mind, body and speech that have transformed themselves into subtle matter and stick to the self) and *bhāvakarman* (similar karmic matter produced by actions), like knowledge (*jñāna*), vision (*darśana*), pleasure (*sukha*) and energy (*vīrya*), are the pure quality modes (*śuddhaguṇaparyāya*) of the self.

29 (E15) An atom which is the eternal cause and effect is the natural mode of karmic matter.

31 (E16) The earth, water, shadow, etc. are the nonnatural modes of karmic matter.

58-59 (E31) There two types of essential nature, general and specific.

There are eleven general types of essential nature, found in all substances: existence (*asti*), nonexistence (*nāsti*), permanence (*nitya*), impermanence (*anitya*), one (*eka*), many (*aneka*), differentiated (*bheda*), non-differentiated, capable of salvation (*bhavya*), not capable of salvation (*abhavya*), and ultimate mental state (*parambhava*). The particular qualities which are found in only some substances are ten in number. They are: consciousness (*cetana*), lack of consciousness (*acetana*), form (*mūrta*), formless (*amūrta*), one-space-pointed (*ekapradeśin*), many-space-pointed (*bahupradeśin*), nonnatural (*vibhāva*) and imputed (*upacarita*).

70 (E39) Existence (*astitva*), etc. *dharmas* are the inherent nature of substances.

77 (E44) The nonnatural conditions and karmic matter (*pudgala*) that are ascribed to a self are due to actions in the case of selves and to time (*kāla*) in the case of karmic matter.

79 (E45) Just as the quality of being (*jīvatva*) is eternal in a self, so also its relationship with *karman* is eternal. This karmic bondage continues until the thirteenth state of spiritual advancement known as the *saṃyogakevalin*.

93 (E55) Nonnatural modes are binding, while dwelling in essential nature leads to liberation.

114-115 (E68) The essential natural nature of a self is one that is bereft of *dravya-* and *bhāva-karmans*, and is, from the essential (*niścaya*) perspective its true nature. That nature of the self, which is neither born nor removed by dissipating the karmic matter, is the purest form of the self.

116-117 (E69) The self is termed "conscious". This consciousness (*cetanā*) is of three kinds: of results of *karman*, of karmic matter, and of awarenesses. Lay persons have all three kinds but pure consciousness of awareness is found only in omniscients. Static beings have only consciousness of karmic matter. Mobile beings have both consciousness of karmic matter and of the results of action. Or it may be said that there is impure consciousness in these other selves and pure

consciousness in liberated selves (perfected *jīvas*).

119-120 (E71-72) Within a self there is neither form nor taste nor smell nor sound or its alternatives, nor figures nor action, so the self is formless. This is the absolute truth (*paramārtha*) nature of the self. By nature the self is without form, it is only metaphorically (*upacāra*) that it is with form.

3. Section on Fundamental Topics (*tattva*)

149 (E86) Self, not-self, inflow of karmic matter, bondage, reversal of karmic flow, destruction of karmic particles and liberation--these are the seven fundamental topics.

150-151 (E87) Inflows are of two types--*dravyāsrava*, when the actual inflow binds the self, and *bhāvāsrava*, when the self loses its resistance to the inflow of karmic particles. *Mithyātva, avirati, kaṣāya* and *yoga* in a self are the sources of the inflow (*bhāvāsrava*).

153-154 (E88) The entering of a self and karmic matter into each other is bondage due to passions (*kaṣāya*). Bondage is of four types. Out of these *prakṛtibandha* and *pradeśabandha* are caused by activity (*yoga*). *Anubhavabandha* and *sthitibandha* are caused by passions.

155 (E88) Just as after closing the holes in the body of a ship water does not leak in, so also in the absence of wrong belief (*mithyātva*), etc. there is a rejection of binding karmic matter.

156-157 (E90) The dropping of karmic matter that had adhered from eons of time to a self is known *nirjarā*. It is of two kinds. The karmic matter that keeps dissipating by itself even without the intent of the self is known as *savipāka nirjarā*, while the intentional and active destruction of karmic matter is known as *avipāka nirjarā*.

158 (E91) Release from the accumulated basic (subsidiary) *prakṛti*, by intervention of the self nature, is emancipation (*mokṣa*). Emancipation is of the very nature of the self. It is of two kinds, *dravya* and *bhāva*.

159 (E92) There are nine categories when merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*) are added to these (seven) essentials.

163-163 (E93) The possessor of non-self, merit, demerit, impure soul, inflow of karmic matter and bondage is a *mithyādṛṣṭin*. The possessor of all others is a *saṃyagdṛṣṭin*. Thus the pure conscious self that has dropped off all karmic matter and stopped further inflow, being emancipated, is a *saṃyagdṛṣṭin*.

4. Section on *Pramāṇas*

165 (E95) The difference between *pramāṇas*, perspectives and standpoints. The three together are known as the *trivarga*.

171-172 (E98) That known by a *pramāṇa* is an object of true cognition. A facet of an object is the subject of perspective. The meaning that is concluded by considering both is the subject of standpoints.

Objects that are of multiple natures should first be investigated through *pramāṇas*, then to destroy one-sidedness the perspectives should be arranged.

5. Section on Perspectives

173-175 (E100) Depending on scriptural knowledge (*śrutajñāna*), cognizing a part of an object is knowing by perspective. One who has this knowledge is a knower. Without perspectives the possibilities (of non-absolutism) may not be realized. Therefore, those who wish to resist one-sidedness must know the perspectives (all the partial opinions). The root of many-sided vision is *naya*.

177-181 (E10a) A seeker (*śramaṇa*) must meditate. However one who does not know objects after considering *pramāṇas* and all opinions regarding them is not a true (*ārādhaka*) seeker.

After deciding on the *pramāṇas* and the perspectives, one may determine the nature of the object, and upondetermining the nature of objects one may gain right vision. Thus by

determining the true nature of objects and right vision the self is able to meditate.

One perspective is known as one-sided, several of them are many-sided. They may be true or false.

One who is devoid of knowing the perspectives does not the true nature objects. How can one come to be of right vision if one does not know the true nature of objects?

183-187 (E105) *Niścaya naya* and *vyavahāra naya* are the roots of *naya*. In determining (*niścaya*), there are two causes, *dravyārthika* (considering an object from the standpoint of substance) and *paryāyārthika* (considering an object from the point of view of its modifications and conditions). The former has ten subcategories, the latter six. *Naigamanaya* has ten kinds. The collective (*samgraha*) has two kinds.The empirical (*vyavahāra*) and immediate (*ṛjusūtra*) perspectives have two each. The remaining kinds, verbal (*śabda*), etymological (*samabhirūḍha*) and factual (*evambhūta*) have one each. There are three *upanayas* (subsumptive correlations), *sadbhūta, asadbhūta* and *upacarita.*

189-191 (E106-107) The one that accepts the main object, while relegating the modes to secondary importance, is known as a *dravyārthika*. The one who makes the object secondary to the modes is known as *paryāyārthika.* That which accepts the selves tainted with karmic matter as if they were as pure as realized beings is known as the *karmopādhi nirapekṣa,* (oblivious to karmic taint), *śuddha* (pure), *dravyārthika* viewpoint. The viewpoint that is oblivious to origination and dissolution and accepts just Being is known as *sattāgrahaśuddhadravyārthikanaya* (existence oriented pure viewpoint).

193-202 (E107-110) That which describes the fondness, etc. feelings as the self is an impure *karmopādhi-sāpekṣadravyārthika* viewpoint. That which describes an object as produced (*utpāda*), spent (*vyaya*) or persistent (*dhrauvya*) at the same time is an impure *aśuddhadravyārthika* viewpoint.

That which divides the object into qualities, qualified, etc., and seeks relationship between them, is known as *bhedakalpanā* (imagining divisions), *sāpekṣa* (relative), *aśuddha* (impure) *dravyārthika* viewpoint. One that opines thus that "amidst all the natures, this is therefore the object' is known as the *anayadravyārthika* opinion. That which accepts the object as one's own object in one's own territory, in one's own time and in one's own nature, is known as the *svadravyādigrāhakadravyārthika* viewpoint. That which accepts the ultimate nature, leaving aside the impure, pure and *upacarita* natures, is known as *paramabhāvagrāhidravyārthika* viewpoint. The one who is desirous of liberation should know this viewpoint.

That which accepts the permanent, unlimited, moon, sun, etc. modes is the *anādinityaparyāyārthika* viewpoint. One that accepts the limited (*sādi*), due to the expiation of modal karmic traces (*paryāya karmans*), and which is not the cause of destruction, hence permanent (*nitya*), is known as the *sādinityaparyāyārthika* viewpoint. The view that relegates existence (*sattā*) to a secondary status and focuses on its origination or temporary nature is known as a temporary pure *paryārthika* viewpoint. One that focuses on the origin, permanence and dissipation modes at one point in time is known as the *svabhāvānityāśuddhaparyāyārthika* viewpoint. One that accepts the modes of lay people to be as pure as those of the liberated ones is the *anityaśuddhaparyāyārthika* viewpoint. This is also known as the *karmopadhinirapekṣa* (oblivious to *karman* differentiations) *śuddhaparyāyārthika* viewpoint. One that focuses on the temporary, impure modes of the four kinds of destinies (*gati*) is the *vibhāvānitya* (impermanent) *aśuddha* (impure) *paryāyārthika* viewpoint.

205-216 (E111-115) The one that accepts an underived future substance as an already derived one is the *bhāvinaigama* viewpoint. For example, to say that a substance is spread out when it is not yet spread. To superimpose a past state onto the

present is known as *bhūtanaigamanaya*. For example, to say "today is the day when the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīrasvāmi takes place". To say a thing has been cooked while it is still cooking is *vartamānanaigamanaya*. *Saṃgrahanaya* has two kinds, pure and impure. In the pure kind, the whole is accepted in its pure existential form (*sat*) without contradiction between the parts, and if only one of its subcategories (*jāti*) is focused upon it becomes the impure *saṃgrahanaya* perspective. The viewpoint that differentiates between the meanings thus arrived at from the above-mentioned pure and impure viewpoints is the *vyavahāranaya*.

Ṛjusūtranaya. That which focuses on the temporary mode of a substance at one point in time is the *sukṣmarjusūtranaya*. For example, the word (*śabda*) is temporary. The viewpoint that considers the human, etc. modes as situated in that particular time as a human form, is the *sthūlarjusūtranaya*.

That which does not accept the tendency of words to have different gender, etc. contained in the same meaning is the *śabdanaya* viewpoint. For example, to imply a gender-oriented meaning in words like "flower" (*puṣpa*), etc. (because those words have grammatical gender).

That which considers the meaning riding on the word or the word implied in the meaning is known as a *samabhirūḍdha* viewpoint. For example, "Indra, "*śaka*", "Puraṃdhara" (are synonyms).

The person who attempts an action with his mind, word and deed becomes named as such--this is the factual viewpoint (*evambhūtanaya*).

The first three (viewpoints) are substance-expressive (*dravyārthika*) and the remaining others are *paryāyārthika*. The first four viewpoints are object-bound (*arthapraṇidhāna*) (having emphasis on meaning) and the remaining three are speech-bound (*śabdapradhāna*) or word oriented.

219-248 (E116-125) The *śuddhasadbhūtavyavahāranaya* differentiates substances based on qualities and modes, and

based on case, etc. through nouns (substance names).

That which accepts one thing's qualities as those belonging to another is *asadbhūtavyavahāranaya*. It has three types, related (*sajāti*), unrelated (*vijāti*) and mixed (*miśra*). These again have three subtypes each. To label as selves those who due to the karmic matter body become one-organed, etc. types of bodies, is known as *vijātīya asadbhūtanaya*. Immediate awareness (*mati*) is form-based; because form arises from substance. If knowledge of unrelated qualities has been superimposed on by form, it is *asadbhūtavyavahāranaya*. If perceiving a relation it is stated that this is the very same mode, then it is *asadbhūtavyavahāranaya* that imposes the related mode on a related mode itself. Whether it is a knowable self or a non-self, if they are the content(s) of knowledge, then labeling them knowledge is (also) the *asadbhūtavyavahāranaya* of the kind that imposes related and unrelated substance modes on both related and unrelated substance modes. Imposing a single space-pointed atom as a multi-spaced one is an imposition of mode on substance type of *asadbhūtavyavahāra*. Another variety of *asadbhūtavyavahāra* is the one that labels a different implication of quality to be the same as the substance, like saying "a white rock", which is imposing a related quality on a related substance. Similarly, the opposite of imposing the substance on the quality is another type of *asadbhūtavyavahāra*.

Gross aggregates (of psychic and physical attributes of a self) are what is popularly known as *pudgala* (karmic matter). This is the imposition of *pudgala* on the modal state, hence another type of *asadbhūtavyavahāra*. To conclude that a body is well-formed on seeing the outer shape of a body is an imposition of quality on mode and thus also an *asadbhūtavyavahāra*.

The cause of emancipation or bondage from the point of view of *vyavahāranaya* is different, but the cause of perfect vision of the ultimate perspective (*niścayanaya*) has its own state of being (*bhāva*) which itself brings bondage or release.

From the ultimate perspective whatever is the nature of the self in all souls is also such from the oint of view of practical view.

By one metaphorical usage (*upacāra*) when another such usage is employed involving truth, untruth, and mixed truth substances or similar, dissimilar and mixed substances, then it is called *upacaritāsadbhūtavyavahāranaya*. For example, the ruler of the country says "this is my country", one living in the country says "this is my country", or a trader while trading says "this is my money". This is truth, untruth and mixed imagined *asadbhūtavyavahāranaya.* The feeling that "my son, my friends and me" or saying "all this is mine" is *svajātyupacārita-asadbhūtavyavahāra naya*). "These ornaments of gold and silver are mine"--this kind of talk is *vijātyupacaritāsadbhūta-vyavahāranaya.* As with country, saying that this fortress, this kingdom, etc. mixed things are mine would be *sajātivijāti upacarita asadbhūta vyavahāranaya.*

218-257 (E125-128) In the nature of substances, existence is the highest (most important) feature and is found in all things. The existence of a substance is the subject of the *pramāṇas* and one of its aspects is the subject of viewpoint. Thus the *pramāṇas* and viewpoints are a little different. Conditioned predication (*syāt*) if relative (*sāpekṣa*) is right, if not relative (*syāt nirapekṣa*) it is false. That which forever denies any rules and is automatically proven as an interjection, is the word "*syāt*" ("maybe"). It proves the substance as a relative entity. There are three divisions, each of seven subdivisions, of the aforesaid: *pramāṇa*, viewpoint and wrong viewpoint (*durnaya*). Those that are *syāt* are *pramāṇas*, those that have divisions of viewpoint are known as viewpoints, and those that are not relative are known as wrong viewpoints.

261-263 (E131-132) The viewpoint that includes the term "maybe" describes the true nature of a substance. Right perspective and *pramāṇas* are known as proper reasoning. That which is bereft of reasoning is not the real essence (*tattva*).

The fundamentals may be fit to be discarded or fit for

acceptance. Other's substance is fit to be discarded. Know that tone's own substance, too, may be either discardable or acceptable according to viewpoint. The self having wrong vision and full of passions is by rule discardable. The right visioned, renounced self is the fit object for contemplation for one who wishes liberation.

265 (E133) *Vyavahāranaya* analyzes the inherent qualities in a substance while the opposite is *niścayanaya*. From the *niścaya* (ultimate) point of view, only the pure self is fit for contemplation. From the *vyavahāra* point of view one's own self, having right vision, right knowledge and right character, is the ideal subject of contemplation.

267-268 (E134) The basic nature of all things is the primary substance of that thing, therefore the meaning arrived at by *niścaya* is the ideal subject for contemplation. In searching for the essence, one should take the help of scripture (*āgama*). Not while praying because the experience of the self is a matter of direct perception.

282-283 (E139-140) Those who contemplate the essence of knowing the *nikṣepas*, perspectives and *pramāṇas* are on the right path of essence and realize the essential thus. If you know the qualities, modes, attributes, nature, placing, viewpoints and *pramāṇas* with all their subcategories, then you can understand substance.

6 Section on the Three Jewels (*Ratnatrayādhikāra*)

285 (E140) The right vision of *vyavahāra*, right knowledge of *vyavahāra*, and right conduct of *vyavahāra*, as well as the *niścaya* point of view vision, knowledge and character, have been said to be the pathway to liberation. Auspicious or inauspicious feelings or attitudes are not the path to liberation, they habitually create karmic bondage.

296 (E145) Without *vyavahāra*, *niścaya* cannot be completed. Therefore, *vyavahāra* is the cause of achieving *niścaya*.

312 (E154) Attachment to things belonging to others causes auspicious and inauspicious states of being, and immersing oneself in one's natural self is the cause of pure states. Having a pure state enables a self to become liberated.

321 (E159) To have faith in the fundamentals is right vision, to seek and find the meaning of fundamentals is right knowledge, and to discard inauspicious actions is right conduct--this is the path to liberation.

322-323 (E159) Some people receive the three jewels (of right vision, knowledge and conduct) of *vyavahāra* through divine order, some through advice from others, and some just by themselves. Thus, they establish the three jewels and go on to meditate upon the state of *niścayaratnatraya*. Not to differentiate the self from *niścayaratnatraya* is the highest ideal itself, because *rātnatraya* is verily the self.

7 Conduct (*cāritra*)

329 (E114) *Niścaya* is the goal, and the means are good company and a renunciant character.

331 (E165) One who does not have attachment to inauspicious (or evil) but is attached to auspicious actions like fasting, etc., is known here as a monk who is the holder of *sarāgacāritra*. The monk who has no attachment for either the auspicious of inauspicious, he is *vītarāga*.

332-333 (E166) Renunciants may be of right vision or of false vision. Moreover, *ṛṣis*, *munis* and *yatis* (different categories of renunciants) may be with or without attachments. One who practices faith, knowledge and conduct for the sake of sense pleasures is [a] false-visioned one (*mithyādṛṣṭi*). One who does so for liberation is the right-visioned one.

335-342 (E171-173) The primary and secondary characteristics of monks, five types of conduct and eight types of cleansing, these are all *sarāgacāritra*.

342 (E173) Since *vyavahāra* creates bondage and immersion in essential nature leads to liberation, therefore while worshiping essential nature one should make *vyavahāra* secondary. If *vyavahāra* remains important even while meditating upon essential nature, then clearly it is bondage as non-natural states (*vibhāva*) have been said to be the cause of *saṃsāra*.

344-345 (E174-175) Just as the *sarāga* state has higher medium and lesser categories, similarly that of the *vītarāga* state also (has the three subtypes). So *ekadeśa vītarāga* conduct may be found in the fifth stage also.

349-351 (E177) First, by accepting the self through heard knowledge (scriptural teachings) one should afterwards appreciate it through one's understanding and contemplation. One who does not depend on the heard (scriptural) knowledge, his self remains ignorant even in auspicious conditions. Abandoning outer worries, and contemplating on knowledge, leads to scriptural knowledge. The same knowledge when appreciated fully (*saṃvittigata*) becomes right-visioned meditation. *Saṃvitti* is appreciating the goal as consciously derived from the path or indications leading to it. This destroys all other alternatives.

354 (E180) The ingredients for right conduct are: right discrimination between what is to be discarded and what accepted, self-control, and having total renunciation (*vītarāga*).

Devoid of all otherness feelings, and meditating on the knowledge of the self that is totally beneficent in nature, one is the mediator of pure conduct (*śuddhacāitra*).

8 Highest conduct (*niścayacāritra*)

361-362 (E182-183) Time (that is the self) is both the cause and the effect. Effect is the pure form and cause is its enabler. The nature of a pure self by dissipation of *karman* is the cause-time. The dissipation of *karman* happens by meditation on such truth.

The pure self that is devoid of any attachments and is the abode of eternal knowledge, etc. qualities is the "effect-time". In

the five conditions, the resultant condition is the "time-cause". Once the cause of pure self is meditated upon with faith, knowledge and conduct, the same will purify the self.

366-367 (E184) Having caused the effect, she self is the cause and since it itself (in its purest form) was the result (of such contemplation), it is also the effect. Thus having the same as both the cause and the effect is not contradictory. Impure sensations cause bondage to the self and pure ones release it. Therefore, pure causes emancipate the self while impure ones definitely bind it.

374-376 (E189-190) Until the self does not realize its ultimate nature of faith, knowledge and conduct it roams lost in the sea of the world. The state of being unsullied by *karman*-produced states is the ultimate transformed state of the self. Therefore, in this world, this transformed state is fit to be meditated upon.

379 (E191) The experience of self is this highest realization (*niścayasaṃyaktva*). Knowing the self is the knowledge of the proper conclusion, and the highest realization and being oblivious of both what is beneficial or evil is the definitive conduct (*niścayacāritra*) of the truly unattached (*vītarāga*) mendicant.

382 (E193) This vision (*niścayadṛṣṭi*) is the only way to emancipation. *Vyavahāradṛṣṭi* causes bondage. Therefore, those desirous of release must abandon *vyavahāra*.

Having controlled the sense-organs, defeated the passions, abandoned the options and achieved one's true nature, the *yogin* should meditate upon the self which is not the body.

387 (E195) It is through knowledge alone that the self may see its own form, and through knowledge does it realize its true nature. Through knowledge it experiences the nature of the self.

389 (E196) One whose breathing is very slow, eyes are fixed, all actions have dropped of, and one who remains steadfast in such a state, is a *yogin*.

9 Means of Self-Realization

(E197) The indicative quality of self is consciousness or realization. Accept it through these qualities. That which is consciousness, that is what I am. The knower is I. The seer is I. The karmic states are results of *karman*.

396 (E198) I am different from the anger, etc. feelings, as I am the supreme essence. I am only the knower. This kind of feeling of unity results in bliss.

400 (E199) There are four kinds of pleasure--those of the senses, of the mind, arising out of calmness, and of the self (spiritual).

409 (E204) My nature is knowledge, vision and conduct--no other layer is my nature. The four obstructions (*ghāti*) having destroyed their *karmans*, I am the realizer of the supreme concluding state, I am the self that can be known only by itself.

413-416 (E205) The way of Jinas, this supreme concluding state (*paramapāriṇāmika bhāva*) is the highest state and the summation of all. That is eternal, indestructible. Reaching that is known as liberation. the one who forever remains in this state of pure consciousness of ultimate concluding state is always content, always satiated.

This verily leads to ultimate happiness. This alone destroys all the attachment, etc. faults of (adhering to) the self.

Knowing the *samayasāra*, one who has accepted the ultimate concluding state of *vītarāga* conduct has (automatically) meditated upon right vision, right knowledge and right conduct. Becoming one with such a one, realized beings go to the abode of the self-realized.

69.270 RAKṢĀNANDA GURU (1200), *Vicārasāra*

The date is given in JRK, p. 353, which cites a manuscript held in Ahmedabad.

70 DHARMAGHOṢA SŪRI (1206)

He was a "son of Candravyavahārin; pupil of Jayasiṃha of Añcalagaccha; preceptor of Mahendra Siṃha" (says NCC 9, p. 243).

Peterson IV, p. lxv: "Pupil of Jayasinha in the Anchala Gaccha. He composed the *Śatapadikā* in *saṃvat* 1263. His pupil Mahendrasūri made an easier recension of it in *saṃvat* 1294...(There is) a copy of a *Śatapadikāsāroddhāra* by Merutuṅga, with a *praśasti* in which Merutuṅga says of Dharmaghoṣa that he was born in Marudeśa in Mahapura in *saṃvat* 1208. His father's name was Chandra and his mother's Rājalade. *Vrata*, *saṃvat* 1216; *sūripada*, *saṃvat* 1224; *svarga*, *saṃvat* 1268, at the age of 60. Merutuṅga also says that this Dharmaghosha converted "Prathamarāja" in Śākambharī."

70.271 DHARMAGHOṢA SŪRI, *Śatapadī*

"Refutations to 100 objections to Jainism. Composed in 1206", says NCC 9, 243 which adds that it was probably written by his pupil. See Indian Antiquary XXIII, p. 175. Velankar at JRK pp. 370-371 explains that the manuscripts supposed to be of this work are in fact of a work by the same title (also called *Praśnottarapaddhati*) by a Mahendrasiṃhasūri who is called "pupil of Dharmaghoṣa of the Añcalagaccha and wrote his work in 1237. This is nothing but a revised and to a certain extent enlarged form of Dharmaghoṣa's work as the author himself plainly states."

70.272 DHARMAGHOṢA SŪRI, *Paramāṇuvicāraṣaṭtriṃśikā*[242]

71 JINADATTA or JINAPĀLA SŪRI (1208)

Not to be confused with the author of #s 171-177 above, this writer is identified in NCC 7, p. 253 as "pupil of Rāsila and Jīvadevasūri of the Vāyaḍagaccha; preceptor of Amaracandra

(author of commentary on *Kāvyakalpalatā*, *Bālabharata*, etc.; NCC I. p. 332; patronized by Dhanapāla, the adopted son of Devapāla of Vāyaḍa family and trusted minister of Chāhumāna Udayasiṃha of Jāvalipura; flourished in the first half of 13th Century."

71.273 JINADATTA, *Vivekavilāsa*

This work, which consists of 1323 verses, is partially translated by Kenneth Folkert, op. cit., pp. 238-402: we provide below the section on Jainism (on pp. 400-402). NCC 7, p. 253 says it is "an encyclopaedic work in 12 chapters containing an account of the different systems of philosophy; composed in 1220 A.D. for his patron Dhanapāla". R. B. Bhandarkar, in *Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency during the Year 1883-84* (Bombay, 1887), provides the text (pp. 458-463). See also on this text Folkert, ibid., pp. 130-132; also JRK p. 359, who says the work is published by the Manager, Diamond Jubilee Press, Ahmedabad 1898, as well in the Sarasvati Grantha Mala No. 1, Agra 1920.

Translated by Kenneth Folkert

"Now the Jaina:

239 The (five) preventers that arise from both taking and
giving things for occasional and repeated use;
Also, sleepiness, fear,
ignorance and abhorrence;

240 Laughter, concern about comfort and discomfort,
passion and aversion, incontinence, yearning,
Sorrow, and consciousness--in whom
are not present these eighteen flaws, he

241 Is the divine Jina, the teacher,
the one who propounds correctly the *tattva* knowledge.

Jñāna, darśana, and *cāritra*
are the road to heaven.
242 (There are) also the *syādvāda*, and the two
pramāṇas, pratyakṣa and *anumāna*.
This entire universe is eternal and non-eternal;
there are either nine or seven *tattvas*:
243 *Jīva* and *ajīva*, merit and demerit,
inflow, and also stoppage,
Bondage, decay, release;
the comment to these is now stated.
244 *Jīva* is characterized by consciousness;
ajīva is what is other than that.
Merit consists of agglomerates of good *karman*;
demerit is the opposite.
245 Inflow means association with *karman*;
stoppage is the hindrance of karma.
Bondage arises from being bound with *karman*;
its (*karman*'s) removal is decay.
246 Destruction of the eight *karmans* is release.
By some is made the inclusion here
That when there is stoppage, it comes from merit;
and when inflow, from demerit.
247 The irreversible release declared by the Jina,
coming when there is the destruction of the eight-fold *karman*,
Is the self's abiding at the top of the universe,
having attained the state of four-fold bliss.
248 Avoiding women, eating alms-food,
with plucked-out hair,
The Śvetāmbaras forbear in purity,
being unattached Jaina saints.
Keeping the vows of purity, involved in *tapas*,
followers of the triple *gupti*,
Having no *siddhānta*, always wandering,

their senses conquered.[1]
249 Hair plucked-out, peacock-broom in hand,
using the hand as a bowl, the Digambaras
Remain standing when in the house of a donor;
they are the other Jaina seers.
250 A *kevalin* does not eat, nor a woman attain
release--
thus the Digambaras
Declare this great difference (between the sects);
they are (actually) the same as the Śvetāmbaras.

72 DEVABHADRA (1208)

This Devabhadra is the pupil of (Śrī)Candra Sūri, the author of the *Saṃgrahaṇīratna*, on which Devabhadra has commented.

72.274 DEVABHADRA, *Vṛtti* on (Śrī)Candra Sūri's *Saṃgrahaṇīratna*[243]

73.275 HEMACANDRA SŪRI (1210)

Vicārasāra(saṃgrahaṇī)

JRK, p. 353 says it is in 85 *gāthās* and gives the above date of composition; says it is noticed by Velankar, No. 1218 of

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[1]Bhandarkar notes that this verse is written in the margin of one of his manuscript sources. Its observation on the lack of a *siddhānta*, plus the fact that it is apparently not a part of the original text, is of some interest. One might conclude from it that the matter of a Digambara *siddhānta* was not of much import at the time of Jinadatta, but that at some later date a copyist or commentator felt it necessary to insert an observation on the point. (Folkert, fn. 4 on p. 402)

Velankar 1930.

74 ĀJITADEVA SŪRI (1216)

NCC 1, Revised Edition, p. 82: "Of the Candrakula; pupil of Bhānuprabhasūri; wrote the *Yogavidhi* in A. D. 1216; a manuscript of Mānatuṅga's *Siddhajayantīcaritra* (A.D.1143) was copied and presented to him at Anhilwad during Bhīmadeva's reign in A. D. 1204. (Peters III. Extracts p. 45) Wiles, p. 96, calls him "pupil and successor of Maheśvara Sūri of the Candra Gaccha". But acc. to Wiles, p. 164, Ājita Devasūri belonged to the Pallīvālagaccha.

Peterson IV (1894), p. i says: "Author, in *saṃvat* 1273, of a *Yogavidhi*, which is quoted in the *Vicāraratnasaṃgraha*. Ājitadevasūri mentions his predecessor Sri Bhānuprabhaguru, and names with honor Śīlagaṇa (?Śīlaguṇam), *saṃvat* 1250)." See Weber II, p. 956 and 1001, Manatuṅga, Malayasūri, and Bhadragupta, all of the Chandra *kula*." (Peterson III, App. p. 306). "The Cambay palm-leaf manuscript of Mānatuṅga's *Siddhajayantīcaritra* was written and presented to Ājitadevasūri in *saṃvat* 1261." (Peterson III. App. p. 45).

74.276 ĀJITA DEVASŪRI, *Yogavidhi* (NCC I, 82)

NCC 1, Revised Edition p. 82: Peters. III. Extracts p. 306, which gives the beginning and ending of the work says he wrote this in 1217.

74.277 ĀJITADEVA SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 82.

74. 278 ĀJITADEVA SŪRI, *Dīpikā* on the *Ācāraṅgasūtra*[244]

NCC 1, Rev. Ed., p. 82.

74.279 ĀJITADEVA SŪRI, *Avacūri* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Praśnaśātaka*

NCC 13, p. 106.

74.280 ĀJITADEVA SŪRI, *Dīpikā* on the *Praśnavyākaraṇasūtra*

Manusript cited in JRK, p. 275, including a reference to *Praśastisaṃgraha,* Ahmedabad, No. 308.

74.281 ĀJITADEVA SŪRI, *Ārādhanā*

Velankar, JRK p. 31, cites a manuscript in Patna.

75 JINAPATI SŪRI (1221)

NCC 7, p. 258: "Of Kharataragaccha; pupil of Jinacandrasūri and teacher of Jinapāla, Jineśvara, Pūrṇabhadra, Sumatigaṇi and Sūraprabha(vācaka); 6th lineal descendant of Jineśvara, born at Vikramapura in 1153 A.D., visited the court of Pṛthvīrāja VI the Chauban ruler of Ajmer; died in 1221 A.D.

Peterson IV, p. xxxvi: "Born, *saṃvat* 1210; *dīkṣā saṃvat* 1218...died *saṃvat* 1277...Jinapati...consecrated a statue of Mahāvīra in the city of Kalyāṇa in *saṃvat* 1233."

75.282 JINAPATI SŪRI, *Carcarī*

NCC 7, p. 258.

75.283 JINAPATI SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Dvādaśakulaka*

NCC 7, p. 258 informs us that this work is quoted by Samayasundara Gaṇi in *Samācārīśataka,* citing Indian Antiquary XXIII, p. 171.

75.284 JINAPATI SŪRI, *Vivaraṇa* on Jineśvara's *Pañcaliṅgī*

NCC 11, p. 32 says it is printed N. S. Press, Bombay 1919. Cf. also JRK p. 227 for more manuscript citations. A manuscript

of this work, without the text of the *Pañcalingī* but containing the text of Jinapati's pupil Jinapāla Upādhyāya's *Ṭippana*, is described as #1623 of Velankar 1930.

75.285 JINAPATI SŪRI, *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* on Jinavallabha's *Saṃghapaṭṭakaprakaraṇa*

NCC 7, p. 259.[245]

76 AJAYA (1222)

NCC 1, Rev. Ed., p. 81: "Second son of Jalhaṇadevī and Jaitrasiṃha, the minister, the younger brother of Ājaḍa, the son of Jaitalladevī Āsaḍa." Velankar at JRK p. 149 identifies Ajaya as "grandson of Āsaḍa, author of the *Upadeśakandalī*...

76.286 AJAYA, *Jñānavilāsakīrtana*

NCC I, 81. Velankar, JRK p. 149 remarks "No manuscript of this work is so far available except [one cited at] Surat. 8".

77.288 SARVADEVA SŪRI (1230), *Vṛtti* on a *Svapnasaptatīkā*

The author was of the Kharatara Gaccha, according to JRK p. 458, who gives the date and place of composition (Jaisalmer, 1230) and cites manuscripts at Chani No. 185; Jainagranthavali p. 358 and other locations.

78.288 HARIBHADRA SŪRI (1231?), *Ṭīkā* on the *Anuyogadvārasūtra*

We are guessing that this work is not by the earlier Haribhadra Sūri (whom manuscripts show lived and wrote in 1115) but rather of the Bhavavihāra Haribhadra, who taught Bālacandra, author of a commentary on a work of Asaḍa, at the request of Asaḍa's son Jaitrasiṃha. Wiles, p. 157, indicates this has been published in 1928. JRK, p. 9, says he was a "pupil of Jinabhaṭa" and provides manuscript citations.

78.289 HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* on Gargarṣi's *Karmavipāka*

Written in 1231, says JRK p. 72, with a manuscript citation.

79 ĀŚĀDHARA (1231).

See VRFV 325-329. NCC 2, p. 194: "Of Sapādalakṣa country where Śākambharī is situated; born at the first town called Maṇḍalakara, in the Vyāghreravāla Vaiśya family, of Śriratnī and Sallakṣaṇa; hailed as Kali-Kālidāsa by his friend the poet-saint Udayasenamuni; hailed as Prajñā-pūjā by Madanakīrtiyati."

"...In the reign of Arjunavarman, settled at Nalakacchapura in his territory; friend of five successive kings of Malva from Arjunavarman to Jaituṅgadeva...

"His last dated work is in *saṃvat* 1300; born probably in *saṃvat* 1235." Thus his life extended approximately from 1177-1242.

Asim Kumar Chatterjee (CHJ2, p. 45, mostly repeated on pp. 209-210) adds: "The poet Āṣādhara himself was a prolific Jaina writer and we have several dates for him, namely *vīra saṃvat* 1285, 1292, 1296, and 1300" (these dates lie between the years 1228 and 1243). "Āṣādhara was in favor with the Paramāra kings and, we are told, that he was conferred the title of *Sarasvatīputra* by Ārjunavarman (AD1211-16). Most of his works were, however, not written at Dhārā but at a place near it, called Nalakacchapura in his colophons, which is identified...with Nalachā, some 20 miles from modern Dhar, which still has a few Jaina temples and boasts a number of Jaina adherents. Āṣādhara wrote his works in the Neminātha *caitya* of Nalakachapura."

Tank, pp. 104ff., gives even more information. "A Digambara, belonged to the family of Vyāghreravāla. Son of Sallakṣaṇa (or Lakṣanā) and Ratni. Born in the fortress of

Maṇḍalakara situated in the country of Sapādalakṣa. Married Sarasvatī, who bore him a son named Chāhaḍa. After the conquest of his country by Sāhiavandina (Shahbuddhin Ghori), he migrated to Dhārā in Mālavā where he studied the principles of Jainism under Paṇḍita Mahāvīra, the pupil of Paṇḍita Dharasena; praised by Vilhaṇa, the lord of poets and minister for peace and war of Vijayavarman, King of Mālava. Afterwards live in the city of Nalakacchapura in the territory of King Arjuna, instructed Devacandra, Viśālakīrti, Vinayacandra, Bālasarasvatī, Madana, and others." A list of some 15 works follows.

Many works are attributed to him; cf. NCC 2, pp. 194-196; also Johrapurkar pp. 89-90. We list here those whose titles suggest philosophical content.

79.290 ĀŚĀDHARA, *Adhyātmarahasya*

NCC I, 148 says "See *Anekānta* III.xi, p. 673", but the reference is not found in the Abbreviation list of that publication.

79.291 ĀŚĀDHARA, Commentary on Pūjyapāda's *Iṣṭopadeśa*

Edited twice, once with translation by Manoharalala Sastri in MDJG 13, 1918 (i.e., Manoharalal Sastri, *Tattvānuśāsanādisaṅgraha*). Translated in Champat Rai Jain's *The Discourse Divine*, Agasa 1973.

79.292 ĀŚĀDHARA, *Prameyaratnākara*

A work on Jaina logic, says NCC 2, 195b.

79.293 ĀŚĀDHARA, *Tarkāmṛta*

NCC II, 195; VIII, 133.

79.294 AŚĀDHARA, *Avacūri* on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*

NCC 2, p. 312.

79.295 ĀŚĀDHARA, *Jinayajñakalpa* or *(Arhat)Pratiṣṭāpātha(sāroddhāra)*/Commentary

NCC 7, 264 gives many citations. On the commentary by the author, see Tank p. 105. Velankar, JRK p. 136, says it was composed in 1228, gives manuscript citations.

79.296 ĀŚĀDHARA, *Nyāyāmṛta*

NCC 10, p. 281.

80 MAHENDRASIṂHA SŪRI (1237)

Peterson IV, p. lxxxix: "Mentioned as pupil of Dharmaghosha and *guru* of Siṃhaprabha. In the *Añchalagacchapaṭṭāvalī* his dates are given as follows: Birth, *saṃvat* 1228; *dīkṣā*, *saṃvat* 1237; *ācāryapada saṃvat* 1263; death *saṃvat* 1309."

80.297 MAHENDRASIṂHA SŪRI, *Śatapadī* or *Praśnottarapaddhati*

The author was a pupil of Dharmaghoṣa of the Añcala Gaccha, says JRK p. 371, also providing the date. Peterson IV, p. lxxxix says he composed this in *saṃvat* 1294. "He wrote to make a similar work written by his teacher Dharmaghoṣa in *saṃvat* 1263 easier of understanding."

80.298 MAHENDRASIṂHA SŪRI, *Vicārasaptaṭīkā* on Kulamandana's *Prakaraṇapuṣpamālā*

JRK p. 353 says it is published with Vinayakuśala's commentary by the Jaina Atmananda Sabha, Series No. 18, Bhavnagar 1912.

81 JINAPĀLA (UPĀDHYĀYA) (1238)

NCC 7, p. 257: "Pupil of Jinapatisūri (or Jineśvara) of

Kharataragaccha; and teacher of Bhadratilaka and Prabodhacandra." A collection of his works is found in *Kharataragacchabṛhadgurvāvali,* ed. Jinavijaya in Singhi JainaSeries 42, Bombay 1956.

81.299 JINAPĀLA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Vivaraṇa* or *Vṛtti* on Jinadatta Sūri's *Carcarī*

Edited by L. B. Gandhi in GOS 37, 1927, pp. 1-27. Written in 1238 A.D., says NCC 7, p. 257. JRK pp. 121-122 gives manuscript citations, says the date of writing may be 1235.

81.300 JINAPĀLA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Vivaraṇa* on Jinavallabha's *Dvādaśakulaka*

Edited Bombay 1934. JRK p. 184 says it was composed in 1236.

81.301 JINAPĀLA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Ṭippaṇa* on Jineśvara's *Pañcaliṅgīvivaraṇa*

NCC 11, p. 52 says it is published N. S. Press Bombay 1919. Cf. also JRK p. 227.

81.302 JINAPĀLA UPĀDHYĀYA. *Vṛtti* on Jineśvara's *Ṣaṭsthānaka*

NCC VII, 257 (based on JRK, p. 491) says this was composed in *saṃvat* 1268 (=1211 A.D.). Velankar at JRK p. 401, on the other hand, says it was composed in *saṃvat* 1262 (=1205 A.D.).

81.303 JINAPĀLA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Vṛtti* on Jinadattasūri's *Upadeśarasāyana*

Edited by L. B. Gandhi in GOS 37, 1927, pp. 28-66. Written in *saṃvat* 1292 (=1241).

81.304 JINAPĀLA UPĀDHYĀYA, *Svapnavicāra*

In Prakrit. See NCC 7, p. 257.

82 BĀLACANDRA SŪRI (1238)

NCC 13, pp. 274-275: "pupil of Haribhadra Sūri of Candragaccha; head of Bāpurigaṇa; patronized by Vastupāla and his son Jaitrasiṃhadeva, ministers of Gurjara kings Vīradhavala and others of the 13th century." Velankar at JRK p. 47 calls Bālacandra "pupil and successor of Haribhadrasūri, successor of Abhayadevasūri, who was the Guru of Āsaḍa, son of Kaṭukarāja of the Bhillamāla family.

82.305 BĀLACANDRA SŪRI, *Vivaraṇa* or *Vivekamañjarī* on Aṣaḍa's *Upadeśakandalī*

Asim Kumar Chatterjee (CHJ2, p. 32) says a manuscript of this was copied in *vīrasaṃvat* 1295 (=1238). Velankar, JRK p. 47, calls the work *Ṭīkā* and says it was composed at Jaitrasiṃhadeva's request, and that Bālacandra was assisted by Pradyumna, pupil of Kanakaprabha of the Devānanda Gaccha, and Padmacandra, successor and pupil of Dhaneśvarasūri of the Bṛhadgaccha..

An edition of a work by this title ascribed to Bālacandra, son of Dharadeva (perhaps not the same author), edited by Har Govinda, Banaras 1919 (two volumes), is held at the University of Chicago Library.

82.306 BĀLACANDRA SŪRI, Commentary on Yogīndudeva's *Paramātmaprakāśa*

This is a commentary in Kannaḍa. A. N. Upadhye (in the Introduction to his edition of Yogīndudeva's *Paramātmaprakāśa* and *Yogasāra* (Srimad Rajachandra Jaina Sastramala 3: Bombay 1937, p. 67; Agas 1973, p. 75), says that a Bālacandra wrote commentaries on three works of Kundakunda, and places that author "at the beginning of the 13th century". Upadhye studies a manuscript containing this commentary, and determines that its date precedes that of Brahmadeva, whose commentary on the *Paramātmaprakāśa* is well known. He provides two extracts from the work, and adds a number of

helpful remarks and opinions based on study of this manuscript.

82.307 BĀLACANDRA SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* on Āsaḍa's *Vivekamañjarī*

Cf. JRK, p. 359, says this was composed "at the request of Āsaḍa's son Jaitrasiṃha" and lists a number of manuscript locations. The work has been published by H. G. Das in JVSS 8 and 14.

Peterson IV, p. lxxxii, however, says a commentary on Āsada's work was written by a Bālacandra in *saṃvat* 1322., i.e., 1265 A.D., and that the same author wrote the works mentioned above. Thus there is a problem in dating Āsaḍa and Bālacandra, and there may be two different Bālacandras who were the authors of various of works. On this compare also Peterson IV, p. lxxxv under Bhadreśvara Sūri, which does not seem to resolve the issue.

83 UDAYASIṂHA (1239)

G. V. Devasthali 1944, p. 825 says Udayasiṃha composed the work below in 1239 A.D., and that he was a pupil of Māṇikyaprabha, pupil of Śrīprabhusūri of the Candrakula.

83.308 UDAYASIṂHA, *Dīpikā* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Piṇḍaviśuddhi*

Devasthali 1944 says it is "a brief commentary based on that of Yaśodeva."

84 TILAKĀCĀRYA or TILAKA SŪRI (1240)

NCC 8, p. 185: "Pupil of Śivaprabhāsūri and successor and grand-pupil of Cakreśvarasūri of Candragaccha." Cf. Velankar 1930, #1600, who says this is a different, earlier Tilakācārya. The one he dates at 1240 "composed his *Pratyekabuddhacaritra* in *saṃvat* 1261, *Jitakalpavṛtti* in *saṃvat* 1274, *Āvaśyakaniryuktivṛtti* in *saṃvat* 1296, and *DvādaśakUlikaṭīkā* in

saṃvat 1304." (Note that Velankar does not mention four of the five works treated below: Are they by a different author altogether?)

84.309 TILAKĀCĀRYA, *Laghuvṛtti* on Bhadrabāhu's *Āvaśyakasūtranirukti*

NCC V, 190 says this is "a short gloss on some of the *sūtra*"; finds many manuscripts. NCC 12, p. 253 lists a *Vṛtti* on the *Pratikramaṇasūtra*, which are a part of the *Āvaśyakasūtra*.

Wiles, p. 202 (following Peterson IV, p. xlviii) says the work is "in 12, 325 *granthas*, composed *saṃvat* 1296 (1239)". [It] seems to be in two versions, [the] smaller called *Gamanikā*...The larger one...extends over 12, 355 *granthas*" (Jinaratnakośa p. 38). Extracts are edited in Balbir, 1993, 441-367. JRK p. 38 gives essentially the same information, plus manuscript citations.

Peterson IV, p. xlviii adds: "Padmaprabhasūri assisted [Tilakācārya] in his task and Yaśaḥtilakapaṇḍita, one of Tilakācārya's pupils, wrote out the first copy of the book."

84.310 TILAKĀCĀRYA, Completion of Cakreśvara's *Darśanaśuddhi-Ratnamahodadhi*

JRK p. 166 gives ms. cit. NCC 8, p. 186 says this was written in 1221 A.D.

84.311 TILAKĀCĀRYA, Commentary on Yaśobhadra's *Pratyākhyānasūtra*

NCC 8, p. 185 and JRK p. 263 cite manuscript locations.

84.312 TILAKĀCĀRYA, *Gamanikāsūtravṛtti*

NCC 5, p. 311 says "on Jaina religion".

84.313TILAKĀCĀRYA, *(Laghu)Vṛtti* on the *Caityavandanasūtra*

NCC 7, p. 82. At p. 297 of JRK Velankar identifies this work

as a commentary on Devendrasūri's *Bhāṣyatraya* on three works, viz., *Caityavandana-, Guruvandana-* and *Pratyākhyāna-sūtras*.

84.314 TILAKĀCĀRYA, *Laghu Vṛtti* on the *Śrāddhapratikramaṇasūtra*

Composed in 1237, says JRK p. 390, citing manuscript locations.

85 UDAYAPRABHA SŪRI (1243)

JRK, p. 272 calls him "pupil of Raviprabha, pupil of Yaśobhadra, pupil of Dharmaghoṣa". Peterson 4, pp. xiii-xiv: gives the following information about the author of the *Ārambhasiddhi*. "Author of the *Dharmābhyudayamahākāvya*. Udayaprabhasūri gives his spiritual genealogy as follows:

(1) Mahendraprabhu. Of the Nāgendra Gaccha.
(2) Śāntisūri.
(3) Ānandasūri and Amaracandrasūri. Contemporaries of Siddharāja.
(4) Haribhadrasūri. Called Kalikālagautama.
(5) Udayaprabhasūri. Our author.

...He was the author of an *Ārambhasiddhi*, for which see Weber II, p. 306. The "*saṅghapati*" whom he honors here is his patron Vastupāla, minister of Vīradhavala (died 1241 A.D.)...Udayaprabha is mentioned in an inscription, dated *saṃvat* 1287."

However, Peterson IV, p. xiv gives the author a different spiritual geneology:

(1) Dharmaghoṣa. He conquered his opponents in the presence of the King of Sapādalakṣa.
(2) Yaśobhadra.
(3) Raviprabha.
(4) Our author. He was assisted by Jayaprabhamuni.

85.315 UDAYAPRABHA SŪRI (1243), *Viṣamapadavyākhyā* on Nemicandra's *Pravacanasāroddhāra*

Cf. NCC II, 328 and JRK p. 272 for more manuscript citations.

85.316 UDAYAPRABHA SŪRI, *Ṭippaṇa* on Śivaśarman's *Bandhaśataka*

In the edition of Śivaśarman's work noted in our #4.4 this commentary is printed and a summary in Hindi is included, which is here summarized in turn by Ratna Lahiri. References are to pages in that edition, and the section titles correspond to those provided there.

Summary by Ratna Lahiri

Statement of auspiciousness, and *adhikāra* (eligibility) for this knowledge.

198 The *jīvasthānas* amidst the *mārgaṇā* stages.
200 *Upayoga, yoga* and *guṇasthānas* among the *jīvasthānas*.
201 Nature of the *guṇasthānas*.
204 Explanation of *yoga-upayoga* within the *guṇasthānas*.
206 Explanation of causes of regular and special bondages (*sāmānyaviśeṣabandha*).
210 Rise (manifestation time) and fall areas of bondage and their destruction.

The *prakṛtibandha* according to the laws of bondage-entry points (*vidhānadvāra*)

214 *Pratikṛtisamutkīrtanā*.
215 Enumeration of *sādhya*, etc.
217 Explanation of *bhūsaṃskāra*, etc. in the *bandhasthānas*.
220 Mastering the bondages (*bandhasvāmitva*).

Sthitibandha (according to duration of effect)

222 Explanation of piercing the *addhā* (*addhācheda*).
224 Explanation of *sādhya*, etc.
225 Explanation of mastery (*svāmitva*)

Anubhāgabandha (according to intensity of effect)
228 Explanation of *anubhāga* and *sādhya*, etc.
231 The mastery of *rasabandha* according to conducive/non-conducive (*praśasta/apraśasta*) nature.
234 Explanation of names of *hāti* and places of *rasabandha*.
236 Explanation of *prakṛti* and *pratyaya*. Explanation of *vipāka*.

Pradeśabandha (according to quantity or number of *pradeśas*)
237 Method of understanding *karmapradeśa*.

238 Nature of *vargaṇā*
239 Explanation of *sādhya*, etc.
241 Explanation of mastery.
243 *Prakṛtisthiti*, etc. causes.
244 *Apabāhutva* (numerical proportion) of the *yogasthānas*.
245 Conclusion of the work.
246 The eulogy in the notes.

85.317 UDAYAPRABHA SŪRI, *Ārambhasiddhi*

Edited in Gujarati with Haribhadra Sūri's *Lagnaśudhi*, Ratnaśekhara Sūri's *Dānasuddhi* and Hemahaṃsa Gaṇi's *Ṭīkā*, by Vijayalabdhisūrīśvara Maharaja. Ahmedabad 1989.

86.318 LAGHUSAMANTABHADRA (1250),
Viṣamapadatātparyaṭīkā on Vidyānanda's *Aṣṭasāhasrī*

Edited by Vamsidhara. Bombay 1915.

87 BHĀVASENA (1250)

P. S. Jaini (at Indologica Taurinensia 13, 1985-86, p. 204) identifies this author as a Śvetāmbara, "who was distinguished by the title of Traividyadeva", as belonging to the fourteenth century on the authority of V. P. Johrapurkar. Johrapurkar tells us that "according to the *nisidhi* stone-inscription found at Amarāpuram (District Anantapur, Āndhra), he was a pontiff of Senagaṇa, a branch of Mūlasaṅgha. His epithet 'Traividya' denotes proficiency in three branches of classical studies, Logic, Grammar and JainaCanon. He styles himself as 'Vādigirivajra'--a thunderbolt for the mountain-like disputants."[246]

V. P. Johrapurkar states that "Ten works of Bhāvasena are known to us", and lists, in addition to those identified below, works having the following titles: *Nyāyadīpikā, Kathāvicāra, Saptapadārthiṭīkā* (the last being presumably a Vaiśeṣika commentary).[247]

87.319 BHĀVASENA, *Muktivicāra*

P. S. Jaini writes: "Only a single manuscript of this unpublished work has survived, and is part of Professor Ernst Leumann's library, which is now preserved at the Bibliotheque National, Strasbourg. A description of this manuscript appears in Chandrabhal Tripathi, ed., *Catalogue of the Jaina Manuscripts at Strasbourg* No. 164. Although it carries only a single title, it consists of two separate works, *Bhuktivicāra*, pertaining to the problem of *Kevalinbhukti*, and *Muktivicāra*, dealing with the controversy over *Strīmokṣa*".

We provide the complete translation by Professor Jaini. "E" and "T" refer to pages in the article identified in endnote 253.

Translated by P. S. Jaini

1 (E206; T210) There are those people (namely, the Śvetāmbaras) whose faculties have been dulled by virtue of hearing the words handed down in the tradition. They accept

the words of the lead of their own "herd" and (boastfully) state the following: What kind of fault is it that attaches to the intelligent in accepting (the claim) that women attain *mokṣa*, since, between men and women, it is the female who is more prominent?

2 (E206; T210) In all matters pertaining to the feminine gender, the human female occupies the foremost position. This is because it is the female who is seen to be the better of the world, which is both the support both the support (the earth) and the supported (living beings). Indeed without women the very origin of the world would not take place.

Moreover, women are also the source of happiness in this joyless (*asāra*) world of transmigration. Women are also pure of heart, and they bring glory to men, gods, and royalty by virtue of being the embodiments of the Goddess of Wealth (Lakṣmī), the Goddess of Learning (Sarasvatī), and the Goddess of Fame (Kīrti). They also become praiseworthy because of their beauty. Thus, because of their number (i.e., population) and their intelligence, in all ways the superiority of women has been accepted by the wise.

Indeed, the whole world has come under the sway of women. Therefore, is it really proper to say that there is no *mokṣa* for women who are of such eminence and who are foremost on earth? Surely, why otherwise would the woman participate in the practice of the *dharma* through charity, worship, etc. (if she were not certain of attaining *mokṣa* thereby)? Surely, the learned opponent who maintains that women cannot attain *mokṣa* has set up an obstruction to his own mother's (salvation).

3 (E206; T211) We deny this claim. Here, in the matter of *mokṣa*, the relative superiority or inferiority (of men and women) is not what should be considered. We maintain instead that a female body does not provide the kind of support that is required for the attainment of *mokṣa*, (since *mokṣa*) is obtainable only by an extraordinary kind of trance that is

distinguished by (perfect) knowledge and detachment. How so?

4 (E206; T211) Since one can perceive the cause-and-effect relationship produced by the atoms of the four great material elements, it is therefore not proper to maintain that there would be no production in the world without a feminine principle. Neither is there any mutual cause/effect relationship between femininity and the world, since such elements as earth, etc. are seen (to be produced without the presence of a feminine principle).

5 (E206; T211) Equally futile is your statement that the word has come under the sway of womanhood. The great souls who have directed their mental activities toward their own selves, as well as the noble sages who have accumulated great merit, all consider women, wealth, and earth to be (as insignificant as) a blade of grass. As the rule says, "For a man without desire, the whole world is like a blade of grass". Neither is there any setting up of an obstacle to the salvation of mothers, since when the conditions conducive to the atainment of *mokṣa* are present, the force of that (totality of cause) will create in women a natural turning toward such activities as charity and worship.

6 (E207; T211) Moreover, those (who maintain that women attain *mokṣa*) say so because of their attachment to women, which is engendered by their memory of the many good deeds done for them by women (such as giving birth and rearing them). Therefore, it is appropriate that you have come to receive the designation "childish".

7 (E207; T211-212) For it has been said in the following verse: Those who are physically women in the realm of action are not endowed with the first three kinds of configurations of joints in the body. (In the absence of these first three configurations), they must accept clothes and, hence, are not fit

to assume (the highest) conduct.[1] Therefore, the doctrine of the salvation of women is not reasonable, nor does it stand up to scrutiny.

8 (E207; T212) How so? Femininity is the result of great sinfulness. On what grounds? Because femininity is rejected (by those with right vision) as in the following phrase: "Begins who are pure on account of right insight (are not reborn as) hell-beings, animals, hermaphrodites, or females.

9 (E207; T212) (Femininity is also the result of great sinfulness) because women are unable to practice nudity, which is the prerequisite for assuming the great mendicant vows.

Moreover, even though women are ordained as nuns, no one in the past has ever admitted (lit., heard) that they attain freedom from all possessions (*nirgranthatā*), nor is this seen at present by any of us. It is admitted by all that the path of *mokṣa* involves the total freedom from all possessions. Therefore, your claim (that women may attain *mokṣa*) is not accepted by the elders (of the tradition). If *mokṣa* could indeed be attained while retaining possessions, then this would amount to supporting the futility of the mendicant discipline, which consists of forsaking all attachment.

[1]The use of the word *karmabhūmi* ("realm of action") is meant to exclude the realm of enjoyment (*bhogabhūmi*) from whence *mokṣa* cannot be achieved. The word *dravyanārī* ("physically women") excludes from consideration people who are physically male but may entertain female libido and thus metaphorically be called female. The word *saṃhanana* ("configurations of joints") refers to different types of joints. Jainas believe that there are six grades of such joints, from the perfect joint, noted for its adamantine quality, to the weakest joint. It is further believed that the highest trances can be entered into only by those who are endowed with one of the first three grades of joints. For details, see Jinendra Varni, *Jainendrasiddhāntakośa* IV, New Delhi, Bharatiya Jnanapitha 1973, p. 156.

10 (E207; T212-213) Moreover, *mokṣa* is that which is adhered to by those aspirants who are characterized by non-possession and distinguished by (their perfection of) knowledge, meditation, and dispassion. How could you claim that keeping (possessions, such as the nuns' wearing of clothes), which is devoid of the characteristics of *mokṣa*, could act as the very cause of *mokṣa*? Therefore the doctrine that women may attain *mokṣa* must be considered entirely incapable of reaching the other shore of the river of the valid arguments put forth by the logicians.

11 (E207; T213) There is no need for us to strive to prove that hermaphrodites (congenitally) may attain *mokṣa*, since our opponent has also accepted it. This (statement is made) according to the accepted law that when an eagle is present, a teacher does not need a disciple to get rid of a snake. It can be proved with great ease in all cases that a man who is a great *yogin* may attain *mokṣa*. Therefore we will put forth valid arguments to prove that he (alone) attains *mokṣa*.

12 (E207; T213-214) (Proposition): A being in a woman's body cannot attain *mokṣa* in that very life.

(Reason): Because it is a body which is unsuitable for the relinquishment of all possessions (i.e., holy nudity is not allowed).

(Invariable concomitance): Whatever body is unsuitable for attaining the state of holy nudity (*nairgranthya*) is unable to attain *mokṣa* in that very life.

(Example): As is the case with the body of a hermaphrodite.

(Application): The body of a woman, which is under debate here, is similarly unsuitable for holy nudity.

(Concluson): Therefore, a being in a female body cannot attain *mokṣa*. Just as *mokṣa* is not admitted for a hermaphrodite because of its unsuitability for holy nudity, so it is also for a woman' body.

13 (E207; T214) (Proposition): Similarly, womanhood is

the locus. It is not the cause of *mokṣa*--this is the proposition to be proved.

(Reason): This is because exceedingly miserable karmic results occur in her.

(Invariable concomitance): Whatever is (the result of) exceedingly miserable karmic actions cannot become a cause for *mokṣa* (as is the case for hell-beings or animals).

(Application): Womanhood, which is under debate here, is the result of the origination of the most miserable *karmans*.

(Conclusion): Therefore, womanhood is not a cause for *mokṣa*.

14 (E208; T214) Similarly, *mokṣa* is the locus; and it is incompatible with womanhood because of the nature of *mokṣa*, which involves the total destruction of the eight kinds of extremely evil *karmans*. Whatever has the nature of bringing about the destruction of these eight kinds of *karmans*--as has, for example, the liberated soul, about which there is no dispute--cannot possibly occur in women. The *mokṣa* we talk of is precisely of that nature and, therefore, cannot possibly occur in women.

15 (E208; T214) Similarly, *mokṣa* has the nature of being totally free from all passions and suffering. It is impossible in woman, because that *mokṣa* has the nature of bringing about the total elimination of the eight kinds of evil *karmans*. The contrary example is the rise of the female libido in a woman, (which proves that she is not free from passions and suffering and the *karmans* that cause those). In this manner, by both supporting and contrary examples, it is determined by those who are trained in the application of the Jaina doctrine of conditional statements (*syādvāda*) that the nature of *mokṣa* is incompatible with womanhood. In all cases, the application of the tropology prevails, and it also overcomes the arguments of the learned opponents.

16 (E208; T214-216) The woman under dispute (i.e., the Jaina nun) does not attain *nirvāṇa*, because the female libido arises in her, as in any other woman. (The nun) is like (any other woman). The reasoning given by us (for not allowing her to attain *mokṣa*--namely, the occurrence of the female libido in her)--is valid, because (none of the following ten reasons by which a *hetu* can be proved invalid apply).

1. The reasoning given is not vitiated by the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhatva*, because of the reasoning--namely, that the rise of the female libido is present in the locus of a women's body.

2. The reasoning given is not vitiated by the fallacy of *vyadhikaraṇasiddhatva*, because both parties to the dispute accept the fact that the female libido does exist in a woman's body.

3. It is not vitiated by either the fallacy of *ajñātāsiddhatva*, or 4, the fallacy of *saṃdigdhāsiddhatva*, since the opponent is neither ignorant about the presence of the female libido in a woman's body, nor does he entertain any doubts about that.

5. There is no fallacy of *viruddhatva*, because of the reasoning given by us--namely, that the rise of the female libido in a woman is not found elsewhere (with unfailing invariable concomitance).

6 There is no fallacy of *anaikāntikatva*, since the rise of the (female libido) cannot be proved to exist in either its locus or non-locus.

7 There is no fallacy of *akiñcitkaratva*, because it does not prove the opposite--namely, the salvation of women, which has not yet been established by the opponent.

8 There is no fallacy of *anadhyavasitatva*, because the reasoning (of the libido arising) is also found in similar cases (i.e., in other women).

9 There is no fallacy of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭatva*, because of the absence of any perception, inference, scriptural authority, or worldly convention by which one could assert the absence of that reason (the rise of the libido) in the locus (the nun).

10 There is no fallacy of *prakaraṇasamatva*, since there is no matching argument put forth by the opponent which would support his claim more than ours.

Thus, the learned have shown that our reason is free from all the fallacies (of logic).

17 (E208; T216) Our example is free from the fault of *sādhyavikala*, since there exists the locus of that which is to be proved, i.e. that no woman attains *mokṣa*.

Our example is free from the fault of *sādhanavikala*, because of the presence of the reason given by us.

Our example is free from the fault of *ubhayavikala*, because the example is applicable both to the nun as well as to the reason given.

Our example is free from the fault of *āśrayahīna*, since our example is vaid for any woman at this present time.

Our example is free from the fault of *apradarśitavyāptika*, since the invariable concomitance between the reason and both the locus and the example has been demonstrated.

Our example is also free from the fault of *viparītavyāptika*, because we have demonstrated that *mokṣa* is not possible when there is the rise of the female libido.

Thus, by the aforementioned inferences, for those distinguished people who have been taught by the noble teachers, there would be the establishment of the desired object which is perceived by us as true.

18 (E208; T216) Objection: But surely, how could you say that, for intelligent people, this is established as you want it to be, since the reason given by you is vitiated by the fault of *anaikāntika* (a fault arising by virtue of the reason not being universally applicable)? Your thesis that *mokṣa* is not possible for women because of the rise of the female libido is not applicable in the case of the Lady Malli (who was a female Tīrthaṅkara). The exception of Malli proves that our argument is fallacious.

19 (E209; T217) You should not say this. This is because

we perceive any means of verification, such as perception, inference, and scriptural testimony which prove the masculinity of the exalted Lords, the Tīrthaṅkaras.

20 (E209; T217 (For example, no one in the world has ever perceived the (alleged) femininity of the images of the Lord Malli; on the contrary, those images are always depicted in masculine gender. Similarly, the syllogistic application of the inference also shows that it has reached the perfection of reasoning (?). The Lord under debate must be a man, because he is never portrayed as female in his images. This is like the images of Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra), which are well known to be male in the traditions of both parties. The same is the case here (with Malli), so it must be like that (i.e., since her image is male, Malli must actually have been male).

21 (E209; T217) Moreover, the person under debate (Malli) cannot be a woman, because that Lord is not to be found in female form in the images of the Jinas. This is because the images of that particular Lord are not found to be endowed with feminine characteristics, but only with male qualities, etc. This and many other reasons support (our claim) that the Lord is male, and no reasons (of the opponent) vitiate the reasoning we have put forth.

22 (E209; T217-218) As far as scriptural testimony is concerned, the following statement "experiencing the male libido, etc." also supports the same argument.

Moreover, there is also this panegyric (in praise of the Lord Malli): "That great sage (Maharṣi), in whose omniscience appeared the direct cognition of all existing knowables".[13] Thus, the panegyric uttered by the ancient teachers supports only the masculinity of the Lord Malli (for the word *maharṣi* in the above verse is in the masculine gender); nowhere is there bound any praise of a Jina's femininity. There also does not exist any panegyric which praises the Jina as possessing a female form, nor does anyone in the world worship the image of a Jina in a female form.

23 (E209; T218) But surely women may attain *mokṣa*, because the conditions required for *mokṣa* are not absent in them, as is also the case with men (who are accepted by both sects as being able to attain *mokṣa*.

24 (E209; T218) Do not say this! The condition for *mokṣa* is the extreme perfection of knowledge, etc. That perfection is not found in women, because it is a perfection (that a woman can never achieve), as is the case with her not being able to attain the extreme form of demerit which alone can lead to the seventh (and lowest) hell. Thus, the cause of salvation, which is perfect conduct, is not found in the locus, namely women, but only in the male mendicants. The contrary example is that of householder. (Thus we may conclude that) women do not attain *mokṣa*, because they have the internal (passions) and external (clothes, etc.), just as do householders.

25 (209-210; T219) Thus, the words of the Śvetāmbaras purporting to show the femininity of the Lord, the Tīrthaṅkara Malli, are as enchanting as the expertise in archery of the son of a barren woman. This we have examined in brief in this work, which has given arguments against the *mokṣa* of women and the eating of food (*bhukti*) by the Kevalin. Similarly, the Ācārya Siddhasena, who is well known for his treatment of the objects and theories of knowledge, has explained this matter properly in the work called *Bhuktimuktiprajñapti*. It has also been set forth by the sage Dharasena, the great master of *dvāda*, in his work *Bhuktivivaraṇa*.[14] So also has it been discussed in great detail by the great sage Āryanandi in his compilation *Bhuktimuktikathā*. Finally, the great learned one, Prabhācandra, who is the wisest of the learned, has examined this issue in great detail with many means of verification in his work *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*. These arguments should all be known from these sources by those who wish to know the arguments refuting the *mokṣa* of women, as well as the eating of food by the Kevalin. Thus is established our object (in this work).

87.320 BHĀVASENA, *Siddhāntasāraśāstra*

The section titled *Pramāprameya* has been edited by Vidyadhar Johrapurkar in Visvatattvaprakasa. Johrapurkar in his Introduction to that edition says this is the first chapter in a work titled *Viśvatattvaprakāśa-Mokṣaśāstra*, in which the "main topics of discussion include the following: (i) eternal nature of soul and its separate existence from the body, (2) existence of an omniscient person and authenticity of his teaching, (3) existence of a God-creator of the world, (4) eternal nature of the Vedas and their authenticity, (5) validity of true knowledge, (6) nature of error, (7) theory of monism, existence of Brahman and nature of Māyā, (8) enumeration of substances according to Vaiśeṣika system and Nyāya system, (9) nature of darkness and *śakti*, (10) nature of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, and (11) Bauddha doctrines of momentary existence, five aggregates and the eight-fold path of salvation." (pp. 14-15). For manuscript citations cf. JRK p. 360.

According to JRK p. 360 the *Viśvatattvaprakāśa* is the first chapter of the whole work, which is titled *Mokṣaśāstra*. But there is no (relevant) mention of a *Mokṣaśāstra* under the appropriate alphabetical listing.

87.321 BHĀVASENA, *Bhuktivicāra*

Padmanabh S. Jaini, in an article published originally in *Researches in Indian and Buddhist Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Professor Alex Wayman* (ed. R. K. Sharma) (Delhi 1993, pp. 163-178, and reprinted in Padmanabh S. Jaini, *Collected Papers on Jaina Studies* (Delhi 2000), pp. 199-215, has edited and translated this text. On p. 199 of the latter Prof. Jaini writes:

"As I set out to transcribe the text, I found it to be in an extremely unsatisfactory condition, full of illegible words and repetitious sentences. Even so, the work seems to deserve attention as it deals with an ancient controversy over the nature of an Omniscient Being in the Jaina tradition. I therefore present here an abridged version (omission indicated by...)

which preserves all of the major arguments appearing in the original text."

Summary by Padmanabh S. Jaini

"'*Bhuktivicāra*' is, of course, the author's own abridgement for the full title, the *Kevalin-bhuktivicāra*, an 'Investigation into the Eating of Food by a Kevalin'. The topic pertains to a controversy between the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras, the two ancient sects of Jainism, over the ability of an Omniscient Being (called Kevalin or Arhat in the Jaina tradition) to survive a lifetime without partaking of any food or water (*kavala-hāra*, lit. food made into morsels). Both sects agree that the attainment of *kevalajñāna* (lit. knowledge isolated from karmic bonds, i.e., omniscience) is preceded by the total destruction of all forms of the desire-producing *karman* (called *mohanīya*), and also that such a person, subsequent to his becoming a Kevalin, leads the normal life of a Jaina mendicant (e.g. moving from place to place, preaching sermons, and so forth) for the duration of his life. They agree further that the Kevalin is still subject to the karmic force called *vedanīya*, which must at all times produce the experience of either physical pain (*asātā*) or pleasure (*sātā*), feelings inseparable from the state of embodiment. The Śvetāmbaras accordingly believe that a Kevalin, regardless of the absence of desire for food, must still feel the pain of hunger, and hence, like any ordinary human being, will not subsist without eating food. The Digambaras find this unacceptable, for they believe that eating as well as bodily functions such as answering the calls of nature, are incompatible with total freedom from desires as well as omniscient cognition which characterize a Kevalin. They have therefore asserted that in the absence of *mohanīya-karman*, the *asātā-vedanīya* of the Kevalin is incapable of yielding its karmic result, thus removing the very reason for eating food, namely, hunger and thirst. The Digambaras don't deny that some form of *āhāra* or food is essential for keeping the body alive. They maintain, however, that this is accomplished by an involuntary intake (*āhāra*) of a subtle material substance called *no-karma-vargaṇā*, a process common to all embodied beings. In the case of ordinary beings, this *no-karma-vargaṇā* must be supplemented by some other form of food for the sustenance of their bodies. But, according to the Digambaras, the Kevalin's body undergoes such a transformation that his *no-karma-vargaṇā* also provides him with all necessary nourishment. The Digambaras therefore describe the Kevalin's body as *parama-audārika*, an extremely pure body, a miraculous body as it were, free from all impurities and sustained by no other 'food' than the *nokarma-vargaṇā*. The Śvetāmbaras find no scriptural support for this theory of the *parama-audrika* body, and believe that a Kevalin, and even as exalted a person as the Jina Mahāvīra himself, must partake of food to assuage his hunger and to sustain his body. The debate between these two rival sects is thus an attempt to define the true nature of a Kevalin, to resolve the apparent conflict that exists between his desireless-ness (*vītarāgatva*) and his need to eat (*bubhukṣā*), between his Infinite Bliss (*ananta-mukha*) and the pains of hunger and thirst."

"E" and "T" references are to the reprint (Delhi 2000).

1 (E202; T205-206) Having paid obeisance to Mahāvīra, the omniscient (*traividya*, i.e. the knower of the three times) Lord of the Jinas, and one who is reverentially greeted by logicians (i.e. disputants in a debate), this meaningful treatise is expounded in order to investigate *Eating of Food (by a Kevalin (i.e. an Omniscient Being)...*

By this meaningful treatise our own doctrine will be established, and the opposite view as held by the Śvetāmbaras will also be refuted.

2 (E202; T206) (Digambara:) Here a certain Śvetāmbara holds the view that the Lord Arhat, the highest Lord who has

attained omniscience eats food. In support of this view he says:

3 (E202; T206) "The body is indeed the foremost means of achieving dharma"; and that body consists of the five great material elements supported by food. Food is for the sake of maintaining the body since without food the body cannot be sustained. This is proved by the fact that the thickness or thinness of the body invariably corresponds to the presence or absence of food. Hence as long as there is a body, the avoidance of food must be considered extremely difficult. (Even one who fasts) must eat at least once at the end of a fortnight, a month, six months, or a year...

4 (E202; T206) (Śvetāmbara:) How do those (i.e. the Digambaras) who claim to speak the truth assert even the endurance of omniscience in the Lord, without the assistance of his body? How can they maintain that the food that supports the body is not the chief cause (of sustaining his life)? Because of food the mind is at peace, intelligence appears, clarity of sense organs is produced, and the body is well nourished. Otherwise, the eyes become weak, the tongue ceases to taste flavor, the nose does not experience, smell, the ears do not hear clearly, the body becomes thin, the mind becomes dull, and one's gait becomes labored; all this is evident to everyone. Therefore, a follower of the doctrine of Syādvāda (i.e. a Jaina), if he believes that the sustenance of the body is necessary for a Kevalin, must also admit food for such a person...

5 (E202; T206-207) (Śvetāmbara:)...Our view that a Kevallin takes food by morsels will be established by all five means of verification. (Here we present the following syllogism:) The point we seek to prove is that the Kevalin eats food. This is because there is in him the presence of the twofold *vedanīya-karman* (which produces pleasure (*sātā*) and pain (*asātā*). Whosoever is like that must eat food, for example, a person on the street. The Kevalin has the twofold *vedanīya-karman*. Therefore he must eat food.

6 (E202; T207) (Śvetāmbara:) Similarly, the Kevalin eats food because he has six *paryāptis* (a process by which a soul brings about the 'completion' of a new life). He must have hunger (*bubhukṣā*, lit. 'desire to eat") because of the 'heat body' (*taijasa-śarīra*), a body possessed by all embodied beings), and also because (even after attaining omniscience) he does move about for the duration of his long life, like any other human being...

7 (E202-203; T207) (Digambara:) All this will be examined in proper order...Your statement is not correct, since the body is not the most important factor here. This is because the stage of a body does not necessarily correspond to the number of days during which it remains devoid of food. For example, the condition of the body of one who takes food after skipping five meals, and of one who takes food after skipping four, three, or two meals, does not differ (proportionately). Similarly, an extreme form of radiant energy is observed n the bodies of ascetics like Bāhubali who practice the highest form of control, and also in those who eat only once in a fortnight, a month, six months, or a year. So was Sītā full of vigor, even after a great deal of suffering and exhaustion, while she kept her precepts. In those mendicants who engage in austerities of fasting and so forth, there is also seen excellence of cognition as well as destruction of obscurations and passions, as has been said:

"The total destruction of defects (i.e. passions) and obscurations (of knowledge) must be possible in some person. Because these two admit of degrees (of absence in ordinary people). For example, the internal and external dirt (in a piece of gold) which can be completely cleansed by proper means." (*Āptamīmāṃsā*, verse 41) If you do not accept this, then you will be contradicting yourself.

8 (E203; T207) (Digambara:)...Moreover, all activities of eating cease beyond the (seventh spiritual) stage (*guṇasthāna*) called *apramattavirata* (i.e. total renunciation free from all forms of carelessness.) As for the fourteen afflictions (*parīṣaha*, see below section 14) beginning with hunger and thirst, these

may exist only up to the (eleventh state called) *sūkṣma-sāmparāya* (i.e. subtle desire) (and not beyond, in the thirteenth state of the Kevalin).

9 (E203; T208) (Digambara:) Are you merely claiming some form of *āhāra* (food), or only that *āhāra* which is eaten by morsels (*kevala-āhāra*)? In the first alternative there is no need for argumentation, because in the Kevalin with Activities (i.e. the thirteenth stage), we also admit the intake of *āhāra* in the form of the quasi-karmic molecules (called *nokarma-vargaṇā*) that a soul automatically takes in during the state of embodiment. The second alternative is not (applicable in this state) since eating in the form of food made into morsels is not found there.

10 (E203; T208) (Śvetāmbara:) But *āhāra* characterized as "edible" is indicated (in the scriptures) for that stage.

11 (E203; T208) (Digambara:) No, because six kinds of *āhāra* are mentioned in the scripture, as is said in the verse: "*āhāra* should be known as sixfold".[15] Otherwise there would be no possibility of the sustenance of the bodies of beings with one sense (e.g. plants), or beings in eggs; for food by way of eating morsels is not possible for them...In the second alternative (of considering only the *kevala-āhāra* as food) there is the fault of inapplicability to those who live in the heavenly abodes. Their bodies are maintained even in the absence of food taken by morsels.

12 (E203; T208) (Śvetāmbara:) In the absence of food by morsels, within a few days the sustenance of the body is in peril. The wise (i.e. the physicians) can figure from signs that our bodies may cease to exist. the same would be the case of a Kevalin who is like us.

13 (E203; T208) (Digambara:) No, (the case is not similar) because of the many inferences that support our contention. It is also known from the scriptures, as for example "One who (knows) all sentient and insentient beings...", and so forth, that the omniscient cognition (of the Kevalin) is free from all

obstructions (i.e. it is not affected by the absence of *kevala-āhāra*)...

14 (E203; T208) (Śvetāmbara:) But surely as long as *vedanīya-karman* exists, the scriptural rule namely "Eleven (afflictions are possible) in a Jina" (*Tattvārthasūtra* ix.11) would apply, and hence there would be thirst and hunger even for a Kevalin. (We therefore offer the following) syllogism: the *vedanīya-karman* (even of a Kevalin) yields its result (in the form of hunger, etc.). Because it is the nature of *karman* (to yield its result), It is similar to the *āyu-karma* (i.e. the *karman* which determines the duration of individual life) (which, you admit, yields its result even for a Kevalin).

15 (E203; T208-209) (Digambara:) This is not a proper argument, because unassisted by *mohanīya-karman* (which produces passions such as desire and aversion), the pain-yielding (*asātā*) variety of *vedanīya* yields instead pleasure (*sātā*) only...(you admit that) due to the excellence of omniscient knowledge, the body of the Kevalin gains such translucence that he can be seen as having four faces (i.e. can be seen from al four directions), and also that his nails and hair cease to grow. For the same reason there is also the absence of eating food by morsels. The (argument based on the) scripture pertaining to the number of afflictions (considered possible for a Jina) is thus overcome.

16 (E203; T209) (Digambara:)...By the excellence of infinite knowledge, the presence also of infinite perception, infinite energy, and infinite bliss (*ananta-sukha*) (which would not be compatible with hunger and thirst) is easily established, as said in the verse:

> "Your glory is unobstructed and your freedom from passion is natural. So is your contentment, and the innate control over the senses. Oh Lord, only in you is to be found complete happiness, the totally unobstructed energy and the cognition extending to all objects."

17 (E204; T209) (Digambara:) The argument that the Kevalin is subject to the desire to eat (*bubhukṣā*) on account of the presence of the *asātā-vedanīya-karman* is rendered invalid by the following syllogism: The Lord, being free from attachment, does not engage in receiving or forsaking something. Because of being free from delusion, he has departed from actions to be performed or to be given up. One who is like this must be of such a nature, as is the highest *yogin* acceptable to both (sides of the debate). This person under discussion (i.e. the Kevalin) is like that and, therefore, he must conform to this description...

18 (E204; T209) (Śvetāmbara:) But the Lord, the Highest Jina is (still a human being and is) seen to share conditions common to all human beings.

19 (E204; T209-210) (Digambara:) Notwithstanding his human condition (it can still be maintained that he does not eat). (There is no single rule that uniformly applies to all human beings because) the periods of abstention from food can vary a great deal from one person to another, as is known from the examples of great mendicants, the veritable treasures of severe asceticism...

As is said:

"You have indeed transcended the human nature; and are a divine being even to the heavenly beings;
Therefore, Oh Lord, you are the highest divinity.
Oh Jina Vṛṣabha, therefore, be gracious to us for our welfare."

(*Bṛhatsvayambhū-stotra*, verse 75)

20 (E204; T210) (Digambara:) By the same (text) one should understand the refutation of arguments (for *kevala-āhāra*) based upon the Kevalin's corporeality, or his ability to speak, or upon his maleness, and so forth.

21 (E204; T210) (Digambara:) Moreover, by his pure meditation he has destroyed all obstructions to knowledge...He is endowed with that bliss which accompanies his omniscience. He has gained his own nature, which is immaculate and incomparable. Therefore, the words of the Śvetāmbara teachers implicating hunger and thirst in the Lord Arhat, the Highest Lord...are extremely disagreeable. He is called Jina precisely because he has overcome evil (*māra*) in the form of hunger, thirst, fear, hostility, and other similar karmic enemies. Moreover the word *jina* etymologically means one who has won a victory over enemies in the form of *karmans* that are instrumental in leading (beings) into a great many terrible calamities of rebirths. Thus it becomes well-established for the learned that the Lord Jina is not subject to the defects of hunger and thirst, and so forth.

22 (E204; T210) (Śvetāmbara:) But in the absence of partaking of food, would it not be improper to say that the Kevalin moves about in the assembly hall (where he preaches)?

23 (E204; T210) (Digambara:) This should not be said. His moving about (even without food) is possible on account of his former meritorious acts, and is comparable to the various miraculous signs appearing in the assembly hall, such as his (being seen as having) four faces (i.e. his visibility from all four sides), and so forth.

24 (E204; T210) (Śvetāmbara:)...(We still submit that the Kevalin) may become an eater of food on account of the affliction (of hunger) produced by the powerful (pain-yielding) *vedanīya-karman*.

25 (E204-205; T210-11) (Digambara:) Not so, because the learned speak of the presence of the pain-yielding *vedanīya-karman* in the state of a Kevalin in a (technical) sense comparable to the metaphorical usage such as "This boy is fire (i.e. haughty)" or "This boy is a lion (i.e., brave)"; surely, the fire and the lion to not become that boy. The *asātā-vedanīya-karman* (in a Kevalin) is incapable of producing its effect without the assistance (of the passion-producing *mohanīya-karman*). Its existence there is comparable to a heap of ashes

devoid of heat. Does fire blaze forth without the assistance (of fuel and wind)? The *vedanīya-karman* alone is incapable of producing any pain. It would as absurd as a young juggler without an assistant climbing ono his own shoulder and dancing; this is because truly even a capable person without help is incapable...

26 (E205; T211) (Digambara:) Moreover, your argument is not valid for the following reason also. If you admit that the Kevalin eats food, then you may have to accept that his body is subject to the impurities of feces and urine, etc. This would certainly lead to the loss of his omniscience. Thus, in joining at one spot you have broken at another. You started with one objective but it resulted in something quite different. Thus the words of the Śvetāmbara (*Dupaṭavādins*, lit. those who wear clothes) cross the limits of logic.

27 (E205; T211) (Digambara:) What is the purport of all this? In the Lord, who has destroyed the *mohanīya-karman*, the painful effects arising from the presence of the *asātā-vedanīya-karman* do not prevail. The latter is comparable to a burnt piece of rope, from which you seek in vain to prove the presence of thirst and hunger (in a Kevalin).

28 (E205; T211) (Digambara:) This matter (namely, the presence of the desire to eat in the Kevalin) has been examined further by the learned (Ācārya Prabhācandra:) "Why should not there also be the (presence of the) desire for such carnal pleasures as embracing a woman and kissing (and so forth)?"[16] (Given your view of the presence in a Kevalin of the desire to eat) it is not proper for you, who profess to speak reasonably, to speak also for his omniscience and his total freedom from desire. Instead, your reasoning only links the defects of sleep, sluggishness, and disease (all proceeding from eating food) in the Highest Lord, the Kevalin. This will lead to the unwanted situation of admitting that the knowledge of the Lord is dependent on the senses, and therefore an ordinary knowledge, like the knowledge of people like us.

29 (E205; T212) (Digambara:) Certain (non-Jaina) devotees (of Viṣṇu or Śiva) believe (that their Deity) enjoys the pleasures of sex and so forth. They even worship (their Deity) with sixteen kinds of services, and also they do not behave in a wholesome manner. The Śvetāmbaras (called "Pāṇḍupaśāḥ", lit. wearers of white clothes) are worse than even these people who hold such wrong views...How? Totally devoid of discrimination, this unintelligent person thinks incessantly of the Deity who is afflicted by the defects of hunger, and so forth. How can one who is himself burning with the pain of hunger, and so forth, be able to extinguish the fire of hunger in others? How can a falling man lift another falling person?...There is no arriving at the desired goal by this means. There is no attainment of the highest goal, namely *mokṣa*, for one who holds the view of the Śvetāmbara: the latter has fallen in manifold sin, since he speaks (blasphemously) of the eating of morsel food by a Kevalin who is free from desire and is characterized by the complete destruction of the defects of hunger and so forth. This (is confirmed) by the word of ancient teachers: "The sinful act of attributing faults (to the Kevalin) by saying that the omniscient eat morsels of food...(leads to the inflow) of the faith-deluding variety of the *mohanīya-karman*.". Such beings inherit *karman* that keeps them in transmigration for the long duration of seventy crores multiplied by seventy crores of the "oceans" of time.

30 (E205; T212) (Digambara:) In conclusion, the Lord Kevalin does not eat food because he is of the nature of four infinites (of knowledge, perception, bliss and energy), because he has completely destroyed the mass of passion-producing *karman*, because he is endowed with thirty-four miracles, because he is distinguished by the majesty of five great auspicious events (viz. conception, birth, renunciation, enlightenment and *nirvāṇa*), all of which are not to be found in an ordinary person (lit. person on the street, i.e. one who eats food). By these arguments well set forth, we have achieved our

desired objective.

87.322 BHĀVASENA, *Nyāyasuryāvalī*

Strasbourg Series #165 (p. 223): "*Nyāyadīpikā*, mentioned by Vadekar (JRK p. 219) and here by Johrapurkar, may be identical" with this work.

88 JINEŚVARA (1257)

NCC 7, p. 279 identifies the author as "pupil of Jinapati of Kharataragaccha".

88.323 JINEŚVARA, *Śrāvakadharmaprakaraṇa*

NCC 7, p. 279 says this was composed in 1257 and cites Jainagranthavali, p. 152; Jesalmere Skt. Intro. p. 56.

89.324 LAKṢMĪTILAKA GAṆI (1260), *Ṭīkā* on Jineśvara's *Śrāvakadharmaprakaraṇa*

According to JRK p. 392 Lakṣmītilaka was assisted by Abhayatilaka Gaṇi of the Kharatara Gaccha. Manuscripts are cited.

90 UDAYAPRABHA (1262)

This Udayaprabha (not the same as #85 who was the author of a commentary on the *Pravacanasāroddhāra*), is listed in NCC 2, p. 328 as: "of Nāgendragaccha; pupil of Vijayasena, guru of Malliṣeṇa...Flourished under Vastupāla, minister of Vīradhavala of Gujarat". He may have written one or two other philosophical works.

90.325 UDAYAPRABHA, *Karṇikā* on Dharmadāsa Gaṇi's *Upadeśamālā*

NCC 2, p. 328 says "composed in *saṃvat* 1299". See also

JKM p. 50 for more manuscript citations. Edited by Punyavijaya Suri in a book entitled *Sukṛtakīrtikallolini (=Vastupālastuti, Upadeśasamalakarṇika, and other panegyric records of Vastupāla of Gujarat* (Bombay 1951). See Kapadia 18, pp. 391-396 for the beginning and ending passages of this text.

90.326 UDAYAPRABHA, *Ṭippaṇa* on Gargarṣi's *Karmavipāka*

NCC 3, p. 212; JRK pp. 69, 72.

91 MĀGHANANDIN (1265)

JRK p. 232: "pupil of Kumudacandra. The author received a grant in A. D. 1265 from King Narasiṃha of the Hoyal Dynasty, where he is described as the author of three other *Sāras*" (beside the *Padārthasāra*), "namely, i.e., *Siddhāntasāra*, *Śrāvakācārasāra* and *Śāstrasārasamuccaya*; see Medieval Jainism [unlocated], p. 84".

91.327 MĀGHANANDIN, *Padārthasāra*

Edited in Kannada by M. C. Padmananda Sarma, 1969.

91.328 MĀGHANANDIN, *Śāstrasārasamuccaya*

In four chapters containing 196 *sūtras* in all. Published in the Manikyalal Digambara JainaSeries 21, Bombay 1922. Also edited by Pramanasagara, New Delhi 2000.

91.329 MĀGHANANDIN, *Vṛtti* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtras*

Cf. JRK p. 156 for ms. cit.

92 DEVENDRA SŪRI (1271)

NCC 9, 161 specifies this author as "of Tapāgaccha; pupil of Jagaccandra and preceptor of Vidyānanda (author of *Sudarśanacaritra*) and Dharmaghoṣasūri (author of *Ṛṣimaṇḍalastotra*)", and directs us to Peters IV. Index of

authors, p. lvii. There is a lot more on p. lviii of Peters IV. Index, including: "At this time (*saṃvat* 1301) lived Vijayachandra, who had been a *lekhyakarmakṛn-mantrī* in the house of Vastupāla and was made *sūri* by Jagacchandra [Devendra's predecessor]...Devendra died *saṃvat* 1327 in Mālava, and his appointed successor Vidyānandasūri thirteen days after him at Vidyāpura; therefore, the brother of the latter, Dharmakīrtyupādhyāya, received the *sūripada* under the name Dharmaghoṣa". This Dharmaghoṣa is the author of works #106.356-358, below. According to NCC 2, p. 189 this author "passed away in *saṃvat* 1327."

Wiley p. 75: "Devendrasūri, Ācārya (died 1270). Śvetāmbara Mūritpūjaka Tapā Gaccha mendicant leader. He was the pupil of Jagaccandra, the founder of the Tapā Gaccha. He is the author of five of the *Karmagrantha* (the sixth was written by Candramahattara), which today are the most widely read of the Śvetāmbara works on Jaina *karman* theory. In the generation after Jagaccandra, there was a split in the Tapā Gaccha over lax mendicant practices, and Devendrasuṛi became the leader of the most strict Lodhi Pośāl (= Skt. Laghu Posala) "Small Monastery") branch of *saṃvegi ṣādhus.* Altough mendicants today do not trace direct pupillary descent from hm Devendrasūri is considered to be an ancestor of the current Tapā Gaccha."

92.330 DEVENDRA SŪRI, *Vandāruvṛtti* or *Śrāvakānuṣāḍānavidhi* on the *Ṣaḍāvaśyakasūtra* or *Śrāddhapratikramaṇasūtra*

(NCC II, 189-190; IX, 161) Cf. Āvāśyaka-Studies I, pp. 33-34. This is a Svetambara work. Acc. to NCC 2, p. 190 it has been printed "with text in Seth Devchand Lalbhai Fund Pustakoodhar Fund series 8, 1912; also from Ratlam 1928." Velankar (JRK p. 38) adds: "(Called) *Vandāruvṛtti* from its initial words...The author quotes several *gāthās* from *Caityavandana* and *Guruvandana Bhāṣyas* and gives various *kathās* in illustration of the performance of the six duties, in a metrical form." Edited from Bombay in 1985. It was long ago edited with a preface and notes by Nanakacandajati from Banaras, and recently in two volumes from Bombay in 1985-1988.

92.331 DEVENDRA SŪRI, *(Nava)Karmagrantha/Sukhabodha*

Edited many times (at least 12!) Velankar, op. cit., pp. 69-70: "It consists of five parts (1) *Karmavipāka* in 60 *gāthās*, (2) *Karmastava* in 34 *gāthās*, (3) *Bandhasvāmitva* in 24 *gāthās*, (4) *Ṣaḍāsīti* in 86 *gāthās;* (5) *Śataka* in 100 *gāthās*. To those is often added a sixth *Karmagrantha* of Candrarṣi Mahattara who is an old writer..."

Peterson IV, p. lvii: "(Devendra is) mentioned as the pupil of Jagacchandra and *guru* of Vidyananda...Author of the *Karmagrantha* or the six *Karmagranthas*. Devendra is the author of the text of the first five, and part author of the text of the sixth. He is the author also of the commentaries on the first five...At the end of this last [i.e., the *Śataka*] Devendra states that that tract is the work of Candramahattara, to which he has himself added 19 *gāthās*, bringing the total number up to 89."

92.332 DEVENDRA SŪRI, *Siddhapañcāśikā/Ṭīkā*

JRK p. 437 say it is in 50 *gāthās*, is published in the Jaina Atmananda Sabha Series No. 16, Bhavnagar 1912, provides manuscript citations.

92.333 DEVENDRA SŪRI, *Bhāṣya* on Yaśobhadra's *Pratyākhyānasūtra*

In 48 *gāthās*, says NCC IX, p. 161, citing locations of manuscripts. NCC 12, p. 285 says it has been printed three times: (1) in a collection, Ahmedabad 1906; (2) with Gujarati transl. Mehsana, Ahmadabad, 1912; (3) Jaina Atmananda Grantharatnamala 15. Says See Br. Mus. Ptd. Bks. 1906-28,

254-255. It is edited with the editor Vijayajinendrasuri's commentary from Santipur 1993.

92.334 DEVENDRA SŪRI, *Upadeśakulaka* or *Upadeśamālā or Uvaesakulaya*

Presumably by this Devendra, though neither NCC 2, p. 346 nor NCC 9, p. 160 assign it to him. It is a work in Prakrit in 22 *gāthās*. Edited Surat 2002.

92.335 DEVENDRA SŪRI, *Bhāṣya* on the *Caityavandanasūtra*

NCC 7, p. 82. Velankar at BBRAS 1930, #1601 says "A treatise on the manner of performing the religious rites of Caityavandana, Guruvandana and Pratyākhyāna or the daily *Āvaśyakas*", and provides an analysis.

92.336 DEVENDRA SŪRI, *Sukhabodha* on Śāntisūri's *Dharmaratnaprakaraṇa*

NCC 9, p. 260. Edited from Bombay in 1988 in two volumes. Edited in Palitana 1906.

92.337 DEVENDRA SŪRI, *Vṛtti* on (Śāntisūri's?) *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*

NCC 9, p. 393.

92.338 DEVENDRA SŪRI, *Śrīdānopadeśamālā*

Edited by Rāmyarenu from Surat 2002 as Acaryasri Omkarasuri Jnanamandira Granthavali 23.

93.339 LAKṢMĪSENA (1276), *Laghuṭīkā* on Jinavallabha Sūri's *Saṃghapaṭṭakaprakaraṇa*

Lakṣmīsena was the son of Hammira, says JRK p. 411, who provides the date and manuscript citations.

94.340 DEVABHADRA (1287), *Vṛtti* on Jinabhadra Gaṇi's *Kṣetrasamāsa*

This author is identified by Velankar, JRK p. 99, as "pupil of Jineśvara, pupil of Devabhadra". Manuscripts are cited.

95.341 YAŚOBHADRA SŪRI (1280), *Vivaraṇa* on Haribhadra Sūri's *Ṣoḍaśakaprakaraṇa*

Edited by Buddhisagara in JPU 6, 1911.

95.342 YAŚOBHADRA SŪRI, *Ṭīkā* on Jinavallabha Gaṇi's *Ṣaḍasīti*

Edited in BL2016.K3.J660.

95.343 YAŚOBHADRA SŪRI, Completion of Haribhadra Sūri's *Tattvārthasūtra-Laghuvṛtti*

Edited Ratlam 1936.

96.344 PRABODHACANDRA GAṆI (1290), *Vivaraṇamañjūṣā* on Jinadattasūri's *Sandehadolāvalī*

"Composed in *saṃvat* 1320 by Prabodacandragaṇi, pupil of Jineśvarasūri of the Kharatara Gaccha", says JRK p. 413, which provides manuscript citations.

97 ABHAYACANDRA (SIDDHĀNTA) CAKRAVARTIN (1290)

NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 273 says "his pupil Keśavavarnin rendered into Canarese his commentary on *Gommaṭasāra* in A. D. 1359 (Indian Antiquary 1916, p. 271)."

97.345 ABHAYACANDRA CAKRAVARTIN, *Mandaprabodhikā* on Nemicandra Saiddhāntika's *Gommatasāra*

The *Jīvakāṇḍa* section is edited in Gandhi Haribhai Devakarana Jaina Granthamala 4, Calcutta 1919-1921.

A. N. Upadhye in the Introduction to his edition of the *Gommatasāra*[248] indicates that this commentary, whose title is *Mandaprabodhikā*, was published with the text as well as several other commentaries by the Bharatiya JainaSiddhanta Prakashini Samstha. It is unfinished, extending only up to *gāthā* 383.

97.346 ABHAYACANDRA CAKRAVARTIN, *Ṭippaṇa* on Vidyānanda's *Aṣṭasāhasrī*

See NCC I, 273.

97.347 ABHAYACANDRA CAKRAVARTIN, *Karmaprakṛti*

Edited by Gokulacandra Jaina in 1968.

97.348 ABHAYACANDRA CAKRAVARTIN, *Syādvādabhāvanā* on Akalaṅka's *Laghīyastraya-Tātparyavṛtti*

Edited by Kallapa Bharamappa Nive. MDJG 1, 1915.

97.349 ABHAYACANDRA CAKRAVARTIN, *Vṛtti* on Nemicandra's *Trilokasāra*

Manuscript cited at JRK p. 162.

98 MALLIṢEṆA (1292)

According to H. D. Velankar, JRK p. 12, Malliṣeṇa was a "pupil of Udayaprabhasūri of the Nāgendra Gaccha".

98.350 MALLIṢEṆA, Commentary on Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāyasāra*

See NCC XI, 76.

98.351 MALLIṢEṆA,. Commentary on Nemicandra Siddhāntavāgīśa's *Dravyasaṃgraha*

See NCC IX, 183.

98.352 MALLIṢEṆA, *Syādvādamañjarī* on Hemacandra's *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā*

"E" is the edition by A. B. Dhruva (see Dhruva). "T" refers to the translation by F. W. Thomas in Flower-Spray. The following summary is made on the basis of Dhruva's "bird's-eye view" together with his extensive notes; quotations cited are from E unless otherwise noted. To make for easier reading, a Sanskrit word is provided at its first occurrence; afterwards, the English translation adopted for that word replaces the Sanskrit word where it occurs in Dhruva's text.

H. D. Velankar, JRK p. 12, says this was written in *śaka* 1214, which would bring our author close to the date of 1292 which we have given him.

The work has been edited several times.

Summary by A. B. Dhruva

4 (E10-12, 21-30; T19-21) *Sūtras* 4-9 criticize the Vaiśeṣika system.

"The Jaina view...is that things are by themselves co-ordinated with things of their own class and differentiated from things of other classes, and consequently there is no need to assume, as the Vaiśeṣikas do, the two hypothetical realities, *sāmānya* (universal) and *viśeṣa* (particular). This, besides being a gratuitous assumption, according to the Jaina view, involves the absurdity of making two such contradictory things as universal and particular reside in one and the same thing, unless you reconcile them in the Jaina manner by regarding them as two relative aspects--and aspects only--of one and the same thing...Mark that the universal and particular are regarded by the Jaina as two relative *aspects* of a single reality, not even two related realities, that is to say, they are only aspects of Reality, and these, again, are relative, not absolutely opposed." (E, p. lxxxiv)

"*Bhāvas* are things past, present or future, i.e., a *bhāva*

does not necessarily connote *present* existence: thus a *dhvaṃsa* (posterior absence) or a *prāgabhāva* (prior absence) which the Vaiśeṣika regards as the *abhāva* (non-existence or absence) of a thing is as much a *bhāva* as the thing itself; moreover, the so-called *abhāva* is not *tuccha* or *mithyā*, i.e., unsubstantial nothing, as some Vedāntins would have it, but is an aspect of *bhāva* and, therefore, the *bhāva* itself." (E, pp. 10, 26)

"(I)n other words, things by their very nature, and not through any imaginary category like the universal, bring about their co-ordination with other individuals of their class, and give rise to common terms. The same (pot) *ghaṭa*, moreover, becomes particular, insofar as it distinguishes itself from other individuals of the same or different class by virtue of its peculiar *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (place), *kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (nature or quality). Therefore, universal and particular need not be recognized as separate categories, they being certain aspects of the things of which they are predicated." (E, pp. 11, 27-28)

"Universals and particulars are but the properties (*dharma*), (i.e. not real independent entities, but mere aspects) of the things (*padārtha*) of which they are predicated. Thus:--Are not properties other than the property-possessors (*dharmin*) of which they are predicated? Is not a predicate different from its subject? To this the author replies: No. If properties were absolutely other than the property-possessor, there could not be such relation between them as *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* or being subject and predicate, any more than between a camel and a donkey, two absolutely distinct entities which could never be related as subject and predicate. Moreover, if properties were held to be distinct from their possessor, i.e., the substratum in which they are supposed to inhere, there would be as many distinct entities in a property-possessor as there are properties, that is to say, an infinite number of things would have to be admitted on the proposed hypothesis." (E, p.11, 28-29)

5 (Elxxxv-lxxxvi; T22-28) "Light when extinguished has not

passed into nothingness and ceased to be, it has only changed its form which is now darkness. Like light, darkness is also a substance--and not a mere absence--which is possessed of a black color and a cool fuel. Similarly, space is both eternal and non-eternal. The Jaina rejects the definition of *nitya* ("eternal") which is generally given by other schools, viz., absolute changelessness. He defines it as that which continues to exist in spite of origination (*utpāda*) and destruction (*vināśa*). To what would origination and destruction belong, argues the Jaina, if nothing continues it? Therefore a continuous reality, he says, must be posited for the very possibility of origination and destruction. In fact, says the Jaina, modes and substance, i.e., change and permanence, exist together: neither is possible without the other. Malliṣeṇa observes that the tenet of the Yoga school agrees with that of the Jaina in this matter."

"Note that the Jaina differs equally from (1) those who hold that all is eternal, and (2) those who hold that all is evanescent, and also from (3) those who hold that some things are eternal and some evanescent. According to him all things are *both* eternal and evanescent although from different points of view. In a way, says the Jaina, even the Vaiśeṣika absolutist admits--without being aware of it--that earth (*pṛthivī*) is both eternal and non-eternal, i.e., not only are some cases of earth eternal and some non-eternal, but earth co-exists simultaneously with eternality and non-eternality. In conclusion, Malliṣeṇa reproduces the criticism of absolute eternalism and absolute non-eternalism from Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* (I.1.33) almost verbatim, and winds up with the observation that the Vaiśeṣika admits the *anekāntavāda* of the Jaina in some of his doctrines without being aware of it; e.g., the Vaiśeṣika holds that *citrarūpa* (variegated color) is a conglomeration of several mutually exclusive colors which belongs to a single whole substance. Similarly, many things in the Vaiśeṣika school are supposed to be enduring for a certain limited length of time; this means that one and the same thing both endures and

perishes, that is, it possesses two contradictory aspects." (E, pp. lxxxv-lxxxvi)

"The obvious difficulty in the way of regarding light or fire as eternal is our experience of darkness (*tamas*) as the negation of light or fire. The difficulty is met by the Jaina by treating darkness as a positive substance, a kind of karmic matter (*pudgala*) into which fire is sometimes transformed. The particles of fire, according to the Jaina theory, assume the particular form (*paryāya*, mode) of light, but when the oil is exhausted or there is a blast of wind the particles abandon the mode of light and assume that of darkness. Thus, the particles persist as the original matter, that which changes being only their mode. A mere change of form does not mean non-eternality--earth, for example, may take numberless forms, such as those of a jar, a storehouse, etc.; yet the earth is recognized as the identical substance persisting through all the changed...The case of light and darkness is not so patent; yet it is the same." (E, pp. 13, 34-35; T23)

"But it may be objected that darkness is not really visible, for whatever is really visible requires light to make it so, whereas darkness does not require it; therefore its visibility must be deemed to be only apparent. The answer made to this objection is: darkness is seen by owls without the help of light, which shows that the pervasion relied upon by the Vaiśeṣika (viz., whatever is visible requires light to make it so) breaks down. No doubt we do require light to enable us to see a pot or a cloth, etc., but there is no reason why we should require it in order to see darkness. For example, gold, pearls, etc., although all fiery, are not visible without external light; whereas a lamp, the moon, etc., are visible even without the aid of other light." (E, pp. 13, 39-40; T23)

"Moreover, darkness possesses not only a color (dark) which makes it visible, but also tangibility, viz., cool touch." (E, pp. 14, 40; T; T23)

"The following are the grounds relied upon by the

Vaiśeṣika, says the author, for holding that darkness cannot be a material substance: want of density, want of resistance, absence of developed--distinct--tangibility, absence of its being a fragment cut off like a chip from a block. To all these, he says, he could make a simple reply: None of these conditions, viz., density, resistance, tangibility, and divisibility is fulfilled by light--and yet light is undeniably a material substance." (E, pp. 14, 40; T14)

"The Jaina has to reconcile origination and destruction with eternality. This he does by pointing to the nature of Reality which, he says, is neither substance nor mode but substance-cum-mode. It was this very consideration which made him posit persistence (*drauvya*) along with origination and destruction in his...characterization of Being, for origination and destruction in his system are not only consistent with persistence, but would lack the peg to hang on and thus become impossible in the absence of persistence." (E15, 44; T24)

"According to the Svāyambhuvādins (i.e., the *yogins*), says the author, a property-possessor, as every substance does, undergoes transformation (evolution, *pariṇāma*) or modification of three kinds: (1) When the substance--gold--is made into ornaments, the ornaments are the property-transformations of gold. (2) The property, again, of gold, viz.., the ornaments, may be changed from one shape to another, when a present shape becomes past and a future shape becomes present. (3) A certain shape may become old by sheer lapse of time. All the three kinds of transformation belong to one and the same property-possessor, and they are supposed to be at once distinct from and identical with the property-possessor. Now, if they are identical with the property-possessor, that property-possessor being persistent or abiding reality, the transformations too are eternal; and if they are distinct from the property-possessor, they are subject to origination and destruction and are therefore non-eternal. Thus they are both eternal and non-eternal." (E16, 46; (T24-25)

"Praśastapāda (here, "Praśastakāra") says earth is of two kinds, eternal and non-eternal: that consisting of atoms is eternal, that consisting of effects is non-eternal. Obviously, it may be argued, this is not an admission that earth--the identical earth--is at once eternal and non-eternal, but all that is said is that *some* varieties of earth (earthy atoms) are eternal, while *others* (effects) are non-eternal...That is to say, eternality and non-eternality are here predicated of two separate subjects. But this defence is futile. For, earthness belongs to *all* the varieties, to eternal as well as to non-eternal earth...; in other words, eternality and non-eternality are both predicated of earth. So also are they predicated of water (*jala*). Then again, there is a tacit admission of non-eternality about *ākāśa* inasmuch as contact and disjunction are predicated of it." (E17, 48; T25)

"The author now takes up the question of eternality-non-eternality in its general form--i.e., without any such particular application as that to light or space as was done above, and points out the innumerable contradictions and impossible positions to which the doctrine of absolute eternality or non-eternality leads us. The whole paragraph of the text is taken almost verbatim from Hemacandra's commentary on his own *Pramāṇamīmāṃsāsūtra* I.1.33." (E17-18, 48; T25-26)

6 (E, lxxxvi-lcii; T 29-30) The first argument, viz., (1) that God is the maker of the world, "is criticized by Malliṣeṇa mainly on two grounds: First, that the inference is precluded by perception, which definitely bears witness to the fact that things (of the world--earth, mountains, etc.) have no maker. Secondly, in the cases in which we have observed making, the making belongs to a person with a body. If to escape the difficulty you say that he can put on a body through his infinite power or that he may possess it owing to its own *adṛṣṭa*, it is a gratuitous assumption which amounts to begging the question."

The second argument (2) takes there to be only one God, "for, the world is one consistent whole, and not a congeries of several conflicting forces, since it is a cosmos and not a chaos. To this the Jaina replies: Not necessarily so, or, many may co-operate to produce a single result: we often find many co-operating to produce a single result without any conflict of wills and consequent confusion, e.g., the bees that make their hive."

"(3): Since His making takes place in all parts of the universe, he must be supposed to be everywhere, and he must be also all-knowing. If he is everywhere he, says the Jaina, absorbs everything into his own self, leaving nothing to exist outside it. If he knows everything, he knows, we suppose, even hell and knowledge in his case being direct experience, he is to be supposed to experience hell!"

"The Jaina continues: we may agree that certain souls are all-knowing, in which case God would be one of such souls, that is to say, he would be on a par with emancipated souls. 'But mark', says Malliṣeṇa, revising his position, 'that knowledge does not actually travel from the knower to the known; and therefore, omniscience does not necessarily involve omnipresence. Moreover, what is the proof of his omniscience?', he asks. It cannot be perception, for we cannot have direct perception of his omniscience, unless we ourselves are omniscient, or become so in the process. It cannot be inference, for you cannot argue from the finite to the infinite...It cannot be presumption...for, the *adṛṣṭa* of living beings including the vegetable kingdom will explain one part of it, and the remaining part which belongs to the inanimate kingdom may well be existing eternally so, and eventually become the object of the joys and sorrows of sentient beings. It cannot be *śabda*, i.e. the authoritative text of the eternal scriptures. For, the scriptures on which you rely are full of contradictions and are therefore unreliable."

(4): By the very nature of the case he is said to be independent. Then, why does he create a world so full of misery and inequalities unless he is wantonly cruel and unjust? If misery is a punishment for a foul deed and inequality is due to our varying *karmans*, this hypothesis of *karman* will suffice

to explain everything, and God will be superfluous."

(5): He is said to be eternal. If so, he should be eternally active, or eternally inactive. In the former case, his work would at no point be finished, and so nothing could ever be accomplished. In the latter case, nothing could even begin. Moreover, how could he have eternally conflicting natures, viz., making and unmaking at the same time?"

7 (E31-34, 79; T37-39) "If there be an absolute distinction between a property and its possessor, there can be no such relation as that of property and property-possessor. If you say that the relation is due to inherence (here *vṛtti*), we would point out that three realities- (1) property, (2) property-possessor and (3) inherence--are not perceived, but only two, viz., the first and the second. If it is contended that the experience "this cloth is in the threads" bears testimony to the residence of the former (the cloth) in the latter (the threads), please note that the line of argument will carry you too far, requiring you to recognize an inherence in an inherence, and so on *ad infinitum*. If, to meet this difficulty, you draw a distinction between the two inherences, saying that while one is primary the other is secondary, all that we need say is--the distinction is imaginary. Moreover, it is contrary to common experience to say that the cloth is in the threads."

8 (E35-48, xciii-xcvi; T40-51) "1(a). The commentator begins by setting forth the principles of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, quoting Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and Udayana's famous verse relating to the restrictions on the field of *jāti* [universal *par excellence*]. He makes a long extract from Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya* on the first point, and quotes from Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* on the second and third. According to the Vaiśeṣika school, there is a definite reality called *sattā* (existence) or *parasāmānya* (the highest universal)."

"(i) It (existence) is not a substance. For it is lacking in the characteristic nature of a substance, which is to be either made up of many substances as its constituents (e.g. a cloth which is made of many threads) and not be complete in a single substance (e.g., a cloth which is not complete in a single thread unlike existence or a universal which is complete in each single substance...), or to be made up of no constituent substance at all (e.g., space which has no constituent as structural parts whatsoever)."

"(ii) It is not a quality, because it exists in qualities, which no quality does."

"(iii) It is not a motion, for the same reason, *mutatis mutandis*."

"1(b) Similarly, there exist individuators as a separate category. For just as a universal--of which existence is the highest--is the principle of co-ordination (*anuvṛtti*) of individuals, so is the individuator the principle of differentiation or distinction (*vyāvṛtti*). By its very nature an individuator belongs to each particular separately, and therefore there should be as many individuators as there are particulars in the universe. Possession of different universals and possession of different parts are two other principles which serve to distinguish things. For example, potness distinguishes pots from cloths, and the possession of parts which are not identical with the parts of another cloth distinguishes the first cloth from the second. Hence it is not necessary to assume any individuators in these two cases. But these methods of distinction will not do in the case of atoms of the same substance, which are distinct from one another and yet alike, or in the case of space which being a single whole does not possess either a universal nor parts."

"1(c). Inherence is the bond of things which are inseparable, such as a cloth and its threads, or a pot and its qualities, or a cloth and cloth-ness, etc., and it is therefore not one of the things themselves."

"2 and 3. The ground of the Vaiśeṣikas for regarding awareness and bliss as adventitious, and not essential, is obvious: We are conscious of our ideas coming and going, and

so also of pleasure and pain which belong to us and are positive in character. Passing states cannot be the essence of things: they belong to us, they are ours, they are not we."

"Malliṣeṇa criticizes these three doctrines as follows--"

"1. Existence is being, and everything that is must possess existence. Moreover, its function is to co-ordinate, and therefore wherever things appear to be alike in one respect or another and are thus capable of co-ordination, there is the field for a universal property. We can co-ordinate all things that exist, and consequently existence can reside in all. The difficulties raised by Udayana do not arise, because the Jaina is not prepared to admit universal property as a real apart from and over and above the particulars which it co-ordinates, nor does he regard particulars as simply particulars incapable of being referred to a universal. According to the Jains, universal(ity) is only an aspect and not a real *per se*; and further, universal and particular are two aspects of the same real, and are not mutually exclusive. Remember that the ancient Vaiśeṣikas who spoke of a *sāmānyaviśeṣa*--the two-in-one--were, according to the Jaina view, wiser than their successors, who made the categories so many water-tight compartments. In the doctrine that existence exists only in substances, qualities and motions and not in the remaining categories one may see a sound distinction made between real categories and conceptual categories."

"2. The distinction between awareness and self, it may be urged, is the distinction between instrument (*karaṇa*) and agent. But the distinction is false. An instrument is not always external to the agent. We speak of a serpent making a coil of himself by himself, where agent, instrument and cause are all one. Again, it has been urged that we are conscious of possessing awareness and not being awareness itself, and consequently awareness must be regarded as distinct from a self. Answer: No, awareness is not external to the self, it is not a possession of something externally related to it. It is a

production or drawing out of something from the self itself and is therefore only an aspect or mode of a self and nothing distinct."

"3. As regards pleasure (*sukha*) (or bliss), the Jaina would distinguish between the pleasure of a transmigrating person (*saṃsārikasukha*) and the pleasure of liberation (*mokṣasukha*), which is everlasting."

9 (E48-54, xcvi-xcvii; T52-56) "It may be urged: Don't we smell from a distance? Answer: No; the particles which possess the smell fly to our nose. But it may be asked: Does not magic work at a distance? Answer: No; the presiding deity of the magical formula or practice who resides elsewhere is working there....In the course of his answer (Malliṣeṇa) urges that the *adṛṣṭa* of our self is supposed to act even at a distance--and it cannot be there hanging in the air, so to say, without an underlying substratum; consequently, our self must be supposed to be existing even there. And since *adṛṣṭa* works everywhere, the underlying substance, viz., the self, must also exist everywhere. But the Jaina denies that *adṛṣṭa* is acting there and everywhere. Things, he says, have their own nature--a fact which is ultimate and does not admit of question or explanation--and that nature is not caused by *adṛṣṭa*. To say that the natures of things are determined by *adṛṣṭa* is to leave no room for your God. Next, since the Vaiśeṣika holds that selves are many, if each of them is all-pervading also, as he believes, what a wonderful clash and inter-penetration of selves would ensue! Moreover, each of them would enter the self of God Himself, and each would thereby become a creator! It may be urged: unless a self was all-pervading, how could the self draw to himself the particles for the body in which he has to dwell in the next life? Or, even if he could, would not his body-sized self, as a consequence, have parts and therefore (be) an effect just like the body itself?

The Jaina, however, is prepared to accept the logical consequence. (More accurately, he says that a self has space-

points (*pradeśa*) though not parts (*avayava*). The Jaina believes that the self is transformable and does change from time to time. He is no believer in absolute changelessness of anything whatsoever. It may be asked in support of the all-pervasion theory: if a self were body-sized, how could a self enter the body? For, two material (*mūrta*) things cannot occupy the same space at the same time. The Jaina answers the objection by denying materiality (possession of color, etc.) in one sense and affirming it in another (non-all-pervading-ness, *asarvagatatva*). The Jana expresses and explains his view that a self is subject to change and is yet eternal (a self) has non-eternal modes though it is eternal substantially. He further points out that for some time after a body is cut, its parts continue to throb and retain the self in them."

10 (E55-61, xcviii-c; T57-62) Malliṣeṇa examines and rejects the definition of "*pramāṇa*" given in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana ("a *pramāṇa* is the cause of the grasping of an object"), and in the *Nyāyasāra* by Bhāsarvajña ("a *pramāṇa* is what conduces to direct experience"). In neither of the two definitions, he says, is the essential fact that a *pramāṇa* is an awareness brought out. On the contrary in the Nyāya system sense-object connection and not the rudimentary awareness which springs from it is regarded as an instrument of perception. Moreover, in the case of the first definition, the word "cause" (*hetu*) which occurs there is too wide and might include the agent and (his) action as well as the instrument. The correct definition of "*pramāṇa*", says Malliṣeṇa, is "a *pramāṇa* is an awareness which determines the thing and distinguishes it from others" (*svaparavyavasāyādi jñānaṃ pramāṇam*)."

"Object of knowledge (*prameyam*). Criticism: The body (*śarīra*), etc. are included in the self and do not require to be separately mentioned (as among the sixteen Nyāya categories). Future lives (*pretyabhāva*) and release (*apavarga*) are similarly states of a self. A more fundamental objection is that a self is not an object of knowledge but a knower (*pramātṛ*). Faults (*doṣa*) can be included in *pravṛtti*, and are only activities of the internal organ which has been separately mentioned. Frustration and sense-objects are results, as one of the Brāhmaṇa logicians, Jayanta, admits. In conclusion Malliṣeṇa says that the right definition of *prameya* is that which has the nature of a substance or a mode."

"Malliṣeṇa next explains various kinds of quibble, futile rejoinder (*jāti*) and ways of losing an argument (*nigrahasthāna*) as are found in the *Nyāyasūtra* and observes once more at the close that this subject is unworthy of the attention of one who lays claim to non-attachment (*vairāgya*)."

Sūtras 11-12 are against Pūrvamīmāṃsā (and Nyāya).

11 (E61-72, c-ci; T63-72) "To say that violence (*hiṃsā*) is found in the Vedas (*vedavihita*) and therefore a cause of morality (*dharmahetu*) is to condemn the Veda, and is, moreover, a contradiction in terms. (Malliṣeṇa) rejects the weak plea of the Vedists that violence though ordinarily a sin is not a sin when it is prescribed by the Vedas. Malliṣeṇa has no difficulty in rejecting this plea as an outrage upon our sense of right and wrong. It may be said that just as the Jainas make an exception in the case of the violence against insects, worms and reptiles which are unavoidably killed in the process of building a Jaina temple, so the Vedist makes an exception of the Vedic sacrifice (*yajña*) which involves violence. Malliṣeṇa meets this plea by pointing out that the violence which takes place while building a temple is unavoidable; moreover, the service which a Jaina temple renders to the spiritual life of the community far outweighs the evil of the violence. The violence involved in a Vedic sacrifice is not necessary for obtaining heaven which, as the Brāhmaṇa scriptures admit, can be obtained by the practice of *yama* (restraint), etc. The Vedists say: "If this be so, hell will be a desert and heaven an overpopulated city!" (Malliṣeṇa replies by quoting from the commentary of Māṭhara on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.)"

"Besides, Malliṣeṇa points out that the Vedic promise of heaven in such a case does not stand to reason and must be taken to be false like many another rites in connection with marriage, etc. Malliṣeṇa then quotes other *dicta* of Brāhmaṇa philosophers such as those of the Vedāntins who like the Sāṃkhyas have condemned violence even for a sacrifice. Malliṣeṇa condemns also the *śrāddha* ceremony which was a great occasion with the Vedist Brāhmaṇas for slaughtering animals and eating animal food."

"Lastly, Malliṣeṇa takes up the scholastic problem whether the Veda is to be regarded as having an author (*pauruṣeya*) or is author-less (*apauruṣeya*). He says that language and its utterance can never be author-less, and every sentence has a certain intention (*tātparya*) which implies an author...Secondly, the logic of exception requires that exceptions should relate to the same matter to which the general rule is applied. Here, on the other hand, exceptions are for the purpose of propitiating gods, guests and *manes*, whereas the general rule (the prohibitory texts (like) 'no one should kill') is for avoiding sin and its consequences. Where is the necessity of propitiating them by violence when other methods are available?"

12 (E73-77, ciii-cv; T72-77) Next, Hemacandra and his commentator examine the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā theory (that of the particular school...which was established by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa) regarding the nature of awareness[1] (*jñāna*). The problems raised therein are: (1) How do we know that we know?--i.e., how is awareness itself cognized, that is, brought to consciousness? (2) How do we cognize objects?"

[1]Dhruva regularly translates "*jñāna*" as knowledge, even where the context, etc. seems to suggest that truth is not relevant to the discussion. We have replaced his "knowledge" by "awareness" or "cognition" in such contexts, though it is not always easy to discern what the context actually dictates.

"The Jaina holds that awareness or consciousness has this dual nature: (1) it reveals itself (*svāvabodhaka*) and (2) it reveals also the world of objects (*arthabodhaka*). He thus rejects the view of Kumārila that awareness itself is known by a process of implication (*ākṣepa*) implied in the fact of the cognized-ness (*jñātatā*) of the object which is its effect. With it he also rejects a similar theory of the "*Yaugas*" (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) who regard awareness as *anadhyavasita*, i.e., cognized by a further act directed upon the first fact of cognition...Hemacandra says that the doctrine of the self-revelation of awareness is a perfectly sound proposition and yet some weak-kneed philosophers have succumbed to the criticism leveled against it by their opponent, which they need not have done."

"...The reply to (the argument against the self-revelation theory) is based on the analogy of a lamp which reveals itself while revealing other objects also and does not require to be revealed by another lamp. The argument of the opponent...is met by an appeal to experience and its irresistible authority...Moreover, how could Kumārila assume that cognized-ness was an obvious fact on which he could base his argument...? What reason is there for assuming that cognized-ness is self-revealed any more than that awareness is self-revealed? In fact we are conscious of the self-revelation of cognition rather than that of cognized-ness. There is one more important objection to meet: that if awareness is knowable, i.e., experience is experienced, it cannot be experience. The answer to that is made with the help of the Jaina theory of aspects or relativity of knowledge..."

Versus Advaita Vedānta:

13 (E77-83, cvi-cviii; T78-83) "Hemacandra's criticism of *māyāvāda* is simple: (1) If *māyā* is, there is no more *advaita*; for *brahman* is one, and *māyā* would be another, thus making two. (2) If *māyā* is not, how will there be this world, which it is sought to account for by assuming *māyā*? Moreover, to say that

something is *māyā*--false--and that it serves to account for the world is a contradiction in terms. For, unless something exists how can it do the duty of accounting for another thing." (E, cv-cvi)

"Malliṣeṇa now challenges the opponent to explain the meaning of 'falsity'.(*mithyārūpatva*)."

"(1) If it means absolute nonexistence it is accepting the position of *asatkhyāti*--which the Vedāntin would not take up, lest it might expose him to the charge of being considered *śūnyavādin* (Buddhist). (2) If it means mis-take, i.e., one thing appearing as another, it is *viparītakhyāti*, which too the Advaitins cannot adopt as it involves two reals--the thing which is mis-taken and thing as it is mis-taken. (3) If it means that it cannot be definitely characterized as either existent or nonexistent *(anirvācya,* inexplicable)--explanation may well be demanded as regards the meaning of this inexplicability. If it means inexplicability = lack of an essential nature (*niḥsvabhāvatva*), it will involve *satkhyāti* or *asatkhyāti* according as '*svabhāva*' in '*niḥsvabhāvatva*' is taken as a positive thing (*bhāva*) or an absence (*abhāva*). Again, if it is the content of the thought of lack of an essential nature, how can such a world be even talked about?..."

"Besides, the whole argument is undermined by the evidence of perception. The Vedāntin now becomes desperate and argues as follows: The very fact of the world being perceived is the reason for regarding it as a mere phenomenon, and therefore unreal. According to this school of thought--a particular school of Śaṃkara Vedāntins--perception is only a sensation in which what is revealed is the thing-in-itself and not its predicate (*nirviśeṣa brahman*), and it is afterwards transformed into perception by the addition of an element (which falls outside the province of perception) whereby a definite character as against all other characters is predicated of the subject. This is what we call the world (*prapañca*). This added element is not based on perception. Malliṣeṇa says that this is all wrong: perception is not merely sensation; it bears testimony to the existence of a certain character and exclusion of other characters; besides this, it reveals the fact that the world consists of many things, every one of which possesses its own nature to the exclusion of every other nature. Moreover, the argument is sublated by inference. Thus: perception is not false, because it is not marked by nonexistence, like the self. But you will say: when one inference is confronted by another inference there must be something to turn the balance. Very well, here it is: If merely being thought about is taken as a reason for falsity, Brahman is false too."

Adopting a somewhat different form of argument, Malliṣeṇa makes out a *prima facie* case for the Vedāntin on the grounds of perception, inference and verbal testimony, and afterwards attacks each one of them. The Vedāntin's argument, he says, would be briefly this: perception only affirms, it does not deny--that is to say, it affirms Reality and, therefore, whatever involves exclusion--the world of objects each one of which is supposed to possess a certain nature as again a certain other nature--falls outside the domain of perception. Inference also supports the same view, and so does scripture (the Veda) which, it is well known, affirms Brahman as the sole Reality. Malliṣeṇa rejects all these arguments as 'the outpourings of a drunken man'. For, no man in his senses, says M., would question that there is no affirmation which is not at the same time a negation (exclusion); the two are the positive and negative aspects of a single Reality, which are presented together. Therefore the Vedāntin's argument which makes all Being one single reality, with nothing by its side to be excluded, is contrary to all experience. In fact, all our experience bears witness to definite characters of things. All awareness is construction-filled and things are many."

14 (E84-94, cviii-clx; T84-93) "What do words express--*sāmānya* or *viśeṣa*--universal or particulars, one or many? Some are universalists, and some of them singularists also. According

to the Jaina, they are all partially right."

"The first group of thinkers (= 'universalists', i.e., Advaitins and Sāṃkhyas) look to the unity of substance; the second (='singularists', i.e., Buddhists) confine their attention to its manifold modes or changes; the third (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) considers both, but treats them as separate, self-sufficient realities. Malliṣeṇa points out wherein each of them errs, what aspect each of them has ignored. The last school--that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika--comes nearest to the Jaina position; yet it fails to appreciate the relativity of...the universal and the particular, the one and the many."

Like Reality expressed by words, the sound expressing it too is both universal and particular. Malliṣeṇa proceeds to prove that sound is not a quality but a material (*paudgalika*) substance. The five reasons brought forward by the Vaiśeṣikas to deny that sound is a material substance are examined and shown to be fallacious.

These arguments, with their answers, are (E, p. 162)

(1) It (sound) "rests in something that is intangible, viz., space."

"Answer: "The attribute which we call sound does not rest in space but in the different kinds (*vargaṇa*) of language. So the intangibility of space does not affect the argument."

(2) Space "experiences no obstruction in he way of going in or going out even in a crowded place."

Answer: "The substance which is the abode of sound must be tangible because it is an object of our senses, found or not according as the percipient is near or far and the wind is blowing in a favorable or unfavorable direction. Parallel case: the particles of matter which are the abode of smell."

(3) (Sound) "does not admit of being analysed into successive parts.

Answer: A "flash of lightning does not admit of analysis into successive parts, and yet it is material (*paudgalika*). The alleged reason is, therefore, inconclusive."

(4) (Sound) "does not give a push even to any fine corporeal substances."

Answer: "The particles of a fragrant substance or dust or smoke give no push to other matter, and yet they are beyond question material."

(5) (Sound) "is a quality of space, which is not matter."

Answer: Sound "may be shown to be not a quality of space, because it is perceptible by a sense of ours, like color which is similarly perceptible."

"Malliṣeṇa next submits another explanation of the *sūtra*. A thing has a nature which is at once one and many. All things possess a double nature of being present (*bhāva*) and being absent (*abhāva*). For, if they were only present, no nature could be denied and one thing would be everything. If they were only absent, all things would have only a negative nature..."

"The Buddhists in their zeal to make a thing even nonexistent by nature affirm in effect that (each thing) is existent in another form (*pararūpeṇa sat*), that is, they must deny the second half of our proposition, viz., there is nothing existent in another form (*pararūpeṇa nāsti*). Thus, one thing could be anything and everything."

15 (E94-101, cx-cxii; T93-99) "In the Sāṃkhya system--

(1) *Cit* (*caitanyaśakti* or *puruṣa*) has nothing to do with the knowledge of things (*artha*), knowing things being regarded as a function of *buddhi*. *Buddhi* is regarded as inert (*jaḍa*), being an evolute of *prakṛti* and not a *dharma* of *cit* or *puruṣa*. This is a twofold offence against truth, says the critic: The function of *puruṣa* should be to know, and *buddhi* should be a *dharma* of *puruṣa* and not a product of *prakṛti*.

(2) *Ākāśa* and other *bhūtas* are said to have sprung from the subtle *tanmātras* viz., *śabda* etc.

(3) *Bandha* and *mokṣa*, say the Sāṃkhyas, do not really belong to *puruṣa*, he being ever free." (E, p. cx)

"Malliṣeṇa first gives a summary of the Sāṃkhya system by

quoting from the *Saṃkhyakārikā*, and shows that it has gone wrong in the matter of the points mentioned by Hemacandra."

"(1) If the power of consciousness (*citśakti*) does not know things, it surrenders its very nature. All talk about the power of consciousness or *puruṣa* being reflected in *buddhi* and thereby enabling the *buddhi* to know is absurd. For only a material thing can be reflected."

"The Sāṃkhya is afraid that if he attributes knowledge to *puruṣa* he would make him as knower the principle of activity and therefore subject to transformation. But he forgets, says the Jaina, that without some sort of activity and consequent transformation he cannot so much as make himself reflected, and without parting with its original nature he cannot have experiences of satisfaction and frustration, and if he parts with it he cannot help being *sakriya* (involved in action) so far. The theory--that *puruṣa* is really free from activity and therefore from experience (*bhoga*) and yet appears to be subject to it on the analogy of a jewel which receives it apparent color from a red flower which is lying near it--is rejected by Malliṣeṇa on the ground that here too the jewel is subject to a real change of state, for it is only a jewel--a transparent crystal--which takes the reflection and not an opaque stone..."

"Malliṣeṇa next deals with certain minor details of the Sāṃkhya system.

"(1) Merit, awareness, non-attachment and lordship and their opposites really belong to the self and not to *buddhi* as the Sāṃkhya holds."

"(2) Further, the ego-maker (*ahaṃkāra*) is not a product of *buddhi*: it is an attribute of the self, which *buddhi*, which is said to be unconscious (*acetana*), cannot produce.

"(4) Space, etc. are not a product of the five *tanmātras*, and it is surprising, says Malliṣeṇa, that the Sāṃkhya who claims to be the foremost of those who believe in the absolute eternality of things (as an advocate of *satkāryavāda* and consequent *nityaikāntavāda* (the theory that reality is eternal and single) should speak of *ākāśa*--apparently a type of eternal thing--as a product!"

"(5) Speech (*vāk*), etc. are regarded by the Sāṃkhyas as sense-organs. But they are not. For, a sense-organ is that which does what nothing else can do--a condition not fulfilled by speech etc."

"(6) It is vain to think that there is no bondage and no liberation. For, there is a *real* confusion of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* which makes our bondage."

"Malliṣeṇa then deals with the three kinds of bondage mentioned in Sāṃkhya works: (1) that which consists in regarding *prakṛti* as the highest ideal of worship like *puruṣa*, (2) that which consists in regarding the types (*vikāra*) of *prakṛti* such as objects, senses, ego-makers and *buddhis* as the objects of worship just like *puruṣa*, and (3) that which consists in practicing the religion of ritualism. Malliṣeṇa points out they are all different kinds of causes which create what the Jaina calls karmic bondage (*karmabandha*). Unless bondage is real and not imaginary as the Sāṃkhya wants us to believe, there is no sense in speaking of liberation."

(7) As regards the Sāṃkhya idea of liberation--that it consists in the cessation of the activity of *prakṛti*--Malliṣeṇa points out that the activity of *prakṛti* can never cease, inasmuch as activity is her very nature. If *prakṛti* can chose to retire from the stage like an actress she may also choose to return there some day and so cause bondage once more! Liberation really consists of the real exhaustion of all *karman*. The Jaina conception of the nature of a self and his liberation is essentially the same as that of the Sāṃkhya with this important difference, however, that while the Sāṃkhya regards awareness, activity, bondage and liberation as erroneously connected with the self, the Jainas regards them as its real states."

Sections 16-18 criticize Buddhism.

16-17(E102-122, cxiii-cxixi; T100-118) "The relation

between *pramāṇa* and *phala* is a causal relation--which implies that the two cannot be simultaneous. Nor can the two be successive, each enduring for a single moment only and leaving no trace behind, for causality is not possible under such conditions. Besides, the causal relation is a relation and as such it implies two correlates, consciousness and something other than consciousness."

"Malliṣeṇa takes a passage from Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* and its *ṭīkā* as a representative text of this school of thought and criticizes it on the ground that no such make-shift as the substitution of an established-establisher *(vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka)* relation for the produced-producer *(janya-janaka)* relation as between identity *(saṃvedaka)* and similarity *(sārūpya)* can succeed in doing away with the necessity of recognizing two instead of one factor in the act of knowledge. The Jaina rejects at the same time the extreme dualism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school--for the simple reason that a *pramāṇa* and its result both belong to one ands the same person, so that their unity in a self somehow cannot be denied altogether..."

"Another favorite doctrine of the Buddhists is their *kṣaṇikavāda*--the doctrine of momentariness...The doctrine of momentariness is rejected by the Jaina on the ground that it is one-sided, the aspect of permanence being as necessary as that of change, that is production and destruction. The former (permanence) belongs to substance and the latter (change) to its modes which are aspects of the same substance. This doctrine of permanence-cum-evanescence...has been criticized by the Buddhist as involving a contradiction, being as absurd as the statement that Devadatta is at once living and dying. But the Jaina sees no absurdity in such a proposition. According to him, while we are living we are also dying, for the 'petals of life' are falling away from us all the while we are living."

"Next is criticized Buddhist Realism...(T)he special trouble of the Buddhist is due to his momentariness theory which makes the realistic position as difficult to maintain as the

idealistic position which was discussed above. Moreover, says the Jaina, it is not true that the content has to be real in order to be a cause of awareness, for there can be awareness of water even when there is no real water but only a mirage. The Buddhist Realist may perhaps argue that the revealer *(prakāśaka)* implies the revealed *(prakāśya)*--the revealed which is also the cause of its revealer. This argument is answered by citing the example of a lamp and a pot between which no causal relation exists although one is revealer and the other revealed. Further, it is pointed out that the cause need not be real, it may be only ideal..."

"Buddhist Realism is divided into two schools, that of 'Presentationists" (Vaibhāṣika) and "Representationists" (Sautrāntika) respectively, the latter being midway between Realism and Idealism. The former holds that awareness is produced by an object (*artha*), the latter that it bears the form (*tadākāratā*) of an object. The point of the realistic argument consists in this, that unless the reality of the object were recognized as a cause of the awareness, anything would be the object of that awareness, and that all distinction between right and wrong awareness would vanish. The critic dispenses with the causality in the object and substitutes capacity in the awareness, by way of a rejoinder to the Realist. Moreover, he sees no likeness (of form, *tadākāratā*) between an awareness and an object (e.g., the feeling of heat is not like the heat in the fire). Likeness, again, cannot account for epistemological relations: thus the reflection of the moon in the water does not apprehend the moon in the sky."

Taking up the second half of the *sūtra*, Malliṣeṇa attacks the school of Buddhist Idealism (Vijñānavāda of the Yogācāra) which asserts that ideas (awarenesses, *jñāna*) are the only reals, there being no causal or corresponding world of external reality....This is criticized as follows:

"This idealistic position which makes our belief in external reality a huge mis-take involves the reality of something that is

mis-taken, that is, taken amiss, which strikes at the root of this extreme idealism."

"Atoms are real. That body is not separable from them is no reason why their reality should be questioned."

"The object is not the subject. The fact of self-consciousness implies that there is a reality other than the self from the consciousness of which the consciousness of the self is distinguished..."

"The inference by which the nonexistence of external reality is sought to be proved can have no value against the evidence of perception which decides the question in favor of its existence."

"That awareness and its content are found together is an unwarranted assumption. The two have distinct natures, e.g., one is experienced as in us, the other outside us; one is already there, which the other notes afterwards."

"The critics next proceed to attack the *śūnyavāda* of the Mādhyamikas, generally understood to mean the doctrine of absolute and universal emptiness or void...An obvious objection which is taken to this doctrine is that it leaves no ground even for itself to stand upon, its only logical position being dead silence. Yet it may be interesting to examine the argument which is advanced in its favor. The argument is a sophistical demonstration of the logical impossibility of the supposed reals, viz., knower, object known, a *pramāṇa* and the knowledge resulting." Since, if there is no *pramāṇa*, how could there be resulting knowledge, everything being void, asks Malliṣen. The refutation of the Buddhist argument, says Malliṣena, can be found *in extenso* in the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha,* a work by the skeptic Jayarāśi.

"This position is met by showing that a *pramāṇa*, etc. are by no means impossible; on the contrary they can be shown to be undeniably real. In fact, (the theory of emptiness,) *śūnyavāda*, if it is to be worthy of credence, must be supported by *pramāṇas*, which, however, will mean negation of emptiness.

18 (E123-126, cxviii; T119-122) "In the absence of an abiding *ātman*, says the critic,--

(1) There can be no moral retribution in our life.

(2) Similarly, there is no room for liberation (*mokṣa*).

(3) Even such an ordinary psychological fact as *smṛti*--memory--becomes impossible.

"(1) The Buddhist no doubt substitutes for the single self a series of consciousnesses (*vijñāna*) of which each preceding one is supposed to be connected with each succeeding one, and vice versa. But who connects them? What is the synthesizing principle?"

"(2) If there is no self, who is to be liberated from the bondage of life? The heap of traces (*vāsanā*) which has to be destroyed must belong to some one, to that very person who has been in bondage."

19 (E127; T123) "The problem which he (the Buddhist) has to face is that of reconciliation of *vāsanā* with *kṣaṇabhaṅga* (i.e., momentariness). Malliṣeṇa...point(s) out how the task is hopeless. (He) put(s) forth this trilemma: are traces and *kṣaṇasaṃtati* (lit., a series of moments), that is, things conditioned by moments, one...or separate...or neither one nor the other?...There is only one escape from all these troubles and that is by taking shelter underneath the shady tree of the Jaina doctrine of many-sidedness *(anekānta),* i.e. difference-cum-non-difference. As Malliṣena graphically puts it, the birds that have flown away far across the wide sea without any hope of finding a resting place must return to their home (*syādvāda*) on the mast of the ship."

20 (E130-133; T126-128) "The principle [of the Cārvāka] (that perception is the only *pramāṇa*; not even inference is one) is impugned on the following grounds: As a result of your doctrine, we cannot be aware of the mind of another person, as we have evidently no direct experience of it...Moreover, we should not forget that we call even perception a *pramāṇa* on the strength of our experience and generalization from

observed cases--that is to say, our belief in the credibility of our senses rests on inferences."

"The materialistic view of the soul is condemned by Malliṣeṇa with the help of a long passage quoted from *Dravyālaṃkāra,* where it is shown that consciousness is not the product of *bhūtas*, and even an ugly and diseased body may hold a beautiful and healthy soul."

22 (E136-138, cxx; T132-133) "The Jaina insistence upon the entirety or wholeness of truth has found expression in various forms...Now,...it is set forth (as) *anantadharmātmakam eva tattvam*--Truth has numberless aspects." (E, p. cxx)

23 (E138-148, cxx; T134-141) "Next the author points out how one and the same thing may be viewed synthetically or analytically as one or as many--as one substance or as many attributes or modes."

In the commentary to this section Malliṣeṇa, in explaining the fourth of the seven "modes of assertion" (i.e., the *saptabhaṅgī*), observes as follows:

"An object such as the soul is (said to be unassertible because it is impossible for a word to denote a single object giving predominance at the same time to both existence and non-existence in the same act. For the two qualities of existence and non-existence cannot be asserted at the same time by the word 'exists', for it lacks the capacity to denote non-existence. Thus too by the word 'non-exists', for it does not have the capacity fo denote existence. Nor can it be denoted by a single conventional term such as *puṣpavant* (meaning 'sun or moon'), because it too can denote both meanings only in succession. This is like the conventional term *śatrśānac*. Whether a conjunctive or a descriptive determinative compound, the sentence does not denote it. So the object is unassertible because there is no expression denotative of the whole. Even when simultaneous existence and non-existence have equal prominence, the ordering cannot be passed over. But it is not totally unassertible, because then it would not be asserted by the word 'unassertible'! Thus the fourth."

27 (E155-159, 272, 274; T149-151) "If self be exclusively eternal, the experiences of happiness and misery will thereby be rendered impossible. For, to be eternal means to be unchangeable, and there cannot be experiences of happiness and misery one after another unless the self could pass (change) from one state to another. It will be said by way of a defense of the eternality thesis that the self does not change, only its states change. This, however, may be met by asking: Do the states remain separate from the self or are they one with the self? In the former case, how could they be associated with the self? Besides, they would be entire strangers to the self, as foreign to it as any other thing in the universe. In the latter case, they are as good as not, and the old difficulty of accounting for change consistently with the eternality of the self remains the same. Moreover, if a self is exclusively possessed of a particular nature, how can there be any difference or change of states such as one from frustration to satisfaction?"

"Similarly, under the hypothesis of absolute non-eternality of a self the resulting lack of personal identity and the passing away of the original *karman* make merit and demerit and their consequent experiences of satisfaction and frustration impossible; in other words, they take away all sense from the law of retribution. Moreover, if a self is non-eternal in the sense of existing only for a single instant he cannot be the author of merit and demerit. For the single instant is the length of time just sufficient for it to come into existence, and there is nothing left to spare for doing merit or demerit....You will say: Suppose the self of the first moment produced the self of the next moment and so on, so that there is a continuity, not the identity, of being. But this explanation will not do. The law of homogeneity of cause and effect would require that a happy self should beget only a happy self, and so the vicissitudes of happiness and misery in the self would become impossible."

98.353 MALLIṢEṆA, Commentary on Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*

See NCC 13, p. 80.

98.354 MALLIṢEṆA, *Pravacanaparīkṣā*

Consult JRK p. 270 for ms. cit.

99 JINASENA (1300)

NCC 7, p. 273 dates him in the 13-14th centuries, and refers us to CPB. intro. p. xxiii. He belonged to the Kāṣṭhāsaṅgha, says Jhalrapatan, p. 13.

99.355 JINASENA, *Trivarṇācāra*

NCC 7, p. 273. A manuscript of this (saying it has 253 folios) is described in Prem Chand Jaina(ed.), *Jaina Grantha Bhandars in Jaipur and Nagaur* (Jaipur 1978), p. 143; it is located No. 23 (Ref. No. 1904B) at the Bisapathi Digambar JainaTemple Granth Bhandra Bada Mandi, Nagaur. JRK p. 163 also cites manuscripts.

ENDNOTES

1. NCC 3, p. 109.
2. Peterson 4, p. xxxiv.
3. JRK p. 226.
4. Edited in JPMJG 12, Ahmedabad 1928. JRK says that it was also published with a Hindi translation by Setabcand Nahar, Calcutta, *saṃvat* 1931 (=1874).
5. Kapadia, Vol. 18
6. Velankar in JRK, p. 48.
7. These remarks are found at http://philtar.ucsm.ac.uk/encyclopedia/jainismakhara.html.
8. Concerning this author consult GOS 76.
9. Edited, with Cirantana's *Cūrṇī*, Udayaprabhadeva's *Ṭippaṇa* and Municandra Sūri's *Śatakaṭippaṇī*. Pindavada 1969. Also edited with Cakreśvara's *Bhaṣya* and Hemacandra's *Vṛtti* in *Vīrasamājagrantharatna* 3, Ahmedabad 1923. See IOPB 1938, pp. 276-280.
10. Edited with Malayagiri's *Ṭīkā*, JPU 17, 1913; with Yaśovijaya's *Vṛtti*, Bhavnagara 1917; with Yaśovijaya's *Gurutattvaviniścaya*, JAG 78, 1925; Ratlam 1928.
11. JRK p. 71.
12. Śivaṣarman, *Karmaprakṛti*, edited by Naginbhai Ghelabhai Javera. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1913.
13. NCC 5, p. 342: "JainaPkt....BORI 148F of 1881-82 (with C.); D. p. 206 (with C.)]
14. It has been published with the text on which it comments in MDJG 12, Bombay 1919 (B162.5.N4525) Also see Banerjee, 1987), p. 486 ff.
15. L. C. Jain, ed., (Nemicandra's) *Labdhisāra*, Vol. 1 (New Delhi 1994) (BL1357.K37.J35)
16. See BL1357.K37.J35. Consult, as well, L. C. Jain's edition of the Labdhisara, cited in the previous endnote.
17. See Banerjee 1987, p. 479.
18. NCC 7, 1973, p. 251ab. See on this Peterson 1894 (JBBRAS Extra, p. xxxiv, who provides, as noted above, two different

accounts of the lineage of the Upakeśa gaccha.

19. Vijayajinendrasuri has edited the work with a commentary (merely identified as *Svopajñāvṛtti*), published in BK1290.D48170 from Śantipur, Saurashtra in 1992. It has been edited several other times as well, e.g., with Yaśodeva Upādhyāya's commentary *Bṛhadvṛtti,* two volumes, Bombay in 1988 = JPU 73, Bombay 1927 (BJ1290.D4518), in two parts, Bombay 1988. Edited with author's own commentary, JPU 68, Ahmedabad 1926 (Emeneau 3989).
20. NCC 9, p. 393.
21. The work is published with Abhayadeva's and Yaśodeva's commentaries in JAG 10, Bhavnagar 1912. See JRK p. 207 for manuscript citations. Edited in *Prakaraṇamālā* (Ahmedabad 1871).
22. NCC 2, p. 31
23. CHJ. pp. 43-44.
24. NCCC IX, 129 says BORI D. xix.I.ii, p. 230 and Jainasahitya aur Itihas, 1st ed. p. 339 cite manuscripts.
25. Edited by Mahendra Kumar in MDJG 1938 (B162.5.P732.5); reprinted in SGDOS 121-122, 1991 (=BC25.P720). This has a Hindi introduction by Kailashchandra Sastri in Volume One and by Mahendra Kumar in Volume Two.
26. The edition Prof. Jaini uses, he says, is that by Mahendra Kumar Nyayacarya, MDJG 1938, pt. II, pp. 865-878.
27. Edited (second edition) in SGDOS 94, 1990 (B162.5.P7330)(Ch). The first edition was by Mahendra Kumar in 1941 (=B162.5.P735 1941).
28. Known only in manuscript. Consult NCC 11, 177; 13, 26 for locations.
29. Edited by Devikumara Jha with Hindi translation from a Gujarati translation by Gulabcandra Gandhi. Bombay 2003 (=BL1378.6.D36155). It was first edited by M. N. Dvivedi from Ahmedabad in 1895. Also edited by Pannalal and Vamsidhara, SJGM 1, 1905; by R. N. Shah, Sangli 1938, (=BL1378.6.D3612 2000) and same with translation Aliganj 1962 See also JRK p. 421.

30. NCC 33, p. 79 says this work is by "Prabhacandra, pupil of Dharmacandra. Alternative title *Tattvārthaṭippaṇa*", and cites the locations of various manuscripts. An edition by Jugalkisor Mukhtar was made at Sarsawa 1944. Cf. also JRK p. 156 for additional citations.
31. Cf. NCC XIII, 26.
32. NCC XIII, 28. Jainagranthavali, p. 92.
33. JJG 11, 1961, p. 11,
34. There is said to be a manuscript of this work at the India Office Library in London, #7567.
35. In 50 verses, published in MDJG 13, Bombay 1918 (i.e., *Tattvānuśāsanādisaṃgraha*).
36. The work has been edited and translated into Hindi by Devendrakumar Jain. Bombay 2003, (=BL1378.6.D36155 2003) It is a work which occupies 166 pages.
37. NCC 13, p. 80 mentions a manuscript citation at Pannalal Bombay III. p. 33.
38. Cf. JRK p. 231 for manuscript citation.
39. A. N. Upadhye's Introduction to K. Krishnamoorthy, *Vādirajā's Yaśodhacarita. A Literary Epic with a Sanskrit commentary by Lakṣmaṇa* (Dharwar 1963), p. ix.
40. CHJ2, p. 100.
41. The edition by Mahendra Kumar in JPMJG 3, 12 has prefatory matter in Hindi. It is published as BC25.V33 (New Delhi 2000).
42. CHJ, p. 206.
43. Printed MDJG 10, Bombay 1917. Edited and translated into Hindi by Surajamukh Jaina (Bina 2001) (BC25.V337) Cf. JRK p. 268.
44. JRK p. 312-313.
45. S. C. Vidyabhusana, HIL p. 196.
46. The author of this work is called "pupil of Devaprabha, pupil of Dharmaghoṣa" at JRK p. 353. The work is

published in AgSS 35, Surat 1923. This edition contains a commentary by Manikyasāgara, *Prākṛtasūktaratnamālā*, JVSS 11, Calcutta 1919.

47. It is also published in SGJM, Calcutta 1921 (=BL1378.6.N34 with Hindi translation. Also in a collection in MDJG 13, edited Manoharalal, Bombay 1918.
48. CHJ2, pp. 164-165.
49. See pp. 3-4 of his Introduction to the edition of Jinaratna's literary work *Līlāvatīsāra* (LDSeries 96: Ahmedabad 1983).
50. For an authentic, systematic and detailed account of Jineśvarasūri's age, life, works and achievements along with the description and evaluation of the sources for the same, see Jinavijaya Muni, *Kathākośaprakaraṇa* (Singhi JainaSeries No. 11, 1949), Introduction, pp. 2-72. The information summarized here is based on that study.
51. Wiley, p. 111.
52. GOS 105, p. xxiii.
53. It is printed with the commentaries of Jinapati and Jinapālagaṇi, DJPF 10, Nirnaya Sagara Press, Bombay 1919.
54. Published in the Tattvavivecaka Sabhā, Ahmedabad. See M. D. Desai, *History of Jaina Literature* (Bombay 1935, p. 208).
55. NCC 12, p. 253.; 9, p. 344.
56. NCC 9, p. 344 advises us to consult Indian Antiquary XXIII. p. 172.
57. NCC 12, p. 253.
58. NCC 2, p. 117 says this is "on Namiunasajalakṣetra." (?) Cf. Jainagranthavali, p. 120
59. NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 275.
60. CHJ2, p. 6.
61. Peterson IV, p. iv.
62. Wiley 2004, p. 21
63. Edited and translated into Hindi with a Hindi *Vivaraṇa* by Jayasundara Vijaya. 1986. Also edited with a commentary in YJG 13, 1910.

64. NCC I, Revised edition, p. 276.
65. Edited in four volumes with Abhayadeva Sūri's and Rāmacandra Gaṇi's commentaries. AgSS 5, 1882. Again edited AgSS No. 12-14. Edited in two volumes with Jinadāsa Mahāttara's *Cūrṇī*. (Ladanum 1994). Chapter 15 has been edited numerous times.
66. Peterson 4, 1899, p. iv.
67. Edited and translated into Gujarati by Arunavijaya. Bombay 1984 (=BL1312.3.A58.J3512). Also edited in Mahāsena: *The Āgamodaya Samiti*, 1920. There is a Gujarati translation from Bhavnagar 1933. Also edited with the edition and translation of the *Sūtra* by M. C. Modi, Ahmedabad 1932. For further refs. cf. JRK p. 8. Peterson 4, 1894, p. iv, comments: "For the ascription of these commentaries, which are anonymous, see Weber I, p. 440-491 notes."
68. NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 276.
69. Peterson 4, 1894, p. iv.
70. First published in 1880 from Banaras (Śriyuta Rāya Dhānapatisiṃha Banadura ka Āgamasaṃgraha 3), again in 1918-20 in two volumes (AgSS 21-22, 1918-1920), reprinted in 1985 with lists of corrections; and still again by Muni Vallabhavijaya from Ahmedabad in 1938. Cf. also JRK p. 454. Ed. by Dharmacandravijaya. Delhi 1985; Bombay 2002.
71. Edited by Padmavijaya. Hastinapur, Meerut 1999. Also edited from Bhavnagar 1912, and in AgSS in 1919. Kapadia (GOS 105, p. xxviii, note 4) adds to the references an edition by R. K. Samstha from Ratlam in 1941.
72. Peterson 4, 1904, p. v.
73. Edited JAG 10, Bhavnagar 1912. Also edited by Caturvijayamuni in JAG 1913. It "consists of 139 Prākṛta Gāthās", says Vadekar, JRK p. 207.
74. Kapadia, v. 18, pp. 209-220. The work is published by

Balsubhai Khushalbhai, Ahmedabad.

75. NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 276. The work is edited in JAG 13, Bhavnagar 1913 with Ratnasimha's commentary, as well as in Agamodaya Samiti Series 8, Surat. See JRK p. 237 for manuscript citations.

76. Edited by Rāya Dhanapatisiṃha Bahādur, Nutana Samskrta Press, Calcutta 1876.

77. Peterson 4, 1896, p. 5.

78. Edited AgSS, 1920, says NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 276. Emeneau (#3930) reports that it is edited by Rai Bahādur Dhanapatisiṃha with a Hindi gloss by Vijaya Sādhu in Rāya Dhanapati Siṃha Bahāduraka Āgamasaṃgraha 11, Calcutta 1876 (mss. at Cleveland, Chicago) (=PK5011.V6. 1876). Wiles adds that it is also edited Calcutta 1919; Mahesana 1920; and Ahmedabad 1935. In addition, says Velankar, JRK p. 357, there is an edition in the Muktikamala Jaina Mohanamala, Baroda 1920 (OCLC34182830; Chicago, Harvard). Also edited by Hargovind Das in Sriman Muktikamala Jaina Mohamala 10, Palitana 1920.

79. NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 275: "Ms. citations at BORI D. XVII, 184; Weber 1824. Edited Calcutta 1880 and again in AgSS in 1916".

80. Sri Harsapuspamrta Jaina Granthamala 141, Santipuri, Saurashtra 1985. See also Weber II. p. 536 and Indian Antiquary 20, p. 367 ff.

81. Emeneau (#3922) reports that It has been published with a Hindi gloss by Vijayasādhu as Rāya Dhanapati Siṃha Bahāduraka Āgamasaṃgraha 6, Calcutta 1876. Also edited AgSS in 1919. Cf. JRK p. 147. Also edited in the Śrī Harṣapuṣpāmṛta Jaina Granthamālā, Shantipur 1987 (=BL1312.3): Also cf. P. Steinthal, Specimsn der Nayadharmakahā, Königliche Ak. zu Munster, Leipzig 1881.

82. Peterson 4, p. iv.

83. In 36 verses. Ed. JAG 13 with *Paramāṇu-* and *Pudgala-ṣaṭtriṃśikā* and Ratnasiṃha's commentary, Bhavnagar 1912; also AgSS 9, 1876.

84. BORI D. XVII. i. 111-3. NCC I, Revised Edition, pp. 275-276 NCC 12, p. 231 says it has been published in JAG, Bhavnagar in 1918.

85. Cites BORI D. XVII. i. 222-223. NCC I, Revised Edition p. 76.

86. NCC 12, p. 231. It has been published in JAG, Bhavnagar in 1918. Published by Nirnayasagara Press, Bombay in 1974 (editor: Caturvijaya) as JAG 62.

87. JRK p. 258.

88. Jainagranthavali p. 138;. Cf. JRK p. 401 for manuscript citations. C. D. Dalal in Pattan I, pp. 365, provides the final lines of this work.

89. Published in DJPS 41 Bhavnagar 1919.

90. NCC 13, 230 says: "comprising Bhagavatīsūtra VIII.9; ascribed to Abhayadevasūri'. Printed. with the commentary. of Vānararṣigaṇi, JAG 12, Bhavnagar 1912; AgSS 11, Surat.

91. Ed. by Vijaya Sādhu in DSA 7 (Emeneau #3924). Edited by A. F. Rudolf Hoernle in two volumes, BI 105, 1890, 1888. (Emeneau #3925) For quotations see Weber II. p. 484. For contents see Winternitz II. p. 303 ff. and Indian Antiquary 20, p. 18. The first head of Shraman Sangh, Reverend Acharya Samrat Shri Atmaram Ji M. has written a detailed commentary on *Upāsakadaśa* along with Sanskrit version and the literal meaning of each word. It has been published from Ludhiana (India) in 1964 A.D. (2021 V.) Also ed. Śrīyukta Rāya Dhanapatisiṃha Bahāduraka Āgamasaṃgraha 7, Calcutta 1876.

92. NCC 10, p. 295.

93. PK3794.D559 T525. Has an English Introduction.

94. Charpentier 1914, p. 54.

95. Edited with the rest of Śāntisūri's works in

Laghuprakaraṇasaṃgraha, Bombay 1925.

96. Edited with other works by Mahābodhivijaya in *Prakaraṇatrayī*. (Bombay 1989) as (B162.5.P74). Edited with *Samāyikasūtra*, Ahmedabad 1906. Edited with Ratnākara's commentary, Ahmedabad 1915. Edited in *Prakaraṇamālā* (Ahmedabad 1871).
97. Edited in *Laghuprakaraṇasaṃgraha*.
98. Edited in *Laghuprakraṇasaṃgraha*.
99. Piotr Balcerowicz, JEHPC, p. xxxix.
100. Edited with notes in Hindi by Dalsukh Malvania (294.408. Si64, no. 20). Also edited in PK3831.S2.N9 1949. The first has notes in Hindi. Also in The Pandit n.s. 36, 1914-39, 1917. Reprinted Banaras 1917. It consists of 55 *ślokas* divided into four chapters.
101. Edited in *Laguprakraraṇasaṃgraha*.
102. It is edited by Ānandasāgara, published Bombay 1916-17; Surat 1950.
103. Edited Bombay 1986 (= BL1356.S370).
104. Printed as JAG 30, Bhavnagar 1912, with commentary. Edited with Devendra Sūri's *Vṛtti*, Mumbai 1988. JRK cites an additional publication in *Jainadharmavidyāpraśāra*, Varga, Palitana, 1905-06.
105. NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 180
106. The work has also been edited in Hīralāl Jaina in Vidyabhavan Sanskrit Granthamala 107, 1964, as well as in B132.N8.M3, and, with a Hindi explanation, by R. C. Jain, Somagiri 1992 and by S. C. Vidyabhusana, BI 180, 1909.
107. In Ohira.
108. Edited by A. S. Sastri. MOLP 84, 1944.
109. *Jaina Sāhitya aur itihāsa*, pp. 335.
110. CHJ2, p. 208.
111. Edited by Pannalal Bakliwal, RJSM 5-9, 1904-1927; also edited JJG 30, 1977. Edited with Hindi commentaries by Nathuram Premi. Partly edited by Jayacandra in SJGM 15, 1918.
112. JRK p. 156 cites Jinagranthavali p. 88. Also see NCC VIII, 79.
113. NCC I, Revised Edition, p. 253 says "Digambara nyāya", provides the verses at the end, manuscript citations.
114. See JRK p. 72 for manuscript. citations.
115. NCC 3, p. 212 says the text of Gargarṣi's work with this commentary and another anonymous one is printed in JAG 52, Bhavnagar, Bombay 1915-1916.
116. Cf. Strasbourg #148 (pp. 207-208).
117. NCC 6, p. 360 and Peterson 4, p. xxvii.
118. According to Velankar at JRK p. 167.
119. HIL p. 206.
120. JRK p. 167 says it is in 226 *gāthās*, and has been published with Devabhadra's commentary by Hiralal Hamsaraja, Jamnagar 1913.
121. Ed. Luigi Suali, Bhavnagar 1912. See IOPB p. 1942. NCC 13, p. 50 says it is in 23 stanzas, composed in 1102 A.D.
122. According to JRK p. 123, who cites Jainagranthavali p. 110 and Pattan Cat. I. p. 302.
123. NCC 10, p. 221; p. 292.
124. NCC 2, p. 312.
125. Introduction to his edition of the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra* (1914, reprinted New Delhi 1980), pp. 56-57.
126. Chatterjee at CHJ2, p. 168.
127. JRK p. 271.
128. Writing about the manuscript numbered #1639 in BBRAS 1839,
129. In the Introduction to Vinayasagara.
130. It is published with the commentary of Siddhasena by Hiralal Hamsaraja, Jamnagar 1914 and also in the DLJP Series Nos. 58 and 64, Bombay 1922. Also cf. Vinayasagara. Also ed. by Vajrasenavijaya, Ahmedabad 1992.
131. NCC 10, p. 221 says this is printed in Atmavallabha

Granthavali, Ahmedabad 1937. Emeneau pp. 399-400 indicates this Prakrit work is translated by Hermann Jacobi in *Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Maharashtri. Zur Einfuhrung in das Studium des Prakrit* (Leipzig 1886), and that Jacobi's work is translated into English by John Jacob Meyer, London 1909. There are also English and Italian translations of sections of Jacobi's books; cf. Wiles, p. 163. There is also another German translation of extracts by R. Fick., *Eine jainistische Bearbeitung der Sagara-Sage,* Kiel 1889. It is published from Ahmedabad 1937 (reprinted 1982 (BL1313.9.U776 1980); Surat 1950- (perhaps incomplete) (=BL1313.9.U776736, 1970 (sic). It is edited with a Gujarati paraphrase by Bhimasena Manaka in Volume III of *Prakaraṇaratnākara* (Bombay 1876-78), and summarized in French by A. Guerinot in AMG 22, 1906. Wiles, p. 162, reports that Hermann Jacobi in his article "Über die Entstehung der Śvetāmbara und Digambara Sekten", ZDMG 38, 1884, 1-42, translates into German a section from the third *adhyāyana* of this work. Another part is translated in the same author's "Die Jaina Legende von dem Untergange Dvāravatī's und von dem Tode Krishna's", ZDMG 42, 1888, 493-529. Some of the narrative portions are translated in other works: cf. Wiles, pp. 162-163 for references. In the "Commentary" (pp. 275-409) to his edition of the *Uttaradhyāyanasūtra* (1914, reprinted New Delhi 1980), pp. 57-59) Jarl Charpentier provides us with a full picture of the nature and contents of this commentary, and compares it with the commentary of Śāntisūri (#71). And by consulting the extensive English footnotes to Charpentier's edition one can gather a fairly complete account of Devagupta's–and Śāntisūri's–comments on the text.

132. Alsdorf 1962.
133. CHJ2; p. 169.
134. NCC 7, 1973, p. 266.

135. Bhandarkar's Report, 1882-83, p. 47.
136. Peterson 4, p. xlii, quoting Klatt's Onomasticon. Bhandarkar's Report 1883-84, p. 152.
137. Edited by H. R. Kapadia. GOS 88.
138. PK 81. B5 no. 220. Edited by Luigi Suali, Calcutta 1930. Has English introduction. 139.Edited by Virasekhara Vijaya in *(Ṣaḍasīti) Caturkarmagranthaḥ* (Ahmedabad 1974, with four commentaries)(=BL2015.K3 J55 1974); has Hindi preface
139. Edited by Gokulcandra Jainain JPMJG 34, 1968.
140. Edited, with Yaśobhadra Sūri's *Ṭīkā* and Rāmadeva Gaṇi's *Vṛtti*, by Virasekhara vijaya in the work quoted in endnote 138.
140. Edited, with author's *Bhāṣya,* Yaśobhadra's *Īśvarapraṇītaṭīkā* and Rāmadeva Gaṇi's *Ṭīkā*, by Virasekhara-vijaya. Also edited from Pindavara 1974-75 (BL2015.K3.J550).
141. Kapadia 18, p. 211.
142. NCC VII, 268 cites Jainagranthavali p. 125.
143. JRK p. 184.
144. NCC 7, p. 269:
145. NCC 7, p. 268 locates manuscripts. Jainagranthavali, p. 163 and JRK p. 309 have more.
146. NCC 13, p. 106 gives manuscript citations. It has been printed with *Avacūri* in *Stotraratnākara*, Bombay 1914 . See IOPB 1938, p. 2609.
147. JRK p. 275.
148. (BL2015.K3.J56) = Edited with Rāmadeva Gaṇi's *Bhāṣya*. 1974, by Virasekhara Vijaya; has Hindi preface. Published with Dhaneśvara's commentary by the JDPS, Bhavnagar 1915, also Santipur, Saurashtra 1987.
149. The work is published as JAG 70, Bhavnagar 1921.
150. NCC 9, p. 226.
151. NCC I.5 cites mss. at Karkal 31(d), Moodbidri II. 208ḍ. Pannalal Bombay IV, p. 6.

152. *Ācārya Umāsvāti Vācaka's Praśamaratiprakaraṇa,* edited and translated by Yajneshwar S. Shastri (Ahmedabad: LDS 107, 1989), p. 7.
153. The work has been edited in S. D. Lalbhai Jaina Pustakoddhara Samstha Series 88, 1940.
154. NCC 2, p. 16 cites various manuscripts dating from between *saṃvat* 1172 and 1288. Kapadia 18, pp. 217-218 says it was "composed in *saṃvat* 1172" and that it is published, but doesn't say where.
155. NCC 8, p. 328.
156. NCC 13, p. 231 says this has been printed in JAG 52, Bombay 1915.
157. Cf. Jainagranthavali, p. 84 (by a Yasodeva, not necessarily this one).
158. (BJ1290. D4518).Two volumes, edited Bombay 1988. NCC 9, p. 220 also speaks of a printed text published as DLJP 73, Bombay 1927.
159. It has been edited by Caturvijayamuni in JAG, 1913. Mss. listed at JRK p. 208.
160. NCC 11, 1983, p. 75 cites manuscripts of this work, "in Prakrit, on 3 chapters only".
161. Consult BL1313.3 N58, 4 volumes.
162. Edited in two volumes Ladnam 1994 (=BL1312.3.B532.A1). Also BL1312.3.B536 B43 2002. 110 pages, with a three page Hindi introduction.
163. Cf. BL1313.6.A582 vol.1. Edited with commentaries of Haribhadrasūri and Maladhārin Hemacandrasūri in Prakrit by Jambuvijaya Muni. Bombay 1999 (=BL1373.6.A582 1999). Also edited by Anandasagar from Ratlam in 928. Also BL1313.6 A582. The Introduction says this is by an author of the "7th c. of *vikram* era".
164. Published in two parts from the Rsabhadeva Kesarimalji Svetambara Samstha, Ratlam 1928-29. Extracts were published in German, subsequently translated into English by Balbir in *Āvaśyaka-Studien* (1), Stuttgart 1993.

165. Edited by Ānandasāgara, Ratlam 1941.
166. Edited with Bhadrabāhu's *Niryukti* by Mohanlal M. Badami, Ratlam 1941.
167. Edited by Ānandasāgara, Ratlam 1933.
168. Edited Bombay 110; by Vijayajinendra Sunison, Santipur, Saurashtra 1991.
169. In 542 *gāthās*, acording to Velankar, JRK p. 51, who gives manuscript locations.
170. Edited by Puṇyavijaya, Prakrtagranthaparisad Series 9, 1966 (=PK5001.A2 P73, no. 9).
171. GOS 88, pp. xxix-xxx.
172. GOS 88, p. xvi.
173. NCC 2, pp. 186-187 and NCC 12, p. 4.
174. Cf. Jainagranthavali p. 208.
175. Also, ed. Pratāpa Vijaya Gaṇi, Baroda 1923-25. Two volumes.
176. GOS 105, p. xxiv.
177. Printed as DLJP 29, Bombay 1915. Cited in IOPB (1938), p. 578. Also published from Ahmedabad in 1965 and Madras in 1990.
178. He directs us to *Praśastisaṃgraha* pp. 1-3, and Ghosal, Intro. p. xlvii.
179. At CHJ2, p. 4.
180. In the Introduction to Ganadhara, p. 15.
181. Edited (BL1313.6.A582) with commentaries by Jinadāsagaṇi and Haribhadra. Emeneau (#3951) lists an edition with Gujarati commentary, published in DSA 44, Calcutta 1879, available at the University of Chicago Library. Edited by Ānandasāgara, Bombay 1915-16; AgSS, Bombay 1923; Patan 1939.
182. Ganadhara, pp. 16-17.
183. It is edited by Haragovinda Dāsa in YJG 25, 27-28, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 1911-. Also: edited by Rajendravijaya (in 3 parts, 1962-63), and edited and translated into Gujarati, Ahmedabad 1996, 2 volumes. Also edited by

Kumudayavijaya in DLP 53, 1920.
184. Edited by Śīlacandra in Sri Neminandana Granthamala 15, Ahmedabad 1994.
185. In Ganadhara, p. 16. The work with the commentary is published in AgSS 50, Bombay 1927. Also edited from Bombay in 1985.
186. NCC 2, p. 191 says: Published DLJP 58, 1920. Perhaps this is the same as DLJP 53, 1988, 1996. Also edited by Rajendravijaya, (PK5013.B5).
187. See JRK p. 370 for manuscript citations.
188. Adding "printed MDJG 21 (*Siddhāntasārādisaṃgraha*) Bombay 1923."
189. Cf. Mahopādhyāya Yaśovijaya's *Jaina Tarkabhāṣā* with translation and critical notices by Dayanand Bhargava (Delhi 1973), p. xvii.
190. In HIL pp. 198-200.
191. This has been printed in five volumes by Motilal Ladhaji, *Ārhatamataprabhākara* 4, Poona 1927-28. It was also edited from Varanasi in 1904.
192. NCC VII, 298 cites this text and gives manuscript citations.
193. Jaina Antiquary 8, 1942, pp. 87-88.
194. It is published in the Hemacandra Granthāvali, Patan (No. 17), 1928", according to Velankar, JRK p. 143.
195. JRK p. 275 cites a manuscript. at Bombay University ms. BS. No. 295 (New No. 2019).
196. Peterson 4, p. xxxv.
197. Wiley, pp. 107-10.
198. Edited by Lalchandra Bhagawandas Gandhi at GOS 37, 1967, pp. 28-66. Also ed. Jinaharisāgara Sūri, Surat 1946.
199. In Granoff/Shinohara.
200. Edited by L. B. Gandhi in GOS 37, 1967, pp. 1-27. See *Apabhraṃśa Sāhitya* pp. 289 and 361-3; also JRAS (1940) pp. 67-68. Also edited by Jinaharisāgara, Surat 1946.
201. NCC 7, p. 81 says it is printed with Jinakuśalasūri's *Vṛtti* and Labdhigaṇi's *Ṭippaṇaka* in Shri Jin Dattsuri Prachin

Pustakoddhar Fund Ser. no. 11, N. S. Press Bombay 1920. See IOPB 1938, p. 577. Also edited by Jinaharisagara Suri, Surat 1946.
202. Edited by Jinaharisāgara Sūri, Surat 1946.
203. JRK pp. 412-413, adding "it is published with the commentary of Jayasāgara by Hiralal Hamsaraj, Jamnagar, and also in the Jinadattasūri Bhandar Series (No. 9) Surat, 1918". The work is also edited by Jinaharisāgara Sūri, Surat 1946.
204. P. L. Vaidya's edition of the *Nyāyāvatāra* with Devabhadra's *Ṭippaṇa*, Bombay 1928, pp. 21-22
205. Balcerowicz 2000, Volume 1, p. xxxix.
206. Ibid., p. xxxix.
207. It has been edited by Jambuvijaya (B131.S33).
208. In *Vīrasamājagranthāratna* 3 (Ahmedabad 1923), citing IOPB. iii. p. 137 for the information.
209. Cf. Jainagranthavali p. 118.
210. On p. 99 of PK Intro, p. civ.
211. Edited by A. N. Upadhye as RJSM 23, first published in 1913, reprinted 1935, 1964 (=BL1316.K85.P7 1964, with an English Introduction). Also edited by Ratnacūḍā Mukhtar, Somagiri 1991, and by Manohāralāla Gupta, Bombay 1913.
212. At least one, in RJSM 24, 1919, (BL1375, S4, K86), an edition by Manohāralāla, contains a Hindi translation. Other editions are by Gajadharalāla Jaina, SJGM 3, 1914, and by Jayacandra Chavara Jaina, Pannalala 1974.
213. Edited by Luigi Suali, Calcutta 1940. Edited and translated into Hindi by Amrtlal Modi, Ahmedabad 1950; Bombay 1991 (BL1376.6.H3715).
214. BC25.C363 contains edition of this by Jinasasana Aradhan Drastr, Bombay vs. 2085 (or 2515?). Table of Contents, but without pagination.
215. Edited several times. (BL1376.6.H376); (PK5001.A2.P73, no. 10); (PK3794.C36) (=DLJP 113 in Gujarati).

216. It has been published with Devabhadra's commentary in DLJP 27, Bombay 1915, and also published in the same series 42, Bhavnagar, and by Bhimsi Manek in *Prakaraṇaratnākara* Volume IV (Bombay 1884-86)–see Guerinot's summary in French in AMG 22, 1906.) 217. Satya Ranjan Banerjee, *A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts* Danavijaya Gani, Agamodaya Samiti 1922, 1938 (BL1312.6.N57). Also edited by Pandita Visvanatha in Raya Dhanapati Sinha Bahaduraka Agamasamgraha 19-23, 1885. First published as edited by Visvanathaji from Benares in 1885. Also, there is an edition by A. S. Gopani and V. J. Chokshi from Ahmedabad 1934 which may contain a translation.
217.Banerjee 1987. Also edited by Pandita Visvanatha in Raya Dhanapati Sinha Bahaduraka Agamasamgraha 19-23, 1885. First published as edited by Visvanathaji from Benares in 1885. Also, there is an edition byA. S. Gopani and V. J. Chokshi from Ahmedabad 1934 which may contain a translation.
218.(BL H3218), two volumes.
219.Edited by
220. Dhruva, p. 14.
221. Ibid., p. xv.
222. Ibid., pp. xx-xxi.
223. Ibid., p. xvii.
224. Wiley, p. 95:
225. CHJ, pp. 172-173
226. P.K.Gode in JainaAntiquary 5, 1939, pp. 133-135, reprinted in SILH 1, 22-25.
227. Edited twice, once in Raya Dhanapati Singha Bahadura ka Jainagama Sangraha 14, Ahmedabad 1883. Also edited in JPU 50, 1919. Wiles, p. 112 says "14,000 *granthas*" (elsewhere he says "16,000"), says it is printed from Ahmedabad 1883, and from Bombay, AgSS 1919.
228. Edited JPU 19, 1913; Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabha,

Bhavnagar 1917; DLJP 17, Bombay 1913. Wiles says "8,000" *ślokas*.
229. Edited at least 4 times: (1) by Bhagavan Vijayasadhu, Calcutta 1878; (2) by Raya Dhanapati Simha Bahaduraka in *Āgamasaṃgraha* 45, 1880; by Devarddhigani, Gopipuri, Surat 1917 (Ch); (3) in DSA 44, 1879; and (4) AgSS 1924. Jambuvijaya summarizes the quotations from other works found in this one at WZKS 38, 1994, 389-401.
230. Banerji 1987
231.Edited JAG 50, (1) Jamnagar 1909; (2) from Bombay, 1919. Wiles says it has 18,850 *ślokas*. Also edited with the *Vṛtti* by P. A. Kothari, Mahasena 2000.
232. Wiles: "3750 *ślokas*." Edited Bhavnagar 1910, 1912, 1919.
233. Edited (1) by Pannyasadana Vijaya Gani, JAG Bhavnagar 1917; (2) Bombay 1920-21, 1987-88; by Vijaya Dharmasurisvara, Bombay 1987. (3) edited with *Vṛtti* by P. A. Kothari, Mahesana 2000.
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BBRAS = Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay Branch

Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta)

BORI = Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

BORI D. = *Descriptive Catalogue of the Government Collection of Manuscripts deposited in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.* 19 volumes. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1916-1962

BSPS = Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series

Charpentier 1914 = Introduction to (his edition of) *The Uttarādhyāyanasūtra, being the first mūlasūtra of the Śvetāmbara Jains.* Uppsala: K. W. Appelbergs 1914

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DLJP = Devacandra Lalbhai Jaina Pustakoddhara Samstha Fund Series

DSA = Raya Dhanapati Siṃha Bamaduraka Āgamasaṃgraha

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Indian Antiquary = Indian Antiquary

IOPB 1938 = India Office Printed Books 1938

JAG = Jaina Atmananda Grantharanamala. Bhavnagar, Bombay

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Jaina sahitya (aur) itihāsa = Nathuram Premi, *Jaina sāhitya aur itihāsa* (Bombay: Hindi Grantharatnakara, 1956)

JBBRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, Bombay Branch

JEHCP, see Balcerowicz 2000

JJG = Jivaraj Jaina Granthamala (Sholapur)

JPMJG = Jñāna-Pītha Mūrtidevī Jaina Granthamālā (Banaras)

JPU = Sheth Devchand Lalbhai JainaPustakoddhar Fund Series, Bombay

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LDSeries = Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series

Malayagiri = Edition of Malayagiri's *Prajñāpanasūtravṛtti* from Mehesana Agamodaya Samiti 1918-19. Reprinted 1988

MDJG = Manikcandra Digamba Jaina Granthamala

MOLP = Mysore Oriental Library Publications

NCC = *New Catalogus Catalogorum.: an alphabetical list of Sanskrit and alllied works and authors.* Edited by V. Raghavan, K. Kunjunni Raja et al. Madras: University of Madras Sanskrit Department 1919-

N. S. Press = Nirnaya Sagar Press

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WZKS = Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud (und Ost)asiens

YJG = Yasovijaya Jaina Granthamala

GLOSSARY-INDEX

The following Index attempts to provide a guide to references to names, titles and topis. It also indicates which Sanskrit words are likely to be translated by which English expressions, and vice versa. Page references in bold face indicate the primary citation of the author or work.

References to authors and works primarily treated in Volume Ten (the first Volume in this Encyclopedia on Jaina philosophy) are preceded by "X" followed by the number of that citation. References to authors and works are given by a number indicating th author's number in Volumes 14-15 followed by a serial number: thus e.g., "84/109". Though most dates of authors indicate s single year they merely represent an estimate of a date when the author may have been alive on the basis of whatever evidence can be found; they are not necessarily authoritative, and are provided mainly for the purpose of ordering the listing of authors and works.

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